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This innovative book explores the role of utopian thinking in law and politics, including alternative forms of social engineering, such as technology and architecture. Building on Levitas’ Utopia as Method, the topic of utopia is addressed within the book from a multidisciplinary perspective.The book addresses central questions surrounding utopian thinking: What are its implications for law and politics? To what extent does it constitute a desirable vision? What are its risks or dangers? How is utopia related to ideology? An impressive selection of contributors reflect on the challenge of utopianism and its attraction, advancing the global public debate on social and political issues. Divided into three accessible parts, this book discusses the relationship between utopia and the law, the notion of utopian politics and utopia in architecture and technology.Addressing the topic of utopia from a variety of perspectives, this book will be an interesting read for academic scholars and students in the field of law, legal and political theory, philosophy, ethics, sociology, religious studies, technology and architecture. In particular, it is relevant for scholars who are interested in the dynamics of social, legal and political change.

In political liberalism there is, generally speaking, a deep distrust of utopian thought. It is conceived as a blueprint for a radical reordering of the existing legal and political order. At the same time, liberal politics appears to be a rather dull affair. Compared with utopia, it seems to have less inspirational and motivational force. This chapter addresses the question of how to conceive of the relation between utopia and the rule of law. Does the rule of law completely rule out utopian thought? According to Van Klink, the rule of law depends for its survival on its ideological as well as its utopian dimension. To prevent that the rule of law is taken too much for granted as a self-evident and fixed idea, it is important to stress its utopian dimension. Conversely, its ideological stabilisation has to secure that the rule of law does not become a flee-floating fantasy.

In this chapter, Van Beers builds on Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology to come to a better understanding of the relation between two contemporary utopias: the humanist utopia of human rights and the transhumanist techno-utopia of human enhancement. According to transhumanist thinkers, transhumanism is the logical extension of humanism. They stress that their school of thought, like humanism, presupposes a rather utopian account of the human based on which individual choice and freedom are to be pursued and protected. For them, human enhancement is not only compatible with, but even commanded by, human rights. Based on an analysis of the utopianism involved in humanism and transhumanism, I argue that this position only holds superficially. Upon closer examination, the transhumanist's quest for techno-utopia, even if he uses human rights as a starting point, is likely to pave the way for a world that can hardly be viewed as utopian according to humanist standards. To come to that conclusion, Van Beers offers a comparison between humanism and transhumanism through the lens of Plessner's first and third fundamental law of anthropology: the law that humans are artificial by nature and the law of the utopian standpoint.

This innovative book explores the role of utopian thinking in law and politics, including alternative forms of social engineering, such as technology and architecture. Building on Levitas’ Utopia as Method, the topic of utopia is addressed within the book from a multidisciplinary perspective.

In the concluding chapter, Bart van Klink and Ingeborg van der Geest integrate the insights obtained by the different chapters from the perspective of possible responses to populism. Analysing these insights from the perspective of logos, ethos and pathos, they discuss how the various contributions to this volume offer potential clues for responding to populist discourse. Specifically, the question will be raised how - both on the level of form and content - citizens could or should respond to the challenges populism poses to current notions of reasonable debate and liberal democracy.

This timely and engaging book examines the rise of populism across the globe. Combining insights from linguistics, argumentation theory, rhetoric, legal theory and political theory, if offers a fully integrated characterization of the form and content of populist discourse. Offering an in-depth analysis and evaluation at the intersection of language, law and politics, Vox Populi will be a great benefit to students and scholars from a range of disciplines.

In this chapter, the editors Henrike Jansen, Bart van Klink and Ingeborg van der Geest provide an overview of conceptions of populism, explanations of this phenomenon and various types of research that have been conducted in order to come to gripes with it.

This chapter sets out to inquire how one may conceptualize a democratic way of dealing with collective attachments in the public sphere. The argument unfolds in three steps. First, Corrias shows that populism and liberalism present conflicting conceptions of the public sphere. Populism insists that the people can actually coincide with their attachments. The public sphere is understood as a Heimat. Liberalism cleanses the public sphere of attachments and denies the need for roots. The public sphere is seen as a marketplace of ideas. Secondly, he argues that both of these conceptions build upon a flawed understanding of the relationship between a collective subject and its values or strong attachments. Contrary to both liberalism and populism, Corrias, thirdly, presents a view in which democracy’s subject is understood as decentred giving rise to a constitutive unrest. The public sphere is the place to deal with this unrest.

