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This study examines how antitrust law adoptions affect horizontal merger and acquisition outcomes. Using the staggered introduction of competition laws in 20 countries, we find antitrust regulation decreases acquirers' 5-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding horizontal merger announcements. A decrease in deal value, target book assets, and industry peers' announcement returns are consistent with the market power hypothesis. Exploiting antitrust law adoptions addresses a downward bias to an estimated effect of antitrust enforcement. The potential bias from heterogeneous treatment effects does not nullify our results. Overall, antitrust policies seem to deter post-merger monopolistic gains, potentially improving customer welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The market power of monopolies can severely restrict citizens' freedom of choice. In the case of utilities, often portrayed as natural monopolies, such power may result in high prices and unreliable or absent services, especially in marginalized communities such as low-income neighborhoods or remote rural villages. While government regulation has been the traditional remedy to curb natural monopolies' power, in this paper, we address a different solution: monopoly bypassing through collective action. We present two types of monopoly bypassing—partial and complete—through the lens of civic wealth creation (CWC): the generation of social, economic, and communal endowments that benefit communities. Through our analysis of three water and sanitation utility services cases, we demonstrate how CWC is used to catalyze the collective action of engaged citizens to effectively bypass monopoly power. The cases highlight the three stakeholder categories involved in CWC initiatives—communities, enterprises, and regimes of support—and illustrate how they act collectively to provide credible market-based solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the distinctive features of the monopolistic phase of capitalism is the growing struggle between two fractions of the ruling class: industrial capital and financial capital. This article analyzes how the hegemony of the latter has displaced the leading and transforming role of the former, in a process of subordination and deformation of the productive logic of capital valorization in favor of the speculative one. This is called the "degeneration of industrial capital". Through the case of the United States and the 2008 crisis, it is shown that speculation has already overtaken productive investment, as well as the negative consequences this has had on economic stability and growth. Parasitism and extreme decadence, expressed in deepening inequality, growing dependence on unproductive activities, and the weakening of capitalism's productive capacities, suggest that the system is entering a phase of decomposition, which may be terminal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The optimal pricing of goods, especially when they are new and the innovating firm is a monopolist, must proceed without precise knowledge of the demand curve. This paper provides a pricing method with a relative robustness guarantee by maximizing a performance index which amounts to a worst‐case ratio of the obtained payoff to the best possible payoff. Assuming monotonicity and complementarity of demand in price and the unknown demand parameter, the performance index is fully determined by its behavior at the boundary of the parameter space. This allows for an efficient computation of an optimal robust price. In the linear case, which can also be used for nonlinear demand with bounded slope, the method provides a simple closed‐form solution. A comparison with the standard worst‐case payoff criterion reveals substantial improvements in both absolute and relative performance, at only a small cost relative to the maximized expected profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sports leagues are traditionally considered natural monopolies. Understanding how they interact with one another is important. It is unclear how participation in a closed supra league affects competition in domestic leagues. This paper studies the effect of participating in basketball's Euroleague on team performance in national leagues. We find that Euroleague participation reduces the probability of victory by around 9% in 'big' leagues (i.e. those with the strongest teams). However, no significant effect was found in other leagues. A possible transmission channel is the reduction in the number of days between matches. We discuss the policy implications of this result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to investigate the impact of monopoly power on the world of work within the logistics segment, particularly in the context of automation processes. We conduct a fieldwork analysis of three workplaces situated in Italy, each owned by distinct types of monopolies: a corporate monopoly, Philip Morris, the global leader in tobacco and cigarette production; a state-owned monopoly, Poste Italiane, the exclusive public provider of mail services within the national borders; and a novel form of digital monopoly that holds control over intangibles and exhibits monopsonistic control over labour — Amazon. Through a comparative examination of these three diverse forms of monopolies, utilising corporate-level metrics and patent data, we scrutinise the restructuring of labour processes following the introduction of Automated Guided Vehicles. Employing a qualitative analysis that includes semi-structured interviews with HR professionals, IT specialists, and workers, we underscore that powerful monopolies play a crucial role in shaping the trajectory of technological development, adoption, and utilisation. Despite notable distinctions observed among the three cases, we document a common trend of standardisation and codification of human activities when interfacing with automated machines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a challenging task to achieve the minimum average CCT (coflow completion time) and provide isolation guarantees in multi-tenant datacenters without prior knowledge of coflow sizes. State-of-the-art solutions either focus on minimizing the average CCT or providing optimal isolation guarantees. However, achieving the minimum average CCT and