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Questions and analyses centered on race have become more prominent in philosophy. By employing a ‘critical philosophy of race’, thinkers become enabled to address how race and racism continue to operate in subtle and unintended ways, including within concepts, theories, principles, practices, and methodologies otherwise purported to be race-neutral. Yet, North American sports philosophy provides few examples of work that grapples with race, racism, or theories of race. In this essay, I ask why and conclude that the shortage of discussions that include explicit references to race or ethnicity in North American sport philosophy is due to the dominance and normalization of white epistemologies – white ways of experiencing, seeing, and knowing the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

J.R.R. Tolkien's legendarium resonates with contemporary environmental debates, highlighting the balance between technology and ecology, especially within Elven societies. Using Rosi Braidotti's sense of posthumanism, this paper analyses the technologic natures of the three Elven communities in Middle-earth: the Sindar, Nandor, and Noldor. Contrary to prevailing ecocritical beliefs that Elves depict a simplistic relationship with nature, this research posits that their profound bond stems from advanced technology, understood as either craftmanship or magic, promoting symbiotic Earth interactions in line with techno-optimistic yet symbiotic views of environmentalism. Challenging the idea that all Elven communities share a uniform relationship with Arda, the study also emphasises distinctions in their technological and environmental alignments within Tolkien's earlier works, especially The Silmarillion. Drawing on Chinese philosopher Yuk Hui's concept of “cosmotechnics”, the paper suggests the Sindar and Nandor adopt an eco-centric posthumanist approach, creating cities synergized with controlled forests, while the Noldor prioritise a harmonious relationship between innovative technology and nature. The study culminates by analysing the convergence of these varied cosmotechnics in Caras Galadhon, Lothlórien's capital. This research provides a fresh perspective on Tolkien's portrayal of technology and ecology, emphasising the intricate and multifaceted nature of his Elven societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I consider diffractive approaches to participant debriefing. In other words, I consider how the feminist relational materialist philosopher Karen Barad's concept of diffraction can be utilised as an innovative approach to participant debriefing. I start this article by explaining how feminist relational materialist philosophers have troubled the philosophical assumptions underpinning traditional approaches to participant debriefing. I then consider how feminist relational materialism has contributed to post-qualitative approaches to research which involve utilising philosophical concepts as methods. Adopting a post-qualitative approach, I go on to present Karen Barad's concept of diffraction as a participant debriefing method that involves participants, researchers and non-humans contributing to research projects becoming different. As part of this, I consider diffractive debriefing in the context of a research project with 21 school pupils in the Southwest of England that involved young people telling stories about menstruation in their everyday lives. In doing so, I describe the diffractive debriefing workshops that were part of such a project. I then draw on such workshops to describe three general principles that I followed when developing a diffractive approach to participant debriefing. The general principles I discuss are: (1) Researchers should avoid instructing participants about what happened in a research project (2) Diffractive debriefing should not finalise what a research project can become and (3) Diffractive debriefing involves an approach to ethics that foregrounds response-ability. I finish the article by considering how diffractive debriefing could be part of research projects beyond my research project which focused on young people and their menstruation stories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Maine de Biran (1766–1824) was one of the most influential philosophers in France during the nineteenth century, being the principal inspiration for French spiritualism and French reflexive philosophy. He was also a significant Freemason. This article offers a translation of Biran's two surviving Freemasonry Speeches , delivered c. 1810, and an introduction to Biran's Freemasonry from the perspective of his philosophical work. The introduction gives a timeline of Biran's Freemasonry and an overview of the text of the Speeches. It then considers some principal themes in francophone Freemasonic culture of the Restoration, especially the practice of ritualized introspection, before moving onto compare, briefly, the content of the Speeches to the main philosophical essay by Biran with which the Speeches is contemporaneous. Based on this evidence, the introduction makes suggestions regarding the role played by Freemasonry in the development of French spiritualism, and indicates trajectories for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the concept of happiness in the work of Julien Offray de La Mettrie Anti-Seneca or Discourse on Happiness (2010). Before exploring the term happiness, it is essential to answer the question: what does the French philosopher understand by being human? To fulfill this purpose, in the first chapter, the idea of the human body, understood as an organic machine, will be analyzed. In the second chapter, we will investigate the physical damage or diseases that can affect the machine or human body. In the third part, we will explore the concept of happiness, understood as carnal pleasure, voluptuousness and organic or arterial happiness. In the fourth chapter, the different ways to achieve a happy life will be examined. As a conclusion, it can be affirmed that happiness is, according to La Mettrie, the result of the organization or composition of the human body; therefore, the individual, when acting according to his nature, must be exempt from recrimination or ethical judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT In this article, we discuss the role that ‘true preferences’ can and should play in discussions on the possibility and desirability of paternalist nudges. Critics have claimed that such preferences do not exist, cannot be known reliably by third parties, and cannot justify whether and how to nudge people. In this article, we argue that these objections undermine the extent to which philosophers and laypeople can make sense of autonomy and authenticity. We