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In the 21st century, the Arctic has rapidly been transforming from a ‘zone of peace and cooperation’ into an arena of interstate rivalry, where the Russia– NATO confrontation is currently playing a pivotal role. These developments determine the growing interest of both the Russian and foreign academic and expert communities in the problems and prospects for regional security. This paper examines the dynamics of military-political situation in the Arctic within the framework of evolution of the Russia–NATO relations. The first section outlines the key military and political security developments in the Arctic before the Ukrainian crisis. The author emphasizes that already at this stage NATO clearly manifested its desire to limit the Russian presence in the region. In the second section the author offers an original periodization of the Russia–NATO relations in the Arctic after 2014 and in so doing identifies three stages. They are all marked by a gradual yet steady escalation of international tension, manifested in the active efforts undertaken by the NATO member states to remilitarize the region and cultivate a narrative about the Russian threat. This course has been reflected in a whole series of alliance’s military exercises, which, as shown in the article, are becoming increasingly extensive and regular year by year. The author concludes that the Ukrainian crisis has only laid bare the true aspirations of the NATO countries seeking to contain Russia in the Far North and refusing to consider its interests and build a constructive dialogue in the field of military and political security. According to the researcher, this circumstance prevents the normalization of relations between Russia and NATO countries in the years to come.

This study examines the effects of sanctions implemented by the European Union and the United States of America against the Russian Federation following the latter's annexation of the Crimea Peninsula and invasion of Eastern Ukraine. The analysis focuses on indirect or spillover effects caused by EU and US sanctions on several macroeconomic variables of the Russian economy. Employing a structural vector autoregressive model, the study uses time-varying sanction indices to simulate sanctions, substituting for binary dummy variables traditionally employed in modelling sanction's implementation. The findings reveal that sanctions have an indirect impact on Russia's GDP through their direct effects on inflation, interest rate, and domestic currency – a notion introduced as "sanction transmission mechanism". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores and evaluates the dangers, advantages, opportunities, and risks for the Serbian economy stemming from its neutral stance in the Ukrainian crisis. Methods employed include content analysis of documents and official announcements, statistical description, analysis, and comparison of data. The research revealed an anticipated uptick in Serbia's trade with Russia, attributed to its lower energy prices. This led to increased production in various sectors, such as machinery, motor vehicles, and the electrical industry. Contrary to expectations, trade with the EU not only increased but also improved structurally, particularly in higher-value goods exports. Recommendations advocate for internal resource investment in EU-threatened industrial sectors, specifically in bolstering production of products witnessing export growth.

With the continuous escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, many European countries have imposed sanctions on Russia, only Serbia has become the "European island" in the wave of anti-Russia. As a candidate country that has been seeking formal accession to the EU, its position of supporting Russia is worth further investigation. At the same time, there is tension be‐ tween the explanation provided by the mainstream rational choice theory and the reality of the event. The group emotion theory provides a more appropriate analytical framework. Specifically, the political basic sentiment in Serbia shapes the basic direction of its preference for the Ukrainian crisis. The political immediate sentiment mobilized by the Vucic government further deepens the pro-Russian complex of its domestic people. And the contrast between Russia and the European and American emotional evaluation methods of Serbia leads to Serbia's official preference for the Ukrainian crisis supporting the EU verbally, but actually leaning more towards Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the growing interest that scholars have paid to animosity in tourism settings, pertinent research draws mostly from tourist perspectives to examine the effects of animosity on travel-related decision-making. The aim of this study is to explore the animosity perceptions of residents against Russian tourists who, following the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the sanctions imposed on Russia, are likely to experience intense animosity when traveling abroad. The study draws from interviews with residents based in Cyprus, a well-known island destination in the Mediterranean that is popular among Russian tourists. The study concludes that animosity within tourism settings represents a complex construct as it evolves and manifests varyingly, depending on multiple factors including media representations, passage of time from occurrence of event, previously held attitudes toward tourists, political or cultural affinity and subjective norms. The study offers a classification of resident animosity/affinity which provides theoretical and practical insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study has tried to answer the question of what effect the components of strategic culture have on the behavior patterns of Russian statesmen with a qualitative method and a descriptiveanalytical approach. And the American in response to the crisis in Ukraine 2022? The hypothesis raised in front of the mentioned question points out that the conflict between the two countries in the Ukrainian scene can be considered strongly influenced by the cultural, value, geopolitical and historical foundations of the two countries, and based on this, war, resort to force, deterrence and strategy Meaning has been found. The findings of the research indicate that in the Ukraine crisis, the dream of great power and the return to the glory of the empire, geopolitical issues, negative attitude towards the intentions of rival activists, traditions related to the Orthodox Church and Russian nationalism, in contrast to the belief in the absolute power of the United States in the field of politics and International relations, and the continuation of the war until the unconditional surrender of the enemy have been placed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides a general evaluation of the Russian direction of Japan’s foreign policy as of late 2023 and analyzes the factors that determine its contents. It considers the speeches of the Prime Minister of Japan, the sections of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s publications which focus on Russia-Japan relations, analyzes the state of economic ties given the sanctions imposed by Japan on Russia, and studies the place of Russia in Japan’s National Security Strategy, adopted in late 2022. The author comes to the conclusion that, despite the obvious influence of the U.S. on the Japanese position regarding Russia, one can hardly speak of Washington bluntly imposing its views on Tokyo. Rather, we find an already established consensus regarding this issue between Japan and the U.S. Meanwhile, the “foreign pressure” is not limited to interaction with the United States, as cooperation with multilateral formats of the “collective West” starts to play an increasingly important role for Japan. From the point of view of domestic politics, the situation also facilitates the continuation of Tokyo’s anti -Russian course, as, within the country, those expressing alternative points of view are de-facto subject to ostracism and “cancelling.” But, even given all these negative factors, one can still glimpse some signs of pragmatism in the Russian direction of Japan’s foreign policy. This lets one hope that, should the Ukrainian crisis be resolved, the Japanese leadership will not put obstacles in the way of normalization of Russia-Japan relations.

