A natureza "inatural" da razão em Kant.

Reflecting upon the "nature" of reason in Kant means, first of all, reflecting upon something entirely "unnatural", that is something which, strictly speaking, does not belong to what, in Kant's view, represents "the nature". Basing on the well-known kantian definition according to which "nature" means "the existence of things as determined by universal laws" (Prol., § 14), it is evident that -- notwithstanding the possibility or even the necessity of considering it the source of such universal laws -- reason as such does not belong to the "things" whose "existence" can be determined by those laws. Belonging to such kind of nature reason would turn an object of possible empirical knowledge and, accordingly, have to correspond to something in the world of phenomena -- what obviously is not the case. Consequently, saying that the nature of reason is unnatural implies that reason not can be an object of possible knowledge or, in other words, that it merely represents an empty conception without any "real signification". -- My paper aims at analyzing this paradoxical situation and intends to point out, at least, one possible approach in order to understand the peculiar character of what can signify "nature of reason" within the scope of the kantian transcendental system on the whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]