aim to identify what kinds of preferences can plausibly be labelled ‘true’ and how that impacts discussions on the ethics of paternalist nudging. We analyse what ‘true preferences’ can mean, not for Econs, but for Humans, and argue, more specifically, that some of our existing preferences have special status. In addition, we argue that satisfying them is good for individuals and that nudgers should seek to overcome the epistemic challenges of discovering their content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will argue for two interrelated theses. First, if we take phenomenological psychopathology seriously, and want to understand what it is like to undergo various psychopathological experiences, we cannot treat madpeople's testimony as mere data for sane clinicians, philosophers, and other scholars to analyze and interpret. Madpeople must be involved with analysis an interpretation too. Second, sane clinicians and scholars must open their minds to the possibility that there may be experiences that other people have, which they nevertheless cannot conceive of. I look at influential texts in which philosophers attempt to analyze and understand depersonalization and thought insertion. They go astray because they keep using their own powers of conceivability as a guide to what is or is not humanly possible to experience. Several experiences labeled inconceivable and therefore impossible by these philosophers, are experiences I have had myself. Philosophers and others would be less likely to make this mistake if they would converse and collaborate more with the madpeople concerned. When this is not feasible, they should nevertheless strive to keep an open mind. Fantastical fiction may have a role to play here, by showing how bizarre experiences may nevertheless be prima facie conceivable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the non-human turn in justice theory remains in its infancy, several projects have emerged, including Earth system justice, multispecies justice, and planetary justice. Crucially, candidate theories must provide convincing responses to the who, what, and how of justice. The question of who can prove particularly challenging, as philosophers continue to debate the moral relevance of properties of entities or the relations between them. Scholars of environmental politics seeking to develop more-than-human justice theories must carefully attend to issues inherent in this debate, including conceptual inconsistencies. Recent work by Winter and Schlosberg advancing a materialist perspective on multispecies and planetary justice demonstrates the difficult task of participating in this conversation, as evidenced by their application of the term 'subjects of justice.' In this brief essay, I identify three flaws in their use of this phrase and explain why the treatment of subjects matters to justice theory in the Anthropocene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to present a way to foster moral growth through Søren Kierkegaard's work The Sickness Unto Death as a tool capable of developing moral sensitivity and judgment. After discussing the need for this topic in the education of today's youth, the thought of Martha Nussbaum will be introduced as the foundation for my proposal, justifying the ethical potential inherent in narrative. This potential is abundantly reflected in Kierkegaard's work. From his unique existential style, the Danish philosopher addresses the authenticity of the self and of one's own existence to achieve the true constitution of oneself. The various forms of despair that the author explores are analyzed, with excerpts from the work highlighting his mastery and subtlety in reflecting the complexity and dynamism inherent in human interiority. This provides the reader with the opportunity to reflect on their ethical and existential state from a Kierkegaardian perspective, recognizing in it the universal aspects of the human condition that great authors throughout history have conveyed through their works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers hold there are genuine cases of culpable ignorance. This paper argues that there are conditions that can render knowledge epistemically culpable too. First, we contrast culpable ignorance with morally culpable knowledge. Second, we examine the nature of epistemically culpable knowledge using a key example. We then highlight empirical support for the claim that there are real-world conditions that make epistemically culpable knowledge possible. Next, we survey three kinds of epistemic culpability fostered by culpable knowledge. Finally, we address the benefits objection and argue that it fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are all used to drawing straight lines to represent time, and above them, we plot historical events or physical or economic data. What to us is a self-evident convention, is however of an astonishingly recent date: it emerged only in the second half of the eighteenth century. To us, this late date seems paradoxical and cries out for an explanation. How else did earlier periods measure change, if not as a function of time? it will be argued that since Antiquity, time was taken to measure change, and change to occur in space. 'Our' idea of representing time as an independent dimension would have seemed aberrant. But then, a second issue arises. Did not medieval natural philosophers employ timelines, Oresme's diagram of the mean speed theorem being the most famous case? However, as will be shown, our interpretation of his diagram is probably wrong. This insight, in turn, takes care of a third paradox, namely Galileo's initial inability to represent the law of free fall correctly. This article will document that the timeline first emerged in the late sixteenth century in works on chronology, made its first appearance in physics in Galileo's diagrams, and had its general breakthrough in the eighteenth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many years Simone Weil and Ludwig Wittgenstein have been placed side by side. Little of that work has tried to explicitly compare the two. Direct comparisons can, however, be made between Weil and Wittgenstein, which can show that the ways they approached philosophy shared numerous traits and ideas. Both thinkers rejected philosophical systems, both admitted that serious philosophical work did not try to reject all contradictions internal to it, and, in fact, both sought to make facing contradictions and seeming contradictions central to their method. Both wrote of the world with a sense of mystery that surrounds human life, a sense of transcendent good. Both engaged the problems with talking about such a good that cannot be neatly fit into language. Both also saw the task of philosophy as one concerned with meaning. Both also saw philosophy as a matter of "work on oneself." This essay will examine what it means to say that philosophy is a matter of work on oneself. To do so, I want to examine primarily two essays, one from each philosopher, essays which bear remarkable similarity to each other in the sort of problem they deal with.They are section xi of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment, and Weil's "Essay on the Concept of Reading." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although virtues and vices are typically thought of as individual qualities, a growing body of philosophical inquiry suggests that they can comprise collective qualities as well. In this paper, I expand upon the work of philosopher Miranda Fricker to question whether arts organizations can be considered institutionally virtuous and/or vicious. I begin with a discussion of collective epistemology, as offered by Margaret Gilbert, which lays the foundation for how collectives can function as "plural subjects" in pursuit of a common belief or goal. From here, I offer a brief overview of virtue/vice epistemology, which I then connect to Fricker's model of collective, and by extension, institutional virtue. Throughout, I provide illustrations of arts organizations who might themselves be said to possess institutional virtue and/or vice. I conclude by elaborating on the accountability of individuals working on behalf of, and sometimes in opposition to, the inner ethos of arts organizations—particularly when those organizations might fall into the harmful realm of institutional vice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper follows the implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics after Truth and Method in which the forming of social life, and with it the idea of worldly understanding, receives greater attention. I argue that the emphasis in his later writings on worldly understanding draws less on the idea of the hermeneutic circle and problematic of the Geisteswissenschaften in which the concept of tradition is prominent than on the movement in language and the encounter with the other. As in the example of translation, I argue that this movement has the character of passage from one place to another that holds within it an element of opacity. The development of this issue draws on a comparative analysis with the work of the Caribbean philosopher Édouard Glissant. From this analysis I show how Gadamer's hermeneutics addresses the issue of understanding across cultures and in mixed cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how legal principles make legal and sub-legal regulation in society. And more specifically how the principles of equality intervene to protect the interests of members of society. Legal principles are an inseparable and essential part of law and justice. When dealing with cases of changing the structures of rights, in other words, a restructuring of their scheme, it must be borne in mind that if we want to increase the expectations of a certain group, we cannot lower the expectations of another group. This entire process is done in accordance with legal principles, and in particular with the principles of equality. As is known, philosophy and the philosophy of law as its branch, are sciences that deal with the ontological and epistemological interpretation and understanding of legal principles and the principle of equality. During the paper, we will focus on the analysis that legal philosophers such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin make of legal principles and the principle of equality seen in several different elements. The approach they have to the principle of equality will be examined, where their positions are united and where they are divided. Both philosophers make a categorization of the principle of equality based on different reference criteria. How are the positions of Rawls and Dworkin viewed by other researchers? Do their ideas match today's society or can we say that they have built "universal principles", where we all refer to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Donald Davidson issued his challenge to anticausalism in 1963, most philosophers have espoused the view that our actions are causally explained by the reasons why we do them. This Davidsonian consensus, however, rests on a faulty argument. Davidson’s challenge has been met, in more than one way, by anticausalists such as C. Ginet, G. Wilson, and S. Sehon. Hence I endeavor to support causalism with a stronger argument. Our actions are correlated with our motivating reasons; to wit, we often do what we have reason to do. In yet other words, we are often rational. Our frequent rationality is easily explained if causalism is correct, but looks like a staggering coincidence otherwise. Anticausalism thus appears to be ill-equipped to account for the very existence of rational behavior, and so far no attempts in this direction have succeeded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the relationship between trust and inquiry to argue for the view that A trusts B to act in some way only if A believes, in a way that she cannot distinguish from knowledge, for reasons of trust, that B will (or has) act(ed) in this way. Call such beliefs ‘outright trusting beliefs’. To support this view, I shall argue, by way of various examples, that the conditions under which inquiry erodes trust are the same as the conditions under which inquiry erodes outright trusting belief. This congruence is easily explained abductively if we take trust to involve such a belief constitutively. While philosophers have sometimes thought that the relationship between trust and inquiry threatens or complicates the doxastic account of trust, the argument presented here suggests, surprisingly, that this relationship supports and even strengthens this account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the prevalence of dementia rises, it is increasingly important to determine how to best respect incapable individuals' autonomy during end‐of‐life decisions. Many philosophers advocate for the use of advance directives in these situations to allow capable individuals to outline preferences for their future incapable selves. In this paper, however, I consider whether advance directives lack moral authority in instances of dementia. First, I introduce several scholars who have argued that changes in peoplewith dementia's values throughout disease progression reduce the validity of their advanced wishes. I then outline Karin Jongsma's rejection of this claim, which she calls the “losing and choosing” distinction. Jongsma argues that changes in people with dementia's values should not be respected, because they are unchosen and dictated by the disease. I