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Category emergence has been a central question in organization theory. Yet, we still do not understand what drives category persistence and updating during emergence as new information arises. We investigate this question through a rich set of oral histories and archival materials on the emergence of the category AIDS from 1978 to 1985. We show that the initial proto-category's features and causal theories cohered with its stigmatized moral meanings. Over time, anomalies challenging these features and theories spurred a minority of medical professionals to update the category's causal theory. However, a silent majority resisted updating the category because the new causal theory conflicted with the proto-category's moral meanings, challenging the clear moral boundary dividing what was perceived as worthy from what was perceived as unworthy. As a result, the majority silenced the vocal minority's updated understandings and withheld resources from the category. This article contributes to the literature on categorization by showing that conflicts between category dimensions can stifle updating, amplify imprinting, and prolong category persistence. Particularly, the dichotomous nature of the moral dimension might hinder the updating of other dimensions, such as the causal one, despite accumulated evidence suggesting the need for updates. We show that calls for category updating backed solely by rational arguments may fail to persuade the silent majority and may falter until the moral boundary is punctured and the category is morally reappraised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current research proposes a novel approach to identity-based choice that focuses on consumers' representations of the self-concept, as captured by the perceived cause–effect relationships among features of an individual consumer's self-concept. More specifically, the studies reported here test the proposal that the causal centrality of an identity—the number of other features of a consumer's self-concept that the consumer believes influenced or were influenced by the identity—underlies identity importance and is a determinant of identity-based consumer behaviors. Across seven studies, using both measured and manipulated causal centrality, the current research provides evidence for the role of causal centrality in identity-based choice. Among consumers who share an identity (belong to the same social category), those who believe that the identity is more causally central perceive the identity as more important and are more likely to engage in behaviors consistent with the norms of the social category. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In responding to Craig Thompson's commentary, we argue that assemblage, contrary to how it has often been theorised in consumer research, is subject oriented. Drawing on Deleuze, we explore how desire is thus not abstract but is part of a context of life that is organised by the subject. In neutralising the subject's attachments, consumer researchers are prevented from seeing how desires left unfulfilled can represent deeper social marginalisations and how the market incentivises unsustainable and uncaring behaviours. We argue that Craig's commentary raises the need to recognise that an affective architecture of feelings is always at work. We call for a more 'care-full' approach which does not ignore the desiring body, deny the power differentials that exist and apoliticises our attachments within these networks of relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a novel view in the the philosophy of race & causation literature known as "causal agnosticism" about race. Causal agnosticism about race implies that it is reasonable to refrain from making judgments about whether race is a cause. The paper's thesis asserts that certain conditions must be met to infer that something is a cause, according to the fundamental assumptions of causal inference. However, in the case of race, these conditions are often violated. By advocating for causal agnosticism, the paper suggests a more modest approach to understanding the role of race in causal relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frankfurt‐style cases suggest that an agent's moral responsibility for an action supervenes on the causal history of that action—at least when epistemic considerations are held constant. However, PAP‐style cases suggest that moral responsibility does not supervene on causal history, for judgments concerning an agent's responsibility for an action are also sensitive to the presence of alternative—and causally idle—possibilities. I appeal to the causal modeling tradition and the definitions of actual causation that derive therefrom in an attempt to resolve this contradiction. I show that even the weakest definitions of actual causation proposed in the literature establish that some PAP‐style cases constitute genuine counterexamples to the supervenience thesis. I consider several responses to these counterexamples on behalf of the defenders of supervenience and show that they fail. Our best current thinking on causation thus appears to be inconsistent with an intuitive and widely held claim concerning the nature of moral responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A theory of necessary and sufficient conditions is presented, as well as a theory of necessary and sufficient causes and effects, viewed as a particular case of the former. Ambiguities of the terms 'condition' and 'necessary condition' are explored, and a neutral meaning for 'condition' is favoured. The relation between necessary and sufficient conditions and implicative conditionals (including counterfactuals) is also discussed. Two problems of counterfactual theories of causal explanation are indicated, concerning (i) how to account for causes that are not necessary and (ii) how to interpret the counterfactual from the negation of the effect to the negation of the cause. Application of the theory of necessary and sufficient conditions to Euler's explanation of the Königsberg bridge problem is discussed. The theory of necessary and sufficient causes and effects is then applied to the flagpole shadow explanation and to two biological explanations, one involving a sufficient but not necessary cause and the other a necessary but not sufficient cause. Causes that are neither sufficient nor necessary are also recognized. Finally, a probabilistic approach to causes that are either not sufficient or not necessary is explored, including its application to examples of such cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces Karen Barad's philosophical framework of agential realism as an alternative philosophy of science perspective for quantitative psychology and measurement. Agential realism offers a rethinking of the research