The Executive & the Environment: An Examination of the Antiquities Act from 1929-2000 in the United States.

For the last two decades, scholars have explored the importance of executive orders as a powerful presidential unilateral power (Mayer 2001, Moe and Howell 1999, Deering and Maltzman 1999, Krause and Cohen 1997, Ragsdale and Theis 1997, Shull and Gomez 1997). These studies fall into two camps. The proponents of the strategic model include scholars like Richard Nathan and Phillip Cooper. In his pivotal study the Administrative Presidency, Nathan argues that presidents strategically use unilateral powers when they are weak. When presidents have limited resources and face a hostile political environment they can compensate their weakness by using an administrative strategy. The enhancement camp argues that presidents use executive orders to enhance policy in conjunction with Congress in times of strong congressional support (Shull and Gomez 1997, Krause and Cohen 1997). Presidents can enhance their stature with the use of unilateral powers when they have strong resources and a cooperative political environment. The same debate can be applied to other unilateral powers. This paper will examine these competing theories by extending the study of unilateral powers to presidential proclamations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]