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An abandoned peace process, increasingly severe Israeli restrictions on Gaza, and divided Palestinian leadership set the stage for the October 2023 surprise attack by Hamas. The devastating Israeli response has left much of the territory in ruins and decimated Hamas's top ranks, while setting off a wider regional war involving Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Iran. US-led attempts to negotiate a cease-fire and resurrect the goal of a two-state solution have proved futile to date, as both sides remain irreconcilable, even in terms of basic understandings of the situation. Peace appears more distant than ever, though global views of the conflict are shifting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has increasingly used peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to manage crises between and within states. The mandates of contemporary PKOs are demanding, calling on peacekeeping personnel to separate belligerent parties, enforce ceasefire agreements, and protect the physical security of civilians. The pursuit of these distinct objectives presents a unique challenge for the UN because it relies on member states to volunteer personnel for these missions. Therefore, the achievement of mandated goals depends on the ability of diverse national contingents to overcome coordination problems and function as a cohesive force. Integrating research of PKOs and international military coalitions, we argue that as national contingents share operational experience within a UN mission, they develop common institutional practices, and become more effective at protecting the civilian population. Using monthly data on UN PKOs from 1990 to 2019, we find that increasing operational experience within a peacekeeping coalition reduces civilian fatalities significantly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the sociological implications of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly regarding the urgent need for justice in Palestine. Topics include the historical context of settler colonialism in Israel/Palestine, the ongoing humanitarian crisis exacerbated by military actions, and the responsibility of sociologists to advocate for a ceasefire and engage with issues of systemic injustice and human rights violations.

The article focuses on the devastating impact of Israel's military actions in Gaza, highlighting the severe humanitarian crisis resulting from the ongoing conflict. Topics include the extreme conditions faced by Gazans, particularly women and children, the absence of reproductive healthcare and justice amidst widespread destruction, and the ethical responsibility of sociologists to advocate for a ceasefire and recognize the suffering in Palestine.

In the Votos de San Millán, the prologue to the Becerro Galicano cartulary, two saints –Millán and Santiago– appear to inspire a combined Leonese and Castilian host to victory over a Moorish army at the legendary Battle of Hacinas. The Votos was in all probability composed between May 1194 and July 1195, i. e., just after the Treaty of Tordehumos established a ten-year truce between León and Castile brokered by the papal legate Gregory of St Angelo on behalf of his uncle Celestine III, intended to smooth the way for a victorious Christian alliance against the Almohads. We contend that the legendary account of battle that appears in the Votos is intended as an allegory for the prospective alliance, before this was shattered at the Battle of Alarcos in July 1195. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Second Vienna Award of 1940, which divided Transylvania into a Hungarian and a Romanian part, a contest started between the two countries for gaining control of the whole region. In order to reach this goal, both countries joined the alliance system of Nazi Germany and in June 1941 entered the war against the Soviet Union. After the battle of Stalingrad, the strategies of the competitors started to change. The two rivals realized that Germany would lose the war, and therefore the peace, including the settlement of territorial disputes and border changes, would be shaped by the Allies. Although they continued to fight on the side of Germany, they prepared for the victory of the Allies. In this new phase of the race, Romania proved to be more successful. In August 1944, she turned the tables on the Wehrmacht while Hungary continued to fight on Germany’s side. Despite the successful Romanian volteface, the future of Northern Transylvania which had belonged to Hungary since 1940, was still undecided. The armistice agreement with Romania signed on September 12, 1944 stipulated that “Transylvania or greater part thereof should be returned to Romania, subject to confirmation at the peace settlement”. The dispute was settled in 1945-1946 by the victorious Allied Powers. The United States and – less firmly – Great Britain and France favored “an adjustment of the Hungarian-Roumanian frontier in Transylvania along ethnic lines which would transfer a small strip from Arad to Szatmár/Satu Mare to Hungary”. The Soviet Union, however, stubbornly opposed any modification of the post1920 borders, including even symbolic changes. This meant that the final decision taken by the Paris Peace Conference in the Fall of 1946 accomplished the restoration of the pre-war frontiers. The race was won by Romania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Amme Idaresi Dergisi is the property of Public Administration Institute for Turkey & the Middle East (TODAIE) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Edgard Milhaud (1873–1964), a professor at the University of Geneva, published a series of texts (from 1932 onwards) promoting the establishment of multilateral international compensation between nation-states, and actively campaigned for this project. His plan centered on a call for a "gold truce" as an alternative to the bilateral clearing agreements that proliferated at the time. The plan drew the attention of several international organizations. It reached the point of arousing the interest of the League of Nations (LON), which decided in 1934 to launch an inquiry (published in 1935) questioning LON members about the project of making clearing agreements multilateral. The Milhaud plan nevertheless fell into oblivion after the Tripartite Agreement (1936) and then the outbreak of WW II. This work aims to situate the Milhaud plan in its intellectual and political context—i.e., the 1930s—analyze its content, and understand its failure. The article also assesses what it had in common with Keynes's plan for an international clearing union developed several years later. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many ceasefire and peace agreements stipulate the disarmament and demobilization of pro-state armed groups involved in the conflict, yet few of these groups ever completely demobilize. This study seeks to explain the process of incomplete demobilization by advancing a theoretical argument that pro-state armed groups are least likely to disarm and demobilize when the monopoly on violence is fragmented, and when there is relative balance of capabilities and interests between the government and pro-state armed groups. Under these circumstances, both governments and pro-state armed groups may favor incomplete demobilization enabling them to pursue their strategic objectives. We draw on unique interview data with pro-state paramilitaries from Ukraine to empirically illustrate our theoretical expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Third party ceasefire monitors routinely gather and report information on conflict events. Although ceasefire monitoring is a common conflict response intervention generally correlated with ceasefire durability, how its routine practices contribute to ceasefire compliance and noncompliance is little understood. This article asks how reporting, monitors' most common practice, affects conflict opponents. Based on the experiences of more than 100 monitors, as well as archival research, I develop theory for how ceasefire monitors' reporting constructs opportunities for conflict actors to demonstrate both compliance and noncompliance, and show evidence for this in cases from Kosovo and South Sudan. That monitoring can produce ceasefire noncompliance challenges existing understandings of monitoring as generally contributing to ceasefire durability. The implication is that even credible monitoring and accurate reporting may have inadvertent consequences on conflict trajectories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a high‐frequency survey in Yemen, we demonstrate how school attendance responds to a series of conflict‐related shocks. First, there are a number of plausibly exogenous events that significantly change the severity of violence but have limited impacts on school attendance. These events include the capture of the southern capital by secessionist forces, an unexpected partial ceasefire, and the capture of a governorate from the internationally recognized government by Houthi forces. Second, we demonstrate how shocks aside from living in close proximity to violence—institutional declines and macroeconomic shocks associated with the conflict—can have large impacts on school attendance and the ability to afford essential services. For example, a teacher strike associated with conflict‐induced instiutional declines caused an immediate doubling of the share of households with poor school attendance. Combined, the results better illustrate some of the mechanisms by which conflict impedes school attendance and human capital formation, and the results have implications for education assistance being delivered in conflict settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Babylon Center for Humanities Studies is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Abant Social Sciences / Abant Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi is the property of Journal of Abant Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a part of the Central Powers. As from 1916, the Empire had been very keen for the war to end. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was deprived of the financial power to continue the war and faced with the demands of independence from the minorities before and during the war, approached the armistice proposals very positively that could end the war in 1916 and 1917. In mid-June 1918, the failure of the attack launched by the Austro-Hungarian troops against the Italian troops and the superiority of the Allied Powers over Germany on the western front in July-August put the situation of the Central Powers in the European fronts in trouble, and after the successful attack launched by the Italian troops on 24 October, there was no possibility for Austria-Hungary to continue the war. The Austro-Hungarian Empire withdrew from the First World War by signing an armistice with Italy on 3 November 1918 at Villa Giusti del Giardino outside the city of Padova. The armistice contained very harsh terms and severely limited the empire in every respect. The Armistice of Villa Giusti consisted of two chapters and nineteen clauses including eight military and eleven naval and maritime provisions. The additional protocol of the armistice consisted of two chapters and nineteen clauses, ten of which were military and nine of which were related to the naval forces and maritime affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Historical Studies (1818-0345) is the property of Association of Arab Universities and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Historical Studies (1818-0345) is the property of Association of Arab Universities and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recent years have seen the acceleration of data- and evidence-based approaches in support of peace processes, creating a renewed confidence that conflicts can be predicted, known, and resolved, based on objective information about the world. However, new technologies employed by conflict parties, stakeholders, and those who aim to make or build peace have also made peace processes less ascertainable, intelligible, and predictable. Technology can thus create both more certainty and uncertainty in (and about) peace processes. This forum article presents a first collaborative attempt to explore how the use of technology by conflict parties and peacebuilding actors influences these dynamics. We examine various fields of