A game-theory analysis of electric vehicle adoption in Beijing under license plate control policy.

To reduce traffic congestion and protect the environment, license plate control (LPC) policy has been implemented in Beijing since 2011. In 2019, 100,000 vehicle license plates were distributed, including 60,000 for electric vehicles (EVs) and 40,000 for gasoline vehicle (GVs). However, whether the current license plate allocation is optimal from a social welfare maximization perspective remains unclear. This paper proposes a two-level Stackelberg game, which portrays the interaction between vehicle applicants and the government to quantify the optimal number of EV license plates under the LPC policy in Beijing. The equilibrium number of EV license plates derived from the Stackelberg model is 58,800, which could increase the social welfare by 0.38%. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to illustrate the impact of important influential factors — total license plate quota, vehicle rental fee, and energy price — on EV adoption. The LPC policy under COVID-19 is also studied through a scenario analysis. If the government additionally increases the total quota by 20,000, 24% could be allocated to GV and 76% to EV. One third reduction of the current vehicle rental fee could increase EV license plates by 10.5%. In terms of energy prices, when gasoline price is low, reducing electricity prices could contribute to EV adoption significantly, while that effect tapers off as gasoline prices increase. • The optimal license plate allocation between EVs and GVs in Beijing is analyzed. • A Stackelberg game is proposed to model stakeholders' interaction under LPC policy. • The optimal license plate allocation policy under COVID-19 is also studied. • One third reduction of vehicle rental fee could increase EV adoption by 10.5%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]