Search

Traditionally, sensitivity to situational norms is understood as deriving from internal cognitive states that represent the rules for appropriate conduct. On an alternative view, norms are 'out there', in the practices and situations themselves, without being duplicated in the head. However, what does normativity look like when it is performed by people engaging with a concrete situation? A 'behaviour setting' offers a window onto these dynamics. This article presents an observational case study of normative coordination within a behaviour setting. Immersed in a scientific laboratory setting, the observations show how the normative demands of the overall behaviour setting can give shape to various places of action, or 'synomorphs', which invite the participants' activities. Responding to the different needs of each synomorph, in turn, maintains the behaviour setting. What connects these two reciprocal timescales of activity are the situationally sensitive activities of the participants. We end with several examples that bring such sensitivity to the interdependence of the norms of a behaviour setting to the fore. This article is part of the theme issue 'People, places, things, and communities: expanding behaviour settings theory in the twenty-first century'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ecological approach to psychology has been a main antecedent of embodied and situated approaches to cognition. The concept of affordances in particular has gained currency throughout psychological science. Yet, contemporary ecological psychology has seemed inaccessible to outsiders and protective of its legacy. Indeed, some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a "package deal"—a principled and unified perspective on perception and action. Looking at the history of the field, however, we argue that ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways. Aiming to open the field to critical engagement and productive exchange, we identify three major strands of thought within ecological psychology, each of which emerged in the 20 years after Gibson's death: physical, biological, and social ecological psychology. Each of these strands develop ecological ideas in quite different directions, making different use of some of its central concepts, adopting different explanatory principles, and embodying different philosophical worldviews. Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology. Given the diversity of the strands, we extend this plea to within ecological psychology itself; the field is better off aiming for a productive pluralism in which the different strands are in dialogue with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To allow different views on motor learning to inform rehabilitation research, the authors aimed to explicate a frequently missed yet fundamental difference in starting point of such views. By considering how rehabilitation in practice answers the question of what parts an activity consists of, reductive and emergent approaches to motor learning are identified and traced throughout rehabilitation practice. The authors show that when a task is cut up along reductive dimensions while also apparently relying on emergent components, this unequally favors the reductive approach and acts to limit the views on motor learning available. By showing the approaches in practice, the authors hope to inspire an awareness that brings both approaches the opportunity to independently inform research so that new theories and practices can proliferate. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article we reconsider the relation between time and agency that is at the heart of the current distinction between online and offline cognition. Mainstream psychology starts out with an abstract notion of time, in which only the current moment is real. Therefore persisting representations are necessary for agents to make their way across time. We take Gibson and Heidegger to offer a different account of the relation between time and agency. Their theories suggest that, by taking agents in their world as coordinated motion, the need for representations disappears. We extend this picture of human involvement by showing how this can account for the concept of time by retaining its relational, situated structure. Finally, we return to the distinction between on- and offline cognition and show that offline cognition need not be considered a different type of cognition, but only a different mode of coordinating: offline cognition in such a view is not a return to the internal manipulation of content; rather, it is a contentless, unstable mode of coordinating to the world in which the relational constitution of agency falters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]