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In the Harvard lectures of 1924–1925, Alfred North Whitehead proposed that our various intellectual activities amounted to an attempt to understand the world and our experiences through hypothesizing. He explained the importance of hypothesis in scientific research and extended the idea of hypothesis to the philosophical method called "speculative philosophy." For Whitehead, philosophy was the attempt to formulate general hypotheses that can transcend disciplines. This paper is intended to explore the possible influence of Victorian philosophers on Whitehead. Victorian philosophers such as John Herschel, William Whewell, and John Stuart Mill discussed the role of hypothesis in scientific discovery. Was Whitehead aware of this tradition? Was he influenced by it? This article indicates that Whitehead at least indirectly inherited the Victorian idea of hypothesis, notably in the thought of Whewell, as mediated by Charles Darwin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes its cue from an unpublished manuscript by the Victorian polymath William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882). I elucidate how he attempted to integrate science and religion through natural theology. I argue that Jevons's manuscript shows that he took the theory of probability to be the most appropriate tool for finding evidence of divine design in natural phenomena. Jevons thus took part in the nineteenth-century natural theology debate, specifically between William Whewell and Charles Babbage. This debate was about both how to interpret the analogy between natural and human contrivances, and about the tools which should be used in natural theology. After introducing the manuscript, I present Jevons's religious ideas about Unitarianism and the relationship between chance and design in his writings. I show Jevons's commitment to natural theology and his idea that humans, due to their finite intellect, should use the theory of probability to investigate divine providence. I then compare Jevons's position to Whewell's and Babbage's Bridgewater Treatises. I show how they had different conceptions of natural theology compared to Jevons, and different ideas about the tools that should be used to investigate natural laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En el presente artículo se sugiere la filosofía inductiva de la ciencia del filósofo victoriano William Whewell como un enfoque apropiado para formular una noción consiliente de la representación científica. Tras un breve recorrido por los antecedentes que hacen necesaria una noción de representación en el ámbito de la filosofía de la ciencia, se expone, en primer lugar, la descripción de lo que se ha denominado el problema de la representación científica. De seguido, se argumenta que la anterior es una caracterización poco manejable del problema que requiere ser deflacionada en favor de un perfil más acotado, para finalmente proponer que la idiosincrática noción de inducción de William Whewell puede ser considerada para desarrollar una noción de representación científica que haga consiliente las cuentas semanticistas y pragmatistas de la representación en ciencia.

Many people assume ceaseless conflict between natural science and Christianity, but the real conflict has been between scientism and Christianity. Scientism is the view that only the sciences (especially not theology) generate knowledge or rational belief. I show how Christianity generated rational beliefs that contributed to the rise of science. This science-fostering rational belief included rationales for when to practice methodological naturalism, and when to study nature without that restriction. Both practices cultivated science, though in different ways. This historical difference is of enduring value for recent debates about metaphysical naturalism (atheism), creationism, theistic evolution, and intelligent design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William Whewell's nineteenth century philosophy of science is sometimes glossed over as a footnote to Kant. There is however a key feature of Whewell's account worth noting. This is his appeal to Aristotle's form/matter hylomorphism as a metaphor to explain how mind and world merge in successful scientific inquiry. Whewell's hylomorphism suggests a middle way between rationalism and empiricism reminiscent of experience pragmatists like Steven Levine's view that mind and world are entwined in experience. I argue however that Levine does not adequately explain exactly how mind and world entwine. He could nonetheless do so if he appealed to