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Als je vermoedt dat de afgifte van de beregeningsinstallatie ongelijk is, dan is het logisch dat je meer water geeft om droge plekken te vermijden. Toch? Alleen werkt dat emissie naar de ondergrond in de hand en dat is in de grondgebonden teelten ongewenst. Op zoek dus naar de ideale installatie met gelijke afgifte.

Recently, large-scale surface-water or canal irrigation systems have been termed ‘a sunset industry’ (Rijsberman 2003). Handing over this sunset industry by means of irrigation management transfer (IMT) policies and the creation of water user associations (WUAs) has three main objectives: to increase efficiency, equity, and empowerment. The Uzbek government, together with the international organizations, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), is currently promoting IMT and the creation of WUAs nationwide. The onset of the policy seemed to be a rational development since the former state and collective farms, which were also responsible for water management on their territories, were disintegrating, and new private farms were emerging rapidly. This study seeks to assess the potential of IMT policies by examining the broader physical, organizational, socio-economic, and political factors that might facilitate or hinder the main objectives of IMT and the creation of WUAs. These factors are addressed and analyzed separately through eight case study chapters that address questions on basin water management, the organizational capacities, and the socio-political dependencies of the district water management departments, the potential for multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs), the politics of social network structures, and the process of land reforms. The study concludes that none of the external factors is conducive to the introduction of IMT policies and for creating WUAs. The implication is that IMT policies will not increase efficiency, equity, and empowerment, but could even worsen the water management situation. Furthermore, these policies will not increase the empowerment of either the WUAs or their members. Hence, under the current conditions, handing over the ‘sunset industry’ will not lead to a new sunrise for irrigation in Uzbekistan.

Recently, large-scale surface-water or canal irrigation systems have been termed ‘a sunset industry’ (Rijsberman 2003). Handing over this sunset industry by means of irrigation management transfer (IMT) policies and the creation of water user associations (WUAs) has three main objectives: to increase efficiency, equity, and empowerment. The Uzbek government, together with the international organizations, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), is currently promoting IMT and the creation of WUAs nationwide. The onset of the policy seemed to be a rational development since the former state and collective farms, which were also responsible for water management on their territories, were disintegrating, and new private farms were emerging rapidly. This study seeks to assess the potential of IMT policies by examining the broader physical, organizational, socio-economic, and political factors that might facilitate or hinder the main objectives of IMT and the creation of WUAs. These factors are addressed and analyzed separately through eight case study chapters that address questions on basin water management, the organizational capacities, and the socio-political dependencies of the district water management departments, the potential for multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs), the politics of social network structures, and the process of land reforms. The study concludes that none of the external factors is conducive to the introduction of IMT policies and for creating WUAs. The implication is that IMT policies will not increase efficiency, equity, and empowerment, but could even worsen the water management situation. Furthermore, these policies will not increase the empowerment of either the WUAs or their members. Hence, under the current conditions, handing over the ‘sunset industry’ will not lead to a new sunrise for irrigation in Uzbekistan.

Onderzoeksvragen zijn hoe samenwerking in waterverdeling kan worden verbeterd, en hoe internationale verdragen zo kunnen worden ontworpen dat ze niet worden verbroken. Onderliggende onderwerpen zijn de aanwezigheid van betwiste eigendomsrechten op water en het ontwerp van aantrekkelijke verdeelregels voor rivierwater. Het doel van dit proefschrift is het analyseren van waterverdeling in grensoverschrijdende rivieren met behulp van speltheoretische modellen. Dit type modellen is geschikt voor het analyseren van strategische interactie tussen landen die een rivier delen, in hun beslissingen omtrent watergebruik.

Onderzoeksvragen zijn hoe samenwerking in waterverdeling kan worden verbeterd, en hoe internationale verdragen zo kunnen worden ontworpen dat ze niet worden verbroken. Onderliggende onderwerpen zijn de aanwezigheid van betwiste eigendomsrechten op water en het ontwerp van aantrekkelijke verdeelregels voor rivierwater. Het doel van dit proefschrift is het analyseren van waterverdeling in grensoverschrijdende rivieren met behulp van speltheoretische modellen. Dit type modellen is geschikt voor het analyseren van strategische interactie tussen landen die een rivier delen, in hun beslissingen omtrent watergebruik.

This report has three objectives: 1. To synthesise and analyse the current water resources management policy environment as it pertains to engaging community structures in development planning, 2. To describe and comparatively analyse the social, structural and operational characteristics of traditional water management institutions around the country, 3. Drawing upon these findings, to analyse the principal opportunities and challenges of using community institutions within formal water rights management structures. Recent drafts of the Water Sector Strategy (WSS) and the Water Law provide the main policy environment for water management. The drafts of the WSS pay tribute to integrated water resources management (IWRM) by incorporating stakeholder participation at the local level (with a focus on water user associations or WUAs) and at the basin level (with a focus on river basin councils). This is also emphasised in the Draft Water Law, with its section on river basin councils and sub-basin councils. The law on WUAs, however, is less explicit. While the July 2007 Draft WSS focused on water pricing, the February 2008 draft focused on poverty alleviation and did not discuss water pricing (although cost recovery for construction and services is still anticipated). The June 2008 Draft Water Law continues to focus on establishing a modern permit system, with the exception of right-of-way areas (areas that are protected and free from interventions). All versions of the Draft WSS have a strong focus on infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion. The drafts highlight the role of NGOs and donors in achieving this, but not all of them deal with the negative consequences that these efforts might have for downstream riparian states.

This report has three objectives: 1. To synthesise and analyse the current water resources management policy environment as it pertains to engaging community structures in development planning, 2. To describe and comparatively analyse the social, structural and operational characteristics of traditional water management institutions around the country, 3. Drawing upon these findings, to analyse the principal opportunities and challenges of using community institutions within formal water rights management structures. Recent drafts of the Water Sector Strategy (WSS) and the Water Law provide the main policy environment for water management. The drafts of the WSS pay tribute to integrated water resources management (IWRM) by incorporating stakeholder participation at the local level (with a focus on water user associations or WUAs) and at the basin level (with a focus on river basin councils). This is also emphasised in the Draft Water Law, with its section on river basin councils and sub-basin councils. The law on WUAs, however, is less explicit. While the July 2007 Draft WSS focused on water pricing, the February 2008 draft focused on poverty alleviation and did not discuss water pricing (although cost recovery for construction and services is still anticipated). The June 2008 Draft Water Law continues to focus on establishing a modern permit system, with the exception of right-of-way areas (areas that are protected and free from interventions). All versions of the Draft WSS have a strong focus on infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion. The drafts highlight the role of NGOs and donors in achieving this, but not all of them deal with the negative consequences that these efforts might have for downstream riparian states.

