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Background: Belief in conspiracy theories has emerged across times and cultures. While previous accounts attributed conspiracy beliefs to mental health conditions, accumulating research suggests that conspiracy theories are common among the general population. In the present study we examined whether conspiracy mentality - that is, a general predisposition to believe conspiracy theories - differed between a group of autistic adults and a general population sample., Methods: This study included an autistic sample ( n  = 682) and a general population sample ( n  = 4358). Participants' conspiracy mentality was measured using the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ)., Results: A one-way ANCOVA (controlling for participants' age, gender, educational level, and ethnicity) revealed no difference in conspiracy mentality between an autism and a community sample., Conclusions: The current study suggests that being autistic, or having more autistic traits, does not predict conspiracy mentality. These findings underscore that autism does not predispose people to conspiracy theories and suggest that autism is neither a risk factor for, nor a protective factor against, conspiracy mentality.

The European Union (EU) is portrayed as a "normative power" that promotes democracy. How does identifying with the EU identity predict citizens' responses to a war between two non-EU countries, where one (Ukraine) appears as the victim (i.e., a nation suffering significant harm as a result of military aggression by another country) and the other (Russia) as the aggressor (i.e., a nation initiating military aggression against another country)? This study tested two contrasting, yet not mutually exclusive hypotheses. Based on the underlying idea that Ukraine is perceived to share similar (European) values while Russia is perceived to deviate from these values, the "humanitarian influence of the EU identity hypothesis" hypothesized that identification with the EU identity predicts increased support for the victim group (Ukraine) and condemnation of the aggressor group over time. Based on the "protective effect of EU identity hypothesis," however, a reverse temporal order was also hypothesized. We conducted a two two-wave study among Greek participants. Our findings provided full support for the first hypothesis and partial support for the second hypothesis. Identification with EU identity predicts increasingly stronger opposition to an intergroup conflict between non-EU countries., (© 2024 The Author(s). Scandinavian Journal of Psychology published by Scandinavian Psychological Associations and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Some people deliberately spread conspiracy theories. What are the reputational benefits and costs of doing so? The Adaptive-Conspiracism hypothesis proposes that it pays to be vigilant against possible conspiracies, especially in case of intergroup threat. Those who spread conspiracy theories may therefore be seen as valuable group members. Few studies have focused on the reputational impact of spreading a conspiracy theory. We conducted five studies (N Pilot = 303; N Study1  = 388; N Study2  = 560; N Study3  = 391; N Study4  = 373) where participants rated a conspiracy spreader (vs. a neutral person) on a range of personality traits in different intergroup contexts. The results indicated that conspiracy spreaders were consistently perceived as more dominant and less warm than people making non-conspiratorial claims about certain events. Moreover, intergroup conflict attenuated the negative effects of spreading conspiracy theories on competence and warmth. These findings support the notion that besides drawbacks, spreading conspiracy theories can have benefits for the spreader's reputation, particularly during an intergroup conflict., (© 2024 The Author(s). British Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society.)

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has had a detrimental effect on people's mental health. Drawing on the palliative function of ideologies, we suggest that people rely on system-justifying beliefs to mitigate psychological distress during the pandemic. We conducted three studies with correlational and experimental designs to examine whether and how system-justifying beliefs can buffer against psychological distress during COVID-19, and whether this effect may vary across social classes. The results indicated that (a) system-justifying beliefs alleviated psychological distress during the pandemic, (b) personal control mediated this relationship and (c) this effect was consistent across all social classes. This study provides robust evidence for the palliative function of system-justifying beliefs during a massive global health crisis (i.e. COVID-19)., (© 2024 British Psychological Society.)

Conspiracy theories introduce a democratic paradox, as belief in conspiracy theories predicts support for both democratic and non-democratic political systems. In this article, we explore whether democratic and anti-democratic attitudes, resulting from conspiracy beliefs, can be mutually exclusive. In Study 1 (United Kingdom, N = 293), we show that belief in conspiracy theories is associated with decreased support for representative democracy, and increased support for direct democracy, anarchism, and autocracy within the same individuals. In Study 2 (United States, N = 302, pre-registered), we experimentally show that the perceived presence of conspiracies is linked to an increased preference for direct democracy, anarchism, and autocracy and decreased support for representative democracy. Mediational analyses suggest that widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo and, less consistently, feelings of political cynicism mediate the relationships between conspiracy beliefs and (anti-)democratic attitudes. In Study 3 (United States, N = 400, pre-registered), we experimentally manipulate (dis)satisfaction with the status quo. Results indicate that rejecting the status quo increases support for direct democracy, anarchism, and autocracy and decreases support for representative democracy. Overall, our findings suggest that people who believe in conspiracy theories tend to favour both democratic and anti-democratic political alternatives, largely attributed to citizens' desire to change the status quo., (© 2024 The Authors. British Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society.)

