On Knowing How I Feel About That-A Process-Reliabilist Approach.

Human subjects seem to have a type of introspective access to their mental states that allows them to immediately judge the types and intensities of their occurrent emotions, as well as what those emotions are about or 'directed at'. Such judgments manifest what I call 'emotion-direction beliefs', which, if reliably produced, may constitute emotion-direction knowledge. Many psychologists have argued that the 'directed emotions' such beliefs represent have a componential structure, one that includes feelings of emotional responses and related but independent representations of what those feelings are about. I argue that such componentiality may help to explain how emotion-direction knowledge is achievable. I begin by developing a hybrid view of introspection that combines David Chalmers' phenomenal realism with Alvin Goldman's 'partial redeployment' account of meta-belief content. I then provide a process-reliabilist account of introspectively gained emotion-direction knowledge that outlines the minimum conditions of reliably forming emotion-direction beliefs, and specifies several ways in which the warrant of such beliefs could be defeated by relevant counterfactual alternatives. The overall account suggests how distinct introspective processes might be epistemically synergistic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]