isolation guarantees in multi-tenant datacenters is difficult due to the conflicting nature of these objectives. Therefore, we propose FIGCS-TF (Fast and Isolation Guarantees Coflow Scheduling via Traffic Forecasting), a coflow scheduling algorithm that does not require prior knowledge. FIGCS-TF utilizes a lightweight forecasting module to predict the relative scheduling priority of coflows. Moreover, it employs the MDRF (monopolistic dominant resource fairness) strategy for bandwidth allocation, which is based on super-coflows and helps achieve long-term isolation. Through trace-driven simulations, FIGCS-TF demonstrate communication stages that are 1.12 × , 1.99 × , and 5.50 × faster than DRF (Dominant Resource Fairness), NCDRF (Non-Clairvoyant Dominant Resource Fairness) and Per-Flow Fairness, respectively. In comparison with the theoretically minimum CCT, FIGCS-TF experiences only a 46% increase in average CCT at the top 95th percentile of the dataset. Overall, FIGCS-TF exhibits superior performance in reducing average CCT compared to other algorithms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Remembering the devastating defeat of the Russian Empire in the Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905), in particular, at the Battle of Tsushima (May 1905), does not easily fit into patriotic and 'great power' narratives of the past promoted in Putin's Russia. In contrast to monolithic, state-dominated accounts of the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945), which have come to prevail over the last two decades, alternative accounts of memory emerge through remembering the Russo–Japanese War. This article highlights how the polyphonic memory of this conflict poses a challenge to monopolistic state-authored accounts, with their rigid, nationalist framings of memory, borders and identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Comment analyzes the entrance of institutional investors into the singlefamily rental market after the Great Recession of 2008. The collapse of the housing market during the Great Recession fundamentally changed the ownership structure of U.S. single-family homes in two distinct ways. First, the number of families renting single-family homes soared. And second, institutional investors entered the single-family home market, buying many homes and converting them into rental properties. This postrecession reality has introduced a housing puzzle: the pricing trends of single-family rentals in the decade after the Great Recession suggest that institutional investors have captured monopolistic power over the single-family rental market despite owning a relatively small market share. Thus, this Comment evaluates the housing puzzle through the lens of antitrust law. While a potential antitrust case appears to suffer from the critical weaknesses of low entry barriers and market shares, analyzing institutional entrance into the single-family rental market under antitrust merger doctrine reveals that the case is stronger than it may initially seem. Although it is hard to envision a successful antitrust lawsuit against institutional investors today, there are reasons to believe these weaknesses will disappear if these market trends continue tomorrow. Furthermore, scrutinizing the entrance under alternative merger theories, such as the unilateral or coordinated effects theories, illustrates that a Clayton Act case would be more impactful than originally thought. After evaluating the antitrust case, this Comment considers how the housing market can instruct antitrust doctrine's further evolution, since commentators across academia, the media, and politics all criticize institutional entrance. By highlighting how unique market facts in housing obfuscate market power, this Comment suggests expanding the merger analysis to include not just levels and changes in concentration, but also orders of magnitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the market structure of the Hungarian bank market and the effects of the financial crisis of 2008 on it. With a static and a dynamic panel model we estimate the elasticity of total revenues with respect to changes in input prices so that we can determine the market structure based on the Panzar and Rosse methodology for the period between 2003 and 2020. We test the input price elasticity according to the balance sheet and profit and loss data of the top 13 companies. The results show that the Hungarian bank market was a monopolistic competition or a monopoly market in long run equilibrium. To see the effects of the financial crisis we use three subsamples, furthermore we estimate and test the H-statistic with a fixed effect model. During the examined period the level of factor price elasticity increased in time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, the geopolitical domination of the United States remained almost unquestioned. However, other countries have emerged as poles of influence in recent years, including China and Brazil. Despite this, cultural and media interaction between the two countries is still limited and often mediated by the United States. This paper explores the algorithmic representation of China by the video streaming platform Netflix and argues that the company acts imperialistically by seeking to establish monopolistic control of the global Internet television market and promoting biases that we call 'algorithmic orientalism'. By presenting China to the Brazilian public through this lens, Netflix plays the role of cultural gatekeeper that continues to promote hegemonically American worldviews. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Militias hamper state‐building by undermining the government's monopoly of violence, which creates an environment of anarchy. Yet many governments collaborate with them. These pro‐government militias (PGMs), such as paramilitary groups, are not only a poor‐country phenomenon, that is, economic growth does not seem to eradicate these armed nonstate actors: Intriguingly, cross‐country data reveals a U‐shaped relationship between GDP per capita and PGM presence. This article presents an economic theory of PGM supply that can explain this puzzling relationship and provide actionable ways for international actors (e.g., UN) to discourage the emergence of PGMs. However, the theory also cautions that some common international policies (e.g., development aid) may unintentionally encourage PGM supply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political, economic transition of post-socialist states in Central Eastern Europe and the Balkans took different directions in the 90s. More recently, countries like Hungary, have experienced democratic backsliding, while Western-Balkans states, such as Montenegro, have been stuck in a never-ending transition. Sport is often utilized as a tool by hybrid regimes that systematically degrade democratic principles, dismantle independent institutions and merge political monopoly with economic power. The present comparative study aims to introduce the sport diplomacy approaches of Hungary and Montenegro, focusing on the state-led utilization of sport in foreign affairs. We argue that hybrid regimes governed by strong political elites tend to influence or overtake control of the autonomous sport movements in order to shape their external image in a more conducive way and to support nationalistic political agendas through the popularity of sports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to analyze theoretically whether changes in an access charge pricing policy can promote green electricity use. The model considers two hypothetical firms: One firm offers green electricity product, and the other firm provides conventional electricity. Each firm pays an access charge to the natural monopoly in order to have access to the transportation network. Through using a vertical differentiation model, we try to analyze the link between the access charges paid by the two firms and the qualities offered. We also attempt to explain why the consumers do not often choose green electricity. Finally, we suggest a new policy that can lead the consumers to choose the green electricity product instead of conventional electricity. Our model shows that changes in the access charge pricing policies can constitute a relevant component in the reforms of the electricity sector and can have impacts on the consumption of the green electricity. A differentiating access charge policy could allow a better penetration of the green electricity product and an increase in the social welfare when consumers have greater preferences in environmental qualities. Otherwise, their preservation at a uniform level is desirable in order to maintain the competition. JEL Classifications : B21, C72, L13, Q21, P28 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the economic impact of the abuse of superior trading position (ASTP) provision within Korea's draft Act on Fair Intermediary Trade of Online Platforms (AFITOP). The AFITOP, proposed as part of competition law reform in the digital era, applies to large online platform operators providing intermediary services. While derived from the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA), the ASTP provision's goal to protect the economically weak is secondary to the MRFTA's primary goal of efficiency. Furthermore, the provision's interpretative uncertainties burden enterprises, especially large ones and those exploring new business models. Including this provision in the AFITOP is likely to reduce innovation incentives among large online platform operators, and to foster enforcement bias toward the ASTP provision by the Korea Fair Trade Commission, thereby increasing inefficiency in competition law enforcement. Therefore, the ASTP provision in the AFITOP should not be introduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Across the economy, monopolists of all kinds are engaged in "conditional dealing." This is the practice of unilaterally offering benefits and penalties, or bribes and threats, to induce trading partners to refrain from competing against the monopolist or from dealing with its rivals. Pharma giants offer discounts conditioned on "loyalty," agricultural monopolists impose "exit penalties" for switching to rivals, and social networks offer interoperability for apps only so long as they don't compete. Economic scholarship shows that conditional dealing can inflict serious harms, but the law has not caught up. In particular, harmful conditioning goes undeterred because it falls into the gaps between the categories of our fragmented monopolization law. Courts have repeatedly tried to squeeze conditioning into ill-fitting categories, rejected claims on the basis of economically irrelevant criteria, and sometimes thrown up their hands altogether. The result: shambolic doctrine, tolerance of harmful behavior, and the collapse of enforcement efforts. Conditional dealing should be recognized as a new category of monopolizing conduct. To that end, this Article provides a new analytical framework: a definition of conditioning, as well as standards for gauging its exclusionary impact, contribution to power, and procompetitive justifications. It explains why a host of criteria often applied by courts--from price-cost and "coercion" tests to quantitative foreclosure screens--should be jettisoned. And it sketches two further ideas with broader implications for antitrust: a framework of "quick look monopolization" for nakedly harmful conditioning and a reinterpretation of the "attempted monopoly maintenance" offense to tackle knowing misconduct in complex markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite Turkey's changing political regimes, sports have remained under state governance since 1938. This article analyzes the ideologies, influences, and politics that have shaped this state monopoly over the sports system across three phases from the 1920s to the 1990s: establishment, stabilization, and instrumentalization. The establishment phase aimed to align sports with nation-building ideals, incorporating nationalist ideology and paramilitarism. The stabilization phase embraced a statist approach influenced by socio-economic conditions and Soviet influence. The instrumentalization phase, beginning with the Özal years, utilized sports for political discourse and socio-economic purposes, retaining the state-run system even during the era of neoliberalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are some countries able to go ahead with comprehensive top-down local government amalgamation reforms, despite the many challenges such a reform entails? So far, we have limited theoretical and empirical understanding of how central governments manage to adopt such reforms. Drawing on different