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This thesis examines approaches to establishing liability in corporate groups. It considers the problem that arises when an insolvent subsidiary's tort creditors suffer personal injury, and try to pursue recourse against other group companies - especially the parent company. Courts have tried to provide answers regarding the parent company's liability for the torts of their subsidiaries, but have had limited success. The thesis reveals difficulty in extending liability to the parent company by way of insolvency law provisions, and by piercing the corporate veil. It recounts the hesitation of the courts in broadening their perspective beyond individual companies, so as to take the group itself as the responsible entity. The thesis points, furthermore, to shortcomings in proposals for a new rule of unlimited pro rata liability. Motivated by the inadequacy of current solutions to this pressing group problem, the thesis explores alternative tort law remedies under an approach suggested by the Supreme Court in the leading cases of VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corp and others and Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd. Chapter III discusses the role of tort of negligence in establishing the parent company's liability. The work analyses case law decisions on how to widen the application of negligence in the corporate group context, and compares UK law with relevant United States' and Australian case law. Since this group problem involves multiple legal entities, Chapters IV and V evaluate the possibility of using the doctrine of joint tortfeasance and/or the theory of vicarious liability in establishing the parent company's liability for its subsidiary company's torts. These two doctrines' extensions in corporate tort cases are seldom discussed in the literature. To conclude, tort law solutions, especially the doctrines of tort of negligence and joint tortfeasance based on participations are recommended to be further developed for corporate tort problems.

Bankruptcy is being used as a tool for silencing survivors and their families. When faced with claims from multiple plaintiffs related to the same wrongful conduct that can financially or operationally crush the defendant over the long term—a phenomenon we identify as onslaught litigation—defendants harness bankruptcy’s reorganization process to draw together those who allege harm and pressure them into a swift, universal settlement. In doing so, they use the bankruptcy system to deprive survivors of their voice and the public of the truth. This Article identifies this phenomenon and argues that it is time to rein in this destructive use of bankruptcy. Whereas the current literature largely discusses mass tort bankruptcy from a doctrinal, constitutional, or economic perspective, this Article examines how bankruptcy proceedings like these cause direct harms to survivors, to public trust in the justice system, and to the corporate economy. It traces the evolution of defendants’ use of bankruptcy to resolve mass torts from asbestos, IUD, and breast implant product liability litigation to its present-day use in controversies involving the Catholic Church, Purdue Pharma, the Weinstein Companies, USA Gymnastics, the Boy Scouts of America, Alex Jones’s Infowars, and Johnson & Johnson. The Article shows how the prior use of reorganization for mass torts created the necessary conditions to allow defendants to use bankruptcy to silence people and facilitate cover-ups in a wider variety of onslaught litigation. It concludes with a normative proposal for the narrow circumstances in which courts should allow bankruptcy to be used to deal with onslaught litigation, while still preserving the voices of those harmed.