Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information.

The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann's (J Math Econ 1:67–96, 1974, https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8) correlated equilibrium concept for complete information games to the case of incomplete information. This paper shows that this solution concept has the following property: for the class of incomplete information games with compact metric type and action spaces, and with payoff functions jointly measurable and continuous in actions, limits of Bayes-Nash equilibria of finite approximations to an infinite game are communication equilibria (and, in general, not Bayes-Nash equilibria) of the limit game. Stinchcombe's (J Econ Theory 146:638–655, 2011b, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.006) extension of Aumann's (J Math Econ 1:67–96, 1974, https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8) solution concept to the case of incomplete information fails to satisfy this condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]