object, measurement process and outcome, causality, and the researcher's responsibility by proposing an ethico-epistem-ontological understanding of material-discursive practices that co-construct our world. The contemporary, canonical underlying philosophy of science perspective of quantitative psychology entails entity realism, a difference between ontic existence and epistemic approaches, complete causality, and determinism. Consequently, the researcher has no responsibility for the characteristics of a research object. The paper introduces agential realism and its assumptions about rejecting entity realism but a particular understanding of phenomena, the entanglement of ontic existence and epistemic approaches, and the researcher's role in co-creating an outcome. A reworking of the concept of causality implies newly emerging possibilities for realizations. Subsequently, the paper addresses four consequences of applying agential realism in quantitative psychology. (1) If there is indeterminacy in every phenomenon, researchers do not search for one true score but assume a realization potential, which has implications for comparisons and replications. (2) If configurations are part of things-in-phenomena, then context does not work as a third variable; instead, all 'parts' are co-creators. This entanglement must be considered in replications instead of trying to eliminate its impact. (3) Agential realism encompasses the researchers' responsibility to justify decisions made in a research project and to clarify ethics. (4) Overall, agential realism alters the research endeavor by asking new questions and interpreting research outcomes differently. Further directions point towards concrete tasks like methodological questions and the necessity within psychology to elaborate further on the conceptualizations initiated by Barad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, a conversation between Simon Grennan, Carol Wild, Miranda Matthews and Claire Penketh, explores drawing as cause and consequence, applying Grennan's thinking to three drawings as a means of exploring and exemplifying ideas discussed in his keynote at the iJADE Conference: Time in 2023. Following an initial introduction to key ideas that were raised for that audience, the paper explores the ways that three particular drawings operate, with temporality offering one of a number of ways that they may be explored. The paper centres on three questions: (i) What might students learn are the different purposes of drawing? (ii) How might students adjudicate the status of drawn traces? (iii) How might students adjudicate the value of drawing activities? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that absences pose a challenge to our understanding of physicalism that has not been properly appreciated. I do this by setting out a thought experiment involving a being in whom absence properties occupy the causal roles that functionalists take to define mental properties, in which case these absence properties realize the being's mental properties. Such a being should be compatible with the truth of physicalism, I argue, even though its mental properties are neither themselves physical properties nor are they realized/grounded in physical properties – instead, they are realized/grounded in (nonphysical) absence properties. I argue that the case serves as a counterexample to leading formulations of physicalism that appeal to realization or grounding, but not to standard supervenience-based formulations of physicalism, because the latter typically include negative truths in their supervenience base in addition to physical truths. I show how realization- and grounding-based formulations of physicalism might be revised to handle the problem, but also recommend that we rethink how we understand physicalism and the role that negative entities can play for physicalists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is Being a mere sum of separate things variously re‐combined over time? Or is it not there at all, arising from nothing more than the projection of a fevered metaphysical imagination? Or might it be the intrawoven phenomenon of all we experience, grounded in a single underlying all‐determining nature? This is the first of a pair of articles on the ontological issues that prompted a philosophical fork between pluralism, nihilism, and monism in India. The present article will focus on Indian critiques of metaphysical pluralism based on the apparent incoherence of ultimately individuating reality's building blocks. The second article will focus on debates about grounding of the causal powers that shape the world and fix it modally. I trace critiques of pluralism (the view found in Vaiśeṣika and Abhidharma that Being is composed of plural fundamental 'bits') through to the competing conclusions of the Madhyamaka 'emptiness' view, and Vedānta's idea that there is a single ground of all Being. For the nihilists, commonsense realism about Being must be repudiated in such a way as to destroy the notion of Being itself. For the monists, the philosophical problems with a pluralistic ontology show that Being is a complex yet holistic medium, and the ground of a cosmos‐defining modal inheritance. Thus in each article I tell the story of how debates about individuation, relation, causation, recombination and modal inheritance blossomed into some of history's most radical philosophies of Being—and in each I set out some prospects for the monistic view's core ontological claims that Being is, and is one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The document discusses the appropriate domain of application for metaphors and similes, providing clear definitions and distinctions between the two. It critiques the conflation of metaphors and similes in literature and philosophy, emphasizing the importance of logic in scientific and philosophical discourse. The author refutes the Neoclassical interpretation of Adam Smith's invisible hand concept, arguing that it is not a metaphor but a straightforward causal statement. The document highlights the significance of using similes and analogies in scientific reasoning and warns against the overuse of metaphors in logical arguments. [Extracted from the article]

