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Copyright of Mevzu is the property of Ali Sever and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of SPORMETRE: The Journal of Physical Education & Sport Sciences / Beden Eğitimi ve Spor Bilimleri Dergisi is the property of SPORMETRE: The Journal of Physical Education & Sport Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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Genelde insanın mahiyeti özelde ise ruhun varlığı ve mahiyeti konusu, düşünce tarihi boyunca tartışılagelmiştir. İnsan, bilen özne olarak önce kendini tanımaya çalışmıştır. Bu sorgulamayı yaparken sadece fenomenal varlığını (bedenini) değil, orada bir yerde olduğundan şüphe etmediği manevi kimliğini de merak etmiştir. Bu merak; anatomiden fizyolojiye, ilm-i ruhtan felsefeye, tıptan sosyolojiye, biyolojiden nörobiyolojiye, psikolojiden nöropsikolojiye, kimyadan nörokimyaya kadar uzanan bilimsel bir yolculuğun tahrik gücünü meydana getirmiştir. Sonunda her uygarlığın kendi bilimsel ve felsefi birikimine uygun olarak çeşitli insan tasavvurları geliştirilmiştir. İnsanlığa mâl olmuş kadim düşünce geleneği, insanı kahir ekseriyette düalist bir tanıma dahil etmiştir. Modern bilimle birlikte insanı fizik olarak incelemek için geliştirilen pek çok aygıtın sağladığı imkanlarla sayısız veriye ulaşılmış, bu veriler insanın fizik ve metafizik veçhesiyle nasıl bir varlık olduğunu anlamada büyük yararlılıklar sağlamıştır. Bununla birlikte doğal dünyaya ve onun bir parçası olan insana dair bilgimiz artıkça bakış açıları paradigmatik değişimlere zorlanmıştır. Bilimsel bilgiyle koşut bir şekilde gelişen ve değişen felsefi akımlar, dinin özellikle Batı dünyasında gerilemesi, bilginin yorumlanmasındaki hâkim modelleri geriletmiştir. İnsan nosyonları da bu büyük tagayyürden payını kaçınılmaz olarak almıştır. Eylemlerin arkasındaki özne, bedenden/beyinden ayrı/bağımsız ve bütünüyle otonom ve rasyonel midir? Yoksa çağdaş sinir bilimin öne sürdüğü gibi bedenden/beyinden ya da onun işlevselliğinden mi ibarettir? Bu uyumlu işlevsellik bütünüyle ya da kısmen doğal nedenselliğe bağlı olarak mı gerçekleşmektedir? İnsanı insan yapan bir öz veya ayırt edici bir özellik var mıdır? Varsa bu öz/özellik fiziksel midir yoksa fizik ötesi bir töz müdür? Bu sorulara ilk dönem kelâmcılarının hangi çerçevede ne cevap verdiği; daha çok dinî bilgi, kısmen dönemin tıp bilgisi ve büyük oranda mantıksal akıl yürütme ekseninde geliştirilen hipotezlerin çağdaş bilimin ileri sürdüğü insan ve ruh tarifleriyle ne oranda örtüştüğü meselesi, makalenin ana konusunu oluşturmaktadır. Özetle bu çalışma; süregelen kadim soruşturmanın iki önemli evresi olarak gördüğümüz, ilk dönem kelâmcılarının ruh teorileriyle güncel bilimsel veriler arasındaki paralellikleri ve yaklaşım benzerliklerini tespit etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Zira akültürasyon sürecine bağlı dönüşümün düşünce üzerinde belirleyici güç hâline gelmediği kelâmın ilk döneminde (mütekaddimûn) serdedilen fikirlerin daha orijinal ve değerli olduğu düşünülmektedir. Problemin temel kavramları arasında yer alan ruh, nefs, zihin, benlik ve bilincin tanımları hakkında kısa bilgiler verildikten sonra erken dönem Mu‘tezilî ve Ehl-i Sünnet mütefekkirlerinin konuya ilişkin düşünceleri güncel verilerle karşılaştırmalı olarak aktarılmıştır. Araştırma boyunca elde edilen veriler, analitik ve semantik tahlillere tabi tutularak sağlıklı bir tasvirî çıkarım yapılmaya gayret edilmiştir.

Copyright of Motif Academy Journal of Folklore is the property of Motif Yayincilik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Pek çok felsefe tarihçisi tarafından en önemli Alman düşünürler arasında konumlandırılan Nicolaus Cusanus Türkiyede felsefe çevrelerinde henüz hak ettiği tanınırlığa ulaşamamıştır. Oysaki Cusanus’un felsefi yazıları kendinden sonra gelen Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel gibi birçok modern filozofun düşüncelerinin tohumlarını barındırmaktadır. Bu sebeple Cusanus’a dair çalışmalar felsefe tarihinde özellikle Rönesans dönemi ve modern felsefeye geçiş için önemli bir durak noktasıdır. Buna rağmen Cusanus’un düşüncelerini inceleyen gerek yabancı dillerde gerek Türkçede kaynaklar sınırlıdır. 19. yüzyılın sonlarına doğru Cusanus üzerine çalışmalar başlamış ve son dönemlerde dünyada Cusanus’a olan ilgi artmıştır. Bu kaynaklarda Cusanus’un özgünlüğüne dair birbirinden farklı tezler ortaya konsa da onun bilgi teorisi ve bu teorinin çağdaş bir konu olarak öznellik felsefesiyle ilişkisi özellikle dikkat çekmektedir. Bunun da sebebi Cusanus’un kendi çağdaşlarından farklı olarak insan zihnine dair görüşleri sonucu bilme ediminde insanı merkez kılıp diğer her şeyi zihnin dolayımına sokmasıdır. Bu durumda insan şeyleri kendinde oldukları gibi değil de zihninin yapımı olan kavramsal dünyanın bir parçası olarak bilebilmektedir. Bu da insan zihnini, bilme ediminde merkeze koyan ama öte yandan onun bilgisini sınırlayan bir düşünce sistemdir. İnsan zihninin bu merkeziliği Cusanus’u insanı dünya üzerindeki ikinci bir tanrı olarak nitelendirmeye götürmüştür. İnsanın ikinci tanrı olarak nitelendirilmesindeki başlıca sebep bilme etkinliği ve bu etkinliğin özünde yatan ölçme edimidir. Ancak Cusanus’un özgünlüğünü ortaya çıkartan ikinci tanrı olarak insan anlayışı ile insan zihninin ölçme edimi arasındaki ilişkiye odaklanarak insanın bu dünya üzerindeki yaratıcılığına dair bir çalışma bulunmamaktadır. Bu makale ile literatürdeki söz konusu boşluğun doldurulması amaçlanmaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda Cusanus’un modern ve çağdaş felsefeyle ilişkilendirilen bilgi teorisindeki özgünlüğü, ikinci tanrı olarak insanın ölçme edimi ayrıntılı bir şekilde incelenerek gösterilecektir.

