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LOCATING INVESTMENT ASYMMETRIES AND OPTIMAL DETERRENCE IN THE MASS TORT CLASS ACTION.

Source :
Harvard Law Review. Jun2004, Vol. 117 Issue 8, p2665-2683. 19p.
Publication Year :
2004

Abstract

Analyzes whether the text and underlying theory of Rule 23(b)(3), which certified mass tort class actions, are consistent with judicial consideration of the systemic investment disadvantages that mass tort plaintiffs tend to face in the conventional separate action process. Benefits of considering investment asymmetries and optimal deterrence; Consideration of investment asymmetries in the text of Rule 23(b)(3); Proposal for structuring judicial consideration of investment asymmetries as part of the Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action certification process.

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
0017811X
Volume :
117
Issue :
8
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
Harvard Law Review
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
13466629
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.2307/4093410