The Western Balkans has been and remains a particularly dense zone in terms of the number of actors present, where the interests of all the leading actors in world politics are bizarrely intertwined. The Ukrainian crisis has added spice to the Balkan agenda, reviving “frozen conflicts” not only within the borders of the region but also beyond its perimeter. Directly dependent on the outcome of the armed confrontation in Ukraine and separately from it, a clash or, at least, an intensification of external actors in the Balkan direction seems inevitable. The historical-systemic approach used in the study and the paradigm of multipolarity made it possible to trace the probable directions of activity of both regional and external actors. Based on a wide range of sources, the work provides a panorama of the foreign policy positioning of regional capitals; identifies major and minor external actors; shows the transformation of approaches and practical steps of key actors through the prism of the ongoing crisis. External actors - the European Union (EU), China, Great Britain, Russia and the United States - are divided into groups in accordance with their positions regarding the pre-crisis Balkans and the Balkans in the face of the fierce confrontation between Russia and the West. Among Western interests, special attention is paid to Great Britain, whose activity in the Western Balkans after Brexit is affiliated with the West in general, but not with the United States (despite all the history of strategic partnership in the region) and, moreover, with the EU separately. Against the background of the dominance of Western institutions in the region, the paper traces, however, the growing role of China, as well as external actors of the “second plan” with an oriental flavor: Türkiye, Iran, and the states of the Persian Gulf. An analysis of Russia’s prospects in the region has shown that the crisis in the system of international relations has largely nullified the results achieved earlier. The degree of Russia’s involvement in the crisis raises the question of its resource capacity, the ability to further maintain its own positions. Additional difficulties will be associated with the consolidated efforts of the Western allies and other external actors, including China, to balance Russian influence and presence in the Western Balkans.

TV channels of each country usually report international news differently according to the citizen’s interests and foreign policy priorities of said country. Thus, foreign policy conflicts can be covered in multiple ways, this fact obviously does not contribute to their resolution. Research focuses on the coverage of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation by the state-owned channels of these countries in 2014-2016. The samples include all news related to Ukraine on the Russian TV channel (Russia 1) and Russia on the Ukrainian channel (UA First) during seven weeks when the selected key events occurred. Quantitative and qualitative analyses were used. All news items were classified into four categories: political news, military news, economic news, social news. The considerable influence of national interest on media frames were shown. Russian and Ukrainian journalists were similarly interested in each other's events, even if the news of the moment was not directly related to the conflict. Both TV channels covered important global news, however they often selected different events which would be interesting for their national audience or related to their country's foreign policy. The both channels had been gradually losing interest in Russian-Ukrainian crisis up to 2015.

Relations between the EU and the Russian Federation have traditionally been characterised by a dichotomy of cooperation and political conflict. The history of the complex relationship between two actors is a result of the joint action of numerous factors in the context of complex political, economic, and security interactions. The paper analyses the future of relations between the EU and Russia through the prism of the Ukrainian crisis and ongoing military conflict based on the assumptions of the neoclassical realism theory. Starting from the thesis that the war in Ukraine has additionally sharpened complicated relations between the EU and Russia, exposing controversial issues presented in various aspects of mutual relations, the paper analyses the possibilities for a reset of relations between two powers, examining preconditions for a possible meaningful existence in the upcoming time. The conclusion is that the critical strategic assessment and shared responsibility of both conflicted actors, in this case the EU and Russia, represent the initial basis for potential less confrontational relations in the foreseeable future. At this demanding international moment, finding preconditions for a sustainable modus vivendi between the EU and Russia has to be a priority and probably the only realistic scenario for sustainable coexistence in the future.