The nature of the human being in general and the existence and nature of the soul in particular has been discussed throughout the history of thought. As a knowing subject, man firstly tried to know himself. While making this questioning, he not only wondered about his phenomenal existence (body), but also about his spiritual identity, which he did not doubt was out there somewhere. This curiosity has created an ongoing scientific journey from anatomy to physiology, from science to philosophy, from medicine to sociology, from biology to neurobiology, from psychology to neuropsychology, from chemistry to neurochemistry. In the end, various human conceptions have been developed in accordance with the scientific and philosophical background of each civilization. The ancient tradition of thought, which is the common accumulation of humanity, has largely included man in a dualist definition. Along with modern science, many devices have been developed to study human beings physically. Numerous data have been reached with the opportunities provided by technology, and these data have provided great usefulness in understanding what aspects a human being has in terms of physics and metaphysics. However, with the increase in our knowledge of the natural world and human, which is a part of it, the perspectives of the period were forced into paradigmatic changes. The philosophical movements that developed and changed in parallel with scientific knowledge, the decline of religion, especially in the Western world, regressed the dominant models in the interpretation of knowledge. Notions of human have inevitably taken their share from this great change. Is the subject behind the actions separate/independent from the body/brain and completely autonomous and rational? Or is it just the body/brain or its functionality, as modern neuroscience suggests? Does this coherent functionality arise entirely or in part from natural causation? Is there an essence or a distinctive feature that makes us human? If so, is this essence/property physical or is it a metaphysical substance? What answers did the early theologians give to these questions? What are the points of overlap between the hypotheses developed mainly on religious knowledge, partly on medical knowledge of the period via largely logical reasoning, and the definitions of human and soul revealed by contemporary experimental science? This line forms the main frame of the article. In summary, this study; It aims to identify the parallels and similarities of approach between the spiritual theories of the early theologians and current scientific data, which we see as two important phases of the ongoing ancient investigation. It is thought that the theories developed in this first period, when the transformation due to the acculturation process is not sufficiently determinative on thought, are more original and valuable. After giving brief information about the definitions of soul, mind, self and consciousness, which are among the basic concepts of the problem, the thoughts of early Mu'tazilī and Ahl al-Sunnah thinkers on the subject are presented comparatively with current scientific data. We tried to make a healthy descriptive inference by making analytical and semantic arguments on the data obtained during the research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The body was marginalized in positivist, humanist, Marxist and feminist geographical thought until the mid-1980s, when the cultural turn took place. Due to the mind/body duality created by Descartes, the fact that the mind and body are separate and this distinction is based on gender has been effective in this othering. For this reason, the mind is associated with masculinity and the body with irrational nature and femininity. Since mostly men have priority in academic research, the body has been seen as feminine and unimportant and has been less involved in research. However, the cultural turn has led to a return to the body and since the early 1990s, interest in the body has increased in geography. The purpose of this study is to criticize that academic studies in geography are generally male-dominated studies. Therefore, it focuses on gendered bodies, but also includes disabled and elderly bodies as other bodies. It is an important work in terms of making bodies visible in places and in the discipline of geography and showing that people are equal regardless of gender, sexuality, class, race, belief and disability. In the first part, the relationship between body space and mind space is explained how public space is organized by the separation of body and mind is shown. In the second part, it is stated how bodies function as other in geographical discourse. In the third chapter, Foucault's view of how bodies are disciplined and made docile through force is focused on. In the last section, it is explained that bodies are gendered and sexualized. As a result, the mind/body duality played an important role in determining what counted as legitimate knowledge in geography, and women's bodies were controlled and regulated in the interests of