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Dictators don't compete: autocracy, democracy, and tax competition.

Authors :
Genschel, Philipp
Lierse, Hanna
Seelkopf, Laura
Source :
Review of International Political Economy. Apr2016, Vol. 23 Issue 2, p290-315. 26p.
Publication Year :
2016

Abstract

It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries worldwide are non-democratic. We explain theoretically why autocracies are less likely to adjust to competitive constraints and test our argument empirically against data on the corporate tax policy of 99 countries from 1999 to 2011. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
09692290
Volume :
23
Issue :
2
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
Review of International Political Economy
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
116263705
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1152995