David Mitchell’s The Bone Clocks reworks the novel form with its generic experimentation, a gesture in response to the transformed geosocial contours of the Anthropocene. Straddling between the realist and the fantastical, the novel decentralizes human perspective that proves increasingly unsatisfactory to confront the complex causality of climate change for imaginative and conceptual limits. In this essay, I argue that Mitchell attends to a conceptual limit imposed by petroculture, one that refuses to connect the future warming climate with the present large-scale combustion of fossil fuels. The temporal disjunction evolves into a strong antagonism between present and future, which can be tellingly revealed by the coupling of realist and fantastical traditions. Mitchell’s genre-blending device therefore pushes the novel form beyond its usual near-sightedness, excavating a deeper layer of climate-induced crisis of human imagination, namely the present’s inability to recognize the delayed effects of its unsustainable consumption pattern. Viewed through an energy-oriented perspective, The Bone Clocks engages with modernity’s ultradeep relationship with oil, complicating our understanding of climate temporality that matters in terms of intergenerational justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article delves into the historical evolution of causal theory, tracing the shift from thing-causation to event-causation in philosophy. It discusses how prominent philosophers like David Hume challenged traditional causal realism, paving the way for a reevaluation of event causation. The text also explores the unintended consequences of advocating for agent causation, which ultimately led to the dominance of event-causation in modern philosophical discourse. This examination raises important questions about the implications of this shift for ongoing debates on causation in contemporary philosophy. [Extracted from the article]

Chagas disease is a prevalent health problem in Latin America which has received insufficient attention worldwide. Current treatments for this disease, benznidazole and nifurtimox, have limited efficacy and may cause side effects. A recent study proposed investigating a wide range of nitroindazole and indazolone derivatives as feasible treatments. Therefore, it is proposed that adding a nitro group at the 5-position of the indazole and indazolone structure could enhance trypanocidal activity by inducing oxidative stress through activation of the nitro group by NTRs (nitroreductases). The study results indicate that the nitro group advances free radical production, as confirmed by several analyses. Compound 5a (5-nitro-2-picolyl-indazolin-3-one) shows the most favorable trypanocidal activity (1.1 ± 0.3 µM in epimastigotes and 5.4 ± 1.0 µM in trypomastigotes), with a selectivity index superior to nifurtimox. Analysis of the mechanism of action indicated that the nitro group at the 5-position of the indazole ring induces the generation of reactive oxygen species (ROS), which causes apoptosis in the parasites. Computational docking studies reveal how the compounds interact with critical residues of the NTR and FMNH2 (flavin mononucleotide reduced) in the binding site, which is also present in active ligands. The lipophilicity of the studied series was shown to influence their activity, and the nitro group was found to play a crucial role in generating free radicals. Further investigations are needed of derivatives with comparable lipophilic characteristics and the location of the nitro group in different positions of the base structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate data collected through Internet of Things (IoT) devices often contain high‐dimensional, nonlinear, and auto‐correlated characteristics, and general causality analysis methods obtain quantitative causality analysis results between variables based on conditional independence tests or Granger causality, and so forth. However, it is difficult to capture dynamic properties between variables of temporal distribution, which can obtain information that cannot be obtained by the mean detection method. Therefore, this paper proposed a new causality analysis method based on Peter‐Clark (PC) algorithm and modified local Granger causality (MLGC) analysis method, called PC‐MLGC, to reveal the causal relationships between variables and explore the dynamic properties on temporal distribution. First, the PC algorithm is applied to compute the relevant variables of each variable. Then, the results obtained in the previous stage are fed into the modified local Granger causality analysis model to explore causalities between variables. Finally, combined with the quantitative causality analysis results, the dynamic characteristic curves between variables can be obtained, and the accuracy of the causal relationship between variables can be further verified. The effectiveness of the proposed method is further demonstrated by comparing it with standard Granger causality analysis and a two‐stage causal network learning method on one benchmark dataset and two real‐world datasets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an apparent tension in Shepherd's accounts of space and time. Firstly, Shepherd explicitly claims that we know that the space and time of the unperceived world exist because they cause our phenomenal experience of them. Secondly, Shepherd emphasizes that empty space and time do not have the power to effect any change in the world. My proposal is that for Shepherd time has exactly one causal power: to provide for the continued existence of self-same or changing objects. Because Shepherd takes causation to be a relation whereby two objects combine to form a third, their effect, whenever we perceive a continually existing object, since time is a proper part of such objects, our perception of time is caused by time itself. Likewise, space's causal power is to provide for the possibility of the motion or rest of objects, and so when we perceive objects with space as a proper part, we come into causal contact with space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Everything that happens has a multitude of causes, but people make causal judgments effortlessly. How do people select one particular cause (e.g., the lightning bolt that set the forest ablaze) out of the set of factors that contributed to the event (the oxygen in the air, the dry weather ...)? Cognitive scientists have suggested that people make causal judgments about an event by simulating alternative ways things could have happened. We argue that this counterfactual theory explains many features of human causal intuitions, given two simple assumptions. First, people tend to imagine counterfactual possibilities that are both a priori likely and similar to what actually happened. Second, people judge that a factor C caused effect E if C and E are highly correlated across these counterfactual possibilities. In a reanalysis of existing empirical data, and a set of new experiments, we find that this theory uniquely accounts for people's causal intuitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper critiques two recent suggestions, by Lei Zhong and Thomas Kroedel, about how to apply the interventionist theory of causation to cases where supervenient properties, particularly mental properties, are involved. According to both suggestions, we should hold variables corresponding to supervenient properties fixed when intervening on the subvenient properties with respect to a putative effect variable and vice versa. The paper argues that both suggestions are problematic. Zhong's suggestion ultimately requires ad hoc exemptions from the holding-fixed requirement. Kroedel's suggestion entails severe constraints on the construction of causal models. Overall, retaining the holding-fixed requirements of interventionism for cases of supervenient properties comes at a significant price. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People judge causation and attribute responsibility by simulating counterfactual alternatives. The counterfactual simulation model (CSM) captures people's causal judgments about physical events and responsibility judgments about social events. In the physical domain, the CSM predicts people's judgments about dynamic collision events, about omissive causes, and about physical support. People spontaneously engage in counterfactual simulation when making causal judgments, as evidenced by their eye-movements. In the social domain, the CSM predicts people's responsibility judgments in helping and hindering scenarios. How do people make causal judgments and assign responsibility? In this review article, I argue that counterfactual simulations are key. To simulate counterfactuals, we need three ingredients: a generative mental model of the world, the ability to perform interventions on that model, and the capacity to simulate the consequences of these interventions. The counterfactual simulation model (CSM) uses these ingredients to capture people's intuitive understanding of the physical and social world. In the physical domain, the CSM predicts people's causal judgments about dynamic collision events, complex situations that involve multiple causes, omissions as causes, and causes that sustain physical stability. In the social domain, the CSM predicts responsibility judgments in helping and hindering scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The developmental properties of organisms play important roles in the generation of variation necessary for evolutionary change. But how can individual development steer the course of evolution? To answer this question, we introduce developmental channeling as a disposition of individual organisms that shapes their possible developmental trajectories and evolutionary dappling as an evolutionary outcome in which the space of possible organismic forms is dappled—it is only partially filled. We then trace out the implications of the channeling-dappling framework for contemporary debates in the philosophy of evolution, including evolvability, reciprocal causation, and the extended evolutionary synthesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A supervised probabilistic dynamic-controlled latent-variable (SPDCLV) model is proposed for online prediction, as well as real-time optimisation of process quality indicators. Compared to existing probabilistic latent-variable models, the key advantage of the proposed method lies in explicitly modelling the dynamic causality from the manipulated inputs to the quality pattern. This is achieved using a well-designed, dynamic-controlled Bayesian network. Furthermore, the algorithms for expectation-maximisation, forward filtering, and backward smoothing are designed for learning the SPDCLV model. For engineering applications, a framework for pattern-based quality prediction and optimisation is proposed, under which the pattern-filtering and pattern-based soft sensor are explored for online quality prediction. Furthermore, quality optimisation can be realised by directly controlling the pattern to the desired condition. Finally, case studies on both an industrial primary milling circuit and a numerical example illustrate the benefits of the SPDCLV method in that it can fully model the process dynamics, effectively predict and optimise the quality indicators, and monitor the process. • A supervised probabilistic dynamic-controlled latent-variable (SPDCLV) method for quality-pattern modelling. • Expectation-maximisation, forward-filtering, and backward-smoothing algorithms for SPDCLV-model learning. • Dynamic causality from external manipulated inputs to latent quality pattern. • Pattern filtering and pattern-based dynamic soft-sensing for quality prediction. • A framework for pattern-based quality prediction and optimisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The neoliberal higher education model has often co-opted efforts from justice-based movements to disrupt academic complicity in a capitalist and colonial system of exploitation. Higher education institutions have already begun looking to, and appropriating, language and ideas from the climate justice movement to perform a response to the injustices that have led to and resulted from the climate crisis. As one way of subverting this appropriation, this article articulates, and reflects on, a specific approach to the Vertically Integrated Program (VIP) model, an educational idea originally developed at the Georgia Institute of Technology where undergraduate students work as researchers with faculty and graduate students. The approach put forth in this article is one based on the experience of the authors in developing a VIP that aims to foster and practice a culture of solidarity with an organisation that is addressing the causes and effects of historical injustices facing the community from which it grew. The practice of solidarity at a time of climate crisis offers a potential solution, showing students that it can be used to break down the walls of higher education, to practice solidarity with those excluded outside of it, and to remind us all of our humanity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores Charles S. Peirce's taxonomy of sign classes, which aims to categorize signs based on Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Scholars have proposed various solutions to organize the sixty-six classes of signs, discussing trichotomic analysis, degenerations of categories, and the application of universal categories to sign aspects. The text introduces the concept of semiostasis to explain semiosis processes, detailing phases of semiosis and cognitive capacities like perceiving/acting and comprehension/instructing. A periodic table of sign classes is presented, organizing classes into periods and phases to understand the communication of signs in semiosis, emphasizing the importance of universal semiotics and the participatory nature of minds. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the decline in sexual activity in American society, attributing it to factors such as the pandemic, technological isolation, and societal norms. It explores the concept of "erotic depression" as a wider pathology affecting society. The text delves into the intersection of sexuality, public and private spaces, and the need for a reevaluation of societal norms to address issues of erotic perception and ecological vitality. It advocates for direct action and collaboration to bring about meaningful change in response to the climate crisis and emphasizes the importance of shared experiences and interactions in fostering a sense of community and well-being. [Extracted from the article]

