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Collusion theory robustly predicts non-cartel rivals to raise their price and increase their output. As the typical cartel cuts back production, its competitors are expected to gain market share during the collusive period and to lose market share inthe period following the cartel's demise. We provide empirical support for this prediction by showing that it applied to the European truck cartel. We also illustrate how our analysis can be used in the prosecution stage. One truck manufacturerdenied cartel participation, whereas the proposed market share test supports the European Commission's finding that this firm was, in fact, a member.

Magistrska naloga se osredotoča na problem zasebnopravnega uveljavljanja pravil konkurenčnega prava kot pomembno dopolnitev javnopravnemu uveljavljanju, ki poteka preko organov za varstvo konkurence. Glavni namen zasebnopravnega uveljavljanja konkurence je predvsem, da se vsem oškodovanim zaradi kršitve konkurenčnih pravil povrne škoda in da se kršiteljem prepreči nedovoljeno ravnanje. V ZDA je takšen način uveljavljanja pravic zasebnikov že precej razvit, medtem ko se je v EU na podlagi aktivnosti Evropske komisije in sodne prakse Sodišča EU začel razvijati šele v zadnjih nekaj letih. K razvoju zasebnopravnega uveljavljanja pravil konkurenčnega prava je dosti pripomogla Evropska komisija, ki je sprejela kar nekaj aktov s tega področja. Kot prvo lahko omenimo Uredbo 1/2003, s katero je prišlo do reforme konkurenčnega prava, katere najpomembnejši doprinos je decentralizacija pristojnosti za presojo protikonkurenčnih dejanj ter neposredna uporaba takrat veljavnega člena 81(3) PES. Sledili sta Zelena in Bela knjiga o odškodninskih tožbah zaradi kršitev protimonopolnih pravil ES, sprejeti leta 2005 in 2008. Njun namen je bil spodbuditi odškodninske tožbe za škodo, ki je bila povzročena s kršitvijo konkurenčnih pravil. S podobnim ciljem je bila leta 2014 sprejeta tudi Direktiva 2014/10/EU. Magistrska naloga analizira številna vprašanja na področju zasebnopravnega uveljavljanja pravil konkurenčnega prava, poudarek pa je na razvoju teorije zaščitne cene oziroma teorije učinka dežnika v EU, ki se je prvič pojavila v sodni odločbi Sodišča EU leta 2014 v zadevi Kone AG in drugi. V okviru teorije zaščitne cene magistrska naloga izpostavlja naslednja vprašanja: ali je Sodišče EU z odločitvijo v zadevi Kone AG in drugi, kjer je priznalo teorijo zaščitne cene, spodbudilo zasebnopravno uveljavljanje pravil konkurence, ali za odškodninsko odgovornost članov kartela zadošča že posredna vzročna zveza med nedovoljenim delovanjem in nastalo škodo, ali je vključitev teorije zaščitne cene oziroma učinka dežnika v civilno odgovornost udeležencev kartela v skladu s funkcijo odškodnine, ali se teorija zaščitne cene lahko pojavi tako v primeru kršitve člena 101 PDEU kot tudi kršitve člena 102 PDEU in ali bi morala teorijo zaščitne cene upoštevati tudi nacionalna sodišča pri odločanju v nacionalnih zadevah, ki nimajo vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami in druga. Problemi zasebnopravnega uveljavljanja pravil konkurenčnega prava v EU so z namenom primerjave dopolnjeni s sodno prakso sodišč ZDA na področju uveljavljanja odškodnin, ugotovitvami v zvezi z razvojem teorije zaščitne cene v ZDA in perspektivo njenega nadaljnjega razvoja na obeh kontinentih, tako v ZDA kot tudi v EU. The MA thesis focuses on the question of private enforcement of competition law. Private enforcement is an important addition to public enforcement, provided by national competition authorities. The main purpose of private enforcement of competition rules is foremostly to compensate all the parties injured from the violation of competition law and to prevent the violators from acting in an impermissible manner. In the USA, such an enforcement of the rights of individuals is already established well, while in the EU on the basis of the European Commission activities and case law, it has started to develop only in recent years. The European Commission has strongly contributed to the development of private enforcement of the competition law by adopting quite a few acts on the topic. Firstly, we can mention the Regulation 1/2003, with which the competition law reform occurred. Its most important contribution lies in decentralisation of jurisdiction for the assessment of anti-competition conduct, as well as the direct use of then valid article 81(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. This was followed by Green and White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, adopted in 2005 and 2008. Their purpose was to encourage compensation lawsuits for the damages that occurred with the violation of the competition rules. The Directive 2014/10/EU was adopted in 2014 and it had a similar goal. The MA analyzes numerous questions of private enforcement of competition law and stresses the development of umbrella pricing in the EU, which for the first time appeared in the ECJ decision in case Kone AG and others in 2014. Furthermore it focuses on the next questions: has the ECJ with its decision in case Kone AG and others, giving the recognition to umbrella pricing theory, strengthened private enforcement of competition rules, does the indirect causal link between the impermissible activity and the occurred damage suffices the existence of civil liability of the cartel members, is recognizing the umbrella pricing theory in civil liability of the cartel members consistent with the function of compensation, can umbrella pricing occur in the breach of the article 102 TFEU as well as in the breach of the article 102 TFEU, should national courts use the umbrella pricing theory also in national cases that don’t affect the trade between the member states and other questions. For the purpose of comparison, the open questions of private inforcement of competition law in the EU are supplemented by a case law of USA courts, dealing with compensation, with findings concerning the development of umbrella pricing in the USA and with a perspective on its further development on both continents, in the USA and in the EU.

Although the pricing dynamics of hardcore cartels have been studied intensively from a theoretical perspective, empirical evidence is still rare. We combine publicly available data with a unique private data set of about 340,000 market transactions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the pricing dynamics during and after the breakdown of a German cement cartel. We find that, first, after the breakdown of the cartel, cartel members reduce net prices to a far larger extent than gross prices and that, second, noncartel members slip under the price umbrella of the cartel to increase profits. Our results have important implications for both the design of screening tools to detect cartels as part of public enforcement and the calculation of damages as part of private enforcement of competition law.