Whewell's hylomorphic metaphor. We may prefer a reductive metaphysical explanation, but I suggest that pragmatists only have recourse to metaphor in this case. Both reductive and metaphorical explanations can enjoy great explanatory power if they exhibit a suitable measure of what I will call semantic distance. Semantic distance measures how close or how far apart explanandum and explanans are from each other in meaning. Metaphorical explanation, as evident in Whewell's hylomorphism and as detailed via the notion of semantic distance, presents a valuable new explanatory tool to those who hold that mind and world are entwined sans recourse to metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bu makalenin konusunu 19. yüzyıl Britanya’sının en önemli entelektüel figürlerinden birisi olan William Whewell’in ahlaki gelişim ideali oluşturmaktadır. Whewell’e göre ahlak bir gelişim idealini ifade eder. Bu gelişim ideali, sonunda gerçek mutluluğun bulunduğu, insan yaşamı boyunca devam eden bir süreçtir. Çünkü yaşadığımız her an daha erdemli, daha iyi bir insan olma imkânımız vardır. Ona göre insanın en önemli görevi, bu gelişim idealini gerçekleştirmektir. Bu gelişim idealinin altında Whewell’in ahlak, bilim ve dini birbirleriyle uyumlu olacak şekilde rasyonel bir sistem içerisinde bir araya getirme motivasyonu yatar. Bu motivasyonun kaynağı ise o dönemde en önemli muhalifleri olan faydacı düşünürlerin özellikle de John Stuart Mill’in sezgici ahlaka yönelttiği gayri rasyonellik ve tutarsızlık eleştirileridir. Bu üç alanı birbirleriyle tutarlı hale getirmenin yolu olarak Whewell, tıpkı dinde olduğu gibi ahlak ve bilimi de teolojik bir temele dayandırmakta görür. Buna göre evrenin ve insanın yaratıcısı olan Tanrı, hem doğayı hem de insanların eylemlerini düzenleyecek belirli ilkeler vaz etmiştir. Burada ahlak ve bilime düşen görev bu ilkeleri keşfetmektir. Bu nedenle ahlak ve bilim temelde bir keşif sürecini ifade eder. Whewell, ahlakın temel ilkelerinin ancak sezgisel olarak bilinebileceğini savunur. Whewell’in sezgici ahlak geleneği içerisinde değerlendirilmesinin temel nedeni de bu kabulüdür. Fakat temel ilkelerin bu bilinme aşaması, herhangi bir şekilde gayri rasyonel bir süreci ifade etmez. Bu ilkeleri sezgisel olarak kavrayan temel yeti akıldır. Vicdan ise aklın yargılarını onaylayan bir yetidir. Ancak Whewell’in sisteminde vicdan, akıldan ayrı bir yeti olmaktan ziyade aklın bir yönüne tekabül eder. Böylelikle Whewell, vicdanı ahlakın temel ilkelerini kavrayan akıldan ayrı bir yeti olarak kabul eden sezgici ahlak düşünürlerinden ayrılır. Whewell’e göre vicdan insanın rehberidir fakat vicdanın yargıları zaman zaman yanılabilir. Bu nedenle de vicdanın sürekli olarak akıl tarafından kontrol edilip geliştirilmesi gerekir. İşte Whewell’in ahlaki gelişim idealini temellendirdiği nokta da burasıdır. Çünkü insana düşen görev, vicdanını sürekli olarak geliştirip tüm yargılarını en üstün kurala uygun hale getirmektir. İşte bu da ahlaki gelişime tekabül eder. Ahlaki gelişimde en yüksek iyi, ödev ve erdem kavramları son derece önemlidir. Whewell’in sisteminde en üstün kural ise Tanrı iradesini ifade eder. Tanrı’nın emirlerine itaat etme yükümlülüğü ödev, ödevi yerine getirmek ise erdeme karşılık gelir. Bu nedenle ödevin ihlali bir anlamda Tanrı’nın emrinin ihlalidir. Ödevi yerine getirmemek, Tanrı’nın iradesine karşı gelmektir. Dinî bağlamda ise bu, günaha tekabül eder. Fakat Whewell, ahlaki gelişim idealini aklın tek başına gerçekleştiremeyeceğini savunur. Bunun temel nedeni, aklın sınırlı yapısıdır. Bu nedenle akıl, bu süreçte vahyin yardımına ihtiyaç duyar. Fakat Whewell, sisteminin rasyonel zeminini muhafaza edebilmek için vahiy karşısında akla, vahyedilmiş din karşısında akla dayanan doğal dine öncelik verir. Ancak Whewell, yine de gelişim idealinin tamamlaması için vahyin yardımını zorunlu görür. Hatta öyle ki vahyin bu yardımını kabul etmeyen, vahye inanmayan kişilerin kınanması gerektiğini söyler. Çünkü ona göre bu gelişim ideali, aklın ulaşamayacağı ve ancak vahiy tarafından verilebilecek bilgilerle tamamlanabilecektir. Whewell, bu noktada o kadar ileri gider ki İsa Mesih’in yeryüzüne inişinden önce hiçbir insanın ahlaki tekamülünü tamamlayamadığını ileri sürer. Buna da gerekçe olarak vahyin o dönemlerde olmamasını gösterir. Whewell’in bu iddiasının kendi sisteminin rasyonelliğini etkileyip etkilemediği makalenin temel tartışma alanını oluşturmaktadır. Kanaatimizce Whewell’in vahyin yardımı olmaksızın ahlaki gelişim idealinin tamamlanamayacağı şeklindeki yaklaşımı, ahlak teorisinin rasyonel zeminini tamamen ortadan kaldırmasa bile ciddi biçimde tartışmalı hale getirmektedir.

