Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning.

According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to φ is a premise in a pattern of sound reasoning leading to the conclusion to φ. But how should the Reasoning View account for reasons that are outweighed? One very promising proposal is to appeal to defeasible reasoning. On this proposal, when a reason is outweighed, the associated pattern of sound reasoning is defeated. Both Jonathan Way and Sam Asarnow have recently developed this idea in different ways. I argue that this appeal to defeasible reasoning faces a challenge, since reasons can be both outweighed and disabled. Way's view generates good predictions about outweighed reasons, but not about disabled reasons. Asarnow's view generates good predictions about disabled reasons, but not about outweighed reasons. We want a version of the Reasoning View that can generate good predictions about both. I present a version of the Reasoning View that can meet the challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]