Conspiracy theories tend to be prevalent, particularly in societies with high economic inequality. However, few studies have examined the relationship between economic inequality and belief in conspiracy theories. We propose that economic inequality leads people to believe conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups (i.e., upwards conspiracy theories) and that moral evaluations of those groups mediate this relationship. Study 1 (N = 300) found support for these ideas in a survey among Chinese residents. Study 2 (N = 160) manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in a virtual society. The manipulation shaped moral evaluations of economically advantaged groups, and conspiracy beliefs, in the predicted manner. In Study 3 (N = 191) and Study 4 (N = 210), we experimentally manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in real Chinese society and replicated the results of Study 2. In addition, in Study 4, we find that economic inequality predicts belief in conspiracy theories about economically disadvantaged groups (i.e., downward conspiracy theories), which was mediated by anomie. We conclude that perceived economic inequality predicts conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups and that moral evaluations account for this effect. Also, upward and downward conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with different psychological processes., (© 2023 The Authors. British Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society.)

People in many societies report that they do not have enough time. What makes people feel so rushed? We propose that economic inequality leads to perceived time poverty by increasing status anxiety. Five studies examined this line of reasoning. Study 1 (N = 230) found a positive correlation between economic inequality and perceived time poverty. Study 2 (N = 194) manipulated economic inequality to test the causal link between economic inequality and perceived time poverty. The results showed that people perceived more time poverty in the high (vs. low) economic inequality condition. Study 3 (N = 381) supported the mediating role of status anxiety in the relationship between economic inequality and perceived time poverty using a questionnaire survey. Study 4 (pre-registered; N = 283) manipulated economic inequality in an ecological valid way and yielded further support for the hypotheses. In pre-registered Study 5 (N = 233), a blockage manipulation design was employed to test the mediating effect of status anxiety as a function of economic inequality, which provided causal evidence for the proposed mediator. Our findings suggest that economic inequality serves as a structural societal factor that fuels people's perception of time poverty., (© 2023 British Psychological Society.)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, different policies were implemented to increase vaccination uptake. Meanwhile, conspiracy theories spread widely, and vaccinated versus unvaccinated people increasingly polarized against each other. This study examined the associations between perceived vaccination coercion, conspiracy beliefs and polarization. We tested the relationship of vaccination status with perceived vaccination coercion, conspiracy beliefs, and polarization, with a total sample size of N  = 1202 ( n  = 400 in China, n  = 401 in the US, and n  = 401 in the UK), among them n  = 603 were vaccinated and n  = 599 were unvaccinated. As pre-registered, unvaccinated people perceived more vaccination coercion and endorsed more conspiracy theories. Conspiracy mentality was positively related to perceived coercion. Contrary to our hypotheses, vaccinated people were more polarized toward unvaccinated people than vice versa. Finally, conspiracy beliefs mediated the link between perceived coercion and polarization among unvaccinated people., Competing Interests: Declaration of conflicting interestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

The European Union (EU) legislation suggests that EU member states progressively adopt and implement policies that are primarily in line with the broader European interests, and secondarily with specific national interests. Yet, citizens from various EU member-states often oppose these EU directives and adopt attitudes that favour national interests. The current study investigates whether EU citizens progressively comply with-or digress from-the directives of the superordinate EU group during the Russia-Ukraine war. In a two-wave study we investigated the role of instrumental reasons (i.e., maximisation of material gain) to cooperate with an EU outgroup, namely Russia, in Greeks' (an EU member state) compliance with the EU directives over time during the Russia-Ukraine war. We hypothesised and found that instrumental reasons to cooperate with Russia: (a) encourage EU citizens to support digressing from EU directives and (b) predict decreased identification with the superordinate identity of EU over time. Moreover, since NATO's approach to the Russian invasion closely mirrors that of the EU, we further investigated the effects of instrumental reasons to cooperate with Russia on Greeks' identification with a different superordinate group, namely NATO. Results were largely similar to those we obtained when focusing on EU as a superordinate group., (© 2023 The Authors. International Journal of Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of International Union of Psychological Science.)

