Impact of cyber attacks on distributed compressive sensing based state estimation in power distribution grids.

Modern power distribution grids suffer from multiple vulnerabilities due to the tight integration between the physical system and the cyber infrastructure. Sophisticated and malicious cyber attacks continue to adversely impact the grid operation leading to performance degradation, service interruption, and grid failure. State estimation plays an essential role in grid monitoring and advancing cyber-attack situational awareness. In this regard, this paper first proposes a distributed compressive sensing (CS) state estimation approach for an unobservable distribution grid. The proposed distributed CS approach divides the distribution grid into sub-areas to perform local state estimation. Then an alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) based iterative information exchange among neighboring areas is employed to complete the estimation process. In this estimation process, the impact of loss of measurement data, false data injection (FDI), replay, and neighborhood cyber-attacks is analyzed. Extensive simulations are performed on the IEEE 37-bus and IEEE 123-bus standard networks to demonstrate the algorithm's robustness to the aforementioned cyber-attacks. A quantitative analysis of computational complexity and simulation time of the distributed CS based approach is also presented. • Compressive sensing (CS) based distributed state estimation for distribution grids. • ADMM based iterative information exchange among neighbors is proposed. • Modeled loss of measurements, FDI, replay, and neighborhood cyberattacks. • The impact of cyber-attacks on the CS-based distributed SE approach is analyzed. • Presents a quantitative analysis of computational complexity and simulation time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]