Bu makalede 19. yüzyıl Britanya’sının en önemli iki ahlâk düşünürü olan William Whewell (1794-1866) ve John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)’in ahlâk ile hukuk ilişkisine dair görüşleri konu edinilmektedir. Whewell, ahlâka temel teşkil eden ilkelerin ahlâki duyu ya da vicdan gibi insan doğasında bulunan bir yeti aracılığıyla doğrudan sezgisel olarak bilinebileceğini savunan bir geleneğe mensuptur. Bununla birlikte Whewell, söz konusu bu temel ilkelerin sezgisel olarak bilinme sürecinin gayri rasyonel bir süreç olmadığını, aklın tüm bu süreç boyunca aktif olduğunu savunur. Bu anlamda akıl, Whewell’in sisteminin en temel kavramı olarak karşımıza çıkar. Whewell’in sisteminde Tanrı iradesi en yüksek iyiyi temsil eder. Buna göre Tanrı iradesine uygun eylem ahlâki olarak doğru eylem olmaktadır. Whewell, akıl ile Tanrı iradesi arasında doğal bir birlikteliğin olduğunu ileri sürerek, akla uygun eylemde bulunmanın Tanrı iradesine uygun olarak davranmak anlamına geldiğini savunur. Buna karşılık Mill’in mensubu olduğu faydacılık ise en yüksek sayıda insanın en büyük mutluluğunu ahlâki olarak doğru eylemin ölçütü olarak belirleyen bir ahlâk teorisidir. Ahlâkın olgusal temelde deneyime ve içgözleme dayanması gerektiğini savunan faydacılık, hiçbir metafizik ve teolojik unsura sistemi içerisinde yer vermez. Faydacılık, ahlâki sezgiciliğin temel ahlâki ilkelerin sezgisel olarak bilinebileceği iddiasını reddeder. Faydacılığın bu yaklaşımı bahse konu iki teoriyi birbirinin doğal rakibi haline getirir. İşte bu rekabetin bir sonucu olan Whewell-Mill tartışmasının konularından biri de ahlâk-hukuk arasındaki ilişkidir. Bu bağlamda Whewell’in ahlâk-hukuk ilişkisine dair görüşleri, Mill’in Whewell’e bu konudaki eleştirileri ve Whewell’in Mill’e verdiği yanıtlar makalenin konu sınırlarını oluşturmaktadır. Karşılaştırma yönteminin benimsendiği bu çalışmadaki temel amaç, ahlâk-hukuk ilişkisine yeni bakış açıları kazandırmaktır. Whewell-Mill tartışmasına odaklandığımızda, Whewell’in ahlâk-hukuk ilişkisini hak kavramı, Mill’in ise adalet kavramı temelinde ele aldığını görürüz. Whewell’e göre yasalar tarafından belirlenmiş haklar olmadıkça ahlâktan bahsetmenin imkânı yoktur. Bu bağlamda adalet de temelde yasaya uygunluğu ifade eder. Mill de tıpkı Whewell gibi adaletin sabit olmayıp, değişken olduğunu kabul eder ve adil olanın ancak faydanın belirleyebileceğini ileri sürer. Mill, Whewell’in ahlâk-hukuk ilişkisine dair görüşlerine itiraz eder ve ona bu konuyla ilgili olarak birbirinin devamı niteliğinde üç eleştiri yapar. Mill’e göre Whewell ilk olarak, yasaların olmadığı yerde ahlâktan bahsetmenin mümkün olmadığını iddia ederek, hukuku ahlâkın temeli haline getirmiştir. Whewell, Mill’in bu eleştirisine itiraz ederek, kendisinin hukuku ahlâkın temeli haline getirmediğini, ahlâki ilkelerin uygulanması için hukuka ihtiyaç duyulduğunu söylediğini belirtir. Mill’in ikinci eleştirisi ise Whewell’in yasaları ahlâki doğruluk ölçütü haline getirdiği ve bunun da ahlâkı haklara, dolayısıyla da yasalara riayete indirgediği şeklindedir. Whewell, ahlâki doğruluğun hukuki doğruluktan çok daha geniş olduğunu söyleyerek Mill’e itiraz eder. Ona göre yasalara itaat, ahlâki doğruluğun yalnızca bir kısmıdır. Mill’in son eleştirisi ise Whewell’in adil olmasalar bile yasalara itaati ahlâkî bir ödev haline getirdiğine dairdir. Öyle ki Whewell’in sisteminde köleliği onaylayan yasalara itaat dahi ahlâki bir ödev haline gelmektedir. Whewell ise yasaların zaman zaman gayri ahlâki olabileceğini kabul etmekle birlikte söz konusu yasalara itaatin itaat etmemeye nazaran daha makul olduğunu belirtir. Zira yasalara uymama durumunun ortaya çıkaracağı sorunlar çok daha büyüktür. Yapılması gereken daha adil yasaların yapılmasını sağlamaktır. Fakat Whewell’e göre yasaları adil hale getirmek ahlâkçının değil hukukçunun görevidir. Mill’in Whewell’e yönelttiği bu eleştiriler, aslında Mill’in kendi sistemini de ilgilendiren eleştirilerdir. Bu eleştirilere Mill’in kendisi de tatmin edici cevaplar verememektedir. Sonuç olarak Whewell ile Mill arasında ahlâk ile hukuk arasındaki ilişkiye dair gelişen bu tartışmada ahlâk-hukuk ilişkisiyle ilgili olarak her iki düşünürde de farklı cevaplar bulmak mümkündür. Fakat bu cevapların mezkûr sorunları çözüme kavuşturduğunu söylemek pek mümkün görünmemektedir.