This thesis is a study of a modernised irrigation scheme in Tanzania. It aims to understand how irrigation and agricultural technologies have interacted with local society to transform production, paying particular attention to gender relations and changes for women farmers. The thesis seeks to contribute to a better understanding of what kinds of livelihood and production changes (negative and positive) eventuate under ‘modernised’ irrigation systems, and how these contrast with conditions under the older local irrigation systems the scheme has replaced. The central research question of the thesis is to understand how irrigation modernisation in the 1980s shaped, and has been reshaped by, the livelihood needs and options of water users. The thesis analyses the initiatives and interactions of agents at various levels – i.e. international, national, community and farm levels – as they attempt to make use of and adjust to the technical and operational demands of a modern scheme. In methodological terms, this thesis is guided by a technographic approach, as advocated by Richards (2002), Richards (2007) and Bolding (2005). A technographic approach ‘focuses on the complex interactions between social groups, collective representations, innovation processes, technical artifacts and nature’. In this case technography is applied to a socio-technical institution, the Lower Moshi irrigation scheme, located in semi-arid lowland terrain at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro. The research work took place over three seasons. In addition to careful examination of project documentation, and interviews with project staff, the study also undertook a randomised sample survey of 300 farmers in the four main project area settlements, and made detailed observational studies across the agricultural cycle of a smaller number of farm holdings owned and operated by both men and women farmers. Since only about 30% of farmers within the scheme actually cultivate irrigated plots sampling was designed to ensure proper representation of non-irrigating farmers, since the activities of this poorer (non-irrigating) group is crucial to the understanding the socio-economic dynamics of the scheme more generally. Finally, some attention was paid to off-scheme communities. Many of the technical problems experienced by the scheme (notably, the failure to distribute water in volumes originally planned) relate to concurrent socio-economic and technical changes taking place in up-stream communities, in particular, and an account is offered of some aspects of these off-project agro-technical changes, and of the disputes that then arose over water rights. The thesis first offers an historical summary of irrigation in the Kilimanjaro region, based on secondary sources and project documentation. In this part of Africa the mountains are wet and forested, and the surrounding plains are dry. The Chagga people (Wa-Chagga) were densely populated on the mountain, farming the wetter slopes intensively in the 19th century, and it was an aim of colonial government to resettle “excess” population in the plains. Some development of irrigation took place from the 1920s to encourage this relocation of population, and a diverse population (mainly but not exclusively Wa-Chagga) settled in Lower Moshi district to farm, assisted by possibilities of irrigation. After independence, the Japanese government offered funding and technical assistance to the Tanzanian government to modernise, re-develop and extend irrigation in Lower Moshi, and a new scheme came into operation in the 1980s, with a strong emphasis on intensive rice production, using high-yielding (Green Revolution) semi-dwarf varieties such as IR54. 22 7 The central finding from this part of the analysis (covered mainly in Chapters 1 and 2) is that the planners did not sufficiently take into account that irrigation in Lower Moshi and among Wa-Chagga and neighboring populations was no new thing. Many of the technical and social problems the scheme subsequently faced can be traced to the fact that farmers were already familiar with irrigation techniques and had developed traditional institutional arrangements to handle water rights and labour burdens. Farmers outside the scheme undercut it by being quick to adopt some project innovations, and to adapt their own practices accordingly. They also diverted water from flowing into the scheme, arguing that access to water from the mountain was an established traditional right under British rule, and still respected by the independent government of Tanzania. The scheme thus failed to develop the area originally intended, and is chronically short of water, undermining the confidence of farmers within the scheme in its management procedures. A further important finding is that women were largely excluded from the associations involved in traditional irrigation water management (apart from providing labour on specific occasions) and gendered notions of task and property rooted in local tradition have continued to influence land inheritance and water rights within the modern scheme. Actual as opposed to planned workings of the scheme are addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, and an account is offered of the introduction of new agricultural technology. Impacts or changes in relation to crop production, hired employment and other production strategies, and income distribution among population are discussed, along with impact on livelihoods. The scheme has had a highly layered impact. Those able to secure plots with reliable water do, indeed, make money out of intensive rice production, but the percentage is rather small, since the project is not able to irrigate reliably, or at all, many areas within the scheme. Farmers in tail end areas with unreliable water, or able only to farm land the project has never succeeded to irrigate, lack the capacity to influence management to change water distribution in their favour. The scheme lacks capital to invest in technical solutions to inadequate water distribution, but in any case the major problem lies in reduced flow, in part a product of up-stream diversions by non-scheme farmers. The project management has failed to assert its legal water right, since the government agrees that traditional rights also apply. Scheme management and maintenance suffer as a result. Farmers without water do not see why they should help maintain the scheme or pay dues. Some solve their problems by becoming “free riders” and acquire water by illegal means; others focus on (less profitable) dry-land crops. A range of these conflicts is examined, including contradictions between different classes of scheme settlers, e.g. wealthier farmers with better access to the scarce water and poorer farmers (including women plot owners) found in tail end areas. A complex interaction of modern property regimes and customary values in the modernisation process is reported. Irrigation project managements in Africa need to take account of these legal and cultural complexities. Intra-household gender relations are a specific focus in the later chapters of the thesis (5-6). Women play a crucial role in the agricultural labour process, both in irrigated and non-irrigated agriculture. They are (by custom) the major providers of household food, while husbands focus on earning cash for other household expenses. The introduction of a cash crop (rice) complicates this division of responsibility. Women continue to provide labour on irrigated plots, but men assume the main decision making role. A small number of women has acquired rights to irrigated land on the scheme (through purchase or inheritance) but a majority are in the position of farm workers or tenants. Irrigated rice increases women's labour burdens and 228 responsibilities, since this is a cash crop and they still have to work on household food crops as well. The scheme has continued to show many of the problems of public irrigation development in Africa since the 1970s discussed in the introduction. However, the situation in Lower Moshi is not as reported for parts of (West) Africa, where women have been supplanted by men in (modernised) rice farming. Here women never enjoyed rights over irrigated crops. What has happened on the scheme is that their burdens have intensified. In cases where women have no husbands they tend to be among the poorest farmers residing within the scheme, with little reliable water or farming only rain-fed crops. In short, the scheme has widened the gap between rich and poor, and intensified existing gender inequalities, in regard to ownership of plots, agricultural output, division of labour, and coping strategies. The thesis also shows that there are strong gender differentials in water rights and in participation in water management. Alienation of women from management and repair undermines scheme renewal. Irrigation management must develop a stronger focus on gender issues to overcome challenges of inequitable water access, if it is to provide any wider opportunities for better livelihoods, food security and nutrition in the area.