theoretical frameworks around public policy as well as research into territorial reforms, this article presents key political and institutional factors that are likely to facilitate top-down municipal mergers and examines whether these theoretical propositions help to explain the adoption of comprehensive top-down municipal amalgamation in four cases: Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, and Portugal. Key political and institutional factors identified in existing frameworks provide a useful starting point for understanding and explaining top-down comprehensive municipal amalgamation reforms, such as the role played by the breaking up of existing policy monopolies and emergence of new venues for discussing the reform. At the same time, the cases also reveal some important nuances that at times run counter to theoretical expectations. Our cases also reveal further factors, including the "bundling" of amalgamation reforms with other wider initiatives, and the potential effect of "distracting events" that should be taken into account in the further development of theoretical frameworks concerning top-down amalgamations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the formation of production and trading networks in economies with general interdependencies and complex property rights. We argue that the right to exclude, a core tenet of property, grants asset owners local monopoly power that is amplified by an economy's endogenous production network. Our analysis generalizes the exclusion core, a cooperative solution concept based on the right to exclude, to markets with production. We identify sufficient (and essentially necessary) conditions for the nonemptiness of the exclusion core. Multisourcing and a bias toward shorter supply chains emerge in exclusion‐core outcomes. As a methodological contribution, we generalize the top trading cycles algorithm to a production economy and we show that it identifies outcomes in an economy's exclusion core. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis study investigates how nationalist sentiments enable the gambling industry to capitalize on national markets. With the help of qualitative content analytical tools, we analyzed 500 curated social media posts targeting Finnish and Swedish audiences. The study compared narrative templates, identifying speaker positions (inside/outside sociocultural context) and types of nationalist connotations (surface-level/in-depth). The results are displayed in a four-field matrix that reveals that Finland’s state gambling monopoly, Veikkaus, leverages ‘cultural nationalism’ to highlight its social role, portraying itself as a supporter of Finnish values, sports, and civil society. In contrast, international gambling companies and former domestic monopolies in Sweden’s license-based regulatory system use more mechanical, ‘sports-nationalist’ symbols, though the former monopoly companies occasionally refer to traditional Swedish cultural identity symbols. Compared to Veikkaus, the Swedish operators approach the national market as commercial outsiders, seeking public trust through sports associations. The study sheds light on how regulatory systems shape digital capitalist strategies for targeting national consumers on the social media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the mechanisms governing the extraction, circulation, and distribution of rent in the biotech industry. Building on recent scholarship, it contributes to debates surrounding the importance of rent in technoscientific capitalism. We analyse genome editing as a global labour process. Part One examines the ongoing patent battle over CRISPR-Cas9 as a struggle for control over a foundational biotechnology increasingly central to several industrial sectors: a process of enclosure that facilitates a shift towards monopoly, rent extraction, and financial speculation. Part Two then details how patented CRISPR technologies are valorised through the construction of global, multi-layered infrastructures of rent extraction based on complex webs of financial and licensing deals. Part Three maps the uneven global geographies of CRISPR patenting. It considers how monopoly power emerges through the continuous conversion of public research into private assets, and how this enclosure reinforces profoundly unequal systems of distribution of royalties and rents in the global biopolitical economy. We interrogate how CRISPR technologies cement and expand neocolonial geographies of rent extraction, privatising the economic benefits and socialising the ecological risks. Finally, we argue that an increasingly monopolistic corporate biopower mediates how genome editing technologies are developed, and which mutant ecologies are socially produced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the trade environment of a globalized economy, tariffs play a crucial role in transnational supply chains. At the same time, the power structure of the supply chain also plays an important role in the decision making and income distribution of a transnational supply chain. Therefore, we construct game-theoretic models to analyze the impacts of tariffs and power structures on the decision making and revenue distribution of transnational supply chains. First, we consider a bilateral monopoly model consisting of a Chinese manufacturer and a U.S. retailer and analyze the effects of tariffs and power structures on decision making and revenue distributions in this supply chain. Then, we extend the model to a duopoly competition model consisting of two Chinese manufacturers and one American retailer, further analyzing the roles of tariffs and power structures. The results indicate that in the bilateral monopoly model, the impact of tariffs on the manufacturer's profits is always greater than on the retailer's profits under a manufacturer-led circumstance. However, in a competitive model, when the market size is large, the impact of tariffs on the manufacturer's profits exceeds that of the retailer's profits; conversely, when the market size is smaller, the impact of tariffs on the retailer's profits is greater than on the manufacturer's profits. Furthermore, we find that in the duopoly competition model, under the manufacturer-led circumstance, both the manufacturer and the retailer earn the highest profits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While a slew of recent