population, patriarchy and capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spinoza sisteminde bir bilinç teorisinin varlığı konusunda dünden bugüne devam etmekte olan ciddi bir tartışma mevcuttur. Bu makale, bir yandan mevcut tartışmanın hafifletilebilmesi için farklı bir okuma teklifi sunmakta, diğer yandan ise söz konusu tartışmanın ana tezlerini -henüz bu konuda herhangi bir çalışmanın yapılmadığı- Türkçe felsefe literatürüne kazandırma amacı gütmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, Spinoza sisteminde bir bilinç teorisinin çıkarılabileceği savunulmakta ve tüm paralelizmine rağmen gerçekte olmasa bile kavramsal olarak zihni bedenden bağımsız bir biçimde düşünebilme imkânı irdelenmektedir. Söz konusu bağlamda, öncelikle “fikrin fikri” doktrini, bilincin metafizik temeli olarak ortaya konulmaktadır. Daha sonra bedenin kompleks yapısını oluşturan parçalara dair zihnin daha fazla “fikir”e ulaşabilme ve bu “fikir”lerden “fikrin fikri”ni çıkarabilme durumuna göre oluşan “bilinç dereceleri”, bilincin epistemolojik yönü olarak saptanmaktadır. Bedenin etkilenişlerinin zihin tarafından bilinme derecesine ve bilgi türlerine bağlı olarak insan zihninin nasıl “kendisinin, “Tanrı”nın ve “diğer varolanlar”ın bilincine ulaştığı tespit edilmektedir. Çalışmada varılan sonuç, Spinoza’da bilincin “bilgi” üzerine inşa edildiği, “fikir”in bilgiyi, “fikrin fikri”nin bilinci temsil ettiğidir. Böylece, neredeyse tüm tartışmaların odağında olan “bilinçli zihinler” ile “bilinçsiz zihinler” ve insan zihnindeki “bilinçli fikirler” ile “bilinçsiz fikirler”e dair ayırımın net olmayan sınırları belirginleştirilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda Spinoza’nın bilinç teorisi, onun en genel kapsamıyla zihin teorisiyle ve bu teorinin bir sonucu olan bilgi teorisiyle temellendirilir. Spinoza’nın zihin teorisine göre, özellikle insan zihni söz konusu olduğunda bedende gerçekleşen her değişim zihinde bir fikre tekabül eder (paralelizm) ya da bir fikir olarak temsil edilir. İnsan zihninde meydana gelen fikirler, bedenin etkilenişlerinin, yani bedenin kurduğu ilişkiler neticesinde alıp verdiği etkilere göre kendisinde meydana gelen değişimlerin birer temsilinden ibarettir. İnsan zihni bu fikirlerin bir kısmını “bulanık”, “bölük-pörçük” ya da “yetersiz” (inadequate) bir şekilde algılarken, bir kısmını da “apaçık”, “upuygun” ya da “yeterli” (adequate) bir şekilde kavrar. Spinoza bu temelden hareketle zihin ve bilgi teorilerini ortaya koyar. Ancak insan zihni kendisinde meydana gelen bedenin etkilenişlerinin fikirleriyle yetinmez, aynı zamanda bu fikirlerin yeterli ya da yetersiz olduklarına bakmaksızın onlara dair ikincil fikirler de oluşturur. Bu ikincil fikirler, birincil fikirlerin -yeterli ya da yetersiz olmalarına göre- farkındalığını ifade eder. Makalede bu oluşum ve farkındalık, yani “fikrin fikri” (ideas of ideas) Spinozacı bilinç teorisinin temel zemini ya da ana hattı olarak detaylı bir şekilde ortaya konulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bilinç teorisinin diğer sonuç veya çıktıları da her şeyden önce bu temel zeminin anlaşılmasını zorunlu ya da gerekli kılmaktadır. Buna göre insan bedeni, diğerleriyle kıyaslandığında Doğada en fazla parçaya ya da bileşene sahip çok karmaşık bir yapıdır. İnsan zihni ise bedenin kompleks yapısının her bir unsuruna dair fikirlere ulaşabilme imkanına sahiptir. Ancak bu fikirlerin içeriği, insan zihninin kendi bedenini tanıma derecesine göre oluşur. İnsan zihninin kendi bedenini bilme derecesi, aynı zamanda onun bilincinin de derecesini belirler. Spinoza insan dışındaki varlıkların da belli bir “canlılık derecesi”ne sahip olduğunu ve söylediklerinin insan kadar diğer varlıklar için de geçerli olduğunu belirtirken aynı zamanda insan bedeninin diğer bedenlerden, insan zihninin ise diğer zihinlerden daha üstün olduğunu temellendirmeye çalışır. Spinoza bir bedenin diğer bedenden üstünlüğünü, diğeriyle kıyaslandığında birinin kendi başına daha çok eylemi daha fazla gerçekleştirebilmesi olarak görür. Bir beden ne kadar çok parçaya sahipse ya da bünyesinde ne kadar çok çeşit cismi barındırıyorsa, o kadar daha fazla eylemi yerine getirmeye ve etki alıp vermeye müsait olur. Çünkü bir beden diğer bedenlerle karşılaştığında ya da ilişki kurduğunda, parçalarının her biri bu karşılaşmadan ya da ilişkiden etkilenebilir. Dolayısıyla beden ne kadar çok kompleks bir yapıdaysa zihin de o kadar çok fikre sahip olabilir. Bu, bedeni diğer bedenlerden üstün olan insanın, zihninin de diğer zihinlerden üstün olma sebebidir. İnsan zihninin kendi bedenini bilme imkanına bağlı olarak aynı zihindeki fikirler arasında ve birbiriyle kıyaslandığında iki zihin arasında “bilinçsiz fikirler” (non-conscious ideas) ve “bilinçli fikirler” (conscious ideas) olduğu gibi, daha düşük seviyeden daha yüksek seviyeye bilinçte derece farkı da oluşur. Bu derece farkı, makalede bilincin epistemolojik sonucu ya da çıktısı olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bilincin metafiziksel temeli ve epistemolojik sonucu birlikte düşünüldüğünde, insanın “kendilik-bilinci” makalenin son konusu olarak gündeme getirilmektedir.

İnsanın kendi varlığına dair ben bilinci yine kendisi açısından şüphe götürmez. Öyle ki Descartes tarafından ifade edildiği gibi, duyulur her şeyden şüphe ettiğimde bile kendi varlığımdan şüphe edememem, bu nedenle, eğer şüphe ediyorsam “düşünüyorum, o halde varım.” Diğer bir deyişle ben, algılarken, düşünürken veya bir şeyi isterken kendimin en açık ve seçik bir şekilde farkında olurum ve bundan da var olduğum sonucu çıkar. Çünkü düşünen bir şeyin yok olduğu kabul edilemez ve dolayısıyla var olmak için düşünmek yeterlidir. Bu da benim düşünen varlığımın, şüphelendiğim duyu nesnelerinden örneğin bedenden farklı bir töz olmasını gerektirir. Çünkü duyulur her şeyden şüphe ederken kendimden şüphe edememem, benim şüphe edilen şeylerden birisi olmadığımı gösterir. Kısacası, şüphe edilen şeyler ile şüphe edilemez şey, bir ve aynı doğadan olamaz. Bu da benim varlığımın en temel biçiminin düşünen bir şey yani bir ruh veya bir zihin olduğu anlamına gelir. Bununla birlikte böyle bir ruh veya zihnin varlığı, deneyci epistemolojiye göre ciddi bir sorun oluşturur. Çünkü ruh veya zihin özellikle dış deneyde bizim için mevcut değildir. Bu nedenle Hume gibi kimi deneyci düşünürler, ben bilincini üreten bir benliğin tözsel varlığını reddeder ve onu olayların içinde gerçekleştiği bir tiyatro sahnesi gibi algılar toplamına veya duyu deneylerine indirgerler. Hatta kimi deneyci düşünürler daha da ileri gider ve algılanan şeylerin onları algılayan ve ben olarak adlandırılan bir tözün varlığını gerektirmediğini ileri sürerler. Bununla birlikte benliğin deneyde nesne olarak gösterilememesi onun yokluğunu kanıtlamaya yetmez. Çünkü eğer algılar var, fakat algılayan bir özne yoksa algılayanın ne veya kim olduğu ya da algıların nerede bulunduğu gibi sorulara cevap verilemez. Hâlbuki “ben”, aktif bir öznenin fikridir ve düşünme, bilme veya isteme gibi tüm zihinsel işlemler onları gerçekleştiren bu aktif öznenin varlığını gerektirir. Bir özne olmadan söz konusu işlemlerin kendi kendine ortaya çıktığı kabul edilemez. Bu nedenle “ben”, bir tiyatro sahnesi gibi sadece algıların toplamı değildir. Buna göre deneyci epistemoloji benliğin varlığına dair tam bir açıklama veremez. Dolayısıyla deneyci epistemolojiye göre benliğin deneyin bir nesnesi olmadığı doğru olmakla birlikte tüm zihinsel işlemlerdeki aktif rolünün ve varlığının reddedilmesi mümkün görünmemektedir. Öyle ki Kant tarafından da ifade edildiği gibi bilincin varlığı olmadan bilginin meydana gelmesi de düşünülemez. Bununla birlikte Kant’a göre her ne kadar bilginin ortaya çıkması için bilincin varlığı gerekli ise de bilinç bir bilgi değeri taşımaz. Çünkü bilinç, sezgi içermez. Dolayısıyla sezgi nesnelerinin bilgisi gibi ben kendimin bilgisine sahip olamam. Bundan da benim, dünyanın sezgi nesneleri gibi duyusal/maddesel bir varlık olmadığım sonucu çıkar. Bununla birlikte Kant’a göre sezgisi bulunmadığı için benim bir ruh veya zihin olduğum da bilinemez. Bu şekilde Kant hem maddeciliği hem ruhçuluğu bilinemez olarak niteler. Ancak Kant’ın çift taraflı bilinemezci tutumu, insanı, kendi varlığının doğası hakkında tatmin etmeye yetmez. Çünkü duyulur nesneleri bilen insan, Kant tarafından, kendi doğasını bilemez olarak bırakılmıştır. Diğer bir deyişle Kant, Descartes’ın şüphe duyduğu duyulur nesneleri bildiğimizi fakat Descartes’ın şüphe götürmez bulduğu kendi varlığımızın doğasını bilemeyeceğimizi söyler. Halbuki Kant’ın aksine benliğin maddeselliğine dair bilginin yokluğu, onun ruhsallığına dair bir bilgi sayılabilir. Çünkü kendi varlığımıza dair sezginin yokluğu yani kendimizi elle tutup gözle göremememiz bizim maddesel olmadığımızı kanıtlar ve bu da bizim bir ruh veya zihin olduğumuz anlamına gelir. Zaten ruh ve zihin kavramları da aslında maddesel olmayan varlık türünü ifade eder.