critique her claim that the process of value change is morally relevant when determining which values we respect. I argue that if individuals with dementia are capable of valuing, their contemporary values should be respected, even when they conflict with past preferences outlined in an advance directive. As such, situations of value change diminish the moral authority of advance directives for individuals with dementia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis article examines the intersection of theology, social media technologies, and human responses to global crises and disaster. It highlights the way in which social media has become a primary platform for engaging with such events, while also considering its effects on mental health. Responding to the needs of others is theologically important, but this raises crucial questions about how tomanage practical engagement with social media amidst the poor mental health outcomes associated with it. This article offers a theological response which emphasises the centrality of the body anddraws on the work of philosopher Albert Borgmann to outline the importance of “focal things” in human experience. Borgmann’s concept is proposed as a potential antidote to the mental health issues and distractions fostered by social media, offering one possible pathway to more meaningful and embodied responses to crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis article focuses on a method of moral self-cultivation advocated by the Chinese Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi: deep reading. To Zhu Xi, reading is not only an intellectual activity of learning knowledge, but also a spiritual exercise. Through meticulous, thorough, and unbiased reading, people can gradually cultivate their minds to have three virtues, carefulness (xixin), patience (naixin), and modesty (xuxin). I argue that these three virtues are like the three civic virtues (attentiveness, seriousness and humility) recently proposed by political philosopher Mary Scudder, who argues that these virtues can help people become ‘listening citizens’. Listening citizens are more eager to actively listen to others’ viewpoints and engage in democratic deliberation, which in turn can create a healthy public culture. In sum, while the goal of becoming a sage through deep reading may not be relevant today, Zhu Xi’s teachings highlight the value of deep reading in fostering good citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proust wrote vividly about grief, but he has not been recognised or studied as a philosopher of grief. It is time that he was. For a powerful and compelling philosophy of grief emerges from the pages of his magnum opus. Though philosophical work on Proust has not turned to this theory of grief, philosophers writing about grief have often drawn on Proust, both explicitly and implicitly, without an awareness of an underlying Proustian theory. This paper fills the gap by placing this philosophically informed, Proustian theory of grief before our eyes. Proust builds on contemporary discussions of habituation (habitude), the process whereby new sensations and new actions become both less salient, intrusive or demanding of our attention, and more crucial for our equilibrium and our continued short‐term functioning. Applying this to the social realm, Proust theorises love in terms of habituation to another person, and grief in terms of a sudden inapplicability or unsuitability of our habits to the world that person has left behind, followed by the painful, uneven and intermittent process of habituating to that new world. The paper explains this theory and charts its relation to some contemporary discussions of grief. Doing so places Proust back into a conversation he has already influenced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current workflows in academic ecology rarely allow an engagement of ecologists with philosophers, or with contemporary philosophical work. We argue that this is a missed opportunity for enriching ecological reasoning and practice, because many questions in ecology overlap with philosophical questions and with current topics in contemporary philosophy of science. One obstacle to a closer connection and collaboration between the fields is the limited awareness of scientists, including ecologists, of current philosophical questions, developments and ideas. In this article, we aim to overcome this obstacle and trigger more collaborations between ecologists and philosophers. First, we provide an overview of philosophical research relevant to ecologists. Second, we use examples to demonstrate that many ecological questions have a philosophical dimension and point to related philosophical work. We elaborate on one example – the debate around the appropriate level of complexity of ecological models – to show in more detail how philosophy can enrich ecology. Finally, we provide suggestions for how to initiate collaborative projects involving both ecologists and philosophers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sheds new light on Alexander von Humboldt’s political position in the revolutionary decade between 1789 and 1799. The young naturalist interacted with both supporters and opponents of the revolution. In July 1790, he even participated in the preparations for the Festival of the Federation in Paris together with Georg Forster. However, Humboldt remained detached from Europe’s polarized politics. He avoided taking a firm stance and distanced himself from revolutionary violence. Continuous emotional and physical crises, in addition to his immersion into scientific studies, fuelled this retreat. While steeped in Enlightenment ideas and committed to a cosmopolitan understanding of liberty, Humboldt absorbed the critique of the French Revolution and the skeptical take on rationalism that the philosophers Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and Wilhelm von Humboldt, Alexander’s brother, articulated.By recognizing these influences and reexamining autobiographical sources, we can identify the various intellectual and political contexts in which Alexander von Humboldt operated during the 1790s. This polycentric approach leads to a nuanced understanding of Humboldt’s political thinking in revolutionary Europe. It explains his caution in political matters and revises the conventional image of Humboldt as a fervent supporter of the French Revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We live in an institutional world, where our identity is significantly shaped by our membership in institutional groups (from sports clubs and condo boards to state and international organisations). As such, then, understanding what those groups are and how they affect our reality through their actions is