engagement, ranging from conflict prevention to peace mediation, peacekeeping, and longer-term peacebuilding. Our discussion engages with a variety of related activities, including predictive analysis and foresight, conflict analysis, cease-fire monitoring, early warning and early action, and problem-solving and trust-building dialogues. We suggest approaching un-certainty as a spectrum between uncertainty and certainty that can be studied across epistemic, ontological, and normative dimensions, thus inviting further academic research and policy reflection. The article is coauthored by scholars and current or former practitioners and underlines the necessity, benefits, and feasibility of research–practice exchanges on this topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The trauma of the October 7 massacre for Israelis and the catastrophe that Gazans have experienced in the subsequent war mark a new stage in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. While October 7 and indeed the Israeli response are exceptional, we cannot overcome their consequences without addressing the root of the conflict. Calls for an immediate ceasefire are understandable but fall into the trap of seeing the solution as being a military decision. This echoes to the attitude of the current Israeli government which poses the response to October 7 as a military one. A new international political initiative is required to change the atmosphere by setting the goal of resolving the conflict on the basis of self-determination for both Israelis and Palestinians. That needs to inform the approach we adopt to ending the current conflict by replacing Hamas and Israel in Gaza with an international security mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will bring forth the memory of a community that has seen immense death and heartbreak as a result of wars and political unrest in the region. Easterine Kire is a poet and novelist who has written extensively on her people, the Nagas. Kire mainly writes about the Angami Nagas in her works of fiction, which are mostly based on real-life events. Her novels Mari (2010), A Respectable Woman (2019) and Bitter Wormwood (2011) will be taken into study. In these three novels, Easterine Kire tells the story of her people, how they fought the "white-man's war" and the Naga insurgency against the Indian union in their struggle to be a free state. The latter part of the paper will focus on the task of the writer, how s/he has to write about the unadulterated history of their people. The task of writing "ourselves/themselves" thus becomes a combined effort of the writer and the people when collective memories are recollected and put in print for future generations. This paper also acts as a detailed review of the mentioned three novels of Easterine Kire while discussing matters such as memory, history and trauma. The last part of the paper focuses on Easterine Kire's reflections on her own novel Bitter Wormwood and her purpose of writing the novel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This commentary argues that Hezbollah felt duty-bound to open a front in Southern Lebanon to ease Israel's military pressure on Hamas. Hezbollah indicated that its participation in the war will continue until reaching a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, apparently expecting the hostilities to last only for a few weeks. However, the war dragged on for months as Israel pledged to keep it going until destroying Hamas and, contrary to what Hezbollah expected, pushing it away from the border area to ensure the safety of its residents in the upper Galilee settlements. The fighting in Southern Lebanon turned into a war of attrition against Hezbollah as Israel eliminated most of its field commanders by drone attacks. Should Israel succeed in evicting Hezbollah from the border area, it would lose its claim to resistance to liberate Lebanese territory still occupied by Israel, increasing the pressure on it to disarm like all other Lebanese factions when the civil war ended in 1989. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document explores the discrepancies and inaccuracies in the narratives surrounding the signing of the Golden Book of Mons by Canadian soldiers during World War I. It emphasizes the importance of using trustworthy primary sources and a transnational approach to accurately analyze and interpret historical events. The document references specific sources and acknowledges individuals who provided information and resources for research purposes. Overall, it provides a critical examination of the historical accounts and highlights the need for caution when relying on military records. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies / Çagdas Türkiye Tarihi Arastirmalari Dergisi is the property of Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies / Çagdas Türkiye Tarihi Arastirmalari Dergisi is the property of Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), founded in February 1976 in the territory of the former Spanish Sahara, belongs today to the so-called unrecognised states category that do not meet all the criteria of the statehood. In the case of the SADR, it enjoys the recognition of several dozen UN members, as well as the most important international regional organisation on the continent – the African Union, however, the Sahrawi government controls only about 20% of the territory it claims rights for. Therefore, the axis of the SADR foreign policy is the constant struggle for international recognition, together with the attempts to exert indirect pressure on Morocco, which could persuade it to adopt the Sahrawi resolution to the protracted conflict over Western Sahara. Both of these goals seem increasingly distant, due to the events of the last three years: the Guerguerat crisis that ended the ceasefire between the POLISARIO Front and Moroccan forces, the decision of the administration of President Donald Trump to open a US consulate in the city of Dakhla in the Moroccan-controlled territory contested by the SADR, and the change in the position of the Spanish government – currently expressing support for the Moroccan plan for Western Sahara autonomy. The article is an attempt to analyse the foreign policy