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Comprehending action language recruits the action system.To what extent do action simulations reflect the fine-grainedparameters of real world action? We investigate whetheraction simulations are sensitive to speed of an action. In twoexperiments participants completed a motor task where theymoved slowly or quickly, followed by a sentence sensibilitytask. We found an overall action effect for sentencesdescribing hand actions: moving slowly increased accuracy(Exp.1) and reduced response time (Exp. 2). For sentencesdescribing full-body actions, responses were more accuratewhen movement speed matched the speed implied in thesentence, in Experiment 1 only. This study demonstratesonline action simulation and provides evidence that speed ofaction can be simulated during sentence comprehension.

There is considerable evidence that language comprehenders derive lexical-semantic meaning by mentally simulating perceptual and motor attributes of described events. However, the nature of these simulations--including the level of detail that is incorporated and contexts under which simulations occur--is not well understood. Here, we examine the effects of first- versus third-person perspective on mental simulations during sentence comprehension. First-person sentences describing physical transfer towards or away from the body (e.g., "You threw the microphone," "You caught the microphone") modulated response latencies when responses were made along a front-back axis, consistent with the action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE). This effect was not observed for third-person sentences ("He threw the microphone," "He caught the microphone"). The ACE was observed when making responses along a left-right axis for third-person, but not first-person sentences. Abstract sentences (e.g., "He heard the message") did not show an ACE along either axis. These results show that perspective is a detail that is simulated during action sentence comprehension, and that motoric activations are flexible and affected by the pronominal perspective used in the sentence.

Given the distributed representation of visual features in the human brain, binding mechanisms are necessary to integrate visual information about the same perceptual event. It has been assumed that feature codes are bound into object files--pointers to the neural codes of the features of a given event. The present study investigated the perceptual criteria underlying integration into an object file. Previous studies confounded the sharing of spatial location with belongingness to the same perceptual object, 2 factors we tried to disentangle. Our findings suggest that orientation and color features appearing in a task-irrelevant preview display were integrated irrespective of whether they appeared as part of the same object or of different objects (e.g., 1 stationary and the other moving continuously, or a banana in a particular orientation overlaying an apple of a particular color). In contrast, integration was markedly reduced when the 2 objects were separated in space. Taken together, these findings suggest that spatial overlap of visual features is a sufficient criterion for integrating them into the same object file. (Contains 1 footnote, 1 table, and 3 figures.)

The embodied view of language comprehension proposes that the meaning of words is grounded in perception and action rather than represented in abstract amodal symbols. Support for embodied theories of language processing comes from behavioral studies showing that understanding a sentence about an action can modulate congruent and incongruent physical responses, suggesting motor involvement during comprehension of sentences referring to bodily movement. Additionally, several neuroimaging studies have provided evidence that comprehending single words denoting manipulable objects elicits specific responses in the neural motor system. An interesting question that remains is whether action semantic knowledge is directly activated as motor simulations in the brain, or rather modulated by the semantic context in which action words are encountered. In the current paper we investigated the nature of conceptual representations using a go/no-go lexical decision task. Specifically, target words were either presented in a semantic context that emphasized dominant action features (features related to the functional use of an object) or non-dominant action features. The response latencies in a lexical decision task reveal that participants were faster to respond to words denoting objects for which the functional use was congruent with the prepared movement. This facilitation effect, however, was only apparent when the semantic context emphasized corresponding motor properties. These findings suggest that conceptual processing is a context-dependent process that incorporates motor-related knowledge in a flexible manner.