Zihnî varlık problemi ontolojik ve epistemolojik yönleriyle birçok konuyla ilişkili olan çok boyutlu bir meseledir. Hem filozoflar hem de kelâmcılar problemi farklı yönleriyle ele almışlar ve aralarında tartışmışlardır. Bu tartışmalar kabul ve ret sadedinde zihnî varlıkla ilgili birtakım delillerin ve eleştirilerin ortaya çıkmasını sağlamıştır. Farklı konularla da ilişkilendirilen bu tartışmalar içerisinde özellikle ma‘dûmlara ilişkin bilginin zihnî varlığın ispatında kullanılması aynı zamanda ma‘dûma dair bilginin yerini tespit etmeye imkân vermiştir. Zira ma‘dûmun bilgiye konu olması bazı istisnalar hariç tutulacak olursa genel olarak kelâmcılar tarafından ittifak edilen bir husustur. Özellikle kelamın konusunun bilinenlere hasredilmesiyle beraber gelen süreç içerisinde mümkün olsun mümteni‘ olsun ma‘dûmların bilinebileceği âlimler tarafından kabul edilen bir husustur. Dolayısıyla ona dair bilginin nerede yer aldığı meselesi zihnî varlık tartışmalarının bir uzantısı olarak ortaya çıkmış olmaktadır. Bu bağlamda hem kelâmcılar hem de filozoflar benimsedikleri bilgi teorileri açısından ma‘dûm gibi nesnel dünyada olmayan ancak akledilebilen ya da hakkında yargıda bulunabilen veyahut tasavvur edilebilen bu kavramlara dair bilginin epistemolojik ve ontolojik olarak nerede olduğunu sorgulamışlar ve bu bilginin yerini belirlemeye çalışmışlardır. Bu çaba neticesinde ma‘dûmla ilgili bilginin yerinin zihin ve hâriç olmak üzere iki şekilde açıklandığı görülmüştür. Nesnel bir karşılığının olmaması sebebiyle ma‘dûmla ilgili bilgilerin yerinin zihin olduğunu iddia eden kelâmcılara karşılık olarak bu bilginin yerinin zihin değil dış dünya olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Onunla ilgili bilginin hâriçte olduğunu iddia edenler arasında da bir ittifak sağlanamamış, kimisi bu bilginin Eflâtûn’un idelerinde kimisi de faal akılda olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Ma‘dûma dair bilginin yerini zihne bağlayanlar arasında ise herhangi bir ihtilaf yaşanmamıştır. Buradan hareketle bu çalışmada esasen zihnî varlığın ispatı için ileri sürülen deliller ve bu delillere yönelik eleştirilerden yola çıkarak ma‘dûma dair bilginin yeri müteahhir dönem kelâmı açısından tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu tartışmalar çerçevesinde taraflar belirtilerek muhaliflerin birbirlerine yönelik eleştirilerine de yer verilmiştir. Çünkü bu eleştirilerin mahiyeti, karşıt görüşte olanların ma‘dûma dair bilginin yeri hakkındaki düşüncelerini ortaya koyma açısından önem arz etmektedir. Çalışmanın kapsamı, zihnî varlığa dair tartışmaların müstakil bir başlık olarak Fahreddîn er-Râzî tarafından ortaya konulmasından hareketle Râzî ve sonrası bazı müteahhir dönem kelâmcıları ile sınırlandırılmıştır. Buna binaen çalışmada müteahhir dönem içerisinde söz konusu meseleye yer veren temsil gücü yüksek ve şöhret bulmuş temel kelâm metinleri ve bu temel metinlere yazılan öne çıkmış şerhler tercih edilmiştir.

17. yüzyıl pek çok alanda olduğu gibi bilim ve felsefe açısından da önemli değişim ve dönüşümlere sebep olmuştur. Bu bağlamda Orta çağ düşüncesindeki Tanrı merkezli hâkim anlayışın yerini insan ve insan doğası bilimi almıştır. Aydınlanma dönemini karakterize eden söz konusu bu durum ile varoluşla ilgili tüm hususlar neden-etki ilişkisine bağlanmıştır. Bu doğrultuda David Hume’da mevcut rasyonalistlerden farklı olarak insan eylemlerinin başlatıcı nedeni olarak insan doğası bilimini tüm bilimlerin odağına yerleştirmiştir. Bu çalışma, İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme (A Treatise of Human Nature) ve İnsanın Anlama Yetisi Üzerine Bir Soruşturma (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) isimli eserlerinden yola çıkarak Hume’un insan doğası/bilimine dayalı duygu-düşünce ilişkisini zihnin işlevi ve deneyim çerçevesinde ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Deneysel yargılardan hareket eden Hume’un bu düşüncesi geleceğin geçmişle uyumlu olacağı varsayımına dayanır. Tüm felsefi yaklaşımının özünü insan bilimi ya da insan doğasına dayandıran Hume’un bu tutumu, daha sonra ardıllarını da büyük oranda etkileyecek olan deneyime yüksek bir otorite vermesinin sonucu olarak okunabilir. Düşünceleri, nesnel akıl yerine insan doğasından hareketle üretmeye çalışan Hume söz konusu eleştirel tutumuyla bilim ve ahlakı da duygulara bağlayarak felsefe tarihinde önemli bir yere sahip olmuştur. İnsanı merkeze alan Hume, insan doğasının araştırılmasına yönelmiş hatta bu doğrultuda matematik, doğa felsefesi ve doğal dini bile insana bağlamıştır. Geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecek hakkında daha öngörülebilir bilgilerin elde edilmesini insan doğası bilimine bağlayan Hume’un düşünceleri iki temel varsayım üzerine kurulur: Birincisi, insanda sabit, değişmeyen, tek yönlü bir doğa bulunur; ikincisi ise, şayet bir insan doğası bilimi inşa edilecekse içerik ve yöntem olarak deneyime dayanmalıdır. Zaten Hume, felsefesinin gayesini de “bu zamana kadar izlenen oyalayıcı ve usandırıcı yöntemleri terk etmek”, “sınırdaki bir kaleyi ya da köyü ele geçirmek yerine doğrudan başkente”, yani “bilimlerin merkezine, bir zamanlar hepsinden üstün olan insan doğasının ta kendisine” yürümek şeklinde ifade eder. Kendisinden önceki felsefi öğretileri sonuçsuz tartışmalar olarak niteleyen Hume’a göre insan doğasına yönelip, insanın anlama yetisinin potansiyeli ve gücünü keşfetmek gerekmektedir. Nedensellik ilişkisinin sınırları ve kaynağını insan zihni ve alışkanlıklar üzerinden temellendiren Hume’un yaklaşımının etkileri hala günümüzde de devam eden hakikat tartışmalarını derinden etkilemiştir. * Bu makale, 2. Türkiye Sosyal Bilimler Sempozyumu’nda sözlü olarak sunulan ancak tam metni yayımlanmayan “David Hume Düşüncesinde Duygu-Düşünce İlişkisinin İnsan Doğasında Temellendirilmesi” adlı tebliğin içeriği geliştirilerek ve kısmen değiştirilerek üretilmiş hâlidir.

Nicolaus Cusanus, considered one of the most important German thinkers by many historians of philosophy, has yet to receive the recognition he deserves in the philosophical circles in Turkey. However, the philosophical writings of Cusanus contain the seeds of the thoughts of many modern philosophers such as Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. For this reason, studies on Cusanus are an essential stopping point in the history of philosophy, especially for the Renaissance period and the transition to modern philosophy. Despite this, texts examining Cusanus' thoughts are limited in foreign languages and Turkish. Towards the end of the 19th century, studies on Cusanus started and recently the worldwide interest in Cusanus has increased. Although there are different theses about the original aspect of Cusanus' thoughts in these sources, his theory of knowledge and the relationship of this theory with the contemporary subject of philosophy of subjectivity attract attention. The reason for this is that Cusanus, unlike his contemporaries, as a result of his views on the human mind, makes the human center in the act of knowing and puts everything else into the mind's mediation. That is why people can know things not as they are in themselves, but only in so far, they are part of the conceptual world, that their own mind constructs that. This is a system of thought that on the one hand puts the human mind at the center through its act of knowing on the other hand, limits its knowledge. This centrality of the human mind led Cusanus to characterize man as the second god on earth. The main reason for characterizing man as the second god is the activity of knowing and the act of measuring that lies at the core of this activity. Despite its significance, there is no study focusing on man's creativity in this world through the relationship between Cusanus's conception of man as the second god and the human mind's activity of measurement, which reveals the originality of Cusanus' thought. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature. To achieve this aim, this study examines the act of measurement of man as the second god, which reveals the originality of Cusanus' theory of knowledge associated with modern and contemporary philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In the Meditations, Descartes offers three arguments for the human soul or mind to exist separately from the body. In the first, with "I think, therefore I am", he realizes that the most basic form of existence is thinking, that is, the consciousness of himself, and based on the undoubted certainty of this, he concludes that he is different from the body, which is doubtful like other sensible things. In the second Descartes argues that because the mind and body can be considered conceptually separate from each other, they are also separate in reality. Because there is no reason why our thinking should not conform to reality. In the third, Descartes appeals to the Platonic argument of the simplicity of the soul. Accordingly, while the soul is indivisible in all its mental activities, the body can be divided and therefore diminished because it is extended. However, with the decrease of the body, there is no decrease in the soul. This indicates that the soul or mind is separate from the body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a significant debate going on long time about the existence of a theory of consciousness in Spinoza's philosophical system of thought. This article, on the one hand, offers a different reading to alleviate the current debate, and on the other hand, it aims to bring the main theses of the discussion in question to the Turkish philosophy literature, which has not been studied yet. In this matter, it is argued that a theory of consciousness can be deduced in Spinoza's system of thought, and despite all its parallelism, the possibility of conceptual thinking the "mind" independently from the "body" even if not in reality, is examined. In this context, first, the doctrine of "ideas of ideas" is put forward as the metaphysical basis of consciousness. Then, the "degrees of consciousness", which are formed according to the mind's ability to reach more "ideas" about the parts that make up the complex structure of the body, and to extract the "ideas of ideas" from these "ideas", are determined as the epistemological aspect of consciousness. Depending on the degrees of ideas of the body's affections by the mind and the kinds of knowledge, it is determined how the human mind reaches the consciousness of "self", "God" and "other things". The conclusion in the study is that in Spinoza, consciousness is built on "knowledge"; while "ideas" represents knowledge, the "ideas of ideas" represents consciousness. Thus, the unclear boundaries of the distinction between "conscious minds" and "unconscious minds" and "conscious ideas" and "un-conscious ideas" in the human mind, which are at the center of almost all discussions, are tried to be clarified. In this sense, Spinoza's theory of consciousness in its most general scope is based on the theory of mind and the theory of knowledge, which is a result of first. In Spinoza's theory of mind, especially when it comes to the human mind, every change that occurs in the body, corresponds to an idea (parallelism) or is represented as an idea. The ideas that occur in the human mind are just representations of the affections of the body, that is, of the changes that occur in the body according to the effects it receives and influences as a result of the relations established by the body. While the human mind perceives some of these ideas in a "confused", "fragmentary" or "inadequate" way, it grasps some of them "clearly" or "adequately". Spinoza puts forward his theories of mind and knowledge on this basis. However, the human mind is not settled with only the ideas of the body's affection that occur in it, but also constitute secondary ideas about these ideas, regardless of whether they are adequate or inadequate. These secondary ideas express awareness of primary ideas, whether they are adequate or inadequate. In the article, this constitution and awareness, that is, the "ideas of the ideas", is tried to be revealed in detail as the basic ground or main line of the Spinozist theory of consciousness. Other results or outcomes of the theory of consciousness require first to understand this basic ground. Accordingly, the human body is a very complex structure that has the most parts or components in Nature compared to the others. The human mind, on the other hand, has the capability to reach ideas about each element and its change of the complex structure of the body. However, the content of these ideas is formed according to the degree to which the human mind recognizes its own body. The degree to which the human mind knows its own body also determines the degree of its consciousness. Spinoza states that non-human beings also have a certain "degree of animation", and while stating that what he says is valid for other beings as well as human beings, he also tries to justify that the human body is superior to other bodies and the human mind to other minds. Spinoza sees the superiority of one body over the other as the ability of one to perform more actions on one's own, compared to the other. The more parts a body has or the more different kinds of objects it contains, the more it is available to perform actions and influences or receives effects. Because when a body encounters or interacts with other bodies, each of its parts can be affected by this encounter or relationship. Therefore, the more complex the body has, the more ideas the mind can have. This is the reason why the mind of a person is superior to other minds because of whose body is superior to other bodies. Depending on the human mind's ability to know its own body, there are "unconscious ideas" and "conscious ideas" between the two minds when compared to and between ideas in the same mind, as well as a difference degree in consciousness from a lower level to a higher level. This degree of difference is discussed in the article as the epistemological result or outcome of consciousness. The "self-consciousness" of human, which