The Ukrainian crisis has reverberated throughout the troubled region of the Balkans in Southern Europe, exposing deep-seated cracks and fractures that have long characterized this geopolitical area. The crisis has not only highlighted divisions between local states but also between communities and ethno-religious groups. In many cases, these intraregional contradictions are exacerbated by external actors and their demands. This article examines the foreign policy priorities and orientations of Western Balkan capitals within the "five plus one" format states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and the partially recognized "Republic of Kosovo") in light of the crisis in Ukraine, illustrating the interplay between regional dynamics and international crises.Drawing on a wide range of sources, including official documents and opinion polls on foreign policy, this paper identifies regional discrepancies in the perception and assessment of the ongoing Ukrainian conflict. The study employs a historical-systemic approach and neorealism principles to discern potential directions for political institutions in the external context. The analysis reveals that a fragile "balance of threats" persists in the region, heavily influenced by the goals and interests of external actors such as the EU, NATO, the United States, Russia, and to a lesser extent, China and Turkey.The military and political disengagement observed in 2022 mirrors the alignment of local players witnessed in 2014, but with a significant difference: the West now expects all participants in the "five plus one" format to fully adhere to their joint foreign policy, including implementing restrictive measures against the Russian Federation. This presents a challenging dilemma for Belgrade and Banja Luka, as they cannot overlook the widespread support for Russia's actions among the Serbian population. Any anti-Russian steps taken by local authorities may lead to serious internal political conflicts in both Serbia and Republika Srpska, with far-reaching implications for regional stability.

Sentiment analysis has gained attention in computational linguistics, where algorithms are dedicated to recognizing sentiments to take better decisions in each context. However, this is difficult to achieve in social networks due to linguistic features. A text classification model of combined lexical-based and machine-learning techniques is presented in this paper; it uses discourse structure including its relations to improve sentiment analysis. The model aims at extracting information about opinion polarity posted by users; then modelling users' usual polarity to detect significant polarity. The model extracts posted texts on Facebook, then it classifies them according to their polarity, which shows the detection of polarity. It provides interesting results using Ukraine crisis argued by Jordanian news followers. Obtained results show a high accuracy (94.68%). It is useful to have information about users' sentiments. It may serve feedback for politicians and jurists, where direct contact with war victims is extremely difficult. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study assesses the dynamic interconnectedness and transference of effects among burgeoning stock exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa and between African and developed markets following the Ukrainian crisis in February 2022. In addition, the paper presents a comparative analysis of return and volatility during three distinct subperiods. These are the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and the ongoing Ukrainian conflict. This paper conducts research using the Bai-Perron test for multiple structural breaks and the spillover index of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), alongside the innovation accounting analysis test. The findings of this paper indicate that the resilience and isolation of stock markets in Africa to external financial shocks (volatility shock) have been weakened in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic as compared to the GFC sub-period. The results affirm that stock markets on the African continent have become more sensitive to structural changes and shocks in developed countries. This study has significant implications for investors and policymakers in Africa. Future investors need to genuinely diversify their investment portfolios to minimize future losses generated by shock transmission among markets. Policymakers might have to introduce fully fledged policies to diversify their economies and attract international investments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research aims to assess the most significant and potentially lasting effects of the Ukrainian crisis on the structure, volume, and directions of Western Balkans international trade. The analysis refers only to trade with Russia and the European Union (EU) as the only trade directions sensitive to disruptions due to the Ukrainian crisis. The research questions are: 1. What are the effects of the Ukrainian crisis on the trade of the Western Balkan (WB) countries with Russia? and 2. Which industries in the WB are at risk of weakening, and which have a chance to develop and increase exports due to disturbances in the EU economies? To prove the hypotheses, an analysis of statistical data on changes in trade in key commodities (index of change) in the most important export products for each WB country was used, as well as an analysis of static data on energy prices, producer prices in the EU, and other data. The results showed that the trade of all WBs except Serbia with Russia declined during 2022. This is a long-term problem for the trade of only a few economic sectors, such as the export of pharmaceutical products from Bosnia & Herzegovina (B&H), stone from Montenegro, and wheat from Albania. In contrast, trade with the EU is changing significantly, as this crucial partner is undergoing a process of accelerated deindustrialisation. The effects of these changes are mixed. Smaller advantages for Serbia, B&H, and North Macedonia in a few sectors may arise from taking over abandoned production in the EU. Whether or not the EU industry’s decline continues at its current rate, these minor advantages may be permanent. But if the shutdown of production extends to the higher industrial sectors, this will directly affect a considerable part of the industrial exports of the WB countries, especially Serbia.