Background: Little is known about how conspiracy beliefs and health responses are interrelated over time during the course of the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic. This longitudinal study tested two contrasting, but not mutually exclusive, hypotheses through cross-lagged modeling. First, based on the consequential nature of conspiracy beliefs, we hypothesize that conspiracy beliefs predict an increase in detrimental health responses over time. Second, as people may rationalize their behavior through conspiracy beliefs, we hypothesize that detrimental health responses predict increased conspiracy beliefs over time., Methods: We measured conspiracy beliefs and several health-related responses (i.e. physical distancing, support for lockdown policy, and the perception of the coronavirus as dangerous) at three phases of the pandemic in the Netherlands ( N = 4913): During the first lockdown (Wave 1: April 2020), after the first lockdown (Wave 2: June 2020), and during the second lockdown (Wave 3: December 2020)., Results: For physical distancing and perceived danger, the overall cross-lagged effects supported both hypotheses, although the standardized effects were larger for the effects of conspiracy beliefs on these health responses than vice versa. The within-person change results only supported an effect of conspiracy beliefs on these health responses, depending on the phase of the pandemic. Furthermore, an overall cross-lagged effect of conspiracy beliefs on reduced support for lockdown policy emerged from Wave 2 to 3., Conclusions: The results provide stronger support for the hypothesis that conspiracy beliefs predict health responses over time than for the hypothesis that health responses predict conspiracy beliefs over time.

A well-established finding is that beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories (e.g., Princess Diana was murdered vs. faked her own death) are positively correlated. This is commonly interpreted as evidence that people systematically believe blatant inconsistencies. Here, we propose that the field has insufficiently acknowledged a compelling alternative explanation: Disbelieving both conspiracy theories also yields a positive correlation. In four preregistered studies (total N = 7,641 adults), online participants evaluated 28 sets of contradictory conspiracy theories. Although the positive correlation was replicated in all cases, this was mostly due to participants who believed the official versions of these events (e.g., Princess Diana died in a car accident). Among participants who disbelieved these official stories, the correlation was inconsistent at best. A mini meta-analysis revealed a negative correlation among these participants, which was particularly due to the dead-or-alive cases. Apparently, researchers should reconsider the notion of systematic belief in contradictory conspiracy theories.

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected all domains of human life, including the economic and social fabric of societies. One of the central strategies for managing public health throughout the pandemic has been through persuasive messaging and collective behaviour change. To help scholars better understand the social and moral psychology behind public health behaviour, we present a dataset comprising of 51,404 individuals from 69 countries. This dataset was collected for the International Collaboration on Social & Moral Psychology of COVID-19 project (ICSMP COVID-19). This social science survey invited participants around the world to complete a series of moral and psychological measures and public health attitudes about COVID-19 during an early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (between April and June 2020). The survey included seven broad categories of questions: COVID-19 beliefs and compliance behaviours; identity and social attitudes; ideology; health and well-being; moral beliefs and motivation; personality traits; and demographic variables. We report both raw and cleaned data, along with all survey materials, data visualisations, and psychometric evaluations of key variables., (© 2023. The Author(s).)

Background: Conspiracy beliefs are associated with detrimental health attitudes during the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic. Most prior research on these issues was cross-sectional, however, and restricted to attitudes or behavioral intentions. The current research was designed to examine to what extent conspiracy beliefs predict health behavior and well-being over a longer period of time., Methods: In this preregistered multi-wave study on a large Dutch research panel (weighted to provide nationally representative population estimates), we examined if conspiracy beliefs early in the pandemic (April 2020) would predict a range of concrete health and well-being outcomes eight months later (December 2020; N = 5745)., Results: The results revealed that Covid-19 conspiracy beliefs prospectively predicted a decreased likelihood of getting tested for corona; if tested, an increased likelihood of the test coming out positive; and, an increased likelihood of having violated corona regulations, deteriorated economic outcomes (job loss; reduced income), experiences of social rejection, and decreased overall well-being. Most of these effects generalized to a broader susceptibility to conspiracy theories (i.e. conspiracy mentality)., Conclusions: These findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs are associated with a myriad of negative life outcomes in the long run. Conspiracy beliefs predict how well people have coped with the pandemic over a period of eight months, as reflected in their health behavior, and their economic and social well-being.

