Is There a 'Social' Brain? Implementations and Algorithms.

A fundamental question in psychology and neuroscience is the extent to which cognitive and neural processes are specialised for social behaviour, or are shared with other 'non-social' cognitive, perceptual, and motor faculties. Here we apply the influential framework of Marr (1982) across research in humans, monkeys, and rodents to propose that information processing can be understood as 'social' or 'non-social' at different levels. We argue that processes can be socially specialised at the implementational and/or the algorithmic level, and that changing the goal of social behaviour can also change social specificity. This framework could provide important new insights into the nature of social behaviour across species, facilitate greater integration, and inspire novel theoretical and empirical approaches. A central question in psychology and neuroscience is the extent to which social behaviour is subserved by dedicated processes or systems that are 'socially specific' or shared with other 'non-social' cognitive, perceptual, and motor faculties. We suggest that a process can be socially specific at different levels of explanation. This approach could help to clarify the role of mirror neurons in social contexts and whether social learning is uniquely 'social'. Experimental design should be guided by an appreciation that social specificity is possible at different levels. Examining social behaviour across species can give unique clues about different implementations and algorithms. For example, converging evidence highlights the anterior cingulate gyrus as crucial for processing social implementations, and that 'theory of mind' is a putative social algorithm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]