This thesis is a study of a modernised irrigation scheme in Tanzania. It aims to understand how irrigation and agricultural technologies have interacted with local society to transform production, paying particular attention to gender relations and changes for women farmers. The thesis seeks to contribute to a better understanding of what kinds of livelihood and production changes (negative and positive) eventuate under ‘modernised’ irrigation systems, and how these contrast with conditions under the older local irrigation systems the scheme has replaced. The central research question of the thesis is to understand how irrigation modernisation in the 1980s shaped, and has been reshaped by, the livelihood needs and options of water users. The thesis analyses the initiatives and interactions of agents at various levels – i.e. international, national, community and farm levels – as they attempt to make use of and adjust to the technical and operational demands of a modern scheme. In methodological terms, this thesis is guided by a technographic approach, as advocated by Richards (2002), Richards (2007) and Bolding (2005). A technographic approach ‘focuses on the complex interactions between social groups, collective representations, innovation processes, technical artifacts and nature’. In this case technography is applied to a socio-technical institution, the Lower Moshi irrigation scheme, located in semi-arid lowland terrain at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro. The research work took place over three seasons. In addition to careful examination of project documentation, and interviews with project staff, the study also undertook a randomised sample survey of 300 farmers in the four main project area settlements, and made detailed observational studies across the agricultural cycle of a smaller number of farm holdings owned and operated by both men and women farmers. Since only about 30% of farmers within the scheme actually cultivate irrigated plots sampling was designed to ensure proper representation of non-irrigating farmers, since the activities of this poorer (non-irrigating) group is crucial to the understanding the socio-economic dynamics of the scheme more generally. Finally, some attention was paid to off-scheme communities. Many of the technical problems experienced by the scheme (notably, the failure to distribute water in volumes originally planned) relate to concurrent socio-economic and technical changes taking place in up-stream communities, in particular, and an account is offered of some aspects of these off-project agro-technical changes, and of the disputes that then arose over water rights. The thesis first offers an historical summary of irrigation in the Kilimanjaro region, based on secondary sources and project documentation. In this part of Africa the mountains are wet and forested, and the surrounding plains are dry. The Chagga people (Wa-Chagga) were densely populated on the mountain, farming the wetter slopes intensively in the 19th century, and it was an aim of colonial government to resettle “excess” population in the plains. Some development of irrigation took place from the 1920s to encourage this relocation of population, and a diverse population (mainly but not exclusively Wa-Chagga) settled in Lower Moshi district to farm, assisted by possibilities of irrigation. After independence, the Japanese government offered funding and technical assistance to the Tanzanian government to modernise, re-develop and extend irrigation in Lower Moshi, and a new scheme came into operation in the 1980s, with a strong emphasis on intensive rice production, using high-yielding (Green Revolution) semi-dwarf varieties such as IR54. 22 7 The central finding from this part of the analysis (covered mainly in Chapters 1 and 2) is that the planners did not sufficiently take into account that irrigation in Lower Moshi and among Wa-Chagga and neighboring populations was no new thing. Many of the technical and social problems the scheme subsequently faced can be traced to the fact that farmers were already familiar with irrigation techniques and had developed traditional institutional arrangements to handle water rights and labour burdens. Farmers outside the scheme undercut it by being quick to adopt some project innovations, and to adapt their own practices accordingly. They also diverted water from flowing into the scheme, arguing that access to water from the mountain was an established traditional right under British rule, and still respected by the independent government of Tanzania. The scheme thus failed to develop the area originally intended, and is chronically short of water, undermining the confidence of farmers within the scheme in its management procedures. A further important finding is that women were largely excluded from the associations involved in traditional irrigation water management (apart from providing labour on specific occasions) and gendered notions of task and property rooted in local tradition have continued to influence land inheritance and water rights within the modern scheme. Actual as opposed to planned workings of the scheme are addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, and an account is offered of the introduction of new agricultural technology. Impacts or changes in relation to crop production, hired employment and other production strategies, and income distribution among population are discussed, along with impact on livelihoods. The scheme has had a highly layered impact. Those able to secure plots with reliable water do, indeed, make money out of intensive rice production, but the percentage is rather small, since the project is not able to irrigate reliably, or at all, many areas within the scheme. Farmers in tail end areas with unreliable water, or able only to farm land the project has never succeeded to irrigate, lack the capacity to influence management to change water distribution in their favour. The scheme lacks capital to invest in technical solutions to inadequate water distribution, but in any case the major problem lies in reduced flow, in part a product of up-stream diversions by non-scheme farmers. The project management has failed to assert its legal water right, since the government agrees that traditional rights also apply. Scheme management and maintenance suffer as a result. Farmers without water do not see why they should help maintain the scheme or pay dues. Some solve their problems by becoming “free riders” and acquire water by illegal means; others focus on (less profitable) dry-land crops. A range of these conflicts is examined, including contradictions between different classes of scheme settlers, e.g. wealthier farmers with better access to the scarce water and poorer farmers (including women plot owners) found in tail end areas. A complex interaction of modern property regimes and customary values in the modernisation process is reported. Irrigation project managements in Africa need to take account of these legal and cultural complexities. Intra-household gender relations are a specific focus in the later chapters of the thesis (5-6). Women play a crucial role in the agricultural labour process, both in irrigated and non-irrigated agriculture. They are (by custom) the major providers of household food, while husbands focus on earning cash for other household expenses. The introduction of a cash crop (rice) complicates this division of responsibility. Women continue to provide labour on irrigated plots, but men assume the main decision making role. A small number of women has acquired rights to irrigated land on the scheme (through purchase or inheritance) but a majority are in the position of farm workers or tenants. Irrigated rice increases women's labour burdens and 228 responsibilities, since this is a cash crop and they still have to work on household food crops as well. The scheme has continued to show many of the problems of public irrigation development in Africa since the 1970s discussed in the introduction. However, the situation in Lower Moshi is not as reported for parts of (West) Africa, where women have been supplanted by men in (modernised) rice farming. Here women never enjoyed rights over irrigated crops. What has happened on the scheme is that their burdens have intensified. In cases where women have no husbands they tend to be among the poorest farmers residing within the scheme, with little reliable water or farming only rain-fed crops. In short, the scheme has widened the gap between rich and poor, and intensified existing gender inequalities, in regard to ownership of plots, agricultural output, division of labour, and coping strategies. The thesis also shows that there are strong gender differentials in water rights and in participation in water management. Alienation of women from management and repair undermines scheme renewal. Irrigation management must develop a stronger focus on gender issues to overcome challenges of inequitable water access, if it is to provide any wider opportunities for better livelihoods, food security and nutrition in the area.