In recent years, it has been argued that conspiracy beliefs and populist attitudes go hand in hand. Despite their theoretical and empirical similarities, it remains unclear why these constructs are so closely associated. Across three studies, we examined the processes underlying the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and populist attitudes. Study 1 (Greece, N = 275) and Study 2 (United Kingdom, N = 300) revealed that the relationship between populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs is mediated by political cynicism and zero-sum thinking. In Study 3 (USA, N = 300, pre-registered), we use a vignette of a fictitious country to experimentally show that having a newly elected populist party in power (as compared to a well-established party) reduced participants' tendency to believe conspiracy theories. Moreover, this was due to increased empowerment, decreased political cynicism and decreased zero-sum thinking. These findings reveal various complementary mediators of the link between populist attitudes and conspiracy thinking and suggest that electing a populist party in power may reduce conspiracy beliefs among the public., (© 2022 The British Psychological Society.)

Moral character is widely expected to lead to moral judgements and practices. However, such expectations are often breached, especially when moral character is measured by self-report. We propose that because self-reported moral character partly reflects a desire to appear good, people who self-report a strong moral character will show moral harshness towards others and downplay their own transgressions-that is, they will show greater moral hypocrisy. This self-other discrepancy in moral judgements should be pronounced among individuals who are particularly motivated by reputation. Employing diverse methods including large-scale multination panel data (N = 34,323), and vignette and behavioural experiments (N = 700), four studies supported our proposition, showing that various indicators of moral character (Benevolence and Universalism values, justice sensitivity, and moral identity) predicted harsher judgements of others' more than own transgressions. Moreover, these double standards emerged particularly among individuals possessing strong reputation management motives. The findings highlight how reputational concerns moderate the link between moral character and moral judgement., (© 2022 The Authors. British Journal of Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The British Psychological Society.)

Corruption is a pervasive phenomenon that affects the quality of institutions, undermines economic growth and exacerbates inequalities around the globe. Here we tested whether perceiving representatives of institutions as corrupt undermines trust and subsequent prosocial behaviour among strangers. We developed an experimental game paradigm modelling representatives as third-party punishers to manipulate or assess corruption and examine its relationship with trust and prosociality (trust behaviour, cooperation and generosity). In a sequential dyadic die-rolling task, the participants observed the dishonest behaviour of a target who would subsequently serve as a third-party punisher in a trust game (Study 1a, N = 540), in a prisoner's dilemma (Study 1b, N = 503) and in dictator games (Studies 2-4, N = 765, pre-registered). Across these five studies, perceiving a third party as corrupt undermined interpersonal trust and, in turn, prosocial behaviour. These findings contribute to our understanding of the critical role that representatives of institutions play in shaping cooperative relationships in modern societies., (© 2022. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited.)

The Big Two theoretical framework suggests that two traits, namely morality and competence, govern social judgments of individuals and that morality shows a primacy effect over competence because it has more diagnostic value. In this study we tested the primacy effect of morality in the workplace by examining how instrumental or relational goals of organizations might influence the importance of morality or competence of candidates during the hiring process. We hypothesized that the primacy effect of morality might hold when organizational goals are relational, but it might get reversed when organizational goals are instrumental. Supporting our hypothesis, in a field study and two experiments (both preregistered) we found that people perceive moral candidates as more appropriate for recruitment when an organization prioritizes relational goals (Studies 1, 2, and 3). In contrast, people perceive competent candidates as more appropriate for recruitment when an organization prioritizes instrumental goals (Studies 1 and 2). Perceived appropriateness of a candidate, in turn, predicts a stronger intention to recruit a candidate (Studies 2 and 3). These results provide evidence for a reversal of the primacy effect of morality in a work setting, and illuminate the important role of organizational goals in social judgments., Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2022 Fousiani, Van Prooijen and Armenta.)