scholarship has examined the phenomenon of executive overstay, there is little talk about the more complex and equally vexing phenomena of judicial overstay. This article begins to examine the many layers and complexities of judicial overstay by exploring whether the political branches ever seek to prolong abusively the time in office of loyal judges, and if so, by what mechanisms. Illustrating this is not merely a theoretical practice, we label such a phenomenon court‐hoarding, and consider it a subset of the broader category of judicial overstay. Our contribution is two‐fold. First, we argue that while court‐hoarding is a somewhat risky and less‐known governance tactic that is likely to occur only when certain conditions are fulfilled, the potential benefits of court‐hoarding for power consolidation and institutional monopoly power are profound. Second, we contribute to the emerging literature on judicial tenure. More specifically, we add conceptual utility to thinking about judicial tenure—and its abuse—by describing a three‐layer model of court‐hoarding, consisting of a core, a mid‐layer, and a periphery, which correspond to three broad categories of influencing judicial tenure across time and space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hydropolitical relations have long attracted the world of academia, and hydrohegemony and counter-hydrohegemony frameworks have recently become important in analysing power relations between riparian states. However, little attention has been given to the hydrohegemonic situation of the Nile River. This study tries to analyse this status, specifically in the Eastern Nile Basin. The data, elicited through unstructured interviews from purposively selected informants, has been analysed thematically. The findings reveal that Egypt aspires to be a hegemon in the basin but is not. Despite its use of different coercive and subtle mechanisms to induce ideational or hegemonic compliance, these have not been successful: Ethiopia has not consented to or accepted Egypt's claim over the Nile. Concomitantly, since the 1990s, Ethiopia's position has transcended from veiled to overt contest, which anticipates a new order, challenging the monopolistic position of Egypt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Purpose: This paper aims to investigate the introduction of rationalist concepts through Taylorization to Turkey during the early republican era, using Wallace Clark's case of the Turkish State Monopolies. Design/methodology/approach: The study uses a historical narrative approach to explore the roles of foreign experts in the transfer of rationalist and Taylorist ideas to Turkish State Monopolies (Inhisarlar Idaresi). Findings: This study illuminates the introduction and adoption of Taylorist principles in early republican Turkey through multiple lenses. First, it underscores the era's fervent drive for rapid modernization, rooted in emulation of Western models perceived as progressive. Second, using a historical narrative approach, this research highlights the pivotal role of foreign expertise in catalyzing and formalizing rationalization efforts. Originality/value: This study makes a unique and meaningful contribution to the history of management in terms of demonstrating the international influence of the Scientific Management Movement through the neglected case of Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the effects of banking integration on banking competition in the ASEAN‐6 countries. Using a data set of 3217 bank‐year observations over the period 1996–2018, our main results indicate that: (i) banking openness positively affects banking competition; (ii) the overall degree of balanced (in/out) integration leads to greater market power; and (iii) the increase in the market monopoly following the participation of foreign banks can be reduced by good regulatory policies. These results remain intact when two alternative competition measures are employed and when a polynomial model and a threshold model are used to reveal the non‐linear and heterogeneous effects of banking integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the competitive dynamics and digitalization within Kyrgyzstan's banking sector. The study analyzes the interplay between bank competition, digitalization, profitability, and stability using the two-step Generalized Method of Moments. Banking competition is assessed from 2012 to 2022 via the Lerner Index and the Boone Indicator. Furthermore, a novel method is employed to estimate the bank digitalization index based on the System Dynamics Approach. Findings indicate a competitive landscape marked by monopolistic competition, where digitalization enhances operational efficiency and competitive advantage. However, increased market power inversely affects digital adoption, suggesting monopolistic banks innovate less than their competitive peers. Further, the study highlights that intensified competition and digital adoption may encourage riskier bank behaviors, aligning with competition-fragility theory. Digitalization improves profitability, advocating for banks to adopt innovations to surpass competitors and improve financial performance. Policymakers are advised to foster a balanced competitive environment that encourages innovation without compromising bank stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work analyses the mutual dependence linking digital platforms, i.e., ‘Big Tech’, and the US military apparatus. Three main elements at the roots of such dependence are detected: an ‘originary linkage’ binding the development of digital platforms with governments’ military R&D efforts; the critical nature of infrastructures and technologies controlled by platforms; and their role as their government’s ‘eyes and ears’ (both at home and abroad). Focusing on the US, we first document the growing relevance of these corporations as US Department of Defense contractors. Second, we explore a selection of multi-year contracts entrusting platforms to develop and manage critical technologies and infrastructures for military purposes. Finally, we document the direct involvement of major US-based platforms in war scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wealth inequality remains as wide, and as troubling, as it was a half-century ago. While scholars have offered various explanations, there is a contributor that has escaped serious