We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean riverflow and an increase in the variance of riverflow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.

We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean riverflow and an increase in the variance of riverflow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.

Onderwerp van het rapport zijn succes- en faalfactoren bij het proces en organisatie van het in de praktijk brengen van het planningsconcept ‘Blauwe Contouren’. Dit zijn stedelijke randzones waar ruimte voor water gerealiseerd wordt in combinatie met andere functies (zoals wonen, werken, natuur, recreatie). In deze studie is bestudeerd welke factoren op verschillende momenten in de beleidscyclus bijdragen aan slagen of falen van het implementeren van het planningsconcept. Hiervoor is een literatuurstudie uitgevoerd naar het slagen en falen van Strategisch Groenprojecten, Rijksbufferzones en Groen In en Om de Stad (GIOS). Daarnaast zijn twee ten uitvoer gebrachte projecten (Woolderbinnenbeek en Bossche Broek) onderzocht. Hiervoor zijn gesprekken gehouden met sleutelpersonen. Het resultaat van de studie is een tabel met succesfactoren. Dit is bedoeld als leidraad voor andere projecten om ruimte voor water te realiseren in overgangsgebieden van stad naar land, maar ook als startpunt voor nadere kennisontwikkeling en kennisuitwisseling op dit vlak

Onderwerp van het rapport zijn succes- en faalfactoren bij het proces en organisatie van het in de praktijk brengen van het planningsconcept ‘Blauwe Contouren’. Dit zijn stedelijke randzones waar ruimte voor water gerealiseerd wordt in combinatie met andere functies (zoals wonen, werken, natuur, recreatie). In deze studie is bestudeerd welke factoren op verschillende momenten in de beleidscyclus bijdragen aan slagen of falen van het implementeren van het planningsconcept. Hiervoor is een literatuurstudie uitgevoerd naar het slagen en falen van Strategisch Groenprojecten, Rijksbufferzones en Groen In en Om de Stad (GIOS). Daarnaast zijn twee ten uitvoer gebrachte projecten (Woolderbinnenbeek en Bossche Broek) onderzocht. Hiervoor zijn gesprekken gehouden met sleutelpersonen. Het resultaat van de studie is een tabel met succesfactoren. Dit is bedoeld als leidraad voor andere projecten om ruimte voor water te realiseren in overgangsgebieden van stad naar land, maar ook als startpunt voor nadere kennisontwikkeling en kennisuitwisseling op dit vlak

Als je vermoedt dat de afgifte van de beregeningsinstallatie ongelijk is, dan is het logisch dat je meer water geeft om droge plekken te vermijden. Toch? Alleen werkt dat emissie naar de ondergrond in de hand en dat is in de grondgebonden teelten ongewenst. Op zoek dus naar de ideale installatie met gelijke afgifte.