comes to the fore as a result of considering the metaphysical basis of consciousness and its epistemological result together, constitutes the last subject of the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of mental existence is a multidimensional subject that is related to many issues with its ontological and epistemological aspects. Both philosophers and theologians have addressed this problem from different perspectives and have discussed it among themselves. These discussions have produced some evidence and criticisms about mental existence in terms of acceptance and rejection. In these discussions, which are also associated with different issues, the use of information about maʿdūm, particularly as evidence of mental existence, also helped pinpoint the place of the knowledge about maʿdūm. The fact that maʿdūm is the subject of knowledge is often a matter of consensus among theologians if some exceptions are disregarded. Particularly due to the extension of the subject of kalām to the known, it is a matter accepted by the scholars that maʿdūm can be known, whether it is mumkin (possible) or mumtani‘ (impossible). Therefore, the issue of where the information about it is located has emerged as an extension of the discussions on mental existence. In this context, in terms of epistemological theories they adopted, both theologians and philosophers have questioned the epistemological and ontological location of the knowledge of such concepts as ma'dūm, which hardly exist in the objective world but can be reasoned out or judged or imagined, and they have tried to determine the place of this knowledge. As a result of this effort, they have recognized that the place of knowledge about maʿdūm can be explained in two ways: the mind and outside world. In response to theologians, who claimed that the place of knowledge about maʿdūm is the mind, it has been claimed that the place of this knowledge is not the mind but the outside world. No consensus has been reached among those who claimed that the information was outside; some claimed that this information was in Plato's ideas, while others claimed that it was in the active mind. On the other hand, there has been no disagreement among those who considered the place of knowledge about maʿdūm as the mind. Based on this perspective, the present study tried to identify the place of information about maʿdūm, with a particular reference to the later kalām period, based on the evidence put forward to prove mental existence and the criticisms against such evidence. As a part of these discussions, the disputing parties were specified and the criticisms of the opponents towards each other were also included. This is because the nature of these criticisms is crucial as such criticisms are capable of revealing the opinions of those who have opposing views about the place of knowledge of maʿdūm. The scope of the present study was limited to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and some later theologians as it was al-Rāzī, who brought mental existence up for discussion as a specific point of debate. Therefore, in the present study, the famous theological texts that are highly representative of mental existence in the late kalām period and prominent commentaries written on these basic texts were preferred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The self-consciousness of a person's own existence is also beyond doubt for himself. So much so that, as expressed by Descartes, I cannot doubt my own existence even when I doubt everything sensible, therefore, if I doubt, "I think, therefore I am." In other words, while perceiving, thinking, or wanting something, I am most clearly and distinctly aware of myself, and from this, it follows that I exist. Because it cannot be accepted that a thinking thing does not exist, and therefore it is sufficient to think in order to exist. This requires my thinking being to be a different substance from the sense objects I suspect, such as the body. Because of the fact that I cannot doubt myself while doubting everything sensible shows that I am not one of the things that are doubted. In short, what is doubted and what cannot be doubted cannot be of one and the same nature. This means that the most basic form of my being is a thinking thing, that is to say a soul or a mind. However, the existence of such a soul or mind poses a serious problem for empiricist epistemology. Since the soul or mind is not available to us, especially in external experience. For this reason, some empiricist thinkers like Hume reject the substantive existence of a self that produces self-consciousness and reduce it to the sum of perceptions or sense experiments, like a theatre stage in which events take place. Some empiricist thinkers go even further and argue that things perceived do not require the existence of a substance that perceives them and is called the self. However, the fact that the self cannot be represented as an object in the experiment is not enough to prove its absence. Because if there are perceptions but there is no perceiving subject, questions such as what or who the perceiver is or where the perceptions are cannot be answered. Whereas “I” is the idea of an active subject, and all mental operations such as thinking, knowing, or wanting require the existence of this active subject who performs them. Without a subject, it cannot be accepted that the events in question have arisen by themselves. Therefore, “I” is not just a collection of perceptions, like a theatre stage. Accordingly, empiricist epistemology cannot give a full account of the existence of the self. Therefore, although it is true that the self is not an object of experience according to empiricist epistemology, it does not seem possible to deny its active role and existence in all mental processes. So much so that, as expressed by Kant, the formation of knowledge is unthinkable without the existence of consciousness. However, according to Kant, although the existence of consciousness is necessary for the emergence of knowledge, consciousness does not have the value of knowledge. Because consciousness does not contain intuition. Therefore, I cannot have knowledge of myself like knowledge of intuition objects. It follows from this that I am not a sensory/material entity like the objects of perception of the world. However, according to Kant, it cannot be known that I am a soul or a mind since it has no intuition. In this way, Kant qualifies both materialism and spiritualism as unknowable. However, Kant’s double-sided agnostic attitude is not enough to satisfy the human being about the nature of his own existence. Because the human being who knows sensible objects is left as ignorant of his own nature by Kant. In other words, Kant says that we know the sensible objects, which Descartes doubted, but we cannot know the nature of our own being, which Descartes found beyond doubt. However, unlike Kant, the absence of knowledge about the materiality of the self can be considered as knowledge of its spirituality. Because the absence of intuition of our own existence, that is, our inability to grasp and see ourselves, proves that we are not material, and this means that we are a spirit or a mind. In fact, the concepts of spirit and mind actually refer to the type of non-material being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Nicholas of Cusa is one of the important philosophers of the Early Renaissance period. He discussed his mystical philosophy, which he developed on the basis of Plato's thought, would contribute to Christian Western Thought. One of the most important areas of manifestation of the views of Cusa, a Catholic clergyman, which can be considered an attempt to create an alternative to Scholastic Philosophy, is religious experience. The view of religious experience, which he put forward in line with an intense understanding of God, with pantheistic themes, stands out as an experience shared by God and man. Cusa tried to reproduce the human understanding of Ancient philosophy from a perspective that was not limited to the theological context, unlike Scholastic philosophy. It is seen that cognitive abilities are made functional in a gradual and layered way in