Back to Search
Start Over
Intellectual Hope as Convenient Friction.
- Source :
-
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society . Winter2015, Vol. 51 Issue 4, p444-462. 19p. - Publication Year :
- 2015
-
Abstract
- In this paper, I examine recent treatments of Peircean truth in terms of regulative principles or intellectual hopes, drawing on work by Christopher Hookway, Cheryl Misak, and Andrew Howat. In doing this I show that recent arguments by Huw Price that Peirce's account cannot provide an effective truth norm do not apply when Peircean truth is construed as a regulative assumption on inquiry. I conclude by comparing the 'anthropological' sensibilities of Price's account of truth as convenient friction, and Peirce's account of truth as a regulative assumption or intellectual hope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *QUIETISM
*PRAGMATISM
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00091774
- Volume :
- 51
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 115099026
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.51.4.04