This article offers a fresh assessment of the views of the American paleontologist and evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould on the relation of science and religion. Gould is best known for his celebrated notion of "nonoverlapping magisteria," which is often seen in somewhat negative terms as inhibiting dialogue. However, as a result of his critique of the unificationist approach to knowledge developed in Edward O. Wilson's Consilience, Gould later made increased use of the more positive notion of a "consilience of equal regard," which recognized the porous nature of disciplinary divides and the propriety of interdisciplinary dialogue. Gould's final views on the relation of science and religion, set out in The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister's Pox, published after his death, affirms the distinctiveness and autonomy of science and religion on the one hand, while encouraging their constructive dialogue and productive interaction on the other. This should now be seen as Gould's definitive statement on this question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the moral development ideal of William Whewell, one of the most important intellectual figures of the 19th century Britain. According to Whewell, morality is an ideal of development. This is a process that continues throughout human life in which there is true happiness at the end. In every moment we live, we have the opportunity to be a more virtuous and better person. According to him, the most important task of human beings is to realize this ideal of development. The motivation behind this ideal is to bring morality, science and religion together in a rational system in harmony with each other. The source of this motivation is the criticism of irrationality and inconsistency directed by utilitarian thinkers (especially, John Stuart Mill), the most important opponents of ethical intuitionism. As a way of making these three areas consistent with each other, Whewell bases morality and science on a theological basis. Accordingly, God, the creator of the universe and human beings, has laid down certain principles that will regulate both nature and human actions. The duty of morality and science is to discover these principles. Therefore, morality and science are simply a process of discovery. Whewell argues that the basic principles of morality can only be known intuitively. The main reason why Whewell is considered within the ethical intuitionist tradition is this view. But this process of knowing the basic principles does not in any way imply an irrationality. The basic power that intuitively perceives these principles is reason. Conscience is a faculty that approves the judgments of reason. However, in Whewell's philosophy, conscience corresponds to an aspect of reason rather than being a faculty separate from reason. Thus, Whewell is distinguished from the intuitive moral thinkers who regard conscience as a faculty separate from reason, which grasps the basic principles of morality. According to Whewell, conscience is the guide of a human being but the judgments of conscience can sometimes be mistaken. Therefore, conscience must be constantly controlled and developed by reason. This point is where Whewell bases his moral philosophy. Because one's duty is to continuously improve their conscience and make all their judgments in accordance with the highest rule. This corresponds to moral development. The concepts of the highest good, duty, and virtue are extremely important in moral development. The ultimate rule in Whewell's philosophy expresses the will of God. The obligation to obey God's commands corresponds to duty, and fulfilling the duty corresponds to virtue. Thus, any violation of duty is a violation of God's command. Failing to do the duty is to go against the will of God. In a religious context, this corresponds to sin. Whewell argues, however, that the ideal of moral progress cannot be fulfilled by reason alone. The main reason for this is the limited structure of reason. Therefore, reason needs the help of revelation in this process. Nevertheless, in order to preserve the rational ground of his moral philosophy Whewell prioritizes reason over revelation and natural religion over revealed religion. However, Whewell still argues the help of revelation necessary for the fulfillment of the ideal of progress. He even says that those who do not accept this help of revelation and do not believe in revelation should be condemned. Because, according to him, this ideal of development can be completed with the information beyond the reach of reason that can only be bestowed by revelation. Whewell goes so far as to argue that no one was able to complete their moral evolution before Jesus Christ descended on earth. He also shows that revelation did not occur at that time as a justification. The question of whether Whewell's claim