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Bounds for the Nakamura number.

Authors :
Freixas, Josep
Kurz, Sascha
Source :
Social Choice & Welfare. Apr2019, Vol. 52 Issue 4, p607-634. 28p.
Publication Year :
2019

Abstract

The Nakamura number is an appropriate invariant of a simple game to study the existence of social equilibria and the possibility of cycles. For symmetric (quota) games its number can be obtained by an easy formula. For some subclasses of simple games the corresponding Nakamura number has also been characterized. However, in general, not much is known about lower and upper bounds depending on invariants of simple, complete or weighted games. Here, we survey such results and highlight connections with other game theoretic concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
01761714
Volume :
52
Issue :
4
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
Social Choice & Welfare
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
135891212
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1164-y