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LOCATING INVESTMENT ASYMMETRIES AND OPTIMAL DETERRENCE IN THE MASS TORT CLASS ACTION.
- Source :
-
Harvard Law Review . Jun2004, Vol. 117 Issue 8, p2665-2683. 19p. - Publication Year :
- 2004
-
Abstract
- Analyzes whether the text and underlying theory of Rule 23(b)(3), which certified mass tort class actions, are consistent with judicial consideration of the systemic investment disadvantages that mass tort plaintiffs tend to face in the conventional separate action process. Benefits of considering investment asymmetries and optimal deterrence; Consideration of investment asymmetries in the text of Rule 23(b)(3); Proposal for structuring judicial consideration of investment asymmetries as part of the Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action certification process.
- Subjects :
- *TORTS
*CLASS actions
*ACTIONS & defenses (Law)
*CIVIL procedure
*PARTIES to actions
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 0017811X
- Volume :
- 117
- Issue :
- 8
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Harvard Law Review
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 13466629
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.2307/4093410