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Reliabilism's Memory Loss.

Authors :
Frise, Matthew
Source :
Philosophical Quarterly. Jul2021, Vol. 71 Issue 3, p565-585. 21p.
Publication Year :
2021

Abstract

Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it. Process reliabilism explains the justification of beliefs by way of the reliability of the processes they result from. Some advocates of reliabilism deny various forms of generativism. Other reliabilists reject or remain neutral about only the more extreme forms. I argue that an extreme form of generativism follows from reliabilism. This result weakens a long-standing argument for reliabilism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
00318094
Volume :
71
Issue :
3
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
Philosophical Quarterly
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
151011730
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa057