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Customers carry with them a general propensity to trust when entering into exchanges with business-to-business (B2B) salespeople. However, propensity to trust not only varies from customer to customer, but customers may also have different levels of trust for different B2B salespeople. These individual differences create a filter that alters the customer's interpretation of salesperson motivations, which in turn has important implications in terms of how this variance influences actual trust. The current study thus argues that the relationship between the customer's propensity to trust and trust in the salesperson is contingent on salesperson characteristics. Using social exchange theory (SET) and agency theory, this study hypothesizes that the salesperson's interaction orientation (IO) and adaptive selling ability (ADAPTS) moderate the customer's trust in the salesperson, contingent upon how the customer attributes the motives of the salesperson. In order to approach this argument, a multilevel-multisource data collection is employed in which customer expectations and evaluations from newly-acquired business customers are investigated in tandem with accompanying B2B salesperson characteristics. Results provide an understanding of the types of salesperson characteristics that are best suited to leverage the customer's preexisting tendencies to trust into actual trust in the salesperson--and those that have the opposite effect. Research Question Customer propensity to trust, or the customer's general expectancies about the trustworthiness of others (Rotter 1971), is a relatively stable belief that captures an individual's initial intentions to trust (Ferguson and Peterson 2015). The propensity to trust is important in new situations, such as newly-formed buyer-seller relationships, because trust determinations are often made before sufficient time has passed to collect data on the other party's trustworthiness. Thus, trust depends not just on past experiences, but also on individual orientations. While trust propensity is a likely antecedent of trust (Bigley and Pearce 1998), unanswered questions remain about to how this attitude alters the interpretation of salesperson motivations and which factors moderate the realized impact of this relationship (Colquitt, Scott, and LePine 2007). We consider a customer's trust in the salesperson as the dependent variable to test the effect of the customer's propensity to trust salespeople, as well as model salesperson IO and ADAPTS as contingent variables that moderate this relationship. H1: The customer's propensity to trust salespeople increases their trust in the salesperson. H2: The salesperson's (a) interaction orientation and (b) adaptive selling ability positively moderate the effect of the customer's propensity to trust salespeople on their trust in the salesperson. Method and Data To test the hypotheses, data from salespeople and customers of a national healthcare solutions provider were collected. The company's management team sent a series of emails notifying their sales force of this research study and requesting participation. Additionally, following the acquisition of each new healthcare customer, the company's management team sent the newly acquired customer an email invitation to participate in this study. In total, a multilevel sample of 47 salespeople and 131 customers was obtained. HLM7 was used to test the multilevel model. The level 1 (customer) and level 2 (salesperson) datasets were first matched in the analytical software. A null model was then run to establish that the level 1 dependent variable (salesperson trust) is impacted by level 2 (salesperson characteristics) groupings. Results show that indeed the nested customer dependent variable is affected by level 2 group membership as evidenced by a significant intercept in the null model (p < .05). The interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was also calculated to assess the extent of the between-group variance. The ICC is .173, which further establishes the need to conduct a multilevel analysis. As such, the main effects and interaction terms were subsequently added to test the theoretical model. Summary of Findings The results support two of our three hypotheses. Consistent with H1, we find that the customer's propensity to trust salespeople increases their trust in the specific salesperson (β = .19, p < .05). Due to the difficulty in detecting crosslevel interactions (Bosker and Snijders 1999), the interaction terms were assessed at the p < .10 level, consistent with previous research (e.g., Yeo and Neal 2004; Smillie et al. 2006). We also find support for H2a in that IO positively moderates the effect of the customer's propensity to trust salespeople on their trust in the salesperson (β = .10, p < .10). Last, H2b's prediction that ADAPTS positively moderates the effect of the customer's propensity to trust salespeople on their trust in the salesperson was not supported. In fact, its coefficient was significant, but negative (β = -.20, p < .10). We next discuss the implications of these findings. Key Contributions Using multilevel-multisource data collected from B2B customers and salespeople, this study provides contributions pertaining to buyer-seller relationships. To start, this study empirically demonstrates that the customer's propensity to trust salespeople is positively associated with the customer's trust in his or her salesperson. This result embodies the first contribution and was captured in a context in which propensity to trust is noted to be particularly critical--amongst newly-formed, buyer-seller relationships. Our remaining contributions stem from the moderator analysis. As IO facilitates the extrapolation of a customer's propensity to trust to trust in the salesperson, managers should make efforts to facilitate an IO amongst their salespeople. Research suggests managers can stimulate this desirable salesperson characteristic by designing control systems, which emphasize unique customer interaction models and motivate specific types of interactions (e.g., interaction content, interaction quantity) depending on the sales context (e.g., strength of brand, customer characteristics) (Homburg, Müller, and Klarmann 2011). On the other hand, managers should be cognizant of ADAPTS's impact on the customer's propensity to trust--trust in the salesperson relationship. Contrary to IO, ADAPTS attenuates this association, indicating ADAPTS may actually be detrimental in certain circumstances (e.g., when dealing with customers who have a high propensity to trust). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current business environment has lead to the development of organizations where firms cooperate and compete simultaneously. This phenomenon of firms simultaneously cooperating and competing is known as co-opetition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). Further the growing competition and rapid technological changes have underscored the importance of continuous knowledge transfer between the firms and is considered as a source of competitive advantage (Grant 1996). However, in co-opetitive relationships, the firms may not share knowledge if they feel that they may loose their competitive advantage over the knowledge. Thus the problem under these relationships is to determine how much and what knowledge needs to be shared and under what conditions. Further, recent studies of inter firm marketing relationships suggest a concept of "plural governance" in which the buyers purchase components from independent suppliers and also make similar components internally (Heide 2003). The current paper suggests that the plural governance leads to co-opetitive relationships between the buyer and the supplier as they not only cooperate but also there is a possibility of competition between them in the future. In a co-opetitive business environment, the supplier may impede knowledge sharing, if he regards the buyer as a potential competitor and hence would try to protect its core knowledge from the buyer's opportunistic behavior. Given this situation, it is important to understand what the buyer should do to facilitate knowledge transfer from the supplier under conditions of plural governance. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Loebecke, Fenema, and Powell (1999) analyze knowledge transfer in co-opetitive relationships by using the concept of prisoners' dilemma. On the basis of game theory, the researchers suggest two main dimensions of inter-organizational information sharing under co-opetitive relationships -- synergy and leveragability. Synergy refers to the extent to which cooperation between the partners yields additional value from interdependent knowledge sharing which is more than the sum of individual partner's knowledge. On the other hand, leveragability refers to the potential of the knowledge recipient firm to increase its value from knowledge sharing by exploiting the shared knowledge by its own that is beyond cooperation, thus leading to "competitive threat" for the partner providing the knowledge. The highest likelihood of knowledge sharing between the co-opetitive partners is a situation of low competitive threat and high synergy as it creates positive attitude toward knowledge transfer process because there is more gain from synergy than what the other party might derive from the knowledge received. Thus it becomes crucial to investigate that under a plural governance situation what buyer should do to reduce the risks and foster the benefits that will create situations of low competitive threat and high synergy with the supplier. The current paper intends to answer the above question by suggesting that the buyer, under the plural governance mechanism, should increase "transparency" in the buyer-supplier relationship. Transparency refers to the openness or the closeness of the firm providing the knowledge (Hamel 1991). Transparency will increase the supplier's belief that the buyer will perform activities that result in positive outcomes and will not pursue actions that result in negative outcome for the supplier. The strength of this belief may lead the supplier to have confidence in the buyer's reliability and integrity and thus will create conditions of high synergy and low competitive threat. Thus, P1: Under the plural governance, the higher the transparency in the buyer-supplier relationship, (a) the higher will be the synergy between the buyer and the supplier and (b) the lower will be the competitive threat by the buyer. P2: Under the plural governance, the knowledge transfer between the supplier and the buyer will be most effective when there is high synergy between the buyer and the supplier and low competitive threat by the buyer. Moderators Studies suggest that when partners have shared vision they tend to commit themselves more to the relationship rather than looking at their own interest that may be detrimental to the other partner (Ouchi 1980). Also, the increased participation not only reduces the conflicts and potential competitive threat of inter-organizational relationships but also improves their quality and coordination (Lee and Kim 1999). Formalization increases the partner confidence in the other partner's reliability and integrity which leads to less protective behavior to withhold the knowledge from the other partner (Mohr and Sohi 1995). Communication is defined as the formal and informal sharing of meaningful and timely information and can be categorized into direct and indirect influence strategies (Anderson and Narus 1990). The direct communication strategies like requests, recommendations, promises etc. lead to gaining compliance and commitment from the partner thus facilitating the knowledge transfer between the partners. Thus, P3: Under the plural governance, the formation of shared values, increased participation, increased formalization, and increased use of direct communication strategies will increase (a) the positive relationship between the transparency in the relationship and the synergy between the buyer and the supplier and (b) the negative relationship between the transparency in the relationship and the competitive threat by the buyer. Power is the ability to evoke a change in other's behavior; including the ability to cause others to do something they would not have done otherwise (Gaski 1984). Coercive bases of power represent a power struggle that may increase the level of conflict inherent in the relationship, thus reducing the transparency. Thus, P4: Under the plural governance, the use of power by the buyer will decrease (a) the positive relationship between the transparency in the relationship and the synergy between the buyer and the supplier and (b) the negative relationship between the transparency in the relationship and the competitive threat by the buyer. Discussion and Implications The paper through the lens of plural governance, contributes to the literature of inter-organizational knowledge transfer under co-opetitive relationships. The paper suggests that the buyer should facilitate increased transparency in the buyer-supplier relationship. Further, the buyer should enhance shared norms by encouraging training, socialization, and rotation of the members both in the buying and the supplying firm. Buyer should also encourage increased participation of the supplier and should adopt direct influence strategies that are rational and non-coercive in nature. Further, buyer should use formalization strategies like formal meetings and written statements that increase the supplier's confidence in the relationship. Last, the buyer should avoid using mechanisms like centralization as they are a source of power and thus create more conflicts than synergy in the buyer-supplier relationships. Buyer-supplier relationships in plural governance without such strategic conditions and skills are dysfunctional with respect to increasing knowledge transfer between the partners and thus overcoming their competitors. References are available on request. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper conceptualizes and proposes the notion of the prosocial orientation of a firm. We contend that a firm's prosocial behavior may be driven by several factors including, motives of the society in which the firm is embedded, leadership behavior of the decision makers that creates a relating service environment in the organization, its stakeholders driving the egoistic stance of the organization, and the prosocial part of the tacit knowledge of its employees that they apply when interacting with the customers and co-workers. We also suggest that firm's prosocial orientation may have several positive consequences such as increased cooperation and teamwork with the prosocial orientation directed at co-workers; greater performance due to extra-role behavior of employees leading to higher service quality levels, greater customer satisfaction, and sales revenues; and more secure and higher levels of investment in the firm. However, prosocial orientation can lead to free-riding and managers are advised to be careful about this. The first contribution this paper makes is through the conceptualization of "prosocial orientation of a firm" that can encompass several terms that are in use today to represent firm social contribution. A theoretical conceptualization of prosocial orientation of a firm can help bring diverse theories under a single umbrella and benefit as one consolidated body of knowledge. A second contribution this paper makes is by proposing motives and outcomes of prosocial orientation of firms that can help link the various academic models of prosocial orientation with their implications to the business community. The model of motives and outcomes of prosocial orientation can help elucidate the business-social relationships from across different theories. The third contribution this paper makes is by capturing the tacit knowledge that is an important source of value generation within the firm, between supplier firms, and with customers. "Prosocial orientation of the firm" can capture the prosocial behavior of the leaders, decisions makers, and front-line employees of the firm as explicit knowledge which then becomes available for measurement and tracking, and can be improved upon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Question Salespeople are known, notoriously so, for engaging in opportunistic acts to manage impressions with coworkers and supervisors. Past studies have examined such opportunistic acts as fudging-"adjusting" sales numbers/orders to make them align with targets, and faking-"appearing" to follow sales directions when in fact one is not. Recently researchers have drawn from power-approach theory to identify when and why faking (and fudging) might activate a behavioral approach system or BAS that builds individual motivation for striving for, and achieving higher level of outcomes. We contextualize this theory for personal selling context to examine when opportunistic behaviors are functional for salespeople. Method and Data Our sample consisted of 344 salespeople working for companies in multiple industries. We tested our hypotheses using structural equations modeling. Summary of Findings While our study found support for several hypothesized relationships, a key finding was that opportunistic behaviors of salespeople can play a functional role by enhancing the positive effects of relational behaviors on sales performance. Key Contributions Whereas past research has shown intuitive (negative) effects of salesperson opportunistic behaviors on sales performance, our study theorizes and demonstrates counter-intuitive (positive) effects of opportunistic behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As boundary spanners, salespeople are known to engage in opportunistic behaviors including fudging--"adjusting" sales numbers/orders to make them align with targets, and faking --"appearing" to follow sales directions when in fact not doing so, among other devices to bend or boost evidence to look good and get ahead. Does fudging and faking really payoff, or is it a myth of professional stereotyping? Using data from a B2B salesperson sample, we show that opportunistic behaviors are detrimental for both performance and satisfaction of salespeople. However, in support of the myth's persistence, we find that performance payoffs of opportunistic behaviors are significant when (a) salespeople also engage in high levels of relational behaviors, and/or (b) work in organizations with ambiguous efficiency or innovative orientations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An abstract of the article "Marketing Strategy Implementation Failure: An Explanatory Investigation Through the Sales-Marketing Interface Lens," by Avinash Malshe and Ravipreet S. Sohi is presented.

Presents an abstract of the paper 'The Interaction of Information Technology and Organizational Learning: The Implications of Achieving IT Competency on Learning Processes,' by Michael J. Tippins and Ravipreet S. Sohi, presented at the 1999 Winter Educators' Conference of the American Marketing Association.

An abstract of the article "Do Board Member Power Blocs Enhance Innovation?," by Shannon Cummins and Ravipreet S. Sohi is presented.