This thesis describes the organisation and performance of two large-scale irrigation systems in the North Coast of Peru. Good water management is important in this area because water is scarce and irrigated agriculture provides a livelihood to many small and middle-sized farmers. Water in the coast of Peru is considered to be badly managed, however this study shows that performance is more optimal than critics assume. Apart from the relevance in the local water management discussion, the study also addresses two internationally much debated topics in irrigation water management: irrigation management transfer (from government to water users' associations) and modernisation of infrastructure.Large-scale irrigation is often associated with low water use efficiencies, low control over the deliveries and low fee-recovery. Volumetric water control is one of the solutions proposed to solve these problems. The idea behind volumetric water control is to allocate and schedule precise volumes of water to meet crop water requirements, if possible on request of the water users. The user is charged per volume of water used to prevent over-use, and to raise sufficient funds to operate and maintain the irrigation system. Many authors stress the difficulties of volumetric water control. For example: on-request scheduling is too costly in large systems with many smallholders. High-tech automatic water control systems are too expensive and difficult to operate and maintain. Setting of the Irrigation Service Fee (ISF) might be too low to provide an incentive for water saving, or might be too high for poor farmers to pay.The study aims to achieve a better understanding of the practices in organisation and performance of volumetric water control in two large-scale irrigation systems in the North Coast. The coastal zone of Peru is extremely arid. Precipitation is near zero, except once in about 15 years when the El Niño phenomenon brings heavy rains and floods. The irrigation systems depend on the highly irregular rivers, which flow from the Andean Mountains. Main crops in the coastal areas are: sugarcane, rice and maize. Two systems were selected for a comparative study: Chancay-Lambayeque (100,000 ha) and Jequetepeque (40,000 ha). In the Chancay-Lambayeque system the users pay US$ 2 per 576 m 3scheduled to be delivered at field level. In the Jequetepeque system the farmers pay a fixed fee according to the crop allowed to grow. For example they pay US$ 60 per hectare of rice.The analytical framework highlights two main points: First, the irrigation infrastructure has certain properties, because different stakeholders designed and constructed parts of it in the past. These properties set certain requirements for use. For example the manually operated, undershot gates need skilled and experienced personnel to operate them well. The properties of the infrastructure also affect the water distribution in particular ways. For example a system with undershot offtakes and no check structures in the ongoing canal transports all fluctuations in the inflow to the tail-end of the canals. This affects the farmers in these areas. Second, the organisations can be regarded as 'semi-autonomous fields' where rules and regulations are transformed and local regulations are applied. Social power relations, technical properties, environmental conditions and the interests of actors influence the rules that are used, how and when. The different organisations that manage the irrigation system form a complex entity. At different levels in the system; water users' organisations, private companies and government agencies play a role in water management. This complex entity can be studied by looking at the domains of authority the organisations have, the rules they use, and the structure of decision-making and accountability between the organisations. Conflicts can reveal the rules used and the power plays involved. During one and a half year field research many key informants and water users were interviewed and a water flow measurement programme was executed.Chapter 2 describes the setting of the two irrigation systems: the natural resources, the long history of irrigation in the area and the present production systems. As the coast is arid and plain, waterlogging and salinity are dangers of irrigation. Irrigation began already 3000 years ago. The present main canal of the Chancay-Lambayeque system was built around AD 1000 and the irrigated area then was larger than today. After the conquest the Spaniards largely continued the management of the Incas. Only when the new settlers claimed increasingly more land for their haciendas, conflicts about water grew. State interventions in the management of the systems started early 20 thcentury. At that time the idea of volumetric water control was proposed. However, it was not until the Agrarian Reform of 1969, when the management became completely in the hands of the State, that volumetric allocation and delivery was introduced. And only with the Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) to the Comisiones de Regantes and Juntas de Usuarios in 1992 volumetric charging was enforced. Today sugarcane and rice are cultivated in high input - high output production systems. Main problem for the small and middle-sized landowners is to obtain credit. The local rice purchasers ( molinos ) provide credit, which leads often to ever greater indebtedness of the smallholders. Execpt for the three sugarcane co-operatives the average landholding is 5 ha.Chapter 3 introduces the complex structure of the entities that manage the irrigation systems. Since the Irrigation Management Transfer in 1992 the Comisiones de Regantes (CRs) at the level of the secondary canals operate and maintain the secondary canals. The board of the Comisiones is elected by all water users. For the operation the board hires staff. At the level of the tertiary canals the Comités de Canal maintain (and sometimes operate) the tertiary canals. In 1994 (for Chancay-Lambayeque) and 1998 (for Jequetepeque) the Juntas de Usuarios formed private companies to take over the operation and maintenance of the main canal and reservoirs. The local irrigation offices of the Ministry of Agriculture (ATDR) retained the authority to allocate water (up to the individual plot level) and supervise the management by the water users' organisation. Besides the ATDR also the Autonomous Watershed Authorities (AACH) and the Special Project Bureaus are government organisations that have certain domains of authority in water management.The main difference in water use between the systems is that the water users in Jequetepeque apply on average twice as much water per hectare of the same crop compared to the users in Chancay-Lambayeque. This is not caused by the volumetric payment in Chancay, but by the difference in water availability per hectare. After the Land Reform the Chancay system was expanded to win political support with the new water users, whereas in Jequetepeque the luxurious water right position acquired by the haciendas was not changed.Chapter 4 describes the practices of volumetric water allocation and scheduling. The National Water Law of 1969 establishes that all water is property of the State and that the ATDR is the organisation that gives concessions for use to individual water users. The ATDR also establishes how much water each user can request maximum depending on the defined cropping zones. However, for the scheduling of water turns according to the cropping plan the ATDR depends on the Comisiones de Regantes . The Comisiones , however, generally comply with the cropping plan to avoid claims of water users for water they are entitled to. Apart from the permanent water rights ( licencia ) there are also water titles for excess water ( permiso ). This institution was already known in the pre-Inca times. It is an adaptation to the ever fluctuating river supplies. In Chancay-Lambayeque water is scheduled in ' riegos' . One riego is one hour of water delivery with 160 l/s at field level. The water users pay in advance and get the hours the next day. In Jequetepeque the turns are only scheduled at the beginning of the rice-growing season. During the remainder of the rice-growing season the water flows continuously from field to field.In water scarce periods, when supply is less than expected, the Junta de Usuarios together with the ATDR adjust the water allocations. In Chancay-Lambayeque all water users then get scheduled a fixed number of hours each 15 days. The number of riegos per hectare is proportionally less the bigger the landholding of the farmer. This results in plots only party planted with rice, but more often in plots completely planted, but deficiently irrigated. In Jequetepeque water scarcity comes less unexpected, because the reservoir has sufficient capacity for an irrigation season. Here certain campos (small clusters of fields) are excluded from rice growing when the reservoir is low.In Chapter 5 an assessment is made of the volumetric water delivery. First a framework for understanding delivery performance is given. In this framework three main factors are central: the physical infrastructure, the operators, and the water users. However, in the first place the Relative Water Supply (RWS) should be looked at. The RWS is the ratio of the delivered water and the crop water requirements. If the RWS at field level is higher than 1.5 water can be used as a substitute for control. An intensive water flow measurement programme was executed to assess the performance of the water delivery service. Water flows were measured at all levels of the canal system: from offtakes from the main canal to deliveries at field level. The Chancay-Lambayeque system with its manually operated undershot gates, few measurement structures, open and unlined canals, its irregular river supply, and complicated on-request scheduling for 22,000 water users is a 'nightmare' system. Nevertheless, the Delivery Performance Ratio (DPR) was remarkably close to 1.0 at different levels of the system, indicating that the actually delivered flows were as programmed. This together with a RWS of between 0.6 and 0.8 at field level leads to a high water productivity. The remarkably good water delivery performance was explained by the skills of the operators and the accountability of the boards of the Comisiones towards the water users. This accountability was a result of the board members wanting to win the next elections to remain in the position to make money from illegal water selling. Also radio and newspapers were used to exert pressure on the boards to perform well. In Jequetepeque the DPR was almost always above 1.0 indicating that there was more water distributed than programmed. This was explained by the fact the in Jequetepeque the RWS was about 2.Chapter 6 focuses on the financial conduct of the two irrigation systems. The charge for the water delivery service is set by the General Assemblies of the water users. They prioritise the expenditures of the Comisiones and therewith set the fee. The fees are recovered by the Junta de Usuarios (or its private company) and then distributed over the different organisations that manage the systems. The fee recovery was high. In Chancay-Lambayeque from 1993 to 1998 more than ninety percent of the distributed water was paid for (per volume). Users paid per riego , thus recovery was spread throughout the irrigation season. The advance payment could be enforced quite well because o social and technical control over the water. Only the sugarcane co-operatives in the head-end of the system took water without paying. A drawback of volumetric charging is that less river supply means less income for the organisations. Also in Jequetepeque the fee recovery was high. Here the farmers did not pay per volume and the recovery was harder to enforce because of abundant water availability. Therefore, the Junta collected the fees at the beginning of the irrigation season when the system was still dry but the rice farmers need to start their nurseries. By strict control over the water to only those users who had paid the fees of last year the Junta recovered the fees. The farmers could not wait with their nurseries until water would be available abundantly because a later start would mean a yield reduction due to low temperatures at the end of the season. This construction of technical, environmental and institutional elements that enforces the payment was called an 'obligatory point of passage'.Between 1.5 to 3.0 million dollars were collected each year in each system. This was more or less sufficient for operation and maintenance and paying taxes. The distribution of theChapter 7 evaluates the functioning and effects of volumetric water allocation, scheduling, delivery and charging. It is concluded that water control in Chancay-Lambayeque is volumetric. In Jequetepeque water allocation and distribution is only volumetric to a certain extent, and charging is not related to the volume actually applied to the field. In both systems there are two important factors shaping water management. First, the history of the institutions and physical infrastructure. Despite the many abrupt changes in the institutional setting the continuities in the long history contributed to the legitimacy of the rules and the functionality of the infrastructure. Second, the contemporary institutions bring about a power balance among the various organisations involved in irrigation management. The governance of the organisation follows surprisingly strictly the National Water Law. Only some minor rules are not complied with. Rule-compliance is partly enforced by social control among 'equal' parties: e.g. farmers in the tertiary block guard their water against theft, and engineers of the Comisiones ensure they get allocated water for their Subsector according to the rules. Rules are also enforced by the governmental organisations ATDR and AACH. They judge about certain types of conflicts (on rule violation) inside the users' organisations. Punishment of rule violation is also used in political ways: a fine by the ATDR implies exclusion of the involved water user from the next election of the board of the Comisión .The effect of volumetric water control on productivity of water is small. It is much more the water availability per hectare that determines the productivity of water. The water in Chancay-Lambayeque is 'stretched' over a much bigger area compared with Jequeteque making water more productive per volume of water applied. The volumetric charging affected livelihoods of poor farmers because it was difficult for them to find the money to pay the water turns when the crops required water. However, as the production system is high input - high output, the farmers invest much money anyway and the water fee is only 5 to 10 percent of the total input costs. The payment per volume made the board and staff of the Comisiones somewhat more accountable in water delivery to the water users.It is concluded in Chapter 8 that the power balance between the water users, different water users' organisations, private company and different public agencies shaped a well functioning entity. The general governance regulations were complied with, but locally rules on allocation, scheduling, maintenance and fee setting were refined and negotiated. It was also concluded that the analytical framework and research methods used in the comparative study were useful in revealing the complex nature of the irrigation management.

Voor het bepalen van de zoekruimte voor waterberging is aan de hand van een proefproject een GIS-methodiek ontwikkeld. Voor het in kaart brengen van het oppervlaktewaterstelsel is gebruikgemaakt van een digitaal terreinmodel dat op geheel kunstmatige wijze is opgezet. Bij de bepaling van de waterhoogte is gebruikgemaakt van dwarsprofielen die gegenereerd worden op basis van maaiveldhoogtegegevens en normen voor het oppervlaktewater. Vervolgens is de zoekruimte voor waterberging met behulp van GIS-technieken bepaald.