scrutiny: state monopoly power. It is not just that there is a long history of states and municipalities using their monopoly power to protect dominant interests, from enacting Black Codes to shuttering Chinese laundries to barring women, immigrants, and minorities from certain professions. It is also that states continue to use their monopoly power in ways that entrench inequality, from zoning restrictions to eminent domain to regulations that, in effect, bar Black women from braiding hair, Latino immigrants from operating food trucks, and more. To raise revenue, states even monopolize markets primarily patronized by vulnerable communities. And yet for the most part, antitrust law--concerned only with efficiency and consumer welfare--has ignored state monopolies. In fact, the Supreme Court has ruled that states are immune from antitrust review even though there is nothing in the Sherman Antitrust Act's text to support this position. This Article takes a different tack. It recovers the Sherman Antitrust Act's neglected connection to anti-state monopolism, and to the Reconstruction Amendments, to show that righting the wrongs of slavery and the Black Codes--both a type of monopoly, a type of price fixing--was a core motivation for the Sherman Antitrust Act. Far from believing states should be able to use their monopoly power with impunity, the Act's sponsor and namesake saw antitrust as a way to rein in discriminatory state monopolies. In short, this Article makes the case for bringing Reconstruction to bear on antitrust. Doing so would not only bring antitrust law closer to its original goal of economic opportunity for all. It would also help fulfill the lost promise of Reconstruction. We say this because, given how the courts have weakened the Fourteenth Amendment, enabling antitrust law to scrutinize a state's discriminatory monopolies would achieve an original purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes market concentration in communication, internet and media industries in Argentina, Brazil and Chile between 2019-2021 using CR4 and HHI indexes. It concludes that the Network Media Economy is highly concentrated. The Internet Core applications sectors operate in an almost monopolistic position. The telecommunications and Internet infrastructure sector collects the majority of revenues of the Network Media Economy with very high concentration in Wireless, Wireline and a little less, but still very high, in Multichannel video distribution and ISPs. Media sectors show significant concentration in audiovisual services and low concentration in online press. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) has a positive impact on average labor wage. • Labor income share increases more in local state-owned and nonstate-owned enterprises. • AML effectively promotes industry competition and boosts the labor income share. • AML reduces market power, curbs monopoly profit, and increases the average labor wage. This study examines the impact of increased market competition on labor income share. We use the enactment of China's Anti-Monopoly Law as a quasi-natural experiment. The results reveal that the Anti-Monopoly Law has a significant positive effect on the labor income share of firms with higher market power. This is because the rising market competition, effected by the Anti-Monopoly Law, inhibits market power and increases average labor wages. Our findings are relevant for firms in provinces with higher administrative monopolies, with less competition, and under industries with less competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyse the optimal discretion of a powerful local government (LG) in deciding the instrument choice and setting standards of simple menu contracts (composed of a fixed price and a cost reimbursement) of monopoly regulation. Between the two, a fixed-price contract entails more incentives for efficiency than a cost-reimbursement contract, but ensures more profits for the firm. Due to a preference bias towards the firm's benefits between governments, an incentive reward, offered by the federal government (FG) to the powerful LG with informational advantage of efficiency gain from the regulation, is considered to induce an efficient regulatory policy. We find that under the FG's delegation mechanism, upper-level government conflict leads to a compromised policy as an exchange payoff and additional informational rent to the LG for part of their information value. For the remaining information, the reward is rejected, and the LG has the discretionary power to set policy criteria for simple contracts. The results suggest that bureaucratic political issues still lead to an excessive tendency towards either a fixed price or cost reimbursement scheme, depending on the bias direction of the LG's preferences regarding the monopoly. However, the delegation mechanism of hierarchical bureaucracy can effectively alleviate the influence of policy distortions caused by political factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains recent developments in Korean competition law enforcement from three perspectives. First, the Korea Fair Trade Commission ('KFTC') has recently improved its public enforcement procedures, focusing on preventing the collection of irrelevant materials during its on-site investigations, ensuring confidentiality in the KFTC's investigations against the legal departments of investigated companies, and enabling more active participation from respondents in expressing their opinions. Second, the most significant progress in the enforcement of Korea's Monopoly Regulation and Fair-Trade Act ('MRFTA') is evident in criminal enforcement. The KFTC and various other national institutions are actively employing criminal penalties, compelling companies to consider criminal procedures early in their response to investigations. Third, advancements have also been made in private enforcement, including (1) increased damage suits by parties injured by MRFTA violations, (2) derivative suits initiated by shareholders to recover company losses, and (3) recent legislative efforts to promote private enforcement through injunctions that prevent and prohibit violations and assist the injured parties in proving damage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Forty years have passed since an inflation-adjusted price cap, widely called RPI-X, was proposed as a way of