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Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) play a critical role in supply chains and social stability. Unfortunately, SMEs often lack access to traditional bank financing. To develop SME suppliers, some creditworthy companies have built platforms to coordinate banks and suppliers by employing purchase order financing (POF). After noting that SMEs differ in terms of their operational flexibility and uncertainty, this research examines optimal purchasing portfolios on such platforms. Specifically, we construct a Stackelberg model involving one buyer and two suppliers and analyse the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker necessary conditions for a buyer's strategy upon which the optimal portfolio can be achieved. According to the experiments that we design to simulate about 200,000 various scenarios, the large buyer only needs to consider the top five strategies. The choice of strategy mainly depends on cost differences of suppliers, and flexibility can be used as an identifier of the purchase quantity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We revisit a coarse-grained model to study the dynamics of ribonucleic acid (RNA). In our model, each nucleotide is replaced by an interaction center located at the center of mass. The interaction between nucleotides is carried out by a series of effective pair potentials obtained from the statistical analysis of 501 RNA molecules of high molecular weight from the Protein Data Bank. In addition to the Watson–Crick interactions, we also include non-canonical interactions, which provide stability to the three-dimensional (3D) structure of the molecule. The resulting knowledge-based interactions for the nucleotides (KIN) model allow us to perform efficient Brownian dynamics simulations under different conditions. First, we simulate the stretch of a set of hairpins at a loading rate similar to the values employed in unfolding experiments near equilibrium using optical tweezers. Additionally, we explore unfolding a set of pseudoknots under conditions farther from equilibrium, namely, at loading rates higher than the experimental equilibrium values. The results of our simulations are compared with those obtained from experimental measurements and theoretical models intended to estimate transition states and activation energies. Our KIN model is able to reproduce the intermediate states observed during mechanical unfolding experiments. Moreover, the results of the KIN model are in good agreement with the measured data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Banks' information technology (IT) capabilities affect their ability to serve customers during the COVID-19 pandemic, which generates an unexpected and unprecedented shock that shifts banking services from in-person to digital. Amid mobility restrictions, banks with better IT experience larger reductions in physical branch visits and larger increases in website traffic, implying a larger shift to digital banking. Stronger IT banks are able to originate more Paycheck Protection Program loans to small business borrowers, especially in areas with more severe COVID-19 outbreaks, higher internet use, and higher bank competition. Those banks also attract more deposit flows and receive better mobile customer reviews during the pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a general equilibrium framework, we show that banks may "buy" political influence at a discount: They offer disproportionately small campaign contributions compared to the influence they exert, thus generating abnormal returns. We distinguish between the direct effect of contributions which, as a cost, reduce bank returns, and the indirect effect of contributions which boost returns via inducing bank-favoring policies. Therefore, abnormal returns may or may not increase with the amount of contributions, depending on which effect dominates: Stricter capital requirements decrease contributions and abnormal returns. When politicians attach more weight to households' welfare, contributions increase and abnormal returns decrease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to understand whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail in a major financial crisis. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits almost exclusively decline for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that banks are better informed about which fellow banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing liquidity even during times of severe financial distress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies how the rise of financial technology (Fintech) lending affects credit access, interest rates, and social welfare. We consider a lending competition model with two incumbent banks and a Fintech lender, which use different information and technologies to assess borrower creditworthiness. We show that Fintech lending could negatively affect high-quality borrowers' access to credit when the Fintech lender's screening accuracy is superior to that of the banks. Furthermore, Fintech lending may worsen the allocative efficiency of credit and reduce social welfare under some conditions. Analytical and numerical results suggest that Fintech lending mostly reduces the expected interest rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We find that mortgage loans originated after the adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD; a mechanism discouraging loan officers' labor mobility) have a lower default probability, a higher loan modification rate, and a lower foreclosure rate. These effects are unaccompanied by any reduction in loan supply and contribute to more stable housing prices. Using the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as an alternative identification generates consistent results. Overall, our findings suggest that restricting loan officers' labor mobility leads to better ex ante screening and ex post monitoring, improving the origination efficiency for U.S. residential mortgage loans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How much of a loan should a lender retain, and how do loan sales affect loan performance? We address these questions in a model in which a lender originates loans that it can sell to investors. The lender reduces default risk through screening at origination and monitoring after origination, but is subject to moral hazard. The optimal lender-investor contract can be implemented by requiring the lender to initially retain a share of the loan that it gradually sells to investors, rationalizing loan sales after origination. The model generates novel predictions linking loan and lender characteristics to initial retention, sales dynamics, and loan performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze a dynamic credit market where banks choose lending standards, modeled as costly effort to screen out bad borrowers. Tighter standards worsen the borrower pool, increasing banks' incentives to employ tight standards in the future. This dynamic complementarity in lending standards can amplify and prolong downturns, decreasing lending and increasing credit spreads. Because lending standards have negative externalities, the market can converge to a steady state with inefficiently tight lending standards. We discuss the role of optimal policy to avoid this outcome as well as the impact of balance sheet costs on lending standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze how interdependencies in financial networks can lead to self-fulfilling insolvencies and multiple possible equilibrium outcomes. Multiplicity arises if a certain type of dependency cycle exists in the network. We show that finding the cheapest bailout policy that prevents self-fulfilling insolvencies is computationally hard, but that the optimal policy has intuitive features in some typical network structures. Leveraging indirect benefits ensures systemic solvency at a cost that never exceeds half of the overall shortfall. In core-periphery networks, it is optimal to bail out peripheral banks first as opposed to core banks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After digital platforms have become successful in the information technology (IT) industry, incumbents