The research in this contribution indicates that members of parliament test each other’s positions on political issues in the form of argumentation games. These games have not been noticed by political scientists so far. That is problematic because, as Wolthuis argues here, it is a crucial feature of populist politics to minimize participation in these games. This means that populist parliamentary behaviour cannot be fully understood without reference to parliamentary argumentation games.

This article deals with populism’s complex relation to democracy, in particular liberal democracy. Is populism a danger to democracy (as Müller and others claim), or is it part of democracy’s modus operandi (Laclau), or is it a shadow that is bound to follow democracy forever (Canovan)? First, a characterization of populism is given, which builds on Moffitt’s conception of populism as a specific kind of political style or performance. Second, rhetorical devices often used in populist discourse will be described. Third, the relationship between populism and democracy is addressed. According to Laclau, populism is not a specific political ideology or strategy, but the general political logic through which a people is constituted. As such, populism is not a threat to democracy; it is essential to its functioning. Žižek criticizes Laclau’s formal conception of populism, because it fails to distinguish democracy from populism: whereas populism is opposed to antagonism in society and seeks to destroy it by excluding the enemy, democracy thrives on antagonism, invites and institutionalizes it. In Van Klink’s view, populism endangers democracy, when it tries to occupy the empty place of power (Lefort) by claiming that the populist leader fully and exclusively embodies ‘the People’. Finally, some lessons from a performative perspective are drawn how liberal democracy could and should defend itself against the ‘populist temptation’.

This article deals with populism’s complex relation to democracy, in particular liberal democracy. Is populism a danger to democracy (as Müller and others claim), or is it part of democracy’s modus operandi (Laclau), or is it a shadow that is bound to follow democracy forever (Canovan)? First, a characterization of populism is given, which builds on Moffitt’s conception of populism as a specific kind of political style or performance. Second, rhetorical devices often used in populist discourse will be described. Third, the relationship between populism and democracy is addressed. According to Laclau, populism is not a specific political ideology or strategy, but the general political logic through which a people is constituted. As such, populism is not a threat to democracy; it is essential to its functioning. Žižek criticizes Laclau’s formal conception of populism, because it fails to distinguish democracy from populism: whereas populism is opposed to antagonism in society and seeks to destroy it by excluding the enemy, democracy thrives on antagonism, invites and institutionalizes it. In Van Klink’s view, populism endangers democracy, when it tries to occupy the empty place of power (Lefort) by claiming that the populist leader fully and exclusively embodies ‘the People’. Finally, some lessons from a performative perspective are drawn how liberal democracy could and should defend itself against the ‘populist temptation’.

Hoe moet het juridische vaardighedenonderwijs in er in de toekomst uitzien? Is het wenselijk dat de rechtenstudent wordt gevormd tot een T-shaped lawyer die, behalve over juridische kennis, ook beschikt over algemene kennis en vaardigheden? Ter verheldering van de discussie presenteert Van Klink een Vaardighedenkwadrant, waaruit verschillende opties voor de verdere ontwikkeling van het juridische vaardighedenonderwijs volgen.

Hoe moet het juridische vaardighedenonderwijs in er in de toekomst uitzien? Is het wenselijk dat de rechtenstudent wordt gevormd tot een T-shaped lawyer die, behalve over juridische kennis, ook beschikt over algemene kennis en vaardigheden? Ter verheldering van de discussie presenteert Van Klink een Vaardighedenkwadrant, waaruit verschillende opties voor de verdere ontwikkeling van het juridische vaardighedenonderwijs volgen.

In this (fully revised) chapter the nature of the legislative process in The Netherlands is discussed and the development towards a more communicative model of legislation.

In this (fully revised) chapter the nature of the legislative process in The Netherlands is discussed and the development towards a more communicative model of legislation.

Translation of a chapter originally published in English.