¿Por qué los beneficios contenidos en la Ley 1340 de 2009 no constituyen un incentivo suficiente para generar la delación de conductas restrictivas de la competencia?

From an exercise of economic analysis of Article 14 of Law 1340 of 2009, through which incentives are established for the delation of anti-competitive practices, this article demonstrates that the benefits contained in the aforementioned norm do not constitute a sufficient incentive to generate the accusation of restrictive behaviors of the competition. The analysis presented has its origins in three hypotheses constructed from principles, theories, and economic concepts: (i) if there is an ongoing investigation by the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce and the entity, at the time of reaching the discharges, has sufficient evidence to impose the fine contained in the legal system, then there will be only sufficient incentive for the first reporter, (ii) if there is an ongoing investigation by the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce and the entity, at the time of reaching the discharges, does not have enough evidence to impose the fine, then the economic agent will not disclose or collaborate with the investigation in any way and (iii) if there is no ongoing investigation by the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce, then no agent economic will betray or confess its participation in a restrictive practice of competition. From the above it is concluded that in any case only in the event that there is an ongoing investigation for restrictive practices of competition, the first informer, and only this one, will be encouraged to confess. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]