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Bangladesh is customarily presented as a poster child for climate change and conflict given its dense population and susceptibility to climate variability. This vulnerability exacerbates existing challenges such as food insecurity and conflict potential. Crises like pandemics and conflicts are external drivers stressing already compromised domestic governance, such as violent politics, poor rule of law, and corruption, further compounding the challenges of land and water resource management and affecting food (in)security in Bangladesh. While we will argue that Bangladesh’s all-out (‘securitised’) efforts to achieve food security are largely successful and there is no evidence of climate conflict related to food, this does not obviate very real food security challenges in remote areas. However, these have not built up to the sense of frustration associated with food riots or community violence. Navigating the possible linkages between climate, food (in)security, and conflict requires debunking common myths and identifying unresolved research puzzles in Bangladesh’s context. These myths promote the oversimplification of complex issues and may lead to misinformed policies and actions. Future research needs to be focused on understanding how climate factors interact with local economic, political, and social dynamics, including governance mechanisms, religious and ethnic tensions, economic inequality, grievances, and political exclusion.

Drawing on an analysis of the implementation of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in the Somali periphery, we consider how the programme is promoted as an ‘innovative’ social protection programme that links food security with development projects. Underpinning its ‘innovative’ role is a community-based approach, focusing upon the institutions, values and capacities of a community. Taking the case of the nomadic pastoralists in Ethiopia’s Somali region, we consider the role of clans as the ‘dominant’ grassroot socio-political organizations. Our analysis, drawing on ethnographic fieldwork shows how in the implementation of PSNP the mobilization and (re)deployment of clanship values and rules create legible and governable Somali pastoral subjects. This is in line with the Ethiopian state’s conception of ‘improvement’ and ‘modern’ way of life based on sedentary-based development and governance. We illustrate how clan leaders unwittingly (re)organize their clan (leadership) values and capacities to support this project. We argue that clan-based implementation of PSNP has become an ‘effective’ mechanism of extending state power and governing nomadic pastoralists, leading to changes in relations of authority and in forms of (inter)subjectivity between pastoralists, their clan (leaders) and the state. Towards this end, we put forward the concept of ‘government through clanship’ to reflect the assemblage of these practices, processes and changes which would offer critical analytical insights into social policies claimed to be community-based.

Change is of all times, but it would appear that in the drylands of Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia/Inner Asia it is happening in an overwhelming manner. Climate change, growing political instability, and increasing enclosures of large expanses of land are some of the changes with far-reaching consequences for those who make their living in the drylands. This edited volume is about the changes that arise from the entanglement of global interests and narratives with the local struggles that have always existed in the drylands. In this chapter, the notion of ‘frontier’ is proposed as a metaphor to frame this entanglement and as a way to bring the different chapters in the volume together. Overviews of the chapters show that to understand the full politics of frontier processes, analytical approaches are necessary that take into account historical institutional changes and different forms of power relations.

Redressing land dispossession in the aftermath of violent conflicts is daunting and complex. While land dispute resolution and restitution are expected to promote return migration, this outcome is contingent upon the changing social, economic and political conditions under which return takes place. Drawing on qualitative data from Makamba Province in southern Burundi, this case study highlights the politically and historically shaped challenges underlying the resolution of competing and overlapping claims on land following protracted displacement. These include the undocumented and fluid nature of customary land rights, institutional and legal pluralism and shifting land governance relations. This paper emphasises the centrality of the state in regulating returnees’ land dispute resolution and restitution processes. Violent conflicts and forced migration have enabled the state to expand its control over customary land tenure. The gradual exclusion or replacement of local authorities has shaped a competitive structure of jurisdictions and confused authority over land. National land restitution commissions have been used by the central government to shape land tenure and state–citizen relations and to exert pressure on land tenure institutions. Addressing competing claims on land following armed conflicts may fail if attendant struggles over public authority and changing political dynamics are insufficiently considered.

This paper explores how the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), as an example of contemporary bottom-up development practices in the global South, governs nomadic pastoralists in the peripheries. Based on fieldwork in Ethiopia's Somali region, we show that PSNP practices of client targeting, community-based public works and (international) financial resource flows, both for their own sake and because of their entanglement with the sedentary metaphysics of Ethiopian state, have advanced sedentary governmental order into pastoral peripheries more than top-down state sedentarization interventions had ever done. Finally, we argue that bottom-up development practice is an effective tool for state-building in the periphery.

Drylands are characterized by high rainfall variability, both in time and space. Long dry seasons, large fluctuations in annual rainfall, and intra-seasonal and localized droughts result in even more extreme fluctuations in resource availability. Typically, dryland inhabitants respond using a range of strategies, including investments in land but also extensive mobile use of natural resources such as nomadic pastoralism. This flexible use of natural resources is also reflected in the flexible set-up of natural resource governance regimes. Yet these flexible regimes increasingly run counter to formal systems of land tenure and land allocation and are affected by increasing climate variability and progressive climate change. In this chapter, an overview will be provided of the main issues at the intersection between climate variability and resource governance regimes and the linkages with present-day climate change.

Over the past decades, extremist violence and jihadism/religious movements have become an important factor in the political and economic developments of drylands. This evolution has been attributed to a variety of underlying dynamics that are typical for drylands, including increasing scarcity of land and water due to climate change; a growing population; the poor performance and authoritarian character of states; increasing displacements and resettlements related to large-scale investments; and progressive marginalization and exclusion of specific social groups. In addition, increasing levels of conflict between population groups have provided a fertile ground for recruitment by armed groups for self-defence and religious purposes, often along ethnic lines, and also to secure access to natural resources. The chapter discusses the backgrounds of these movements and shows how a jihadist movement in the Sahel transformed from a terrorist movement into a rural insurgency.