has an impact on the rationality of his philosophy is the main problem of this article. Here I argue that Whewell's approach that the ideal of moral development cannot be completed without the help of revelation makes his philosophy controversial, even if it does not completely remove the rational ground of moral theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the polemic between William Whewell and John Stuart Mill, two major thinkers of 19th century British moral thought. In his work, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England, Whewell criticized Bentham and utilitarianism. Mill also wrote an article titled "Whewell on Moral Philosophy" to answer these criticisms. Whewell generally accuses utilitarianism of evaluating actions on the basis of pleasure and pain and Bentham of building a moral theory on pleasure and pain; Mill accuses Whewell of solving the relation between self-interest and duty by appealing to God, and of appealing to utilitarian reasons when generating justifications for the basic moral principles of his system. This polemic, in which both thinkers often apply rhetorical tricks, is a polemic in which opinions are supported by popular arguments rather than technical ones. In this polemic, Whewell's main purpose is to show that utilitarianism does not have as strong foundations as it seems, while Mill's aim is to present that Whewell's criticisms are based on prejudices. In this context, based on the answers given, it can be said that Mill is more successful than Whewell, which I think should not be accepted as the absolute defense of both theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Henry Huxley and Charles Darwin discovered in 1857 that they had a fundamental disagreement about biological classification. Darwin believed that the natural system should express genealogy while Huxley insisted that classification must stand on its own basis, independent of evolution. Darwin used human races as a model for his view. This private and long-forgotten dispute exposes important divisions within Victorian biology. Huxley, trained in physiology and anatomy, was a professional biologist while Darwin was a gentleman naturalist. Huxley agreed with John Stuart Mill's rejection of William Whewell's sympathy for Linnaeus. The naturalists William Sharp Macleay, Hugh Strickland, and George Waterhouse worked to distinguish two kinds of relationship, affinity and analogy. Darwin believed that his theory could explain the difference. Richard Owen introduced the distinction between homology and analogy to anatomists, but the word homology did not enter Darwin's vocabulary until 1848, when he used the morphological concept of archetype in his work on Cirripedia. Huxley dropped the word archetype when Richard Owen linked it to Plato's ideal forms, replacing it with common plan. When Darwin wrote in the Origin of Species that the word plan gives no explanation, he may have had Huxley in mind. Darwin's preposterous story in the Origin about a bear giving birth to a kangaroo, which he dropped in the second edition, was in fact aimed at Huxley. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Most studies deny that Kritik der Urteilskraft played a significant role in the early reception of Kant's philosophy in England. In this paper, I examine the notebooks, letters and lectures of several members of British medical and scientific institutions to tell a different story. Drawing from the writings of Thomas Beddoes, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Joseph Henry Green and William Whewell, I identify a line of reception in which Kant's critique of judgement's power of reflection was used to establish the consilience of the mind's anticipation of systematic order and the organization of natural bodies. Each discovered in Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft a shared principle for judgements of taste and scientific inquiry, made available through the mind's affective response to the appearance of contingent order in nature. Their writings, I contend, evince a more sophisticated reception of Kant's philosophy in England than has hitherto been recognized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stars and other astronomical references play a significant part in Charles Dickens’s writings, from the 1830s to the end of his career. He took an interest in contemporary discoveries and theories in astronomy, but also uses cosmic phenomena in religiously inspired and symbolic ways. This network of references, from the farcical depiction of an astronomer in The Lamplighter and the self-aggrandising cosmic references of Mr. Pecksniff, through the benevolent star that shines in Hard Times and brief remarks on arguments for and against life on other planets, culminates in, and gives extra meaning to, Dickens’s greatest work of stargazing, Great Expectations.

