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Convergence of strong time-consistent payment schemes in dynamic games.
- Source :
-
Applied Mathematics & Computation . Dec2017, Vol. 315, p96-112. 17p. - Publication Year :
- 2017
-
Abstract
- The problem of consistency of a solution over time remains an important issue in cooperative dynamic games. Payoffs to players prescribed by an inconsistent solution may not be achievable since such a solution is extremely sensitive to its revision in the course of a game developing along an agreed upon cooperative behavior. The paper proposes a strong time-consistent payment scheme which is stable to a revision of cooperative set solutions, e.g., the core. Using a linear transformation of the solution, it becomes possible to obtain non-negative payments to players. In the paper, we also deal with a limit linear transformation of the solution whose convergence is proved. Developing a non-negative strong time-consistent payment scheme in a closed form, we guarantee that the solution supported by the scheme will not be revised over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00963003
- Volume :
- 315
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Applied Mathematics & Computation
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 125022698
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2017.07.030