DIE US-MARINE IM LICHT DES 11. SEPTEMBER 2001.

For the United States Navy, too, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 marked a turning point. On a grim level of tragic loss of life, one third of the victims in the Pentagon that day were Navy personnel. Institutionally, the sea-going military service needed to cope with the emerging American policy focus on what came to be known as small wars. Under the umbrella of the "Global War on Terrorism", its focus areas stretched from the Afghan mountains to the Iraqi desert - and much further. These developments were very land-centric, relying on Army, Air Force, and transformed Marine Corps units on the most part. In the public and political eye, the Navy risked being relegated to only a supporting function in these campaigns, despite evidence to the contrary. Thus, strategically the Navy set out to use 9/11 and its aftermath to re-fashion its sense of self. Together with the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps, it produced a maritime strategy in 2007 that underlined the broad diplomatic, economic, and security/defense missions of seapower. Maritime terrorism and the role of naval forces against terrorists were incorporated, fully aware that navies could counter terrorism but are not procured for just that. The Navy had experienced its own prelude to 9/11 in the Yemini port of Aden in 2000. That day's attack on the destroyer USS COLE by terrorists preempted September 11 by less than a year. With the "Global War on Terrorism" and its costly land wars in Asia closing down and being replaced by other challenges in the past decade, the US Navy is once again shifting its focus to provide tools to American policy-makers. For the US Navy, the post-9/11 developments will have to be shed in favor of China, the emerging peer competitor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]