from traditional industries increasingly implement digital platform strategies. However, there is mixed evidence on whether these incumbents benefit from digital platform strategies. To provide systematic insights, we focus on the banking industry. With the emergence of open banking, banks have begun implementing digital platforms to unlock the innovative power of third-party developers. We conducted an event study based on the announcement of digital platform strategies in a global sample of 165 banks. We show that, on average, investors react positively to the announcements. Contrary to our expectations, this effect is more substantial for banks from emerging markets than those from developed markets. Prior artificial intelligence (AI) orientation only partly contributes to investors' favorable perception of a digital platform strategy. These results point to the complex interplay of AI orientation and digital platform strategies, yielding questions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We find that disclosing bank-specific information reallocates systemic risk, but whether it mitigates systemic bank runs depends on the nature of information disclosed. Disclosure reveals banks' resilience to adverse shocks and shifts systemic risk from weak to strong banks. Yet, only disclosure of banks' exposure to systemic risk can mitigate systemic bank runs because it shifts systemic risk from more vulnerable banks to those less vulnerable. Disclosure of banks' idiosyncratic shortfalls of funds does not differentiate such exposure, rendering the resultant reallocation of systemic risk ineffective in mitigating systemic runs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stress tests convey information about the strictness of future tests, creating incentives for banks to alter their future lending behavior. Regulators recognize and use this influence: they may conduct softer stress tests to encourage lending or tougher stress tests to reduce risk-taking. This information management can lead to inefficiencies when (a) the test loses credibility or (b) the test becomes self-fulfilling. In addition, banks may distort their lending behavior in anticipation of the stress test design, leading to further surplus losses. The analysis applies to banking supervision and regulation more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study how banks use "regulatory adjustments" to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments (without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk). We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We exploit the information content of option prices to construct a novel measure of bank tail risk. We document a persistent increase in tail risk for the U.S. banking industry following the global financial crisis, except for banks designated as systemically important by the Dodd–Frank Act. We show that this post-crisis difference in tail risk for large and small banks is consistent with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status of large banks being reinforced by the Dodd–Frank designation: Naming the banks whose failure could threaten the financial stability of the U.S. gave investors a list of banks the government deemed as TBTF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Basel I introduced capital requirements for undrawn commitments, but only for revolvers with an original maturity greater than one year. We use this regulatory discontinuity to estimate the impact of capital regulation on the cost and composition of credit. Following Basel I, short-term commitment fees declined relative to long-term commitments and issuance of short-term facilities increased. Our results highlight the sensitivity of credit provision to capital regulation, particularly for banks with less capital. We are able to infer that low-capital banks are willing to forego twice as much income from fees to reduce required regulatory capital by a dollar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate whether firms' number of credit relationships with financial institutions affects labor market outcomes. Using 5 million observations on matched credit and labor panel data from Brazil, we estimate IV regressions, employing exogenous variation in firm-lender relationships due to nationwide bank M&A activity. Firms with more relationships employ more workers and pay higher wage bills. Credit availability, cost of credit, and financial institution heterogeneity are economic channels. The firm-level results translate into positive macroeconomic effects in municipalities and states. The evidence is novel and indicates the positive effects of multiple relationships on labor market outcomes in an emerging economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We characterize the interaction between banks' liquid assets purchases and deposit issuance decisions. Using global games, we derive a liquidity multiplier : the amount of deposits a bank can create when endowed with one additional unit of liquid asset to maintain a given level of liquidity risk. In our central theorem, we prove it is larger than unity. This entails that banks have a special role in enhancing liquidity provision, "multiplying" liquid assets into a larger quantity of deposits. Our theory has implications for banks' balance sheet choices, the pricing of liquid securities, and the role of public liquidity provision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using supervisory data on operational losses from large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), we show that BHCs with socially responsible workforce policies suffer lower operational losses per dollar of total assets. The association significantly varies by the type of workforce policies and the type of operational losses. It is driven not only by small frequent losses but also by severe tail operational risk events. Further, the risk-reducing effects of the socially responsible workforce policies are stronger for larger BHCs with more employees. Our findings have important implications for banking organization performance, risk, and supervision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the design of stress tests that provide information about aggregate and idiosyncratic risk in banks' portfolios and impose contingent capital requirements. In the optimal static test, an adverse scenario fails all weak and some strong banks, limiting the stigma of failure. Sequential tests outperform static tests. Under natural conditions, the optimal sequential test consists of a precautionary recapitalization, followed by a scenario that fails only weak banks, similar to TARP in 2008, followed by SCAP in 2009. Our results also shed light on the Federal Reserve's decision to test the banks twice in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using regulatory data, we study German bank lending in countries targeted by financial sanctions. We find that domestic banks in Germany reduce lending in sanctioned countries, whereas their foreign bank affiliates outside Germany increase lending. In some cases, this is because the bank affiliates' host countries have not imposed sanctions themselves. However, even German bank affiliates in host countries that enact sanctions like Germany increase lending if these host countries lack strong institutions and anticrime policies. These findings suggest that even universally adopted sanctions distort bank capital flows and competition if the level of their enforcement varies across bank locations. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A repurchase agreement (repo) is a source of cash and collateral. We document that the money market is more segmented when the collateral motive prevails. Two crucial aspects of the central bank framework lead to this disconnect: banks' access to the central bank's deposit facility and assets' eligibility for quantitative easing (QE). We show that repo rates lent by banks with access to the deposit facility and secured by QE eligible assets are more collateral-driven and disconnected from funding-based money market rates. Our results are relevant for different monetary policies and have suggestive implications for the monetary policy pass-through. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]