The Ukrainian crisis has repercussions not only on Russia and Ukraine, but also on all countries of the world, including the Middle East region, especially with respent of energy and food security, and this is what prompted the Arab countries to adapt to these repercussions through initiatives based on strengthening regional Arab security, or by reformulating regional security according to a new approach that governs partnership with major powers, whether security or economic. However, the rapid developments in the Russian-Ukrainian crisis prompted these countries to develop future visions to readapt with the international transformations that tend towards a multilateral system, to confront the current security threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The foreign policy of the great powers due to the Arab revolutions and the recent upheavals in the Middle East seems to display an 'American retreat' and a 'Russian comeback.' In this context, the countries of the MENA region want to build their relations with new partners and not only with the United States. Egypt, which historically was an ally of the Soviet Union (today Russian Federation), and then of the United States, has kept a neutrality on the Ukrainian conflict for several reasons. My research work aims to provide a political and economic analysis in view of the strategic choices that Cairo has made. For several years, the land of the Pharaohs has been trying to balance its relations with Western countries and also those at the regional level and has become an essential mediator, such as in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In terms of its food security, the country is dependent on Russian wheat (50%) as well as Ukrainian wheat (30%). The tourism sector, which is one of the country's four main sources of income, is also a major issue for the government: Ukrainian and Russian tourists flock to the country in large numbers every year. On the commercial level, Russia is seeking to further develop its economic relations with Egypt. This is illustrated by the USD 20 billion project to build the first nuclear power plant in Egypt, in Dabaa, by the Russian state-owned company Rosatom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction. The choice of Korea and Türkiye to analyze the behavior model within the framework of the changing international order is primarily due to such facts as maintaining close ties with Washington since their formation and their reference to each other as “brothers in blood”. Nevertheless, the historical paradigm of building the foreign policies has shown that there are some common directions that should be marked as “brotherhood in spirit”. The comparative analysis given in the article identifies the modern behavioral models of “the land of morning calm” and the Republic of Türkiye towards a changing geopolitical reality. The purpose of the study is to analyze the common points of intersection in the political processes of the two republics from the moment of their formation to the present days, also to identify the role of the “middle powers” during the Ukrainian crisis. Materials and Methods. The methods of induction and deduction, the method of content analysis, the method of comparison and analysis, and the statistical method as well as the civilizational approach were used in the research process. Due to the methods used, the authors of the article have managed to conduct a comparative analysis in these planes. The information base was made up of materials presented in news sources, statistical materials of international organizations, publications of scientists and experts. Results. A comprehensive country comparative analysis of states’ foreign policy trends in the XX and XXI centuries has been carried out, as well as their interaction with the “West” and the “westernization” of their course at the present stage – “brotherhood in spirit”. Also, the researchers have carried out main conclusions on their role of middle powers and regional actors due to the ongoing tectonic shifts in the international paradigm. Discussion and Сonclusion. Analyzing their “brotherhood in spirit” during the Ukrainian events, it is noted that Türkiye, in comparison with Korea, pursues a more independent course from the West, taking into account its own interests, while both are characterized by a “two-track” policy. Both states are taking a wait-and-see position in the conditions of the emerging political conjuncture of global interaction. The practical significance of the work is the analysis of the behavior of two countries – Korea and Türkiye – as “middle powers” in a changing world order. The obtained results can contribute to further study the role of this type of state in the “West–non-West” relationship.

The main aim of this study is to measure the dynamic connectedness and spillover effects among emerging stock markets in Asia and the developed stock markets of the US and Europe in the ongoing Ukrainian crisis. The paper also aims to provide a comparative analysis of return and volatility spillovers during the global financial crisis in 2008, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Ukrainian crisis. This paper utilizes the multiple structural beak test of Bai & Perron (2003) and also depicts the risk and return transmissions among these markets using the Diebold & Yilmaz (2012) method. The main outcomes of this study indicate that the stock markets in Asia are less affected by the political crisis in Ukraine as compared to the previous effects during the GFC and COVID-19 periods. The results also show that sensitivity of Asian financial markets to global shocks has been weakened in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis in favour of increased resilience of Asian stock indices to external shocks. These results carry an important implication for international and local investors as well as for policy makers in Asia, where investors have greater potentials for portfolio diversify and risk reduction across Asian markets. Doi: 10.28991/ESJ-2023-07-02-04 Full Text: PDF

The purpose of the article is to establish changes in the degree of integration of Russian society under the influence of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013–2022, to argue proposals for improving the effectiveness of the identity policy of the Russian Federation. The topic was considered at the federal and macro-regional (South of Russia) levels. The research methodology is social constructivism in terms of the spheres of national identity and interethnic relations. Methods of analysis — questionnaire survey, secondary analysis of the results of sociological surveys. The results of the study substantiate a new understanding of the socio-cultural integration of a multi-ethnic society. Changes in the perceptions of Russians during 2000–2021 about the goals of social development and basic values, about the relationship between the state and society, about the desirable goals of the state policy of identity are revealed. These changes are developing in the direction of conservative values, recognition of the independence of Russian society from the West, but paradoxically combined with the preservation of a number of liberal values and orientations. Differences in the state of identity between the age and territorial groups of Russian society are established. In this context, the ideas of the residents of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as the Republics of Donbass about their identity are important, confirming the increased conservatism and Russiancentricity in comparison with the metropolitan megacities of Russia. Ukraine as such is on the periphery of the geopolitical picture of the world of Russians, at the same time, it acts as a contrasting “Other” — a negative example of the consequences of choosing the Western path of development. The 2022 special military operation became a catalyst for value changes that have been brewing in Russia for a long period. Russian Identity Politics Influenced by the Ukrainian Crisis of 2013–2022 becomes more than before, aimed at the formation of the Russian multiethnic nation, the strengthening and integration of the state, the education of a positive perception of history. At the same time, these changes are not sufficiently fixed in the educational, symbolic and informational policy of the Russian Federation, new trends contradict the former course towards the socio-cultural integration of Russia into the globalized world through westernization. The author argues proposals for reforming the state identity policy of the Russian Federation.