Fortune telling is a widespread phenomenon, yet little is known about the extent to which people are affected by it-including those who consider themselves non-believers. The present research has investigated the power of a positive fortune telling outcome (vs. neutral vs. negative) on people's financial risk taking. In two online experiments (n1 = 252; n2 = 441), we consistently found that positive fortune telling enhanced financial risk taking particularly among men. Additionally, we used a real online gambling game in a lab setting (n3 = 193) and found that positive fortune telling enhanced the likelihood that college students gambled for money. Furthermore, a meta-analysis of these three studies demonstrated that the effect of positive fortune telling versus neutral fortune telling was significant for men, but virtually absent for women. Thus, positive fortune telling can yield increased financial risk taking in men, but not (or less so) in women., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Using the label 'conspiracy theory' is widely perceived to be a way of discrediting wild ideas and unsubstantiated claims. However, prior research suggests that labelling statements as conspiracy theories does not reduce people's belief in them. In four studies, we probed this effect further, and tested the alternative hypothesis that the label 'conspiracy theory' is a consequence rather than a cause of (dis)belief in conspiracy-related statements. Replicating prior research, Study 1 (N = 170) yielded no evidence that the label 'conspiracy theory' affects belief in statements. In Study 2 (N = 199), we discovered that the less people believed in statements, the more they favoured labelling them as 'conspiracy theories'. In Studies 3 and 4 (Ns = 150 and 151), we manipulated the relative believability of statements and found that participants preferred the label 'conspiracy theory' for relatively less believable versus more believable statements. The current research therefore supports the hypothesis that prior (dis)agreement with a statement affects the use of the label 'conspiracy theory' more than the other way around., (© 2021 The British Psychological Society.)

At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multinational data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 ( N  = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution-individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar results were found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, and collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-neglible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic., (© The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of National Academy of Sciences.)

Status can be seen as power over valued resources or as prestige that lies in the eyes of the beholder. In the present research, we examine how power versus prestige influence observers' punishing motives. Possession of power implies the capacity to harm and elicits threat and therefore should trigger stronger incapacitative motives for punishing an offender. In contrast, prestige signals the observer's admiration of the target and therefore should elicit a strong motivation to help an offender reintegrate into society. Studies 1 and 2 manipulated an offender's status (power vs. prestige vs. control) and group identity (ingroup vs. outgroup). Supporting our hypotheses, both studies revealed that observers had stronger incapacitative motivations towards powerful as opposed to prestigious offenders, particularly when the offender came from the ingroup. Study 2 also showed that observers had stronger restorative motives towards a prestigious as opposed to powerful offender. Contrary to expectations, group identity did not moderate the effect of status on observer's restorative motives. Study 3 manipulated power and prestige separately and showed that power elicits stronger incapacitative motives through ingroup threat and perceived capacity to harm. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings., (© 2022 The Authors. British Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society.)

The Covid-19 pandemic has inspired many conspiracy theories, which are associated with detrimental health beliefs and behaviors (e.g. reduced physical distancing; decreased vaccination intentions). We propose a previously unrecognized mediator of these relationships: A self-perceived likelihood to already have experienced a Covid-19 infection. Results from a large sample ( N  = 9033) revealed that self-perceived infections mediated the link between conspiracy beliefs and health beliefs and behaviors. These findings emerged independently of institutional distrust, and actual infections as indicated by a positive medical test. These findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs shape people's interpretation of the physical signals of their own body.

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (that is, conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation) or amongst both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N = 104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, albeit small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (that is, those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control., (© 2022. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited.)