of an unrecognised state such as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in the context of international conditions in the region (in this case Maghreb), challenges it faces and the possibility of achieving its goals. The paper is largely based on qualitative data collected during field research over the years 2016-2023 conducted during study visits to Algeria and Spain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although multilingualism in higher education context continues to garner increasing scholarly interest, research remains scarce on school administrators' policies on multilingualism. To the best of our knowledge, this study constitutes one of the very few attempts to tackle this issue in higher education context and the first of its kind to pursue such endeavour in North Cyprus setting. This study seeks to investigate, through a post-structuralist perspective, the perceptions and policies of multilingualism by the director and assistant directors of an English preparatory school in a North Cyprus university which has flourished as a haven for international education. The study combines a multiplicity of data through semi-structured interviews and informal chats to provide a richer insight into the multifaceted case being investigated. The findings demonstrate that administrators regard multilingualism as a seal of internationalism and educational quality. They remain hesitant and even mostly sceptical, however, about whether translingual practice could offer any meaningful contribution to language learning processes. Although poststructuralist understanding considers truth and identity to be decentred and forever changing, and despite the scope of our study being limited to one particular institution only, our findings promise great potential for inspiring reflection and research in other universities in North Cyprus and elsewhere, which similarly aspire to international competition in higher education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, based on Italian archival material, reconstructs the battles between the Yugoslav and Italian armies that took place in April 1941 for Shkodër. The Yugoslav Zeta Division was the only major unit of the Yugoslav army that successfully went on the offensive. The war plans of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia envisaged an offensive against the Italian forces in Albania and a connection with the Greek army. The Italian defense was organized without a preliminary plan. The front near Shkodër was geographically demanding and suitable for defense. The attack of the Zeta Division began on April 8, 1941 and proceeded gradually, and the Italian commanders only later decided to actively defend Shkodër. The Zeta Division also tried to land across the lake. The first Italian defense line was near the state border and was breached on April 9, 1941. A day later, the Italian forces organized the main defense on the Proni Banush river. The Zeta Division tried several times to attack the main defensive line, but was repulsed with heavy losses, so it went on the defensive. On April 14, 1941, the Zeta Division received an order to start armistice talks. On April 15, 1941, the Italian forces received an order to carry out a breakthrough towards Montenegro, but they were stopped when carrying out a tank attack on the organized Yugoslav defense. The Zeta Division suffered heavy losses in these battles, and the Italian forces also lost several tanks and a large number of men. A day later, due to the disintegration of the Yugoslav army, Italian forces quickly penetrated across the state border. The commander of the Centauro Division, with the exception of the last day, successfully used tanks, the Yugoslav forces were not prepared for anti-tank combat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study is primarily based on documents in the French military and diplomatic archives. We attempted at following the evolution of the Romanian army supply during 1917, specifically in the first months from Romania's entering the World War. Nonetheless, the information in the archives regarding this stage of Romania's participation is somewhat contradictory. The reason is, though sometimes the supply was satisfactory, there were times when the allies did not follow the minimum quota of 300 tones of war materials per day, as the Military Convention in 4/17 August 1916 stipulated. The Romanian army was entitled to receive weapons and ammunition from more countries like, for example, France, England, United States, Portugal, Spain, Brazil and even Japan. Unfortunately, after the Russian revolution on 25 October / 7 November and the concluding of the truce with the Central Powers, in December at Brest Litovsk, the new order in Petrograd decided to put an end to any delivery intended for Romania. Thus, the Romanian kingdom found impossible to fight the Central Powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Online Journal Mundo Asia Pacífico is the property of Universidad EAFIT and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The level of violence in Thailand's Deep South has been on a downward trend since the 2013 launch of a peace dialogue, although attacks against non-combatants remain a concern. In February 2023, a general framework known as the "Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace" was agreed upon between the Thai government and the separatist group Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (Patani Malay National Revolutionary Front, or BRN), laying out a roadmap for the conduct of a ceasefire and public consultation expected to lead to political solutions. While the newly elected Thai government has pledged to resume the peace talks with Malay-Muslim insurgents fighting for independence, its commitment and vision remain unclear. Given that the military has dominated Thai politics for nearly a decade, regaining civilian control over government operations in the Deep South could significantly change the dynamics of the conflict. However, it is doubtful if the government will be bold enough to challenge the military and other conservative forces that have long dominated conflict management in the restive region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]