The Ukrainian crisis, which came into its active phase in February 2022, led to the collapse of Russia’s relations with many countries, and Japan was no exception. The Japanese government expressed strong criticism of Russia’s actions and joined the anti-Russian sanctions with, probably, most vigor, compared to any other Asian nation. This makes the question about the reasons for such course pursued by Tokyo vis-à-vis Russia a particularly timely one. In Russia, there is a widespread opinion that such position held by Tokyo is caused mostly by pressure from the United States. Yet such view seems to be a gross simplification. This article attempts to analyze the positions of various participants of the Japanese foreign policy making process about the events unfolding in Ukraine. It shows that, even though all key parties, irrespective of their political orientation, take a critical stance towards the actions of the Russian Federation, their statements show some nuances reflecting their ideological priorities. For example, the ruling LDP emphasizes solidarity with the US; its junior coalition partner, Komeito, stresses humanitarian aspects and the role of the UN; the Japan Innovation Party criticizes the government for indecisiveness and calls for more active military policy, while the left-wing populist Reiwa Shinsengumi even refused to support the relevant Diet resolution to demonstrate its principled stance to the voters. There are indeed opinions which can arguably be called apologetic towards Russia. However, those holding such opinions are but a minority and are hardly able to alter the position of the government or the Japanese public as a whole. There is a virtual consensus about the issue, and nuances in the positions of major political forces are inconsequential. One would be justified to assume that, under any probable domestic political situation, Tokyo will not change its policy about the matter.

The article analyzes the driving forces behind Russian-Italian relations, which have traditionally been a model of pragmatic cooperation and mutually respectful dialogue. The purpose of the work is to identify indicators in order to explain and predict the successes and failures of interaction at critical moments of crises in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The author proposes a system of 4 coordinate axes: 1) political continuity – personality factor; 2) similarities – divergences of priorities and foreign policy instruments; 3) presence – absence of common institutions; 4) strong – weak pressure of the international environment. Their influence on Russian-Italian relations is reviewed on the example of four cases: the Kosovo crisis (1999), the Transcaucasus crisis (2008) and two Ukrainian crises (2014 and 2022). Regarding the current situation, the article states that personality factor acquired a positive value after the elections in Italy in September 2022, but all the others have negative values (priorities and foreign policy instruments are different; common institutions are virtually non-existent; international pressure is very strong) and will remain so at least until the end of the hot phase of the conflict. This paper offers a theoretical basis for the analysis of Russian-Italian relations. It may prove useful for a deeper understanding of international developments, given the high degree of uncertainty and the de facto breakdown of the pre-existing system of relations between Russia and the European countries. The work also provides a basis for similar research on other European countries in order to conduct a comparative analysis for a more comprehensive understanding of the principles of Russian-European relations.

On March 30, 2022, Professor Tōgō Kazuhiko gave an interview in Tokyo. Professor is known as an expert on Russia and Europe, the author of many books, among which are The Inside Story of the Negotiations on the Northern Territories: Five Lost Windows of Opportunity [Tōgō, 2010], Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945– 2009: The Quest for a Proactive Policy [Tōgō, 2011]. Professor Tōgō shared his opinion on current complicated issues, including Japan’s relations with the US, Europe, and China, the Russia-Ukraine crisis, conflict between Russia and the West, as well as his view of the Western values and Japan’s position in the world.

Ukraine is the terrain for a new geopolitical game and China's position is ambiguous. The article aims to analyse how Beijing places itself in the Ukrainian crisis, considering the BRI, the relations with the European Union and the new Global Security Initiative announced in April. The analysis is based on scientific literature, recent articles and publication, and official documents, both in English and Chinese. The main findings show that China is engaged in a balancing act between Russia and the West, in an apparent neutral stance, that seeks to maximise Chinese gains on the long run.

The article touches the development of the French energy policy in 2017–2022 under the presidency of Emmanuel Macron. The author analyzed the dynamics of the energy mix change during 2017–2021 period in the context of the Energy transition act of 2015 and the plans of the French authorities concerning the management of five main types of the energy sources (atomic power stations, oil, gas, RES and coal). The paper highlights the tasks of E. Macron in this field and main steps of his administration to achieve them, structured into three stages – the first, relatively calm one – the beginning of Macron’s presidential term (2017–2019), the second – the COVID-19 pandmic (2020–2021) and the third – an escalation of the Ukrainian crisis (2022) in the time of Macron’s re-election for a second presidential term. It is shown that the French authorities had to adjust their original plans under the influence of a number of events, especially in the second and third stages. The article concludes that the majority of Macron's election promises in the energy sector were not fulfilled, but French authorities made a number of significant steps aimed at further adjustments to the French energy mix announced by Macron in 2017.