Voor het bepalen van de zoekruimte voor waterberging is aan de hand van een proefproject een GIS-methodiek ontwikkeld. Voor het in kaart brengen van het oppervlaktewaterstelsel is gebruikgemaakt van een digitaal terreinmodel dat op geheel kunstmatige wijze is opgezet. Bij de bepaling van de waterhoogte is gebruikgemaakt van dwarsprofielen die gegenereerd worden op basis van maaiveldhoogtegegevens en normen voor het oppervlaktewater. Vervolgens is de zoekruimte voor waterberging met behulp van GIS-technieken bepaald.

This thesis describes the organisation and performance of two large-scale irrigation systems in the North Coast of Peru. Good water management is important in this area because water is scarce and irrigated agriculture provides a livelihood to many small and middle-sized farmers. Water in the coast of Peru is considered to be badly managed, however this study shows that performance is more optimal than critics assume. Apart from the relevance in the local water management discussion, the study also addresses two internationally much debated topics in irrigation water management: irrigation management transfer (from government to water users' associations) and modernisation of infrastructure.Large-scale irrigation is often associated with low water use efficiencies, low control over the deliveries and low fee-recovery. Volumetric water control is one of the solutions proposed to solve these problems. The idea behind volumetric water control is to allocate and schedule precise volumes of water to meet crop water requirements, if possible on request of the water users. The user is charged per volume of water used to prevent over-use, and to raise sufficient funds to operate and maintain the irrigation system. Many authors stress the difficulties of volumetric water control. For example: on-request scheduling is too costly in large systems with many smallholders. High-tech automatic water control systems are too expensive and difficult to operate and maintain. Setting of the Irrigation Service Fee (ISF) might be too low to provide an incentive for water saving, or might be too high for poor farmers to pay.The study aims to achieve a better understanding of the practices in organisation and performance of volumetric water control in two large-scale irrigation systems in the North Coast. The coastal zone of Peru is extremely arid. Precipitation is near zero, except once in about 15 years when the El Niño phenomenon brings heavy rains and floods. The irrigation systems depend on the highly irregular rivers, which flow from the Andean Mountains. Main crops in the coastal areas are: sugarcane, rice and maize. Two systems were selected for a comparative study: Chancay-Lambayeque (100,000 ha) and Jequetepeque (40,000 ha). In the Chancay-Lambayeque system the users pay US$ 2 per 576 m 3scheduled to be delivered at field level. In the Jequetepeque system the farmers pay a fixed fee according to the crop allowed to grow. For example they pay US$ 60 per hectare of rice.The analytical framework highlights two main points: First, the irrigation infrastructure has certain properties, because different stakeholders designed and constructed parts of it in the past. These properties set certain requirements for use. For example the manually operated, undershot gates need skilled and experienced personnel to operate them well. The properties of the infrastructure also affect the water distribution in particular ways. For example a system with undershot offtakes and no check structures in the ongoing canal transports all fluctuations in the inflow to the tail-end of the canals. This affects the farmers in these areas. Second, the organisations can be regarded as 'semi-autonomous fields' where rules and regulations are transformed and local regulations are applied. Social power relations, technical properties, environmental conditions and the interests of actors influence the rules that are used, how and when. The different organisations that manage the irrigation system form a complex entity. At different levels in the system; water users' organisations, private companies and government agencies play a role in water management. This complex entity can be studied by looking at the domains of authority the organisations have, the rules they use, and the structure of decision-making and accountability between the organisations. Conflicts can reveal the rules used and the power plays involved. During one and a half year field research many key informants and water users were interviewed and a water flow measurement programme was executed.Chapter 2 describes the setting of the two irrigation systems: the natural resources, the long history of irrigation in the area and the present production systems. As the coast is arid and plain, waterlogging and salinity are dangers of irrigation. Irrigation began already 3000 years ago. The present main canal of the Chancay-Lambayeque system was built around AD 1000 and the irrigated area then was larger than today. After the conquest the Spaniards largely continued the management of the Incas. Only when the new settlers claimed increasingly more land for their haciendas, conflicts about water grew. State interventions in the management of the systems started early 20 thcentury. At that time the idea of volumetric water control was proposed. However, it was not until the Agrarian Reform of 1969, when the management became completely in the hands of the State, that volumetric allocation and delivery was introduced. And only with the Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) to the Comisiones de Regantes and Juntas de Usuarios in 1992 volumetric charging was enforced. Today sugarcane and rice are cultivated in high input - high output production systems. Main problem for the small and middle-sized landowners is to obtain credit. The local rice purchasers ( molinos ) provide credit, which leads often to ever greater indebtedness of the smallholders. Execpt for the three sugarcane co-operatives the average landholding is 5 ha.Chapter 3 introduces the complex structure of the entities that manage the irrigation systems. Since the Irrigation Management Transfer in 1992 the Comisiones de Regantes (CRs) at the level of the secondary canals operate and maintain the secondary canals. The board of the Comisiones is elected by all water users. For the operation the board hires staff. At the level of the tertiary canals the Comités de Canal maintain (and sometimes operate) the tertiary canals. In 1994 (for Chancay-Lambayeque) and 1998 (for Jequetepeque) the Juntas de Usuarios formed private companies to take over the operation and maintenance of the main canal and reservoirs. The local irrigation offices of the Ministry of Agriculture (ATDR) retained the authority to allocate water (up to the individual plot level) and supervise the management by the water users' organisation. Besides the ATDR also the Autonomous Watershed Authorities (AACH) and the Special Project Bureaus are government organisations that have certain domains of authority in water management.The main difference in water use between the systems is that the water users in Jequetepeque apply on average twice as much water per hectare of the same crop compared to the users in Chancay-Lambayeque. This is not caused by the volumetric payment in Chancay, but by the difference in water availability per hectare. After the Land Reform the Chancay system was expanded to win political support with the new water users, whereas in Jequetepeque the luxurious water right position acquired by the haciendas was not changed.Chapter 4 describes the practices of volumetric water allocation and scheduling. The National Water Law of 1969 establishes that all water is property of the State and that the ATDR is the organisation that gives concessions for use to individual water users. The ATDR also establishes how much water each user can request maximum depending on the defined cropping zones. However, for the scheduling of water turns according to the cropping plan the ATDR depends on the Comisiones de Regantes . The Comisiones , however, generally comply with the cropping plan to avoid claims of water users for water they are entitled to. Apart from the permanent water rights ( licencia ) there are also water titles for excess water ( permiso ). This institution was already known in the pre-Inca times. It is an adaptation to the ever fluctuating river supplies. In Chancay-Lambayeque water is scheduled in ' riegos' . One riego is one hour of water delivery with 160 l/s at field level. The water users pay in advance and get the hours the next day. In Jequetepeque the turns are only scheduled at the beginning of the rice-growing season. During the remainder of the rice-growing season the water flows continuously from field to field.In water scarce periods, when supply is less than expected, the Junta de Usuarios together with the ATDR adjust the water allocations. In Chancay-Lambayeque all water users then get scheduled a fixed number of hours each 15 days. The number of riegos per hectare is proportionally less the bigger the landholding of the farmer. This results in plots only party planted with rice, but more often in plots completely planted, but deficiently irrigated. In Jequetepeque water scarcity comes less unexpected, because the reservoir has sufficient capacity for an irrigation season. Here certain campos (small clusters of fields) are excluded from rice growing when the reservoir is low.In Chapter 5 an assessment is made of the volumetric water delivery. First a framework for understanding delivery performance is given. In this framework three main factors are central: the physical infrastructure, the operators, and the water users. However, in the first place the Relative Water Supply (RWS) should be looked at. The RWS is the ratio of the delivered water and the crop water requirements. If the RWS at field level is higher than 1.5 water can be used as a substitute for control. An intensive water flow measurement programme was executed to assess the performance of the water delivery service. Water flows were measured at all levels of the canal system: from offtakes from the main canal to deliveries at field level. The Chancay-Lambayeque system with its manually operated undershot gates, few measurement structures, open and unlined canals, its irregular river supply, and complicated on-request scheduling for 22,000 water users is a 'nightmare' system. Nevertheless, the Delivery Performance Ratio (DPR) was remarkably close to 1.0 at different levels of the system, indicating that the actually delivered flows were as programmed. This together with a RWS of between 0.6 and 0.8 at field level leads to a high water productivity. The remarkably good water delivery performance was explained by the skills of the operators and the accountability of the boards of the Comisiones towards the water users. This accountability was a result of the board members wanting to win the next elections to remain in the position to make money from illegal water selling. Also radio and newspapers were used to exert pressure on the boards to perform well. In Jequetepeque the DPR was almost always above 1.0 indicating that there was more water distributed than programmed. This was explained by the fact the in Jequetepeque the RWS was about 2.Chapter 6 focuses on the financial conduct of the two irrigation systems. The charge for the water delivery service is set by the General Assemblies of the water users. They prioritise the expenditures of the Comisiones and therewith set the fee. The fees are recovered by the Junta de Usuarios (or its private company) and then distributed over the different organisations that manage the systems. The fee recovery was high. In Chancay-Lambayeque from 1993 to 1998 more than ninety percent of the distributed water was paid for (per volume). Users paid per riego , thus recovery was spread throughout the irrigation season. The advance payment could be enforced quite well because o social and technical control over the water. Only the sugarcane co-operatives in the head-end of the system took water without paying. A drawback of volumetric charging is that less river supply means less income for the organisations. Also in Jequetepeque the fee recovery was high. Here the farmers did not pay per volume and the recovery was harder to enforce because of abundant water availability. Therefore, the Junta collected the fees at the beginning of the irrigation season when the system was still dry but the rice farmers need to start their nurseries. By strict control over the water to only those users who had paid the fees of last year the Junta recovered the fees. The farmers could not wait with their nurseries until water would be available abundantly because a later start would mean a yield reduction due to low temperatures at the end of the season. This construction of technical, environmental and institutional elements that enforces the payment was called an 'obligatory point of passage'.Between 1.5 to 3.0 million dollars were collected each year in each system. This was more or less sufficient for operation and maintenance and paying taxes. The distribution of theChapter 7 evaluates the functioning and effects of volumetric water allocation, scheduling, delivery and charging. It is concluded that water control in Chancay-Lambayeque is volumetric. In Jequetepeque water allocation and distribution is only volumetric to a certain extent, and charging is not related to the volume actually applied to the field. In both systems there are two important factors shaping water management. First, the history of the institutions and physical infrastructure. Despite the many abrupt changes in the institutional setting the continuities in the long history contributed to the legitimacy of the rules and the functionality of the infrastructure. Second, the contemporary institutions bring about a power balance among the various organisations involved in irrigation management. The governance of the organisation follows surprisingly strictly the National Water Law. Only some minor rules are not complied with. Rule-compliance is partly enforced by social control among 'equal' parties: e.g. farmers in the tertiary block guard their water against theft, and engineers of the Comisiones ensure they get allocated water for their Subsector according to the rules. Rules are also enforced by the governmental organisations ATDR and AACH. They judge about certain types of conflicts (on rule violation) inside the users' organisations. Punishment of rule violation is also used in political ways: a fine by the ATDR implies exclusion of the involved water user from the next election of the board of the Comisión .The effect of volumetric water control on productivity of water is small. It is much more the water availability per hectare that determines the productivity of water. The water in Chancay-Lambayeque is 'stretched' over a much bigger area compared with Jequeteque making water more productive per volume of water applied. The volumetric charging affected livelihoods of poor farmers because it was difficult for them to find the money to pay the water turns when the crops required water. However, as the production system is high input - high output, the farmers invest much money anyway and the water fee is only 5 to 10 percent of the total input costs. The payment per volume made the board and staff of the Comisiones somewhat more accountable in water delivery to the water users.It is concluded in Chapter 8 that the power balance between the water users, different water users' organisations, private company and different public agencies shaped a well functioning entity. The general governance regulations were complied with, but locally rules on allocation, scheduling, maintenance and fee setting were refined and negotiated. It was also concluded that the analytical framework and research methods used in the comparative study were useful in revealing the complex nature of the irrigation management.