controlling prices in the UK's newly privatised monopoly telecommunications company by a form of incentive regulation. The paper traces developments since then in several jurisdictions, within the context of a wider field of changing regulatory governance involving legislatures and governments as well as regulatory agencies. The focus is on, first, the experience of increasing complexity of the incentive schemes adopted, and second on the growing political salience of regulatory decisions which adds goals such as net zero, with more direct quantitative targets, to maximising consumer welfare. The implications of these changes for regulatory interventions are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the applicability and implications of the political tournament model in Chinese cities by arguing that there is urban bias in political tournaments, especially in prefecture-level cities. Urban district leaders have to cooperate more and compete less than their counterparts in counties. The implication is that the percentage of urban districts is positively associated with monopolistic behavior of local government. Based on land leasing data of 290 prefecture-level cities from 2004 to 2014 (except 2012), it is found that the percentage of districts is positively associated with the speed of land price decline in leases through tender, auction and listing (TAL). This result supports the urban bias hypothesis in the context of the Coase Conjecture. It is also found that the total number of districts or population size is negatively associated with the speed of land price decline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to shed light on the relatively obscure landscape of industrial organization within the reinsurance sector, particularly in Brazil, which was among the last nations to dismantle state monopoly. Our objective is to assess the impact of concentration in the Brazilian reinsurance market on reinsurer performance. Employing traditional indexes from Industrial Organization literature and utilizing regression models for panel data, we examine the elasticity of revenues from reinsurers as a reflection of the sector's competitive structure. The data set comprises 78,190 observations from 164 reinsurers across 22 lines of business (LOB) monthly spanning from 2008 to 2022. The findings reveal a pronounced market concentration, with higher industry concentration correlating with diminished premium revenues across most LOBs. Additionally, Local reinsurers enjoy substantial advantages over Admitted and Occasional counterparts. Notably, factors such as portfolio diversification and economic group affiliation prove significant, particularly concerning the category of reinsurer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Privacy and antitrust are on a collision course. Large firms with monopoly power or near-monopoly power can build products that ostensibly enhance user privacy while raising rivals' costs and allowing monopolist firms to gain footholds in secondary markets. In this Note, I use the example of Apple's privacy changes, the impact these changes had on digital advertising, and Apple's subsequent expansion of its own digital marketing offerings as a motivating example of how current antitrust doctrine is ill-equipped to handle this new form of monopolist behavior. Privacy is the latest example of an "incommensurability" problem in the final stage of the standard rule of reason analysis. Even if a plaintiff can demonstrate competitive harm from privacy-preserving conduct, courts are constrained in what type of relief they can order. Fortunately, one of the main federal antitrust enforcers--the Federal Trade Commission--is also the source of much of federal privacy law. It has the authority and expertise to promulgate rules pursuant to section 18 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to address anticompetitive privacy and strike the appropriate balance between competition and consumer protection. Much of the Commission's privacy enforcement has reflected the heavily criticized "notice-and-choice" privacy framework. However, the Commission's recent initiation of the Magnusson-Moss rulemaking process signals an opening to not only move beyond this framework, but also to consider both competition and privacy in the formation of any rule regulating technology firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumer stockpiling involves the intertemporal demand substitution that allows the firm to differentiate stockpilers from others and employ varying pricing strategies. In this paper, I set up a two‐period monopoly model that incorporates consumer stockpiling behavior to investigate the effect of stockpiling‐based pricing. In equilibrium, I show that when the level of heterogeneity among consumers is high, consumer stockpiling can be used as a device for the firm to identify preferences and price discrimination. Welfare analysis suggests that consumer stockpiling improves consumer surplus and profit despite the associated stockpiling‐based pricing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Great Central Gas Consumers’ Company (GCGCC) was established by the metropolitan middle class to address the detrimental effects of gas industry monopoly through the promotion of market competition. It revealed that the middle class staunchly advocated for the use of liberalism to safeguard their own rights and interests, coinciding with Britain’s wider acceptance of liberalism and echoing the clarion call of the era of liberalism. Government engagement and interference in the formation of the GCGCC, as well as the ensuing disputation around it, could be seen as a manifestation of the principle of liberalism rather than a violation thereof. It reflected that liberalism was neither the absence of government nor total laissez-faire. The fact that the old gas companies adjusted their positions and compromised in favour of liberal principles demonstrated the more flexible response mechanisms of the modern industrial system to industrial and social problems, as well as the significant influence of liberalism on the development of the British industrial sector and society as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The threat of monopoly power looms large today. Although not the telecommunications and tobacco monopolies of old, the Goliaths of Big Tech have become today’s target