The current energy crisis, COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine have been negatively affecting several channels, including energy, trade and the financial sector. As banks play the main role in all real sector business activities, it is of great importance to examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis on bank performances. Currently, banks are showing weaker profitability after the strong recovery in 2021, while the world is facing the impact of the war on energy prices, inflation and growth, which reinforces the existing vulnerabilities. This article assesses the impact of the current crisis on the financial performance of the banking sector in the Western Balkans. Our study shows that the energy and COVID-19 crisis have had a detrimental effect on the financial performance of banks in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the Ukraine crisis will prolong and extend these negative effects on the financial stability and liquidity of the banking sector in Western Balkans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is devoted to the identification of push and pull factors of immigration of Russian citizens to Armenia in the context of the projections of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the Armenian society. Secondary analysis of statistical data and the sociological surveys, as well as the results of in-depth interviews, made it possible to identify the political, social and economic push factors that determine emigration from Russia (sanctions applied against Russia, partial military mobilization, worsening of economic situation, restrictions on freedom of speech and the risk of persecution); pull factors that attract and retain relocants specifically to Armenia (Armenia’s liberal migration policy towards Russian citizens, favorable conditions for foreigners to do business in Armenia, the availability of financial and banking services for Russians, relatively affordable prices for housing, goods and services,and security, Christianity, hospitality and knowledge of the Russian language etc.), as well as factors pushing migrants out of Armenia (the challenges of providing an acceptable standard of living, the lack of well-paid jobs, cooperation between the special services of the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation, the threat of Azerbaijani aggression).

In the context of increasing international tension, the Western Balkans, as a historically formed arena for the clash of interests of the leading powers, require special analytical attention. The article raises questions of the international subjectivity of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and the self-proclaimed polity of Kosovo), as well as the positioning of the region in the current uncertainty of world politics. The main research focus is the political strategies, positions and specific steps of key external actors; trends and forecasts in terms of the influence of long-term beneficiaries of the Balkan political agenda. Special attention is paid to the problems of the vulnerability of the EU policy towards the Balkans, the imaginary monolithic nature of the "Western bloc", the resource capacity of Russia, and the Chinese potential in the Balkans. Based on the historical-systemic approach and the neorealism paradigm, the study analyzes the foreign policy goals and settings of the world's giants, leading their Big Balkan Game, and also revealsthe attitude of the local societies to the presence of "aliens" in the region. The rich empirical material made it possible to come up with a reasoned conclusion: the Western Balkans is highly dependent on external forces. The echo of the Ukrainian crisis has added urgency to the Balkan agenda but has not changed the composition of the key players. However, the level of their presence varies: the "Western bloc", as well as China, have the potential to increase their influence, while the resource capacity of the Russian Federation is limited to the Serbian segment. Nevertheless, the unity of the "collective West" in the Balkans is not monolithic, and the contradictions among the Western camp give Moscow opportunities to pursue a more subtle policy.

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The article analyzes how Germany, particularly through the Ukrainian crisis that began in 2014, has been placed at the decision- making center of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), thus becoming the de facto chief architect after Poland of the EU's response to Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine. The article highlights the internal and external implications of this role, including in other policy areas in particular with regard to the Baltic States. To do so, we must first take a closer look at the principles of German foreign policy and the specific nature of German-Russian relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economic and political relations between the Russian Federation and the EU from the Ukrainian crisis (2013) until the beginning of the war (end of February 2022) can be defined by the term “cold peace”. Its semantic meaning presents the gradual erosion of bilateral trade and economic relations and their intensified destruction as a result of a number of sanctions and restrictive measures. The aim of this analysis is to trace the development of the relations between the EU and Russia in the post-crisis period until the war and their positioning in the “black-and-white colour spectrum” between the “strategic partnership” and “cold peace”. Undoubtedly, after the beginning of the war in the end of February 2022, the situation changed dramatically, as well as the relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation.

In the context of international events, the relations between Russia and Turkey remain complex, although they are based on mutual recognition of security and other interests and cooperation that is mutually beneficial. The strained relations between Turkey and the United States, caused by disagreements in Syria and Turkish purchase of the S-400 missile system, have shown Turkey's growing commitment to a more independent foreign policy. Russia is under sanctions due to the annexation of Crimea and is an actor in the crisis over Ukraine due to the NATO threat of expansion to the Russian western borders, which escalated after the Russian recognition of the independence of the People's Republic of Donetsk and Lugansk (Donbas) and launching a "special military operation" in Donbas. In the foreign policy of Russia and Turkey and acting towards the third parties, their conflicting interests and providing direct or indirect support to parties to the conflict, without a direct conflict, are often present, which shapes their specific "competitive cooperation". The engagement of Turkey and Russia in Syria has proven to be effective, both in military operations and in mediating negotiations, which has reduced the influence of the United States and NATO in this area. The crisis management model implemented in Syria has not been successful in the Libyan crisis due to the Russian more passive attitude and greater influence of the Western powers and the UN mission. The common engagement in energy and military projects and technology transfer is an indicator of cooperation focused on the industries of strategic importance. The Russian interests in the NATO non-expansion and Turkey in entering the European Union markets can also have a positive effect on the current economic, political and security position of Serbia and the countries of the region.

