The research on demand information sharing strategy and game structure decision in online platform selling model.

This paper studies the demand forecast information sharing strategy and game structure decision in online platform selling model. In this paper, we consider an online platform-selling model consisting of an e-retailer, an e-commerce platform and a third-party logistics. There are two important assumptions: 1) the e-retailer owns the private demand forecast information and can choose to share with the e-platform, the 3PL, or both; 2) the e-commerce platform could determine the game structure. Based on these, we investigate the e-retailer's optimal information sharing strategies under different game structures and then analyze the e-platform's optimal game structure selections under different information sharing strategies. Our results show that, 1) when the service efficiency of the e-commerce platform is weak, the equilibrium strategy of e-retailer is not sharing the information, and that of e-commerce platform is making decisions before 3PL. 2) When the service efficiency of the e-commerce platform is strong, or when the service efficiency of the e-commerce platform is moderate and the accuracy of the demand forecast is high, the equilibrium strategy of e-retailer is sharing the information with the e-commerce platform, and that of e-commerce platform is making decisions after 3PL. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]