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Found Guilty by Association: In Defence of the Quinean Criterion.
- Source :
-
Ratio . Mar2018, Vol. 31 Issue 1, p37-56. 20p. - Publication Year :
- 2018
-
Abstract
- Abstract: Much recent work in metaontology challenges the so‐called ‘Quinean tradition’ in metaphysics. Especially prominently, Amie Thomasson argues for a highly permissive ontology over ontologies which eliminate many entities. I am concerned with disputing not her ontological claim, but the methodology behind her rejection of eliminativism – I focus on ordinary objects. Thomasson thinks that by endorsing the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment eliminativism goes wrong; a theory eschewing quantification over a kind may nonetheless be committed to its existence. I argue that, contrary to Thomasson's claims, we should retain the Quinean criterion. Her arguments show that many eliminativist positions are flawed, but their flaws lie elsewhere: the Quinean criterion is innocent. Showing why reveals the importance of pragmatism in ontology. In §1 I compare Thomasson's account and the eliminativist views to which it stands in opposition. In §2 I re‐construct Thomasson's reasons for rejecting the Quinean criterion. In §3 I defend the Quinean criterion, showing that the eliminativists’ flaws are not consequences of applying the Quinean criterion, before explaining the criterion's importance when properly understood. I conclude that Thomasson, though right to criticise the methodology of ordinary‐object eliminativists, is wrong to identify the Quinean criterion as the source of their mistake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00340006
- Volume :
- 31
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Ratio
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 127847198
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12150