What sense does it make to say that a new program implemented in a community with roots as old as evolution caused an observed health benefit? Evaluation of community approaches has often sought to isolate the causal roles of interventions. Central to this is the assumption that there are causes to be proven and isolated. Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) dismissed the concept of cause, arguing that all things, "substances," are not caused but simply are. Actions of things in nature can influence each other, e.g., erosion of a mountain, but their substance, the mountains simply are. For Spinoza, satisfaction in life comes from realizing and acting in accord with our substance, but this requires communities that support such realization and action. Thus, communities and the vast influences they contain are central to human welfare. Interventions within them do not cause benefits but join with the history, culture, and numerous other features of the community in becoming part of how the community influences its members. Implications include a) expanding the social ecological model fully to embrace multiple influences – including innovative programs – and interactions among them, and c) varied research methods to identify practical lessons about how communities may adopt and incorporate innovations to engender change, rather than a catalogue of interventions that are supposed to change them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rise of machine learning and "big data," many large yet spurious relationships between variables are discovered, leveraged by marketing communications, and publicized in the media. Thus, consumers are increasingly exposed to many large-magnitude relationships between variables that do not signal causal effects. This exposure may carry a substantial cost. Seven studies demonstrate that the magnitudes of relationships between variables can distort consumers' judgments about whether those relationships reflect causal effects. Specifically, consumers often use a magnitude heuristic : consumers infer that relationships with larger perceived magnitudes are more likely to reflect causal effects, even when this is not true (and even when relationships' correlations are held constant). In many situations, relying on the magnitude heuristic will distort causality judgments, such as when large-magnitude relationships between variables are spurious, or when normatively extraneous factors (e.g. reference points) distort perceptions of magnitudes. Moreover, magnitude-distorted (mis)perceptions of causality, in turn, distort consumers' purchase and consumption decisions. Since consumers often encounter spurious relationships with large magnitudes in the health domain and in other consequential domains, the magnitude heuristic is likely to lead to biases in some of consumers' most important decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, Ross and Woodward (2022) argued that the reversibility of an outcome – that is, whether the outcome can be undone – affects causal judgments. One prediction of their account is that reversibility affects causal judgments in late-preemption scenarios, where people typically judge that events that produce the outcome earlier are more causal than preempted alternative events that would have otherwise produced the outcome. Ross and Woodward’s account predicts that when the outcome is reversible, people would judge these events similarly – as in standard overdetermination cases. In three experiments, we found no evidence that reversibility affects causal judgments in late-preemption cases. We discuss how these results affect the experimental philosophy and cognitive science of causation, causal modeling, and experimental jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I analyse Émilie Du Châtelet’s (1706–49) account of causation which, in turn, is crucial for understanding her philosophical main work, the Institutions de physique (1740/1742). So far, the topic of causation in Du Châtelet’s thought has received but little attention despite its importance. I will show that Du Châtelet’s account of physical causation is that of physical influx much in line with the position taken by some of the most prominent eighteenth-century German metaphysicians at the time of the publication of her Institutions: Martin Knutzen (1713–49), Johann Peter Reusch (1691–1758) and the pre-Critical Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). I will argue that physical influx takes place at the level of simple substances or physical monads, and I will defend my interpretation against the main objection to physical influx: that it conflicts with Leibniz’s non-transfer argument. The ultimate metaphysical details regarding how physical influx has to be understood remain an issue, that of understanding the causality of the cause. This, however, is an issue that other causal theories face, too (in their own way). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question whether there are virtual objects grows more salient, as virtual reality (VR) technology becomes commercially viable. Arguments for realism about virtual objects rely on virtual causation. This paper argues that current accounts of virtual causation (both realist and irrealist) are inadequate – realists oversimplify the relation between virtual objects, virtual events, and their digital counterparts, while irrealists conflate virtual objects with their on-screen representations. Once these issues are rectified, it becomes clear that virtual causation is illusory, because the presumed structure of causal interactions between virtual objects does not map onto the structure of causal interactions between underlying computational objects and processes. Thus, the key realist contention that the causal interactions between virtual objects reveal their identity with the underlying computational objects and processes (digital objects) cannot be sustained. I conclude that an appropriate understanding of virtual causation favours irrealism about virtual objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows that Spinoza went through a drastic change in his view on divine teleology, and that this change is worth paying attention to. In the Short Treatise (KV), Spinoza endorsed a version of divine teleology. As is widely recognized, however, he explicitly rejects divine teleology in the Ethics. I argue that this marks a significant change in his view. To illustrate the significance, I argue that