Escape From Jekyll Island: Temporality, Presidential Brokerage, and Reform.

Why do potentially transformative U.S. reforms often prove incoherent and incremental? In the U.S., the cultural and institutional barriers to enacting major reforms are high. After reforms are enacted, their opponents retain many institutional pathways to challenge reforms. This paper focuses on presidents in emergent partisan regimes as uniquely-positioned actors who broker design compromises throughout the reform process. During presidential campaigns, opposition candidates have incentives to promise transformative reforms which offer a decisive break from the past. Upon entering the legislative arena, however, presidents' incentives shift toward supporting moderating design compromises. Finally, as reforms are implemented, presidents face intense demands to make administrative decisions which appease the business community. Through the layering of design compromises, reforms are watered down and made less coherent. This paper explores this dynamic by analyzing the design and implementation of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act. Existing scholarship explains the Federal Reserve System's design through reference to discrete critical junctures: a clandestine retreat at a Georgia resort; a broad congressional compromise; or a partisan-controlled implementation process. These explanations each describe the emergence of a more coherent "Fed" than the fragmented organization which began operations in 1914. To understand why potentially transformative reforms often disappoint, one must account for the shifting pressures presidents encounter when guiding reforms to fruition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]