“Jogo livre” e a “sensificação de ideias” na Crítica do juízo de Kant.

In the discussion of the systematic relation between the various theorems explained in the First Part of Critique of Judgment, the question of the connection of aesthetic judgment with e certain type of its possible objects, that is: with the works of art, is very important, but not sufficiently cleared up by Kant. In spite of the fact that – owing to the determination of the judgment of taste on the basis of a genuinely “aesthetic” (receptive) activity, i.e. determined by a free play of the cognitive faculties – any form of objective orientation remains strictly ruled out, the introduction of the (productive) figure of “aesthetic idea”, in the context of the subsequent “art of genius”, seems to undermine this former principle, since with that enters a new constitutive element, namely the reason, which was explicitly excluded in the initial discussion of the activity of aesthetic reflection., characterized as a free play between understanding and imagination only. – In this paper, my aim is to analyze this problematic constellation and try to find a way to reconcile the two systematic elements, apparently inconsistent, based on Kant´s later assertion (§60) that taste, “in fact”, is no more than “a capacity for judgment with regard to the sensualization of moral ideas, by means of a certain analogy of reflection”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]