Paying for Multilateralism: How the Domestic Demand for Shapes the International Supply of American Coalition Uses of Force.

Recent scholarship has found that domestic politics affects foreign aid provision and that the US uses foreign aid to attract coalition partners in its uses of force abroad. The goal of this paper is to synthesize these two research agendas. It argues that under certain conditions the US pays' for multilateralism by rewarding states for being coalition partners. These conditions are rooted in American domestic politics. When different parties control the executive and legislative branches of the US government, the US president is under greater pressure to demonstrate that actions taken abroad do not serve narrow interests. This is because divided government can hinder the viability of the mission by posing added constraints on the use of force. One mechanism for making use of force more credible is to gain international support. To generate that international support, the US political leadership makes coalition participation an attractive option for states by such positive inducements as foreign aid. Though any provision of foreign assistance is ultimately subject to the approval of Congress, the President still is able to overcome these concerns in using these instruments. This is especially true for the provision of military grants because Congress members do not have electoral incentives to vote against legislation that produces very uncertain distribution outcomes. This paper thus shows that American domestic politics matters for the level of aid weaker states are able to gain as coalition members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]