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Implementation intentions have been demonstrated to reduce alcohol use in retrospective self-report measures. It remains unclear, however, whether they can moderate drinking in a challenging naturalistic context. We examined this by studying the effects of implementation intentions on alcohol use in a bar. One hundred and twenty-one participants visiting a local bar were randomized over three conditions: control, motivational trigger, and motivational trigger plus implementation intentions. Those in the motivational trigger group were motivated to reduce drinking, and the combined intervention group made additional alcohol-related implementation intentions. We assessed participants' pre- and post-intervention breath alcohol concentrations, their post-intervention drinking behavior over one hour, and measures of trait impulsivity and reward sensitivity. To predict post-intervention drinking, multiple hierarchical regression was used. Neither the motivational trigger nor the added implementation intentions reduced drinking. Across treatment groups, trait impulsivity predicted alcohol consumption. The present study showed that motivational trigger and implementation intentions failed to reduce alcohol use in a naturalistic setting. Potential reasons, implications, and limitations are discussed. This first attempt demonstrates that implementation intentions aimed at moderation are not as easily implemented in a public high-risk context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Evidence that tic behaviour in individuals with Tourette syndrome reflects difficulties inhibiting prepotent motor actions is mixed. Response conflict tasks produce sensitive measures of response interference from prepotent motor impulses and the proficiency of inhibiting these impulses as an act of cognitive control. We tested the hypothesis that individuals with Tourette syndrome show a deficit in inhibiting prepotent motor actions. Methods: Healthy controls and older adolescents/adults with persistent Tourette syndrome without a history of obsessive-compulsive disorder or attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and presenting with stable mood functioning (i.e., no history of well-treated anxiety or depression) participated in this study. They performed a Simon task that induced conflict between prepotent actions and goal-directed actions. A novel theoretical framework distinguished group differences in acting impulsively (i.e., fast motor errors) from the proficiency of inhibiting interference by prepotent actions (i.e., slope of interference reduction). Results: We included 27 controls and 28 individuals with Tourette syndrome in our study. Both groups showed similar susceptibility to making fast, impulsive motor errors (Tourette syndrome 26% v. control 23%; p = 0.10). The slope (m) reduction of the interference effect was significantly less pronounced among participants with Tourette syndrome than controls (Tourette syndrome: m = -0.07 v. control: m = -0.23; p = 0.022), consistent with deficient inhibitory control over prepotent actions in Tourette syndrome. Limitations: This study does not address directly the role of psychiatric comorbidities and medication effects on inhibitory control over impulsive actions in individuals with Tourette syndrome. Conclusion: The results offer empirical evidence for deficient inhibitory control over prepotent motor actions in individuals with persistent Tourette syndrome with minimal to absent psychiatric comorbidities. These findings also suggest that the frontal-basal ganglia circuits involved in suppressing unwanted motor actions may underlie deficient inhibitory control abilities in individuals with Tourette syndrome., Introduction Individuals with Tourette syndrome often describe premonitory urges that precede tic behaviour. This has motivated imaging studies to focus on somatosensory and sensorimotor processes as neural correlates of such [...]

Theories about the functional relevance of consciousness commonly posit that higher order cognitive control functions, such as response inhibition, require consciousness. To test this assertion, the authors designed a masked stop-signal paradigm to examine whether response inhibition could be triggered and initiated by masked stop signals, which inform participants to stop an action they have begun. In 2 experiments, masked stop signals were observed to occasionally result in full response inhibition as well as to yield a slow down in the speed of responses that were not inhibited. The magnitude of this subliminally triggered response time slowing effect correlated with the efficiency measure (stop signal reaction time) of response inhibition across participants. Thus, response inhibition can be triggered unconsciously--more so in individuals who are good inhibitors and under conditions that are associated with efficient response inhibition. These results indicate that in contradiction to common theorizing, inhibitory control processes can operate outside awareness. Keywords: cognitive control, awareness, response inhibition, consciousness, unconscious processing

To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02367.x Byline: Bernhard Hommel (1), Lorenza S. Colzato (1), Wery P.M. van den Wildenberg (2) Abstract: ABSTRACT The classical Simon effect shows that actions are carried out faster if they spatially correspond to the stimulus signaling them. Recent studies revealed that this is the case even when the two actions are carried out by different people; this finding has been taken to imply that task representations are socially shared. In work described here, we found that the 'interactive' Simon effect occurs only if actor and coactor are involved in a positive relationship (induced by a friendly-acting, cooperative confederate), but not if they are involved in a negative relationship (induced by an intimidating, competitive confederate). This result suggests that agents can represent self-generated and other-generated actions separately, but tend to relate or integrate these representations if the personal relationship between self and other has a positive valence. Author Affiliation: (1)Leiden University and (2)University of Amsterdam Article History: (R eceived 7/26/08; R evision accepted 12/15/08) Article note: Address correspondence to Bernhard Hommel, Leiden University, Department of Psychology, Cognitive Psychology Unit, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden, The Netherlands, e-mail: hommel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl.

Objectives: Essential tremor (ET) is a movement disorder characterized by action tremor which impacts motor execution. Given the disrupted cerebellar-thalamo-cortical networks in ET, we hypothesized that ET could interfere with the control mechanisms involved in regulating motor performance. The ability to inhibit or stop actions is critical for navigating many daily life situations such as driving or social interactions. The current study investigated the speed of action initiation and two forms of action control, response stopping and proactive slowing in ET. Methods: Thirty-three ET patients and 25 healthy controls (HCs) completed a choice reaction task and a stop-signal task, and measures of going speed, proactive slowing and stop latencies were assessed. Results: Going speed was significantly slower in ET patients (649 ms) compared to HCs (526 ms; F (1,56) = 42.37; p <.001; η 2 =.43), whereas proactive slowing did not differ between groups. ET patients exhibited slower stop signal reaction times (320 ms) compared to HCs (258 ms, F (1,56) = 15.3; p <.00; η 2 =.22) and more severe motor symptoms of ET were associated with longer stopping latencies in a subset of patients (Spearman rho =.48; p <.05). Conclusions: In line with previous studies, ET patients showed slower action initiation. Additionally, inhibitory control was impaired whereas proactive slowing remained intact relative to HCs. More severe motor symptoms of ET were associated with slower stopping speed, and may reflect more progressive changes to the cerebellar-thalamo-cortical network. Future imaging studies should specify which structural and functional changes in ET can explain changes in inhibitory action control. (JINS , 2019, 25 , 156–164) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]