Spinoza consistently maintains the following two premises in both the KV and the Ethics: (1) human beings act on account of some end; (2) human actions are actions of God. While the endorsement of divine teleology is consistent with these two, the rejection of divine teleology results in a trilemma. The trilemma, to be sure, can be resolved by introducing referential opacity to divine action contexts. I argue, however, that it is worth asking why Spinoza revised his view in this way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Causal multivariate time-series analysis, combined with network theory, provide a powerful tool for studying complex ecological interactions. However, these methods have limitations often underestimated when used in graphical modelling of ecological systems. In this opinion article, I examine the relationship between formal logic methods used to describe causal networks and their inherent statistical and epistemological limitations. I argue that while these methods offer valuable insights, they are restricted by axiomatic assumptions, statistical constraints and the incompleteness of our knowledge. To prove that, I first consider causal networks as formal systems, define causality and formalize their axioms in terms of modal logic and use ecological counterexamples to question the axioms. I also highlight the statistical limitations when using multivariate time-series analysis and Granger causality to develop ecological networks, including the potential for spurious correlations among other data characteristics. Finally, I draw upon Gödel's incompleteness theorems to highlight the inherent limits of fully understanding complex networks as formal systems and conclude that causal ecological networks are subject to initial rules and data characteristics and, as any formal system, will never fully capture the intricate complexities of the systems they represent. This article is part of the theme issue 'Connected interactions: enriching food web research by spatial and social interactions'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue was based on a flagship panel of the 2022 International Association for Critical Realism (IACR) annual conference held at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague on realist complexity. The aim of this special issue is to capture and specify what Critical Realism (CR) can contribute to the literature on complexity. Against the background of previous attempts that have subsequently coalesced the two under the rubric of 'Complex Realism', the primary objective here takes stock of the various analytical shortcomings of 'Complex Realism' and aims instead to understand how CR scholars analytically treat complexity. Put differently, the contributors of this special issue problematize the amalgam between CR and complexity evident in 'Complex Realism' and ask instead how CR deals with complexity (Realist Complexity). In so doing, they present a variety of arguments and approaches which will be dealt with below. The next section will provide a short background on the origins of complexity sciences before it highlights both the tents and shortcoming of Complex Realism. The final section will provide a summary of all key contributors of this special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper approaches globalization through the lens of folk lore, myth, and John Law's hopeful monsters, focusing on Hannah Twynnoy, a woman allegedly killed by a tiger in Malmesbury (England) in 1703. Hannah's death was taken up three hundred years later as a metaphor for globalization when local factory jobs were relocated to a 'tiger economy' (Malaysia). Taken to manifest Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury's 'state of nature', Hannah's story also illustrates the reverse. Globalization can fragment and deregulate, but globalization assembles and regulates to. Hannah's gravestone and burial records blend real and virtual, local, and global; the genealogy of 'tigers' challenges Michel Foucault; and questions regarding blame echo across centuries, in ongoing conflict over agency and causation (as per Edmund Evans). Is globalisation a 'jungle out there'? No. Local factory jobs did go. Nevertheless, sustaining global intellectual property regulation means the company employs more people in Malmesbury today than before manufacturing relocated. After it was announced that local jobs would be 'eaten up' by a 'tiger economy', a spate of alien big cat (ABC) sightings near Malmesbury did express what Susan Lepselter calls the inchoate injuries of class and power. Indeed, experiencing such fabulous things did resonate with something real. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Our study aims to address two pivotal questions: "What are the recent advancements in understanding the etiology of urological tumors through Mendelian Randomization?" and "How can Mendelian Randomization be more effectively applied in clinical settings to enhance patient health outcomes in the future?" Methods: In our systematic review conducted in April 2023, we utilized databases like PubMed and Web of Science to explore the influence of Mendelian Randomization in urological oncological diseases. We focused on studies published from January 2018, employing keywords related to urological tumors and Mendelian Randomization, supplemented with MeSH terms and manual reference checks. Our inclusion criteria targeted original research studies, while we excluded reports and non-relevant articles. Data extraction followed a PICO-based approach, and bias risk was independently evaluated, with discrepancies resolved through discussion. This systematic approach adhered to PRISMA guidelines for accuracy and thoroughness in reporting. Results: From the initial 457 publications, we narrowed down to 43 full-text articles after screening and quality assessments. A deeper understanding of Mendelian Randomization can help us explore risk factors with a clear causal relationship to urological tumors. This insight may pave the way for future research in early diagnosis, treatment, and management of associated diseases. Conclusion: Our review underscores the value of MR in urogenital tumor research, highlighting its efficacy in establishing causality and its potential to clarify disease mechanisms. Despite challenges like large sample sizes and variant identification, MR offers new perspectives for understanding and managing these tumors, suggesting a trend towards more inclusive and diverse research approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main aim of this article, which is to express the essence of du'a, starts with a question: what is du'a, and doesn't it constitute a gap in the system of causality and rational structure of the creation of the world? A definition of the essence of du'a and its dynamics is given through the