This book discusses water distribution in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal irrigation system in Raichur district, Karnataka, India. The system is located in interior South India, where rainfall is limited (approximately 600 mm annually) and extremely variable. The region suffered from failed harvests and famines in the past. A large scale irrigation system was constructed to solve these problems. The system is operational since 1953 and was completed in 1968. The area to be irrigated is 240,000 ha.The Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is a protective irrigation system. It has been designed to spread available water thinly over a large area. It involves supplementary or partial irrigation. Crop water requirements are not fully met. In a particular agricultural season only part of the area is irrigated. Not production per unit area is maximised, but production per unit water.The last point implies a fundamental contradiction inherent to protective irrigation. For a farmer with a given landholding maximisation of production per unit land is the obvious strategy, instead of contributing to the maximum total product given the volume of water. The most remunerative crops, rice and sugarcane, demand a lot of water. Farmers who have the opportunity therefore appropriate more water than their protective share. As a result others do not get their share. Irrigation water in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, like in many other systems, is unequally distributed.The central theme of the thesis is the day to day occurrence of this unequal distribution of water. The book attempts an interdisciplinary analysis of `water control' at different levels: the tertiary unit, the secondary canal and the main (primary) canal. The technical/physical, organisational and socio-economic/political dimensions of water control are related. The central research question is the following.How do the pattern of commoditisation, the form of state regulation and the characteristics of the technical infrastructure shape, and how are they in turn shaped by, the forms of organisation of water distribution in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal irrigation system?The method is that of an intensive case study. The research started at the local level with the study of water distribution in a number of tertiary units (local irrigation units in which farmers distribute water among themselves), which were located in the upstream and downstream part of the irrigation system, and with a certain degree of water scarcity. The assumption was that scarcity would induce organisation.After research at this level the investigations gradually moved against the current onto the canal system and the distribution points located there, to the offices of the officials of the Irrigation Department who manage this part of the system, to the houses of politicians, to the shops of traders in seeds and fertiliser, and even to the High Court and Parliament of Karnataka. Mainly social-anthropological research techniques were used.The book has ten chapters. After an introduction chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework of the analysis. Chapters 3 to 5 give background information on the phenomenon protective irrigation, the design of the system, and the socio-economic development in the region as a result of the introduction of irrigation. Chapters 6 to 9 are the core of the thesis. They discuss water distribution practices at different levels. Chapter 10 presents the conclusions and discusses the possibility of reform of the present situation with regard to water management.Chapter 2 introduces the two central concepts of the book. The first is the notion that irrigation systems are sociotechnical systems. They are heterogenous and complex because they consist of many different types of elements, which are related to each other in multifarious ways. The second concept is water control. Three dimensions of water control are distinguished: the technical/physical dimension, the organisational dimension and the socio-economic/political dimension. The central assumption is that these three dimensions are intimately related. Water control in irrigation is described as an example of politically contested resource use. With this description the importance of the social relations of power in the use of irrigation water is emphasised.Chapter 3 explains the meaning of protection and localisation. The notion of protection originated in British colonial irrigation policy. Three meanings of it are identified: 1) the general meaning of the function of irrigation to protect against drought/crop failure and famine), 2) protective irrigation as a financial-administrative class of irrigation works in the colonial period, and 3) protective irrigation as a specific type of irrigation in the technical, organisational and socio-economic/political sense. In South India, localisation is part of protection. Localisation is a form of land use planning in which the government legally prescribes which crops farmers can and cannot grow with the irrigation water.It is remarkable that the protection objective has remained a central element of Indian irrigation policy, also after independence, despite the (recognised) practice of unequal water distribution. The explanation of this persistence is found is the populist nature of the Indian political system. Politicians act as resource brokers who can secure their political support, among other ways, by getting canals constructed to their constituencies. At the same time they depend primarily on the category of large farmers within their constituency, who are the ones who tend to appropriate water above their protective share. For this reason politicians do not take action against unequal distribution. Because of the influence of politicians on their work, the officials of the Irrigation Department also find themselves in a difficult position.The genesis of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is described in chapter 4. The history of the system starts in the period 1850-1860. The implementation of the plans made in that period and after it for a canal in Raichur district, was complicated by the relationship between Madras Presidency, directly ruled by the British, and the Nizam's Dominions, a formally independent Princely State. The Tungabhadra river was the border river of these two territories. The construction of a dam across it for creating a reservoir required agreement of both governments. Prolonged political negotiation was necessary to come to an agreement on the sharing of the available water. Despite the dominance of Madras presidency it was finally decided to share the water on a 50/50 basis. In 1944 an agreement was signed that allowed the start of the project, but negotiation protracted till 1976, among other things as a result of the reorganisation of the Indian States after independence.In 1945 construction of the project started. Once the available volume of water had been agreed, the further design was mainly done by engineers with little external influence. The cropping pattern was protective from the beginning, and in choice of canal alignments cost of construction was the major consideration. Social boundaries, like those of villages and farms, were not taken into consideration; topography and soil type have determined the design. The explanation of this lies in the very high social status of engineers in this period which made doubting their decisions impossible, and in the absence of institutions for discussion and negotiation regarding design elements.The introduction of irrigation in Raichur district has resulted in rapid economic development, which is described in chapter 5. Irrigation has induced the occurrence of intensive commercialised agricultural cultivation with high productivity. The migration of farmers from the neighbouring state of Andhra Pradesh to the new irrigation system has played a key role in this development. The migrant farmers came with sufficient investment capital and knowledge of irrigated agriculture, and started a farming system based on rice cultivation, and sugarcane to a lesser extent. Initially the local population had insufficient means for investment. The migrants bought land from local farmers. The larger local farmers used the returns of their land sales to invest in the development of their remaining land for irrigation (levelling, making field bunds). There has been a massive transfer of land to migrant farmers. In the course of time migrant as well as local farmers started to invest in pump irrigation, lifting water from the river and natural drains.A geographical pattern has emerged in which rich and middle peasants mainly have land in the upstream reaches of the canals, and small and poor peasants mainly in the downstream parts (the chapter first develops a typology of these four categories of farmers). Notwithstanding this general correlation of location and socio-economic class, the exact relationship differs from locality to locality. Migrant farmers could not always obtain land in the geographically most favourable locations. Sometimes water scarcity developed in areas where sufficient water was available earlier. The process of the relocation of farms in relation to access to water, continues to this day through the mechanisms of purchase and sale of land, the transfer of land in dowries, and through the acquisition of land by extending loans with land as collateral. The process of agrarian change can not be fully understood without incorporation of this inherent spatial dimension.Chapter 6 is the first chapter on day to day water distribution practices. It analyses events at the level of the tertiary unit, within which farmers distribute water among themselves. It was found that in many cases detailed systems of rules existed for rotational water distribution. These are based on the principles of zoning of the irrigated command area, and on a fixed irrigation time per unit area. The rules are used in periods of water scarcity. Outside these periods irrigation takes place on the basis of mutual agreement.Despite the fact that these rules incorporate equity principles, strongly unequal water distribution can be observed. The reasons for this are that the rules only refer to the supply of water, and that they are not applied continuously. The demand for water is differentiated. Small, downstream farmers adjust their crop choice to the anticipation that they will lose conflicts with large farmers on the distribution of water. Small farmers grow crops that demand less water, and thus avoid conflicts. However, these crops are also less remunerative. The anticipation is the product of the dependence of small farmers on large farmers for obtaining credit and for employment for themselves and their family members. Large farmers also act as representatives of the local irrigation unit in discussions with the Irrigation Department and in other activities to safeguard water supply.Water distribution at the level of the secondary canal, called distributary in India, is discussed in chapter 7 (organisational aspects) and chapter 8 (technical aspects). Chapter 7 describes which rules for rotational water distribution have emerged in the interaction of the Irrigation Department officials who manage these canals, and the water users. In many secondary canals rules for rotation exist, which are, like those at tertiary level, mobilised in times of scarcity. At this level the rules also do not accomplish equity in water distribution. They express the power balance between users in different parts of the irrigated area, and that between water users and the government administration.In contrast to what is often assumed, corruption is not the dominant mechanism in water distribution at secondary level in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. The problematic relationship between government managers and water users are not translated into financial transactions, but into political mediation. In certain circumstances local politicians (members of parliament) can play an important role in water management. Politicians depend on the political support of farmers. In exchange for their votes farmers can ask the politician to influence the behaviour of Irrigation Department staff. The local members of parliament's power over the Irrigation Department staff is based on their influence on the three-yearly (or more frequent) transfer of government officials. In this way a `triangle of accommodation' emerges, in which none of the parties involved (farmers, officials and politicians) has absolute control, and in which continuous negotiation is necessary about the distribution of water.Chapter 8 concentrates on the structure that links the secondary canal with the local irrigation unit: the pipe outlet structure. Because the discharge that flows from the secondary canal to the field channel through the pipe of the pipe outlet structure, depends on the upstream as well as the downstream water level, and on the cross section of the pipe (which can be adjusted with a shutter), it is practically impossible to regulate the discharge with any degree of precision. As a result it is unknown how much water is exactly diverted by the pipe outlet structures. Why this type of outlet structure remains in use, and have not been replaced by outlet structures used elsewhere in India that are more fit for the task of equitable distribution, is not completely clear.In practice there is substantial variation in the precise characteristics of the pipe outlet structure: the robustness of construction (concrete, stones and mortar), the location of the shutter (visible or non-visible, accessible or non-accessible), the type of lock or locks, and other characteristics. This variation expresses water distribution practices and problems along the canal. The characteristics and the state of the outlet structures are an expression of the relationships between different groups of farmers along the canal and between farmers and the Irrigation Department.The last chapter on water distribution practices, chapter 9, discusses the process of institutional change within the Irrigation Department in relation to main canal management. In a period of two years with extreme water shortage (1988-1990) a number of institutional changes took place that have improved water supply to the downstream parts of the canal. The original rules for distribution of water based on the localisation pattern have been abandoned. To replace these, new rules have been adopted that on the one hand consolidate inequality, but on the other hand provide a more realistic basis for negotiating water supply to the downstream part of the canal. As a result of the introduction of these new rules water supply to the downstream part has been improved, particularly it has become more stable.The concluding chapter, chapter 10, gives a summary reply to the central research question, and discusses the implications of the analysis for reform of irrigation management. It is argued that the analysis has identified both a number of structural limitations or hurdles for reform, and has shown that the day to day practice of water distribution provides opportunities for change. The opportunities are related to the capacity for self-management of water users, the joint formulation of rules for distribution by farmers and Irrigation Department staff, and the technical creativity and the possibility of institutional change within the Irrigation Department.After this the different perspectives that exist on the generally felt need for reform are discussed. These perspectives vary from technical and managerial arguments for `good management', economic arguments for `efficient management', ecological arguments for `sustainable management', to political arguments for `egalitarian and democratic' management. An attempt is made to describe a comprehensive approach in which technical, organisational, economic and political elements are intertwined.As regards the irrigation policy reform situation in Karnataka it is argued that more attention for the participation of water users and other interest groups in the formulation of policy is necessary. At present, efforts to change policy and practice take place in a rather isolated manner at high levels in the government, or in individual, local situations in irrigation systems. The creation of a broad support base for reform in society is considered a priority.Finally a number of research topics are listed and briefly discussed that could contribute to the reform agenda. These are the design process of canal irrigation technology, the political dimension of irrigation, and the issue of use(r) rights. This research should be situated in the daily practice of water management, that is, on the waterfront.