this understanding that people are treated with a holistic approach from an epistemic point of view. Cusa mysticism, which is based on the understanding that constitutes the ultimate point of these abilities, can be considered as a structure that decouples emotion and information in this sense or tries to provide a cognitive content to emotion. This knowledge is not a certified knowledge as we know it, but in fact a state of consciousness, and an existential orientation towards God stands out in it in a significant way. It is assumed that when this competence, which Cusa calls intellectual vision, is achieved, intuition will turn into an element that provides the unity of many mental and sensory acts with a very rich and diversified integrity. The main thesis of this study is that Cusa defines the experience of God as a face-to-face relationship in which each individual shares his or her singular experience directly with God. It seems that the Cusa defines the experience of God as a face-to-face relationship in which each individual shares their singular experience directly with God. Describing this experience as a “intellectual vision”, Cusa believes that thus it is possible to achieve a holistic understanding of being and that this point that it has reached is actually the realization of a level of consciousness that God is experiencing himself, as well as the experience of God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The simplest explanation for the monologue; "One person's conversation or one's own dialogue. Monologue in theater texts is usually written to reveal the hidden sides and inner world of the actors. In this way, the audience will have full control of the actors. The important thing here is to partner with the mind of the person. In this respect, the task of the monologue seems to present the life of the game person in full. In the modern era, classical games traditionally use monologue in this way. However, the function of the monologue changes in the post-modern period. It is now the language of the mind of the character. The mind of the game person who escapes from the center, who is not integrated speaks. In doing so, the voice of the game person is not consistent. It has many voices. Characters want to talk, want to be heard, but it was unclear whether they were willing to explain this to others. Sam Shepard uses the monologue in his plays as the voice of fragmented selves, as an expression of their mental activity. In these plays when external action is weak, the characters are in a showdown with themselves. In doing so, characters speaks polyphonically. Different voices, different consciousnesses come into play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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British novelist A.S. Byatt's A Whistling Woman, the final volume of The Frederica Quartet (1978-2002), does not just conclude a story spanning almost twenty years, but it also mirrors elemental opposites like science and religion, body and mind, visual and the verbal against a background of the social upheavals of the 60s. The focal point of the novel, a conference on 'Body and Mind' enables Byatt to problematize the dichotomy of associating body with women and mind with men revisiting the dilemma built on the constraints of marriage and motherhood and having an intellectual, independent existence as a woman in the whole quartet. While uncovering those conventions that especially determine the fate of women through the protagonist of the tetralogy, Frederica, Byatt casts her narrative net even wider with scientific and religious discourses organized around students, university authorities, scientists, anarchists and religious cult members outlining the social and cultural atmosphere of the late sixties. In compliance with new trends in science, introduction of television and visual culture of the period, the pictorial representations, ekphrastically integrated works of art turn into key narrative devices to elucidate the interwoven plots opening gateway to the defining moments, ideas and figures that are inherent in the sub-narratives and at the same time reverberate Byatt's high regard for art and science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bir kişinin, topluluğun ya da bütün bir dilin sahip olduğu söz ya da kelimeler bütünü olarak tanımlanan kelime hazinesine söz varlığı da denilmektedir. İnsanların Vocabulary, which is defined as the entire collection of words a person, a community, or a language has, is also referred to as lexicon. When vocabulary that individuals possess is discussed, the personal dictionaries they have in their minds are referred to. Briefly stated, the term vocabulary is the mental dictionary of the human brain. Mind, which is the mechanism that is responsible for human behavior, enables the complex processes at work in our brain for the language skills of reading, listening, speaking, and writing skills to function in a harmonious manner. Vocabulary is classified into two groups in terms of language skills related to comprehension and production as receptive vocabulary and productive vocabulary. Receptive vocabulary refers to the part of the lexicon used by individuals in the comprehension process as they are engaged in reading and listening while productive vocabulary refers to the part individuals make use of in the production process in speaking and writing activities. This qualitative study which is based on document analysis aims to dwell on the mental dimension of vocabulary and to describe the relationship of the vocabulary to memory within that context.

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Simon Udo and Michiel Leezenberg point to the cognitive traces in the works of 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 1078), named Asrār al-Balāgha and Dalā'il al-i'jāz. However, neither Simon nor Leezenberg provide an insight whether these traces can be found in other classical sources, where majāz and isti'āra are discussed. This paper argues that Simon's and Leezenberg's argument that the awareness of the cognitive elements in the classical Islamic approach to majāz and isti'āra cannot be reduced in 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's works. Rather, that the Hanafī legal theorists were aware of the function of dhihn/mind in the mechanism of majāz. Due to presenting a remarkable theoretical examination of the tropes and metaphors, 13th and 14th century Hanafī uṣūl al-fiqh sources are chosen. To clarify my argument, I will mainly focus on the analysis of the terminology, which expounds the relationship between majāz and mind: Such as, ittiṣāl (ilink/connection), dhihn (mind,) maḥal (space/domain). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Academic Journal of Philosophy / Felsefi Düşün is the property of Pinhan Yayincilik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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It is widely adopted that categories reside in the mind forming webs of semantic relationships of various types. Markman classies these relationships into two broad groups: taxonomic and thematic. She claims that until the age of 6 or 7, children are more likely to form thematic relations between categories, but after this age taxonomic relations begin to gain salience. In this research, a study group consisting of 300 primary, secondary and high school students in total were given three semantic webs including categories from different levels of categorization at superordinate, basic, subordinate levels. Using the categorical levels they had chosen from the three categorical levels of the web, the participants were asked to write sentences, in the context they created. In the database, the tendency of the participants to establish thematic and taxonomic relationships as well as the categorical levels they used were observed. The results showed that taxonomic relations clearly predominated the sentences produced by the participants. However, taxonomic awareness was seen to increase with age. It was also seen that the participants used peculiar sets of categorical levels while making taxonomic and thematic sentences.

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