presentation of the essential basis of the creation of the world according to some Quranic verses, as well as Islamic speculative Gnosticism according to which the world is based on desire and demand (talab). On this basis, the ontological status of du'a and the fact that it does not contradict God's wisdom is underlined. The second part of the study is based on an interpretation of a Quranic verse according to which the reality of du'a is made possible only thanks to God and through His creation of an innate divine human nature, which naturally searches its God and addresses its demands to Him. From this point of view, the special status of man in respect to all the other creatures who, through his supplications, is responsible of defining his ontological status in this world and the hereafter, is also presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ibn Sīnā famously opens The Metaphysics (Al-ilāhiyyāt) of The Healing (Al-šifāʾ) with a discussion of what constitutes the subject matter of that science. Several candidates are introduced and subsequently dismissed, before "the existent qua existent" is identified as its subject matter. Among the candidates dismissed, he mentions "the ultimate causes for all existents, the four of them" (which are, however, things investigated [ maṭālib ] in this science). Here, Ibn Sīnā comes to problematise the notion of causality itself. He is adamant that "the existence of causes for things which are effects" is not self-evident, but needs to be proven by the metaphysician by means of a "demonstrative clarification" (bayān burhānī). He explains why sensation (ḥiss) and experience (taǧriba) cannot prove causality, before turning to its metaphysical proof. In this article, I investigate what Ibn Sīnā thought this "demonstrative clarification" of causality is. I present an analysis of his train of thought and a commentary on the various points he makes, leading up to his proof of causality. These points touch on problems of psychology, scientific method, and scientific proof, and can be unpacked by taking into account explanations he offers elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Any progress in shaping up an externalist psychiatry, so previous discussion suggested, must begin from questions about the ontology of social causation. So far, research and theory have adhered to a naturalistic approach to the social causes of illness, concentrating mostly on the 'social determinants of mental health' (inequality, discrimination, housing insecurity, etc.). The paper starts with an assessment of 'social determinants' through the lens of epidemiology and critical psychiatry. It illustrates existing practical and political approaches that fight these constraints and it highlights their therapeutic value. It argues, though, that a focus on social determinants is not sufficient for fully realizing externalism because a great portion of sociogenic illness remains causally indeterminate. Alongside political action, externalism requires a social etiology that is established by virtue of the meaning that it holds for patients, rather than by virtue of its capacity to identify objective social causes of illness. This entails abandoning naturalism about social causation and embracing constructivism. The paper shows that this methodological shift is less contradictory and more effective than it is commonly imagined. Drawing from further anthropological evidence, it concludes that only by lending support to projects that balance a focus on constraints with social construction will psychiatry be truly externalist. At stake is a prospect of effective treatment for sociogenic illness for the countless in struggle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various different impairments and their interactions can cause reading problems referred to as "dyslexia". Since reading requires the interaction of many abilities, the impairment of each of these abilities can result in dyslexia. Therefore, the diagnosis must differentiate various kinds of dyslexia. The diagnosis of a certain kind of dyslexia cannot be delimited to the investigation and description of symptoms but must also include the investigation of the causes of each kind of dyslexia. For this purpose, a scientifically unequivocal concept of causation and appropriate methods are needed to distinguish them from co-existing impairments that have no causal influence on reading performance. The results of applying these methods cannot be adequately accounted for by a non-scientific, intuitive understanding of necessary and sufficient conditions and causation. The methods suitable for revealing the causes of dyslexia are described in detail, and the results of applying these methods in experiments, in which 356 children with developmental dyslexia participated, are reviewed. Since the concepts of "necessary" and "sufficient" conditions and "causation" proposed in the philosophy of science are not suitable for describing causes of dyslexia and their interaction, they are replaced by a more detailed, experimentally based conceptual framework that provides an accurate description of the conditions required for correct reading and the causes of dyslexia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce the overall topic of the S.I. Difference-Making and Explanatory Relevance and provide brief summaries of the twelve contributed articles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we develop a non-reductive variant of the regularity theory of causation proposed in Andreas and Günther (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105: 2–32, 2024). The variant is motivated as a refinement of Lewis's (Journal of Philosophy 70:556–567, 1973) regularity theory. We do not pursue a reductive theory here because we found a challenge for Baumgartner's (Erkenntnis 78:85–109, 2013) regularity theory which applies to our previous theory as well. The challenge is sidestepped by a framework of law-like propositions resembling structural equations. We furthermore improve the deviancy condition of our previous theory. Finally, we show that the present theory can compete with the most advanced regularity and counterfactual accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key challenge for probabilistic causal models is to distinguish non-causal probabilistic dependencies from true causal relations. To accomplish this task, causal models are usually required to satisfy several constraints. Two prominent constraints are the causal Markov condition and the faithfulness condition. However, other constraints are also needed. One of these additional constraints is the causal sufficiency condition, which states that models must not omit any direct common causes of the variables they contain. In this paper, I argue that the causal sufficiency condition is problematic: (1) it is incompatible