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On the Adequacy of Attitude-Ascriptions.
- Source :
-
Filosofia UNISINOS . 2022, Vol. 23 Issue 2, p1-15. 15p. - Publication Year :
- 2022
-
Abstract
- Fregeans and Russellians defend different conceptions on the truth-conditions of reports of attitude ascriptions. Very often, they appeal to our intuitions and to pragmatic aspects to support their view. In this paper I propose a principle of adequacy of attitude-ascriptions. In the first section, I review the old puzzle concerning the failure of the principle of substitution salva veritate in attitude ascriptions. In the second section, I present my principle, which is based on the claim that by choosing a designator for an attitude-ascription a competent speaker is usually oriented by her supposition of the hearer's epistemic state concerning the referent. In section 3, I apply my conception to some traditional tricky examples of attitude ascriptions in the literature. In section 4, I argue that even in non-standard situations (e.g. context of irony) a competent speaker must take into account the hearer's epistemic state. Then, in the fifth section I suggest a consequence of my proposal for the discussion on exportation. Finally, in the concluding remarks I sketch some thoughts about the possibility of extending my pragmatic proposal to a semantic account of the truth-conditions of attitude-ascriptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *ATTITUDE (Psychology)
*CONCEPTION
*LITERATURE
*LECTURERS
*SEMANTICS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 15195023
- Volume :
- 23
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Filosofia UNISINOS
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 158451705
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.232.02