Many citizens distrust powerful societal institutions, and hold conspiracy theories about them. What are the implications of this suspicion of institutions for people's social relationships? The current paper proposes that institutions have at least two functions to regulate citizens' social relationships: providing people with a sense of safety, and providing models for group norms and values. Suspicion of institutions undermines both of these functions, and therefore yields a range of negative societal outcomes by impacting people's interpersonal, within-group, and between-group relationships. More specifically, suspicion of institutions reduces trust between strangers, within-group cooperation, commitment, and prosocial behavior, and increases prejudice, intergroup conflict, polarization, and extremism. We conclude that institutional distrust and conspiracy theories erode the fabric of society., Competing Interests: Conflict of interest statement Nothing declared., (Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Is hate fundamentally different from other negative emotions? Despite a fair amount of theorizing about hate, there is little empirical evidence that helps to answer this basic question. The present research examines how people construe interpersonal and intergroup hate and provides an empirical analysis of how hate is conceptually different from dislike, anger, contempt, and disgust. In five preregistered studies, using exploratory (Pilot Study) and confirmatory (Studies 1, and 2a through 2c) within-subjects designs, we asked adult participants in the United States (N total = 1,074) to describe examples of their interpersonal and intergroup targets of hate, dislike, anger, contempt, and disgust. We assessed their subjective experiences of each emotion by measuring the associated intensity, duration, arousal, valence, perceived threats, and action tendencies. Across studies, results revealed that participants feel consistently more emotionally aroused, personally threatened, and inclined toward attack-oriented behaviors when experiencing hate as compared with dislike, anger, contempt and disgust toward interpersonal targets. At the intergroup level, results revealed that participants experience hate as more arousing than the three moral emotions, more intense than dislike, anger and contempt, and feel more inclined toward attack-oriented behaviors than when they feel dislike and contempt. Results are in line with a general pattern of increasing differentiation suggesting that hate is conceptually closer to disgust and contempt than to anger and dislike. We discuss the specific differences and similarities between hate and these emotions across targets and their implications for future research on hate and negative emotions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Many citizens around the globe believe conspiracy theories. Why are conspiracy theories so appealing? Here, we propose that conspiracy theories elicit intense emotions independent of emotional valence. People therefore find conspiracy theories entertaining - that is, narratives that people perceive as interesting, exciting, and attention-grabbing - and such entertainment appraisals are positively associated with belief in them. Five studies supported these ideas. Participants were exposed to either a conspiratorial or a non-conspiratorial text about the Notre Dame fire (Study 1) or the death of Jeffrey Epstein (preregistered Study 2). The conspiratorial text elicited stronger entertainment appraisals and intense emotions (independent of emotional valence) than the non-conspiratorial text; moreover, entertainment appraisals mediated the effects of the manipulation on conspiracy beliefs. Study 3 indicated that participants endorsed stronger conspiracy beliefs when an election event was described in an entertaining rather than a boring manner. Subsequent findings revealed that both organisational (Study 4) and societal conspiracy beliefs (Study 5) are positively associated with sensation seeking - a trait characterised by a preference for exciting and intense experiences. We conclude that one reason why people believe conspiracy theories is because they find them entertaining., (© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society.)

Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national samples. Study 2 (N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic (r = -0.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics., (© 2022. The Author(s).)

Conspiracy theories are widespread and have a profound impact on society. The present contribution proposes that conspiracy theories are explanatory narratives that necessarily contain justice judgments, as they include attributions of blame and accusations of unethical or criminal conduct. Conspiratorial narratives also are mental simulations, however, and may elicit genuine feelings of injustice also without evidence of actual malpractice. Indeed, conspiracy theories sometimes describe unfair events that are unlikely to have occurred, unethical authorities that might not actually exist, and so on. Here I propose two complementary processes that stimulate belief in evidence-free conspiracy theories: (1) Existential threats instigate biased mental processing and motivated reasoning, that jointly promote an alternative perception of reality; and (2) group allegiances shape how people perceive, interpret, and remember facts to highlight the immoral qualities of competing outgroups. Due to these processes, conspiracy theories elicit a set of distinct reactions such as poor health choices and rejection of science. Moreover, evidence-free conspiracy theories require interventions beyond traditional approaches to install justice principles, such as debunking falsehoods and reducing polarized intergroup distinctions. I conclude that the scientific study of conspiracy theories is part of, and has a unique place in, social justice research., Competing Interests: Conflict of InterestAll the authors declare that they have no conflict of interest., (© The Author(s) 2021.)

Although conspiracy theories are ubiquitous across times and cultures, research has not investigated how cultural dimensions may predict conspiracy beliefs. The present research examined intergroup conspiracy beliefs in United States and Chinese samples at the peak of the trade war. In two studies (one pre-registered; total N = 1,092), we asked US participants to what extent they believed Chinese institutions and companies were conspiring against the United states and Chinese participants to what extent they believed US institutions and companies were conspiring against China. Results revealed that such beliefs were stronger among Chinese than US participants due to higher power distance values and vertical collectivism. In particular, these cultural dimensions were associated with increased psychological involvement in intergroup conflict (as reflected by higher levels of collective narcissism and perceived outgroup threat), which in turn predicted intergroup conspiracy beliefs. Exploratory analyses suggested that particularly power distance values mediate these effects. We conclude that cultural dimensions that promote hierarchy in society are associated with increased intergroup conspiracy beliefs., (© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society.)