Despite deserving a place amongst the historic milestones of the philosophy of disciplines, the system of the sciences put forward by Whewell has so far received little interest. Yet his ideas had a significant impact on the researches subsequently carried out on the topic, exerting in particular a decisive influence on Peirce and Spencer. The present paper aims to display the innovatory nature of the philosophical foundations of the Whewellian classification of the sciences. In this respect, we will argue that the most striking feature of his disciplinary system lies in a heuristic categorization of the sciences according to their “methods of discovery”. This represents a double departure from both the Aristotelian and the Baconian disciplinary paradigms, which are instead underpinned by ontological and epistemological criteria, respectively. Next, we will explore the pivotal role of Whewell's classification of the sciences for his overall project of a philosophy of scientific discovery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Astronomers of the first half of the nineteenth century viewed our solar system entirely differently from the way twentieth-century astronomers viewed it. In the earlier period the dominant image was of a set of planets and moons, both of which kinds of bodies were inhabited by intelligent beings comparable to humans. By the early twentieth century, science had driven these beings from every planet in our system except the Earth, leaving our solar system (and perhaps others) as more or less desolate regions for the most part bereft of intelligent life. This essay traces this extinction and its relation to religious thought, noting the role played in it by Sir John Herschel and especially by William Whewell. The inverse square laws for gravitation, heat radiation, and light receive special attention, as does the question of the relevance of the Christian notions of a divine incarnation and redemption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Type' in biology is a polysemous term. In a landmark article, Paul Farber ( Journal of the History of Biology 9(1): 93-119, ) argued that this deceptively plain term had acquired three different meanings in early nineteenth century natural history alone. 'Type' was used in relation to three distinct type concepts, each of them associated with a different set of practices. Important as Farber's analysis has been for the historiography of natural history, his account conceals an important dimension of early nineteenth century 'type talk.' Farber's taxonomy of type concepts passes over the fact that certain uses of 'type' began to take on a new meaning in this period. At the closing of the eighteenth century, terms like 'type specimen,' 'type species,' and 'type genus' were universally recognized as referring to typical, model members of their encompassing taxa. But in the course of the nineteenth century, the same terms were co-opted for a different purpose. As part of an effort to drive out nomenclatural synonymy - the confusing state of a taxon being known to different people by different names - these terms started to signify the fixed and potentially atypical name-bearing elements of taxa. A new type concept was born: the nomenclatural type. In this article, I retrace this perplexing nineteenth century shift in meaning of 'type.' I uncover the nomenclatural disorder that the new nomenclatural type concept dissolved, and expose the conceptual confusion it left in its tracks. What emerges is an account of how synonymy was suppressed through the coinage of a homonym. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Apresentamos um exame sobre a distinção entre os “contextos” da descoberta e da justificação a partir de algumas concepções de William Whewell (1794-1866). Mediante a leitura dos escritos de Whewell e de sua biografia intelectual, observamos que sua filosofia da ciência e o papel desta em seu projeto para reformar a ciência pressupõem a inclusão de elementos que foram encarados como secundários pelos filósofos da ciência. Concluímos que, para Whewell, os aspectos epistemológicos e metodológicos da ciência não são independentes da integridade da formação e dos compromissos intelectuais e morais dos cientistas, tampouco da compreensão histórica da produção de conhecimento.