The paper deals with the comparison of two cases when humanity was closest to the outbreak of a world nuclear war - the Cuban missile crisis (1962) and the Ukrainian crisis (2022). First, the basic elements of the term "international crisis" were given, and then, based on selected criteria, the Cuban crisis and the reality that arose from the invasion of the Russian armed forces into Ukraine were analyzed. The international legal aspects of these problems were specially addressed, with the fact that it was pointed out that, unlike the American naval blockade of Cuba, there was nothing illegal in the deployment of Soviet missiles on that island, yet the USA was still ready for war just to remove the threat. In the case of the Ukrainian crisis (2022), everything is much more complicated. Although at first glance, this is a classic case of aggression, Russia invoked the favorite arguments and concepts of the USA, such as humanitarian intervention and preventive self-defense. In the concluding remarks, the authors point out that, according to current international law, all international disputes and crises must be resolved exclusively by peaceful means, that the Ukrainian crisis should not be an exception in this respect, and that, after all, a good example is the Cuban Missile Crisis, which ended with a kind of agreement.

The armed conflict in Ukraine, which began in February 2022, also has its own geopolitical dimension. The hypothesis that is being proven in this paper is: The consequences of the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis irreversibly transform the geopolitical environment and thus induce the formation of a New World Order. The aim of the research is to look at the trends in the transformation of the geopolitical environment and, accordingly, to analyze the potential scenarios for the development of international relations. The research is based on the theory of structural realism and classical geopolitical theory, and the study is carried out using the methods of analysis, synthesis, content analysis and geopolitical pattern on the dichotomy of the thalassocratic and tellurocratic concepts.

After gaining sovereignty in 1991, the ideas of federalization were more or less present in the socio-political life of Ukraine at all stages of its development. This is a consequence and expression of the regionalism historically inherent in this country. However, despite the obvious presence of socio-cultural and economic regional differences, which allow us to draw parallels with such countries as Switzerland, Belgium, or Canada, where they were the objective basis of federalism, in Ukraine the federal principles of state structure were not implemented. The reasons for this are primarily related to the peculiarities of the internal political development of Ukraine, which predetermined the lack of real political and economic conditions for the implementation of the ideas of federalism in practice. In particular, all the leading political forces capable of advocating such a reform on a national scale have demonstrated their disinterest in the transition to a federal state system in various periods. The appeal to the ideas of federalism was for the most part a tool for mobilizing the electorate and became a convenient object for criticism from the Pro-Western and national-Patriotic political camp, which was especially evident during the «orange revolution» and in the subsequent period. It can also be stated that the basic ideas of federalism have not been consolidated at the level of mass consciousness in Ukraine. After 2014, the negative attitude towards of deralism has signifi cantly increased. In the context of the acute confl ict in the Donbas and the deep crisis of Russian-Ukrainian relations, the federalization of the country was presented by the ruling regime as a mechanism for destroying Ukrainian statehood, and calls for changing the state structure were actually criminalized. At the same time, due to the actualization of the manifestations of regionalism, certain elements of federalism were discussed in the framework of public discussions on the decentralization of the public administration system.

In this analysis, the theoretical framework is examined based on primary and secondary sources of research concerning the foundation of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Subsequently, the existing security environment is extensively analysed, at the international and regional level, while a critical overview of the political- military framework of security at the European level is also examined. Furthermore, an overview of the relations between Russia and Ukraine is attempted in two dimensions, regarding to the geopolitical role of Greece and its role in the European interaction, and the analysis of influence and the effects of the Ukrainian crisis in the field of Energy Policy of the European Union (EU) within its effect on the European defence policy. In this context, the key role of Greece and Cyprus and both mediation for energy sufficiency and Europe's autonomy is thoroughly examined, as a consequence of the geopolitical and geographical factor that may affect the existing dependencies on Russian natural gas based on of the East Med area, hence the potential influence of forming a new field of interdependence at the energy level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper examines the Temporary Protection Directive which was activated for the first time in March 2022 as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. By analysing the implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive in the Netherlands, the present paper aims to reveal the main strengths and weaknesses of temporary protection, as a legal instrument. In addition, since the author of the paper has direct experiences with Ukrainian refugees in the Netherlands, the purpose of the article is also to reveal the practical challenges the refugees are undergoing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The death of every empire is always painful and often turns into tragedy. It inevitably entails painful processes: the rupture of habitual economic ties, the loss of vast territories and spheres of influence, the formation of new states and the definition of borders between them, the emergence of national minorities on the territory of neighbors, etc. However, perhaps the most painful result is the sense of loss of self-worth, a complex of lost greatness that develops into the so-called post-imperial syndrome. In the 20th century, it manifested itself in Germany, Great Britain, France, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and former metropolises, which, with the loss of their colonies, lost not only established ties but also geopolitical influence, and with it their former imperial power. In the first quarter of the 21st century, Russia also has had to face the post-imperial syndrome. This article is devoted to its manifestations at this time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Integration processes in the post-Soviet space actualize the topic of several individual organizations prospects considering current trends on the international scene, particularly the ODED-GUAM. This formation is specific because it was initially created without the participation of the Russian Federation and also formed as an alternative to the Common-wealth of Independent States and other integration projects where the leading role was recognized for the Russian Federation.The study consists of two parts. The first part examines the development process of the ODED-GUAM organization and high-lights the main stages of its existence. The transformation of the conceptual ideas of the organization’s development from a global to a local actor in world politics was also mentioned in the article. The study conducts a broad analysis of the organization’s source base, evaluates the results that the organization has achieved and the reasons of its composition change.The second part of the study is devoted to the analysis of the prospects for the development of this organization from the standpoint of neorealism (structural realism) taking into account the combination of endogenous and exogenous factors.The totality of moments related to the specifics of the ODED-GUAM conceptual component evolution, the episodic nature of its activities, the presence of the internal conflict of interests among participating countries, the leading international actors positions towards the organization, allows us to consider the integration entity is mostly the artificial construct that unified states that were for one reason or another out of key integration projects of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space. It is also relevant to consider the ODED-GUAM as a tool for promoting the interests of such actors as the United States and the EU in the post-Soviet space, as an instrument of information, ideological, and economic pressure on Russia and its partners in integration entities.In fact, the prospects of the ODEDGUAM organization are directly dependent on the position and policy of external actors who consider this organization as one of the platforms to influence the Russian Federation as well as the People’s Republic of China and the integration projects implemented by these countries.