This book discusses water distribution in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal irrigation system in Raichur district, Karnataka, India. The system is located in interior South India, where rainfall is limited (approximately 600 mm annually) and extremely variable. The region suffered from failed harvests and famines in the past. A large scale irrigation system was constructed to solve these problems. The system is operational since 1953 and was completed in 1968. The area to be irrigated is 240,000 ha.The Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is a protective irrigation system. It has been designed to spread available water thinly over a large area. It involves supplementary or partial irrigation. Crop water requirements are not fully met. In a particular agricultural season only part of the area is irrigated. Not production per unit area is maximised, but production per unit water.The last point implies a fundamental contradiction inherent to protective irrigation. For a farmer with a given landholding maximisation of production per unit land is the obvious strategy, instead of contributing to the maximum total product given the volume of water. The most remunerative crops, rice and sugarcane, demand a lot of water. Farmers who have the opportunity therefore appropriate more water than their protective share. As a result others do not get their share. Irrigation water in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, like in many other systems, is unequally distributed.The central theme of the thesis is the day to day occurrence of this unequal distribution of water. The book attempts an interdisciplinary analysis of `water control' at different levels: the tertiary unit, the secondary canal and the main (primary) canal. The technical/physical, organisational and socio-economic/political dimensions of water control are related. The central research question is the following.How do the pattern of commoditisation, the form of state regulation and the characteristics of the technical infrastructure shape, and how are they in turn shaped by, the forms of organisation of water distribution in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal irrigation system?The method is that of an intensive case study. The research started at the local level with the study of water distribution in a number of tertiary units (local irrigation units in which farmers distribute water among themselves), which were located in the upstream and downstream part of the irrigation system, and with a certain degree of water scarcity. The assumption was that scarcity would induce organisation.After research at this level the investigations gradually moved against the current onto the canal system and the distribution points located there, to the offices of the officials of the Irrigation Department who manage this part of the system, to the houses of politicians, to the shops of traders in seeds and fertiliser, and even to the High Court and Parliament of Karnataka. Mainly social-anthropological research techniques were used.The book has ten chapters. After an introduction chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework of the analysis. Chapters 3 to 5 give background information on the phenomenon protective irrigation, the design of the system, and the socio-economic development in the region as a result of the introduction of irrigation. Chapters 6 to 9 are the core of the thesis. They discuss water distribution practices at different levels. Chapter 10 presents the conclusions and discusses the possibility of reform of the present situation with regard to water management.Chapter 2 introduces the two central concepts of the book. The first is the notion that irrigation systems are sociotechnical systems. They are heterogenous and complex because they consist of many different types of elements, which are related to each other in multifarious ways. The second concept is water control. Three dimensions of water control are distinguished: the technical/physical dimension, the organisational dimension and the socio-economic/political dimension. The central assumption is that these three dimensions are intimately related. Water control in irrigation is described as an example of politically contested resource use. With this description the importance of the social relations of power in the use of irrigation water is emphasised.Chapter 3 explains the meaning of protection and localisation. The notion of protection originated in British colonial irrigation policy. Three meanings of it are identified: 1) the general meaning of the function of irrigation to protect against drought/crop failure and famine), 2) protective irrigation as a financial-administrative class of irrigation works in the colonial period, and 3) protective irrigation as a specific type of irrigation in the technical, organisational and socio-economic/political sense. In South India, localisation is part of protection. Localisation is a form of land use planning in which the government legally prescribes which crops farmers can and cannot grow with the irrigation water.It is remarkable that the protection objective has remained a central element of Indian irrigation policy, also after independence, despite the (recognised) practice of unequal water distribution. The explanation of this persistence is found is the populist nature of the Indian political system. Politicians act as resource brokers who can secure their political support, among other ways, by getting canals constructed to their constituencies. At the same time they depend primarily on the category of large farmers within their constituency, who are the ones who tend to appropriate water above their protective share. For this reason politicians do not take action against unequal distribution. Because of the influence of politicians on their work, the officials of the Irrigation Department also find themselves in a difficult position.The genesis of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is described in chapter 4. The history of the system starts in the period 1850-1860. The implementation of the plans made in that period and after it for a canal in Raichur district, was complicated by the relationship between Madras Presidency, directly ruled by the British, and the Nizam's Dominions, a formally independent Princely State. The Tungabhadra river was the border river of these two territories. The construction of a dam across it for creating a reservoir required agreement of both governments. Prolonged political negotiation was necessary to come to an agreement on the sharing of the available water. Despite the dominance of Madras presidency it was finally decided to share the water on a 50/50 basis. In 1944 an agreement was signed that allowed the start of the project, but negotiation protracted till 1976, among other things as a result of the reorganisation of the Indian States after independence.In 1945 construction of the project started. Once the available volume of water had been agreed, the further design was mainly done by engineers with little external influence. The cropping pattern was protective from the beginning, and in choice of canal alignments cost of construction was the major consideration. Social boundaries, like those of villages and farms, were not taken into consideration; topography and soil type have determined the design. The explanation of this lies in the very high social status of engineers in this period which made doubting their decisions impossible, and in the absence of institutions for discussion and negotiation regarding design elements.The introduction of irrigation in Raichur district has resulted in rapid economic development, which is described in chapter 5. Irrigation has induced the occurrence of intensive commercialised agricultural cultivation with high productivity. The migration of farmers from the neighbouring state of Andhra Pradesh to the new irrigation system has played a key role in this development. The migrant farmers came with sufficient investment capital and knowledge of irrigated agriculture, and started a farming system based on rice cultivation, and sugarcane to a lesser extent. Initially the local population had insufficient means for investment. The migrants bought land from local farmers. The larger local farmers used the returns of their land sales to invest in the development of their remaining land for irrigation (levelling, making field bunds). There has been a massive transfer of land to migrant farmers. In the course of time migrant as well as local farmers started to invest in pump irrigation, lifting water from the river and natural drains.A geographical pattern has emerged in which rich and middle peasants mainly have land in the upstream reaches of the canals, and small and poor peasants mainly in the downstream parts (the chapter first develops a typology of these four categories of farmers). Notwithstanding this general correlation of location and socio-economic class, the exact relationship differs from locality to locality. Migrant farmers could not always obtain land in the geographically most favourable locations. Sometimes water scarcity developed in areas where sufficient water was available earlier. The process of the relocation of farms in relation to access to water, continues to this day through the mechanisms of purchase and sale of land, the transfer of land in dowries, and through the acquisition of land by extending loans with land as collateral. The process of agrarian change can not be fully understood without incorporation of this inherent spatial dimension.Chapter 6 is the first chapter on day to day water distribution practices. It analyses events at the level of the tertiary unit, within which farmers distribute water among themselves. It was found that in many cases detailed systems of rules existed for rotational water distribution. These are based on the principles of zoning of the irrigated command area, and on a fixed irrigation time per unit area. The rules are used in periods of water scarcity. Outside these periods irrigation takes place on the basis of mutual agreement.Despite the fact that these rules incorporate equity principles, strongly unequal water distribution can be observed. The reasons for this are that the rules only refer to the supply of water, and that they are not applied continuously. The demand for water is differentiated. Small, downstream farmers adjust their crop choice to the anticipation that they will lose conflicts with large farmers on the distribution of water. Small farmers grow crops that demand less water, and thus avoid conflicts. However, these crops are also less remunerative. The anticipation is the product of the dependence of small farmers on large farmers for obtaining credit and for employment for themselves and their family members. Large farmers also act as representatives of the local irrigation unit in discussions with the Irrigation Department and in other activities to safeguard water supply.Water distribution at the level of the secondary canal, called distributary in India, is discussed in chapter 7 (organisational aspects) and chapter 8 (technical aspects). Chapter 7 describes which rules for rotational water distribution have emerged in the interaction of the Irrigation Department officials who manage these canals, and the water users. In many secondary canals rules for rotation exist, which are, like those at tertiary level, mobilised in times of scarcity. At this level the rules also do not accomplish equity in water distribution. They express the power balance between users in different parts of the irrigated area, and that between water users and the government administration.In contrast to what is often assumed, corruption is not the dominant mechanism in water distribution at secondary level in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. The problematic relationship between government managers and water users are not translated into financial transactions, but into political mediation. In certain circumstances local politicians (members of parliament) can play an important role in water management. Politicians depend on the political support of farmers. In exchange for their votes farmers can ask the politician to influence the behaviour of Irrigation Department staff. The local members of parliament's power over the Irrigation Department staff is based on their influence on the three-yearly (or more frequent) transfer of government officials. In this way a `triangle of accommodation' emerges, in which none of the parties involved (farmers, officials and politicians) has absolute control, and in which continuous negotiation is necessary about the distribution of water.Chapter 8 concentrates on the structure that links the secondary canal with the local irrigation unit: the pipe outlet structure. Because the discharge that flows from the secondary canal to the field channel through the pipe of the pipe outlet structure, depends on the upstream as well as the downstream water level, and on the cross section of the pipe (which can be adjusted with a shutter), it is practically impossible to regulate the discharge with any degree of precision. As a result it is unknown how much water is exactly diverted by the pipe outlet structures. Why this type of outlet structure remains in use, and have not been replaced by outlet structures used elsewhere in India that are more fit for the task of equitable distribution, is not completely clear.In practice there is substantial variation in the precise characteristics of the pipe outlet structure: the robustness of construction (concrete, stones and mortar), the location of the shutter (visible or non-visible, accessible or non-accessible), the type of lock or locks, and other characteristics. This variation expresses water distribution practices and problems along the canal. The characteristics and the state of the outlet structures are an expression of the relationships between different groups of farmers along the canal and between farmers and the Irrigation Department.The last chapter on water distribution practices, chapter 9, discusses the process of institutional change within the Irrigation Department in relation to main canal management. In a period of two years with extreme water shortage (1988-1990) a number of institutional changes took place that have improved water supply to the downstream parts of the canal. The original rules for distribution of water based on the localisation pattern have been abandoned. To replace these, new rules have been adopted that on the one hand consolidate inequality, but on the other hand provide a more realistic basis for negotiating water supply to the downstream part of the canal. As a result of the introduction of these new rules water supply to the downstream part has been improved, particularly it has become more stable.The concluding chapter, chapter 10, gives a summary reply to the central research question, and discusses the implications of the analysis for reform of irrigation management. It is argued that the analysis has identified both a number of structural limitations or hurdles for reform, and has shown that the day to day practice of water distribution provides opportunities for change. The opportunities are related to the capacity for self-management of water users, the joint formulation of rules for distribution by farmers and Irrigation Department staff, and the technical creativity and the possibility of institutional change within the Irrigation Department.After this the different perspectives that exist on the generally felt need for reform are discussed. These perspectives vary from technical and managerial arguments for `good management', economic arguments for `efficient management', ecological arguments for `sustainable management', to political arguments for `egalitarian and democratic' management. An attempt is made to describe a comprehensive approach in which technical, organisational, economic and political elements are intertwined.As regards the irrigation policy reform situation in Karnataka it is argued that more attention for the participation of water users and other interest groups in the formulation of policy is necessary. At present, efforts to change policy and practice take place in a rather isolated manner at high levels in the government, or in individual, local situations in irrigation systems. The creation of a broad support base for reform in society is considered a priority.Finally a number of research topics are listed and briefly discussed that could contribute to the reform agenda. These are the design process of canal irrigation technology, the political dimension of irrigation, and the issue of use(r) rights. This research should be situated in the daily practice of water management, that is, on the waterfront.