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to provide an extensive account of Robert Leslie Ellisʼs largely forgotten work on philosophy of science and probability theory. On the one hand, it is suggested that both his ‘idealist’ renovation of the Baconian theory of induction and a ‘realism’ vis-à-vis natural kinds were the result of a complex dialogue with the work of William Whewell. On the other hand, it is shown to what extent the combining of these two positions contributed to Ellisʼs reformulation of the metaphysical foundations of traditional probability theory. This parallel is assessed with reference to the disagreement between Ellis and Whewell on the nature of (pure) mathematics and its relation to scientific knowledge. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

A common view is that, whether taught in philosophy departments or elsewhere, practical ethics should include some introduction to philosophical ethics. But even an entire course cannot afford much time for this and expect to do justice to ethical concerns in the practical area (for example, business, engineering, or medicine). The concern is that ethical theories would need to be "watered down," or over-simplified. So, we should not expect that this will be in good keeping with either the theories or the practical concerns. In addressing this problem, we turn to philosopher Thomas Reid ( 1710-1796). He insisted that, because morality is for everyone, one needn't be a philosopher to understand its requirements. Although it can be useful to organize our moral thinking around a few basic principles, a system of morality is more like a system of botany or mineralogy than geometry. Noting this can guide us in constructing effective courses in practical ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay discusses philosopher Charles Peirce's thought regarding the relationship between scholastic logic and Gothic architecture in connection with art historian Erwin Panofsky's analogy between Gothic cathedrals and the "Summa Theologiae" by theologian Thomas Aquinas. The role of the concept of habitus in these analogies is analyzed. Also explained is the impact of philosopher William Whewell on Peirce's interest in art history and of art historian Edgar Wind on Panofsky.

In this paper, I examine William Whewell’s (1794–1866) ‘Discoverer’s Induction’, and argue that it supplies a strikingly accurate characterization of the logic behind many statistical methods, exploratory data analysis (EDA) in particular. Such methods are additionally well-suited as a point of evaluation of Whewell’s philosophy since the central techniques of EDA were not invented until after Whewell’s death, and so couldn’t have influenced his views. The fact that the quantitative details of some very general methods designed to suggest hypotheses would so closely resemble Whewell’s views of how theories are formed is, I suggest, a strongly positive comment on his views. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Many people worry that the theory of evolution that Charles Darwin gave in his Origin of Species is now dated and no longer part of modern science. This essay challenges this claim, arguing that the central core of the Origin is as vital today as it ever was, although naturally the science keeps moving on. Darwin provided the foundation not the finished product. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke created a special epistemological category for mathematical and religious knowing. This category of knowledge was quickly brushed to the side in the French Enlightenment, but the English preserved it well into the nineteenth century. This article considers the ways that the neo-Lockian joining of mathematics and theology fundamentally affected both mathematical and theological thinking in the first half of the English nineteenth century. It argues that these developments set the stage for the post-Darwinian conflicts between science-including mathematics-and religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Primarily between 1833 and 1840, William Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology and his tidology is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]