imperative. To that end, some philosophers have taken on the task of elucidating ‘institutional agency' (the capacity of institutional groups to act). Most recently, for example, Michael Bratman has introduced a theory of institutional agency, according to which an institutional group can act if the relevant participants act on an institutional intention (viz., a decision output that satisfies certain rationality constraints). Crucially, he develops this approach on the assumption that ‘planning agency' is the core capacity involved across various forms of human practical organization: individual, social, and institutional. However, this paper shows that while true that planning agency may be a basic element of individual and shared intentionality, it is not so relevant for institutional intentionality. In fact, contra Bratman’s intuitions, it argues that institutional agency is constructed out-of-group attitudes and actions, for which group agency, but not planning agency, is the core capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I discuss theological aesthetics in light of various descriptions of experiences of transcendence that art can provide for human beings. The American author Patti Smith describes, e.g. how works of art "call her" so that she must respond with art productions of her own. This looks similar to what German sociologist Hartmut Rosa calls "resonance". He describes art as one of the places where an experience of vertical resonance can take place. Smith's experiences also correspond to the description of the basic experience of transcendence of human beings as they are interpreted by the Danish philosopher Dorthe Jørgensen. However, she reduces these experiences to be immanent in nature because they are objectless. I suggest that systematic theology can contribute with a distinct theological interpretation of aesthetic experiences through a three-fold argument. First, to combine beauty and infinity in the being of God. Second, to reinterpret the notion of the incarnation as God's continuous presence in the world. And third, by combining natural theology's point that creation speaks of God with a reinterpretation of the artefacts that humans can create. As such, this paper proposes how systematic theology can contribute to the interpretation of aesthetic experiences of transcendence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aims of this paper is to discuss the main points in which Deleuze sees Kant's thought as an enemy and an ally, especially in the problem of difference. The purpose of this article is to discuss the main points in which Deleuze sees Kant's thought as an enemy and an ally, especially in the problem of difference. The approach will be concentrated in the work Difference and Repetition, which houses the main discussions to develop the question of how Deleuze takes Kantian philosophy as an enemy, but which must be explored until the moment in which it finds itself strange. This is a procedure typical of the Deleuzian method of "subverting" the thoughts of philosophers that are taken, in the first place, as philosophies to be explored to the maximum extent. In this case, the subversion of Kantianism consists in assuming it as the inaugurator of the thought of representation in modernity with the creation of the ground in the transcendental; to expose the insufficiency of this thought when thematizing difference; and explore the reversal of time promoted by Kant, as one of the greatest contributions to the problem of difference in thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the distinction, central to Kant's pre-critical philosophy, between necessary natural order and contingent natural order, which is essential for defining the concept of order and understanding the specificity from which Kant situates the difference between the organic and the inorganic during this period. It is argued that, in relation to the latter, this distinction is more suited to the context and intentions of the philosopher. This differentiation is explicitly presented in 1763 in The only possible argument in support of a demonstration of the existence of God, but, as it is argued, it was already outlined in 1755 in the Universal natural history and theory of the heavens, the work whose analysis the article begins with. For this reason, the aforementioned distinction serves as both the starting point, in 1755, and the point of arrival, in 1763. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We scan Paul K. Feyerabend's work in philosophy of physics and of science more generally for insights that could be useful for the contemporary debate on the foundations of quantum mechanics. We take as our starting point what Feyerabend has actually written about quantum mechanics, but we extend our analysis to his general views on realism, objectivity, pluralism, and the relation between physics and philosophy, finding that these more general views could in fact offer many interesting insights for physicists and philosophers working on quantum foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives an account of Gilles Deleuze's and Jean-Paul Sartre's respective conceptions of "the Other" as this concept evolves in relation to Sartre's earliest insights into self/Other dynamics in his 1937 essay, The Transcendence of the Ego. By reading Deleuze through his early interlocutor—the philosopher and author Michel Tournier—I argue that the account of Otherness presented in Deleuze's early (and later disavowed) "Sartrean" works represents a critique of Sartre's own revisions to the concept of Otherness in his 1943 magnum opus, Being and Nothingness. Thus, we can read Sartre and Deleuze as offering competing views of how (and indeed if it is possible) to inherit Sartre's own early insights into the value of existential phenomenology for a "positive" account of interpersonal relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses French philosopher Luc Marion’s (1946-) idea about Heidegger’s concept of onto-theology, how metaphysics thinks about the relation between Being and beings, and how God is included in this thinking, and the justification for the idea that onto-theology is idolatrous. According to Marion, even though philosophy treats God as the highest or perfect and infinite being, it is precisely because of this treatment that it actually borders on idolatry. According to him, this is a common characteristic of the thought starting from Scholastic thought and continuing until Heidegger, which sees God as an object of metaphysical imagination. Marion, who takes his criticism of onto-theology from Heidegger, nevertheless claims that he, too, remains in an idolatrous line when it comes to Being. Being is thought through a being, and this implies ontological