The rise of the shareholding state in Italy: A policy-oriented strategist or simply a shareholder? Evidence from the energy and banking sectors' privatizations.

• The shareholding state in Italy emerges following the partial privatizations of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the 1990s. • The literature finds that states retaining minority stakes in their former SOEs are unlikely to influence corporate strategies. • This paper suggests that state minority stakes may serve state interests. • The decision to retain majority or minority stakes depends on sectoral specificities. • It also depends on the influence that private shareholders may exercise on the board. The shareholding state in Italy emerges following the partial privatizations of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the 1990s. As today, it is still debated whether the Italian state is using its controlling stakes in former SOEs to pursue policy objectives, or if it is acting passively as other financial shareholders. The limited contributions in this field of study find that states retaining a minority stake are unlikely to influence corporate strategies, while the opposite occurs when a majority stake is held. This paper suggests that minority stakes may also serve state interests even if the company's statute does not envisage the state to play an active role. The issue is explored through a case study of the partial privatizations of CDP, in which the state retains a majority stake, and Eni, in which the state retains a minority (albeit predominant) stake, and that operate respectively in the banking and energy sectors. Their different level of financialization unveils the diversified strategies adopted by the Italian state to preserve national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]