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Why have relations between Russia and the West experienced such a dramatic downturn despite already hitting what seemed to be rock bottom in 2014? The dissociation model offers a novel approach to analyse the conflict between the two sides and its tragic development. According to this approach, Russia’s dissociation from the panEuropean social order contributed to the outbreak of hostilities in 2014 and to Russia’s war of aggression in February 2022. Signs of Russia’s dissociation – intentional distancing from the core rules and norms of this order – were evident long before the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but the developments that followed marked a culmination of this process. The paper asserts that during the dissociation process, the foregrounding of ideational factors as opposed to material factors aggravated tensions and contributed to the radicalisation of relations between Russia and the West. Specifically, the study demonstrates how the fallout of institutional breakdown precluded management of the territorial security conflicts, resulted in the securitisation of the energy sector and overall polarisation of the relationship, and accelerated Russia’s authoritarian turn, preventing any attempt to repair bilateral and multilateral relations with the West after 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the mid to late 2010s, Russian-Japanese relations underwent a period of rapid growth. This was largely based on the fact that S. Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the time, was intent on making the development of ties with Moscow one of his key political priorities, thereby hoping to solve the problems of territorial delimitation and the lack of a peace treaty between the two countries on conditions acceptable both for Moscow and Tokyo. Time has shown that his calculations were mistaken: in the early 2020s it was not possible to get closer to the conclusion of a peace treaty, as well as to maintain the pace of development of relations at the same level. Due to this, S. Abe’s successors, Y. Suga and F. Kishida, showed much less interest in developing ties with Moscow. The reasons for this failure were not limited to the incompatibility of the parties’ positions on the territorial delimitation issue, but rather included structural factors of economic and international-political nature. In this sense, the Ukrainian crisis of 2022, which, at the time this article is being finalized, seems to have caused a collapse of Russia’s relations with the countries of the collective West and with Japan and has become the final stage of a long process of deterioration of bilateral relations

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The article examines the state of integration processes in the post-Soviet area over the past decade, with a focus on the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which has contributed to a holistic, comprehensive picture of the current situation with previous developments, consistent disclosure of the conditions for the development of integration processes, highlighting opportunities for the development of integration processes, their defining, designations of cause-and-effect relationships in international political processes in the region. With structural and functional analysis, presented by the mechanisms of functioning of the relevant factors of efficiency in the modern environment and to assess the mechanisms of their activity in changing conditions, the following elements are distinguished in the work: study of the stages of integration processes in the region, identification of factors influencing, analysis and comparison of statistical trade and economic indicators of the EAEU member states, as well as the prospects for the development of integration in the post-Soviet space. The use of SWOT analysis makes it possible to identify potential and weak factors in the development of the EAEU, assess the possibilities for the participation of the Russian Federation in this organization, using possible scenarios for the further functioning of the EAEU. Based on the analysis of macroeconomic indicators, political and economic processes within Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, the authors conclude that there is a high risk of contradictions in these areas in relations between the EAEU countries, which suggests the most likely scenario for the further development of integration processes in violation of the deadlines implementation of plans. The financial factor is the insufficient mechanism for overcoming integration ties in comparison with the European Union. As a prospective development of the EAEU, the most optimal way is seen as its transformation into a kind of economic and political organization.

The article is devoted to identifying the current image of Russia in the mirror of the German media after the Ukrainian crisis. The role of the media is noted, the crisis situation in Ukraine is characterized. Analyzed publications in the leading print media of Germany on the topic of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine and the role of the Russian Federation in the political crisis in Ukraine (2013–2014). The authors have identified and identified key approaches in the formation of German society a certain idea of Russia and its foreign policy. As conclusions, it is noted that both for objective reasons, and not least thanks to the German media, which use a lot of negative characteristics when constructing the image of Russia, relations between the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany go through a zone of mutual exclusion. However, relations between the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany can go to a new level, taking into account the possible pragmatic cooperation of the two states, and provided, among other things, a reduction in the degree of anti-Russian rhetoric in the German media.