for potential antitrust violations. It is not only their control over the social media infrastructure and digital advertising technologies that give people pause, but their monopolistic collection, use, and sale of customer data. But large technology companies are not the only private companies that have exclusive access to your data; that can crowd out competitors; and that can hold, use, or sell your data with little to no regulation. These other private companies are not data companies, platforms, or even brokers. They are public utilities. Although termed “public utilities,” these entities are overwhelmingly private, shareholder-owned entities. Like private Big Tech, utilities gather incredible amounts of data from customers and use this data in various ways. And like private Big Tech, these utilities can exercise exclusionary and self-dealing anticompetitive behavior with respect to customer data. But there is one critical difference— unlike Big Tech, utilities enjoy an implied immunity from antitrust laws. This state action immunity has historically applied to utility provision of essential services like electricity and heat. As utilities find themselves in the position of unsuspecting data stewards, however, there is a real and unexplored question about whether their long enjoyed antitrust immunity should extend to their data practices. As the first exploration of this question, this Article tests the continuing application and rationale of the state action immunity doctrine to the evolving services that a utility provides as the grid becomes digitized. It demonstrates the importance of staunching the creep of state action immunity over utility data practices. And it recognizes the challenges of developing remedies for such data practices that do not disrupt the state-sanctioned monopoly powers of utilities over the provision of essential services. This Article analyzes both antitrust and regulatory remedies, including a new customerfocused “data duty,” as possible mechanisms to enhance consumer (ratepayer) welfare in this space. Exposing utility data practices to potential antitrust liability may be just the lever that is needed to motivate states, public utility commissions, and utilities to develop a more robust marketplace for energy data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many ceasefire and peace agreements stipulate the disarmament and demobilization of pro-state armed groups involved in the conflict, yet few of these groups ever completely demobilize. This study seeks to explain the process of incomplete demobilization by advancing a theoretical argument that pro-state armed groups are least likely to disarm and demobilize when the monopoly on violence is fragmented, and when there is relative balance of capabilities and interests between the government and pro-state armed groups. Under these circumstances, both governments and pro-state armed groups may favor incomplete demobilization enabling them to pursue their strategic objectives. We draw on unique interview data with pro-state paramilitaries from Ukraine to empirically illustrate our theoretical expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the implications of stablecoins and their potential coexistence with sovereign money, advocating against such coexistence to maintain financial stability and monetary sovereignty. Topics include the historical context of sovereign money monopolies, the economic arguments against stablecoin coexistence, and legislative proposals aimed at regulating stablecoins versus creating sovereign digital currencies.

The ideal of self-correcting competitive markets has delayed proper acknowledgement of consumer harm and monopolization in technology platform markets. Two attitudes have long dominated the policy landscape: a historical reluctance to over-enforce antitrust and a tendency to frame the regulation of digital platforms in categorical terms. Should policy makers “regulate” or should they “break up” Big Tech? Should they decentralize digital power, or should they transform companies like Google into accountable bottlenecks? These ways of articulating the problem reflect an impoverished understanding of the scope of antitrust law and the nature of regulation in the digital economy more broadly. Policymakers often rely on narrow justifications for legal intervention such as efficiency, natural monopoly, externalities, and transaction costs. They conceive of antitrust, which includes remedies such as break-ups, as a body of law that acts marginally to preserve pre-legal, efficient, and decentralized market processes. They view utilities and other regulatory schemes as rigid modes of intervention in production that interfere with free competition and limit consumer choice and innovation. These conceptions obscure a more nuanced picture. Decentralizing and centralizing efforts, which structure digital markets, overlap across legal domains. To make sense of this overlap, the Article defends a conceptual move away from disciplinary categories and discontinuous remedial solutions and toward an experimentalist approach to law in digital ecosystems. In practice, antitrust and regulatory law are converging in revealing ways. Antitrust cases are increasingly sensitive to the gatekeeping power of platform intermediaries and procompetitive digital market regulation is on the rise. As such, the justifications for an either/or approach to antitrust and regulation, e.g., the preference for underenforcement and ex post intervention, are untenable. Antitrust is but one branch of law that structures and enables competition. Regulatory frameworks such as the DMA in Europe do not undermine but instead can promote competition, innovation, and consumer choice. Relying on the case of Google and its regulation between 1998 and 2022, and looking at regulatory schemes such as the EU DMA, AICOA and the AMERICA Act, the Article situates antitrust and public utility efforts as part of a spectrum of regulatory approaches to digital markets. It configures the space of regulatory possibility across ex ante and ex post, centralizing and decentralizing strategies. The question is not whether to break up or regulate Big Tech, it is what forms of competition, innovation, and choice a digital society needs as it transforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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