Irrationalizing the rational choice model of voting: The moderating effects of partisanship on turnout decisions in Western and postcommunist democracies.

The rational choice model of voting has been criticized for the fact that citizens expecting greater costs than the benefits associated with voting still turn out. This article focuses on the function of partisanship by which the effect of the rational calculation on voting is moderated. Previous studies have only tested the effect of partisanship on turnout additively failing to explore its interactions with the costs and benefits of voting. My multilevel analyses using the CSES data show that partisanship significantly moderates the effects of the information costs and intrinsic benefits of voting on turnout. These results, however, are not found in the postcommunist new democracies with unstable party systems hindering partisanship from serving as a political cue and from providing an expressive satisfaction of voting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]