difference. While Marion states that this difference is ignored, he says that God’s death creates an opportunity in this situation. This means that God’s ontotheological and idolatrous disposition is revealed. Basing his critique of onto-theology on thinkers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, Marion explains the causes of onto-theology and the idolatrous tendency and offers his own alternative on how to avoid it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Natural theology is a branch of philosophy that employs empirical and logical methods to gain insight into the nature of God and His attributes. The fundamental structure of natural theology is derived from the tenets of religion and the essential concerns of metaphysics, a branch of philosophy. The arguments for the existence of God represent a central aspect of religious discourse. Consequently, natural theology is situated at the nexus of religion and philosophy. The investigation of the nature of God is a pursuit that has been undertaken since the earliest periods of human history. Nevertheless, within the context of Western philosophy, its roots can be traced back to the ancient Greek tradition. In the last century, there has been a tendency to approach the Pre-Socratics with a certain degree of bias. These philosophers have been viewed in two distinct ways: either as evangelists of the prophetic path or as scientists whose focus was solely on nature and who made no theological claims. This paper examines the possibility of offering an alternative interpretation of their philosophical contributions from the perspective of natural theology. It is proposed that exploring the historical context could provide new insights into studying philosophy and religion. Scholars engaged in the field of the philosophy of religion and those specializing in the history of philosophy may gain new perspectives by tracing the footprints of natural theology within the surviving fragments of the Milesian school [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In secondary literature, especially among orientalists, it is a frequent misperception that Ibn Khaldun was a loyal student of Aristotle and the Greek intellectual heritage at large. But Ibn Khaldun was remarkably selective and critical in his approach to the philosophical paradigm and philosophical models, and, in keeping with the general character of the muteakhhirûn period of Islamic thought, did not see any harm in occasionally benefitting certain concepts and models of philosophical accumulation. One of the places where this criticality and selectivity is manifested is his use of Aristotle's famous expression "Man is political by nature." While for Aristotle, this statement reflects a metaphysical and moral conception of the state as a necessary consequence of a human being's essence (nature), Ibn Khaldun interprets this statement solely in the context of sociality and the need for a division of labor to ensure the material existence and security of human beings. Beyond this, Ibn Khaldun does not ascribe a metaphysical and moral meaning and function either to 'umran, which he uses in the sense of sociality, or to the state/mulk, as Aristotle and his Muslim followers such as al-Fârâbî, Ibn Sînâ, and al-Tûsî did. Moreover, Ibn Khaldun criticizes these philosophers for doing so and underlines that the science of 'umran is a different discipline from political philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics, the great Aristotelian Commentator Ibn Rushd defines "knowledge" (scientific knowledge, epistemē, 'ilm) as one of Aristotle's five intellectual virtues and the faculty of reason, akin to the other virtues, in an Aristotelian way. Ibn Rushd defends the teleological argument, rooted in Aristotle's teleological reading of nature, and supports the modal strong epistemic status of this argument, which is part of the concept of knowledge, in his early work (Short Commentary on Metaphysics), middle period work (al-Kashf) and late work (Long Commentary on Metaphysics), all in harmony with each other. Ibn Rushd, constructing the teleological argument based on the definition of knowledge, which fundamentally articulates the necessary or essential qualities inherent in objects in defense of de re modality, takes a step that seems quite radical within the context of the Aristotelian epistemic tradition to which he is affiliated: The teleological argument, strongly associated with the concept of knowledge—one of the five intellectual virtues—is presented as a form of deductive inference accessible not only to philosophers but also to ordinary public. In other words, according to him, the argument is both a philosophical and a religious way. This implies, for instance, that natural theology, typically viewed by Aquinas as an activity reserved for the higher epistemic class with talent and leisure, is seen by Ibn Rushd as a robust epistemic activity accessible to ordinary people. This new element, which can be referred to as common sense natural theology, contends that ordinary public knowledge and philosophers' knowledge differ in details, such as whether it is a simple or complex deductive inference, while remaining the same in terms of their knowledge status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper brings the analysis of epistemic injustices and the perspective of media philosophy into dialogue by proposing the new concept of medial epistemic injustice. After introducing the topic, the contribution confronts some metaphilosophical stances in light of the recent medial turn in order to suggest that, despite all their controversies, philosophers seem to agree that doing philosophy uniquely involves writing texts. This discussion sets the stage for the claim that institutionally sanctioned philosophy manifests a mono-genreism that only admits one particular kind of written text and a mono-medialism that excludes all media other than writing. Next, the relationship between non-verbal media and philosophy is examined more closely on two levels. First, it is emphasized how academic philosophy leaves no room for corporeal thinking and visual thinking; second, it is illustrated how this may harm some individuals, using the example of deaf people and visually oriented autistic people. The conclusion proposes a provocative Gestalt-switch: What if current "angelic" philosophical knowledge were itself atypical, exhibiting the traits of an aphantasic mind? