Two-period pricing and decision strategies in a two-echelon supply chain under price-dependent demand.

This paper presents a two-period supply chain model which is comprised of one manufacturer and one retailer who are involved in trading a single product. The demand rate in each period is dependent on the selling prices of the current period and the previous period. We assume that the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader and declares wholesale price(s) to the retailer who follows the manufacturer’s decision and sets his selling prices for two consecutive periods. The manufacturer adopts one of the two pricing options: (1) setting the same wholesale price to both the selling periods (2) setting different wholesale prices to two different selling periods. Based on these pricing options, we develop four decision strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer and compare them. For a numerical example, we study the effects of these decision strategies on the optimal results of the supply chain. Further, we graphically analyze under what circumstances a particular decision strategy plays a dominant role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]