Low-carbon transition pathways in the context of carbon-neutral: A quadrilateral evolutionary game analysis.

In the context of carbon-neutral, countries are urging a social-wide transition to decarbonization. However, the efficiency of this transition has not been as expected due to the game of benefits among relevant players. Here, we develop a quadrilateral evolutionary game model that highlights the complex interactions at a multi-player level, including producers, regulators, third-party certifiers, and consumers, in order to analyze evolutionary pathways and stable strategies. Our results suggest that: (1) there are significant correlations among the quadrilateral game players, and the benign interactions among them will effectively drive the social-wide low-carbon transition; (2) if consumers have higher low-carbon preferences, producers will be attracted to actively choose the low-carbon transition strategy, which may form a stable portfolio strategy; (3) proper interventions, such as reducing transition costs, increasing reputation loss, and raising consumers' whistle-blowing abilities, can help promote the systematic evolution to the low-carbon state; and (4) rent-seeking behavior between producers and third-party certifiers should be strongly monitored by regulators, and higher penalties can prevent their duty dereliction. These findings provide significant implications for policy-makers to make better-informed decisions about the social-wide low-carbon transition in the context of carbon-neutral. • The evolutionary game model on low-carbon transition is constructed. • Consumers' low-carbon preference is the priority factor of transition willingness. • Strong regulation can urge producers to transit into low-carbon production. • Higher penalties to avoid collusion, higher validity of low-carbon certificates. • Whistle-blowing behavior actively affects the evolutionary system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]