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The practice of science appears to involve "model-talk". Scientists, one thinks, are in the business of giving accounts of reality. Scientists, in the process of furnishing such accounts, talk about what they call "models". Philosophers of science have inspected what this talk of models suggests about how scientific theories manage to represent reality. There are, it seems, at least three distinct philosophical views on the role of scientific models in science's portrayal of reality: the abstractionist view, the indirect fictionalist view, and the direct fictionalist view. In this essay, I try to articulate a question about what makes a scientific model more or less appropriate for a specific domain of reality. More precisely, I ask, "What accounts for the fact that given a determinate target domain, some scientific models, but not others, are thought to be "appropriate" for that domain?" I then consider whether and the degree to which each of the mentioned views on scientific models institutes a satisfactory response to this question. I conclude that, amongst those views, the direct fictionalist view seems to have the most promising response. I then utilize this argument to develop a more precise account of the problem of differential importability, and ultimately offer a more general and less presumptive argument that the problem seems to be optimally solved by justifying comparative evaluation of model-importabilities solely in terms of comparative evaluations of what I characterize as models' "holistic" predictive success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal philosophers often ask whether a person has a reason to obey the law simply because it is the law. We ask the contrary question: does a person have a reason to disobey the law simply because it is the law? Many philosophers who have considered the question of disobedience have focused on injustice; others have defended disobedience on libertarian or anarchist grounds. In contrast, we argue that there is a content-independent reason to disobey the law even when it is not unjust, illegitimate, or otherwise undesirable. Legal philosophers generally agree that law claims peremptory authority, but they also generally agree that any duty to obey the law is substantially more limited. We argue that insofar as the law makes inflated claims to authority, it generates a content-independent reason to disobey. This anti-authoritarian principle is grounded in the virtue of clearly communicating one's political commitments to others within a democratic society. By disobeying, one communicates one's conviction that the law makes inflated claims to authority. We show how our account of disobedience as such is distinct from more familiar theories of anarchism and civil disobedience and argue that it is applicable whether one lives under conditions of justice or injustice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Postmodernism is characterized by a celebration of diversity, difference in viewpoints and a rejection of universal truths. It often critiques the authority of institutions and traditional power structures and emphasizes the subjective nature of human experience. In terms of methodology, postmodernists use deconstruction and analysis of language and discourse to critique and challenge dominant narratives and beliefs. This paper explores the challenges that relativism, as viewed through the lens of postmodernism, poses to the concept of absolute religion. The areas of belief, epistemology, values, and laws are specifically examined. Acceptance of relativism carries significant implications for religion, such as the loss of religion's exclusive status and the promotion of pluralism - a key goal of postmodernism. A comprehensive literature review is conducted, drawing on the works of philosophers and scholars who have explored the topics of postmodernism and relativism, and their impact on religion. This study seeks to identify the challenges posed by relativism and offer a brief counterargument. The findings suggest that while relativism may recognize the existence of diverse truths and encourage believers to maintain their own beliefs, it ultimately creates problems when it assumes that the fact of truth itself is different and makes the plurality of truth absolute. This leads to skepticism about religion and the view that religion is only individual belief about truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of fictional models is extensive and rewarding in modern science. This fact captured the attention of philosophers of science, who are focusing on questions such as the following: is it possible for a fictional model to be explanatory? And, if so, in virtue of what is such a fictional model explanatory? In this paper, I discuss these questions in relation to the realism vs. anti-realism debate in philosophy of science. I focus on work developed by Alisa Bokulich who has argued for the explanatory role played by fictional models, claiming that it can be accommodated by realism in 'a broad sense'. To this end, Bokulich introduced what she called 'an eikonic conception' of explanation, as opposed to the so-called 'ontic' conception. This move, Bokulich claims, allows non-causal explanations to be acceptable to a modified version, as opposed to a 'naïve' brand of realism. Roughly, a fictional model can capture aspects of reality if it manages to act as a proxy for a theory targeting a physical system. As Bokulich explains with the example of James Clerk Maxwell's use of mechanical models, this is due to structural correspondences between a model and a theory at a certain level of abstraction. However, Bokulich does not explain how the model grasps reality. In this paper, I fill this missing piece of the puzzle. While I agree with Bokulich on the explanatory function of fictional models, I shall invoke her reading of Maxwell's work to draw a different conclusion. Specifically, I argue that structural correspondences at various levels form what I call 'a ladder of abstractions' which connects aspects of a target system to the corresponding depths of descriptions. Modifying in these terms the scope of 'representing a system', I suggest that Bokulich's proposed modification of realism is obviated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although acceptance may be a crucial step in responding to catastrophic losses, such as those resulting from spinal cord injuries, a careful analysis of case studies and psychological literature supports the notion that acceptance is a place that one arrives at and not something one can make happen. We present five responses to loss with the goal of enabling helpers, whether professionals or family, to address the situation of patients in a nuanced, empathic, and helpful way: (a) Resisting, denying, and the value of fighting, (b) putting aside the painful awareness of loss allows forward moving action, (c) giving up and stopping the fighting while remaining distressed in an unacceptable situation, (d) resignation as a reluctant yes