This paper seeks to understand the association between ratees' relational justice perceptions and their feedback acceptance, both directly and through leader-member exchange (LMX). The paper also examines the moderated mediation effect of supervisory trust. The paper presents the findings of two studies. Study 1 utilized two data sets collected through an online survey from 280 part-time students working full-time (Sample 1) and 292 working professionals (Sample 2) in Pakistan. Study 2 utilized data collected from N  = 167 students recruited for a scenario-based experiment that manipulated whether a manager was fair or unfair. Results revealed that relational justice positively predicted feedback acceptance in Studies 1 and 2. LMX positively mediated the above-mentioned relationship in both studies. As expected, supervisory trust negatively moderated the relational justice-feedback acceptance relationship in Study 2. The present study contributes to performance management theory and practice by illuminating that raters can stimulate performance partnership by employing a relational justice approach that increases the likelihood that employees accept performance feedback., Competing Interests: Conflict of interestThe authors declare that they have no conflict interest., (© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021.)

Interpersonal trust is an important source of social and economic development. Over decades, researchers debated the question whether and how public institutions influence interpersonal trust, making this relationship a much-discussed issue for scientific debate. However, experimental and behavioral data and insights on this relationship and the underlying psychological processes are rare and often inconsistent. The present set of studies tests a model which proposes that institutional trust indirectly affects trust among unrelated strangers by enhancing individuals' feelings of security. Study 1 (survey on trust in a broad spectrum of state institutions), Study 2 (nationally representative data from 16 countries), and Study 3 (experimental manipulation of institutional trust) provide convergent support for this hypothesis. Also, the results show that the effect remains consistent even after controlling for individual dispositions linked to interpersonal and institutional trust (Study 1 and 3) and country level indicators of institutional performance (Study 2). Taken together, these findings inform and contribute to the debate about the relationship between institutions and interpersonal trust by showing that when institutions are trusted, they increase feelings of security, and therefore promote interpersonal trust among strangers., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

When people are transgressed against, they are usually motivated to restore personal power that was threatened by the transgression. We argue and test the new idea that while revenge and forgiveness responses are typically seen as opposites, both may be empowering, depending on the offender's intent to harm. Across two studies, one experimental (N = 381) and one employing an autobiographical recall paradigm (N = 251), we tested a moderated mediation model. Notably, we found that revenge is empowering at high levels of intent and forgiveness is empowering regardless of intent. Importantly, we also demonstrate that empowerment provides an explanation for the process by which getting revenge and forgiving are each associated with improved affective outcomes for victims., (© 2019 The British Psychological Society.)

In the present research, we examined a discrepancy between people's beliefs about, versus punitive reactions towards, offenders. Particularly, appraisals of offenders along the dimension of communion (i.e., being friendly or trustworthy) should primarily affect people's beliefs about them, as reflected in demonizing and conspiracy theories, and to a lesser extent observers' punitive reactions. However, actual evidence of transgression should (more strongly than beliefs) influence observers' punitive reactions. In two studies, we manipulated communion and transgression ambiguity in the context of financial offences. The transgression was presented as either an observable and clear-cut immoral case (non-ambiguous transgression) or as a case that involves a grey area between what is legal or illegal (ambiguous transgression). Study 1 revealed that viewing an offender as low (as opposed to high) in communion predominantly influenced demonization and conspiracy beliefs involving the offender. The transgression manipulation, however, mostly influenced observers' punitive reactions and their underlying punitive motives. Similar findings were obtained in Study 2. We conclude that although beliefs about offenders and punitive reactions are often strongly related, they are actually grounded in different psychological processes., (© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society.)

People often consider themselves as more moral than average others (i.e., moral superiority) and present themselves as more moral than they actually are (i.e., moral hypocrisy). We examined whether feelings of moral superiority-as a manifestation of self-enhancement motives-motivates people's hypocritical behavior, that is, their discrepant moral performances in public versus private settings. In three studies (total N = 1,151), participants distributed two tasks (one favorable and one unfavorable) between themselves and an anonymous partner, with the option of using an ostensibly fair randomizer (e.g., a self-prepared coin). We found that when experiencing feelings of moral superiority (vs. non-superiority), people, especially those who highly identified with moral values (Studies 1 and 2), were less likely to directly give themselves the favorable task, but they were not less likely to cheat in private after using the randomizer (Studies 1 to 3). Both self-enhancement motives and moral identity have implications for hypocritical behavior, by motivating public moral appearances but not private moral integrity., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