with the requirement that the variables in a model must not stand in non-causal necessary dependence relations, such as mathematical or conceptual relations, or relations described in terms of supervenience or grounding, (2) it presupposes more causal knowledge as primitive than is actually needed to create adequate causal models, and (3) if models are only required to be causally sufficient, they cannot deal with cases where variables are probabilistically related by accident, such as Sober's example of the relationship between bread prices in England and the sea level in Venice. I show that these problems can be avoided if causal models are required to be monotonic in the following sense: the causal relations occurring in a model M would not disappear if further variables were added to M. I give a definition of this monotonicity condition and conclude that causal models should be required to be monotonic rather than causally sufficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hierarchical groups shape social, political, and personal life. This paper concerns the question of how individuals within such groups can be responsible. The paper explores how individual responsibility can be partially grounded in difference-making. The paper concentrates on the control condition of responsibility and takes into view three distinct phenomena of responsibility in hierarchical groups. First, a superior can be responsible for outcomes that her subordinates bring about. Second, a subordinate can be responsible although she is unable to prevent the outcome she brings about. Third, a superior can sometimes be responsible to a greater degree than her subordinates. It is argued that difference-making, as an interpretation of the control condition that partially grounds responsibility, accounts for all three of these phenomena within a limited but significant range of circumstances and can hence partially ground individual moral responsibility in hierarchical groups. The paper provides an element of a theory of individual responsibility to complement theories of corporate responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I explore the question of how to ground the responsibility of agents in some tricky cases involving multiple agents who act in a non-coordinated fashion. These are scenarios where no single agent has the individual ability to make a difference to a harmful outcome, but where the outcome would have been avoided if they had all acted as they should have (thus, the agents collectively made a difference to the outcome's occurrence). I argue that an important source of the problem is that it's hard to motivate a concept of cause that can be behind the agents' responsibility in these cases. I illustrate the problem with a particular example: Yablo's proportionality criterion on causation. I then sketch a possible solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Dead Past Growing Block theory of time—DPGB-theory—is the metaphysical view that the past and the present tenselessly exist, whereas the future does not, and that only the present hosts mentality, whereas the past lacks it and is, in this sense, dead. One main reason in favour of this view is that it is immune to the now-now objection or epistemic objection (which aims at undermining the certainty, within an A-theoretical universe, of being currently experiencing the objective present time). In this paper, I examine the additional arguments offered by P. Forrest and G. A. Forbes to back the DPGB-theory and show that they do not work. I also examine a proposal to rescue the DPGB-theory suggested by an anonymous reviewer for this journal and argue that it does not work either. Moreover, in line with D. Braddon-Mitchell and against Forbes, I argue that the DPGB-theory is indeed committed to the existence of zombies in the past. Being ad hoc and burdened by a very odd and counterintuitive ontological commitment, the DPGB-theory turns out to be rather unpalatable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Free will plays a critical role in human motivation. Recent advances in science and technologies have had a significant impact on free will. They have raised serious concerns regarding the threatening effects of such advancements on perceived autonomy. However, there is still a longstanding debate on the existence of free will, known as the problem of free will. Philosophers have provided contrasting views regarding the existence of free will and its relationship with causal determination and mental causation problems. These problems are related to the underlying dualistic approach between mental and physical factors. Similar to the philosophy literature, the motivation literature is concerned with the problem of free will and its influence on motivation and performance. Cognitive evaluation and self-determination theories are the most renowned theories which assert the effect of autonomy (i.e., free will) on intrinsic motivation. However, these theories have mainly focused on the effect of the need for autonomy as an underlying driver of intrinsic motivation. They have not been able to address the fundamental question about the existence of actual free will and its effect on motivation and performance. This is mainly due to their dualistic approach in the form of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation dichotomization. Motivational congruence theory addresses the problem of free will and substantiates its effect by going beyond such a dualistic approach and resolving the related problems of mental causation and causal determination. The theory does this by taking a cotextualist and dialectical approach to the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivational mechanisms and context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Dinbilimleri Journal is the property of Dinbilimleri Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Compatibilists aim to solve the causal exclusion problem by arguing that a physical cause and a mental cause are compatible with each other without involving the problematic overdetermination. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I target at Karen Bennett's (2003, 2008) influential compatibilist strategy—one that rests on the assumption that a mental cause is sufficient for bringing about a physical effect, just as a physical cause is. I argue that, on a plausible physicalist picture, this assumption cannot be established. Second, I propose a weaker and more plausible interpretation of the mental efficacy, which takes a mental cause to be necessary (but not sufficient) for a physical effect in a counterfactual sense. The resulting picture of mental causation avoids the difficulties engendered from Bennett's assumption and delivers fresh resources to solve the exclusion problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]