to a life situation that cannot be changed, and (e) reconciliating; coming to terms and finding peace with the way the world, which is what we mean by acceptance. Since acceptance is not an act of the will, it is crucial that helpers respect the difficult and lengthy process that patients move through in their individual way and at their own pace. Here we draw upon the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas's interpersonal philosophy of ethics to elaborate on what it means to treat persons with respect and emphasize the critical importance of listening deeply to patients as fellow human beings. Public Significance Statement: This article provides a careful evaluation of the emphasis on encouraging people with spinal cord injuries to accept their new circumstances. Based on literature and extensive interviews we have concluded that while acceptance may be an important step in responding to catastrophic loss, it is not an action but a place that one may arrive at. Accordingly, we recommend that helpers be responsive to the particular situation and experiences of people who struggle with tragic life changes and consider how "denial" and "resistance" may be adaptive at both a physical and a practical level. Furthermore, those who have been injured may benefit significantly from having someone accompany them on their journey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article contrasts the way that laws are regarded by some philosophers of science with the way that they are regarded by scientists and science educators. After a brief review of the Humean and necessitarian views of scienfic laws, I highlight difference between scientists who regard laws as being merely descriptive and philosophers who generally regard them as being explanatory and, in some cases, as being necessary. I also discuss the views of two prominent philosophers of science who deny any role for scienfic laws. I conclude that science educators should be wary of adopng the necessitarian view of scienfic laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term 'breakthrough generation' was coined by the German philosopher Hugo Fischer (1897–1975) in 1930, at the very beginning of the Great Depression. This structural notion represents a timeless, emancipation oriented ideal that effectively integrates the relevant positive qualities and abilities of modern and critically thinking man, which he has potentially picked up in the course of his historical development towards a higher humanity as a European and realist, and which he actually possesses as qualities and norms. This complex ethos is intended to form the initial basis on which the modern idea of a European federation is consciously realised. The purpose of this paper is not only to creatively point to these concrete and supporting motivational starting points and qualitative-historical assumptions of the modern European and to place them in a functional framework of intelligibility, but also to recall the important historical-philosophical fact that Fischer's specifically grasped and developed idea of the formation of post-war Europe is very closely linked to the thinking of T. G. Masaryk, whom Fischer admired and respected as a philosopher and statesman and whose democratizing idea of a 'new' Central European space fundamentally inspired him in many ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among those included in the lists of being sent out in 1922 as part of the "Philosophers' Steamboat," there was Sergei Nikolayevich (Father Sergius) Bulgakov (1871–1944). Prior to his deportation, Bulgakov, after many years of struggle, reunited his philosophical and theological journeys. This is reflected in his dialogues and essays, in particular, in At the Feast of the Gods and At the Walls of Chersonesus, and Tragedy of Philosophy. In exile, Bulgakov continued to reflect on the tragedy of a thinker facing a spiritual catastrophe, the tragedy of Russia torn by wars and revolutions, and his personal tragedies. Having regained his firm foundation and a way to overcome his uprootedness, Bulgakov makes an outstanding contribution to preserving Russian culture. This paper focuses on Bulgakov as a person, and his philosophy of religion is considered from the vantage point of how it reflects his personal struggles and humanistic worldview. The Philosophers' Steamboat, an act of ideological repressions that followed the turbulent years of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War, bears a lesson for today when Russia is at war again, and many prominent cultural figures sever ties with their country. Sergei Bulgakov's fate and work set an example of living and creating through tragedy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concerns the Russian émigrée translator and philosopher Natalie Duddington (1886–1972). By establishing Duddington's dependence on Nicholas Lossky (1870–1965), the paper argues that Duddington formed a unique synthesis of Russian intuitivism and British realism in her essay 'Our Knowledge of Other Minds'. Despite the historical significance of Duddington's work, it will be concluded that her synthesis succumbs to the most recent criticism which has been posed against perceptualists such as Fred Dretske (1932–2013). Russian 'intuitivism' is understood here as the school of thought that was first developed by Lossky and subsequently inherited by Duddington. 'Perceptualism' will be understood as the broad claim that we perceive the contents of another mind in an immediate way rather than infer them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers and members of the public think it is wrong to procreate. If one wants children, it is permissible to adopt. But procreation is allegedly impermissible because there is some respect in which adoption is better than procreation. There are two prominent variants of such objections. First, we have a duty to help others. Adopting a child from a poor country satisfies that duty. But procreation does not. Second, adding another person to a wealthy nation through procreation contributes to climate change. But adopting does not. I show that such objections are unsound. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Pl. 1.3, Apuleius provides an account of the genesis of the tripartition of philosophy, recalling its incorrect (but by then traditional) attribution to Plato. In doing so, Apuleius states that Plato showed that the three parts of philosophy do not fight each other, but on the contrary support each other with mutual aid. While the meaning of the passage is clear, the text has been long debated. The aim of this paper is to show that none of the texts printed so far is satisfactory, and to propose a new solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]