In this introduction to the EJSP Special Issue on conspiracy theories as a social psychological phenomenon, we describe how this emerging research domain has developed over the past decade and distill four basic principles that characterize belief in conspiracy theories. Specifically, conspiracy theories are consequential as they have a real impact on people's health, relationships, and safety; they are universal in that belief in them is widespread across times, cultures, and social settings; they are emotional given that negative emotions and not rational deliberations cause conspiracy beliefs; and they are social as conspiracy beliefs are closely associated with psychological motivations underlying intergroup conflict. We then discuss future research and possible policy interventions in this growing area of enquiry.

Belief in conspiracy theories-such as that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were an inside job or that the pharmaceutical industry deliberately spreads diseases-is a widespread and culturally universal phenomenon. Why do so many people around the globe believe conspiracy theories, and why are they so influential? Previous research focused on the proximate mechanisms underlying conspiracy beliefs but ignored the distal, evolutionary origins and functions. We review evidence pertaining to two competing evolutionary hypotheses: (a) conspiracy beliefs are a by-product of a suite of psychological mechanisms (e.g., pattern recognition, agency detection, threat management, alliance detection) that evolved for different reasons, or (b) conspiracy beliefs are part of an evolved psychological mechanism specifically aimed at detecting dangerous coalitions. This latter perspective assumes that conspiracy theories are activated after specific coalition cues, which produce functional counterstrategies to cope with suspected conspiracies. Insights from social, cultural and evolutionary psychology provide tentative support for six propositions that follow from the adaptation hypothesis. We propose that people possess a functionally integrated mental system to detect conspiracies that in all likelihood has been shaped in an ancestral human environment in which hostile coalitions-that is, conspiracies that truly existed-were a frequent cause of misery, death, and reproductive loss.

Because punishments are expected to give offenders what they deserve proportionally to the severity of their offenses, the punishment of an entire group because of the misdeed of a few of its members is generally considered as unfair. Group entitativity might increase support for such collective punishment, because members of highly entitative groups are perceived as more similar and interchangeable. We designed three experiments comparing support for third-party collective punishment of low versus high entitative groups. As comparison base-rate, we included conditions in which participants punish an individual wrongdoer (Experiments 1 & 2). Results show that although support for individual punishment is higher than support for collective punishment, this difference was reduced (Experiment 1) or absent (Experiment 2) when the group was highly entitative. Experiment 3 replicated the increasing effect of group entitativity on support for collective punishment. We conclude that group entitativity increases the likelihood of an entire group being treated as a single unit, facilitating collective punishment when a few group members commit an offense.

A common assumption is that belief in conspiracy theories and supernatural phenomena are grounded in illusory pattern perception. In the present research we systematically tested this assumption. Study 1 revealed that such irrational beliefs are related to perceiving patterns in randomly generated coin toss outcomes. In Study 2, pattern search instructions exerted an indirect effect on irrational beliefs through pattern perception. Study 3 revealed that perceiving patterns in chaotic but not in structured paintings predicted irrational beliefs. In Study 4, we found that agreement with texts supporting paranormal phenomena or conspiracy theories predicted pattern perception. In Study 5, we manipulated belief in a specific conspiracy theory. This manipulation influenced the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs. We conclude that illusory pattern perception is a central cognitive mechanism accounting for conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs.

The 2016 European Union (EU) refugee crisis exposed a fundamental distinction in political attitudes between the political left and right. Previous findings suggest, however, that besides political orientation, ideological strength (i.e., political extremism) is also relevant to understand such distinctive attitudes. Our study reveals that the political right is more anxious, and the political left experiences more self-efficacy, about the refugee crisis. At the same time, the political extremes-at both sides of the spectrum-are more likely than moderates to believe that the solution to this societal problem is simple. Furthermore, both extremes experience more judgmental certainty about their domain-specific knowledge of the refugee crisis, independent of their actual knowledge. Finally, belief in simple solutions mediated the relationship between ideology and judgmental certainty, but only among political extremists. We conclude that both ideological orientation and strength matter to understand citizens' reactions to the refugee crisis., Competing Interests: Declaration of Conflicting Interests: The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.