Search

The journal Theology and Science assembled a group of four academics to comment on Andrew Davison's 2023 monograph Astrobiology and Christian Doctrine (Cambridge University Press, 2023). In this paper, the author responds to some of their observations, and suggests themes for further consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study entitled "The Stance of the Dominicans Towards the Immaculate Conception of Mary on the Example of Selected Scripts (13th- 16the Centuries)" aims to answer the question of how great the influence of St. Thomas' position on the opinions of Dominican theologians regarding the analyzed issue was. It examines the negative and homogeneous position adopted by the Dominicans, revealing its foundations and the presence of the theological perspective indicated by St. Thomas Aquinas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines the relation between scientific inquiry and philosophical thought in the context of a Thomistic account of human sexual difference. I begin by considering Thomas's own view and its explicit though brief appeal to biological observation. In particular, I focus on his claim that being male or female stems more from a substance's matter than from its form. Then, I look at a fairly recent exchange between William Newton and myself, in which, drawing upon Thomistic thought in the context of contemporary science, we argued opposing positions. Mine held that sex stems more from form than from matter, while Newton maintained that Thomas's original position is better. In reviewing this exchange, I note strengths in Newton's argument and suggest a further distinction, even while concluding that my fundamental position is still a better account. Lastly, I turn to further questions and the necessity of continued partnership between philosophy and science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is artificial intelligence (AD virtuous? Can AI become as virtuous as hunmns? This article is intended to explore these questions with a focus on artificial moral advisor (AMA). AMA is a proposal for thefuture application of AI to human moral life. Hence, this article will be dedicated to the theoretical anal ysis of the issues surrounding AMA. Socratic AMA will be the spec#ic object Of study. To this end, this article will examine whether or not the Socratic AMA con enhance hummi virtuous lije through exploration of Thomas Aquinas's theology of virtue. It will argue thnt the Socratic AMA is not as virtuous as humans insofar ns it lacks both the subject ami ultimate end of virtue anti is diaracterized as measurable. Nevertheless, the Socratic AMA can be considered to be embedded with delegated virtues and is expected to assist humans in their cultivation of virtue in certain contexts by reason of both its capacity to gather voluminous informntion and its tremendous processing power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that Jīva Gosvāmin's (c. 1517–1608 ad) concept of acintya and Thomas Aquinas's (1225–1274 ad) concept of mystery are similar. To make this case, I examine how each of them characterizes the nature of unity and plurality within the being of God, which is the issue of relations within a single object. I examine contemporary translations of acintya as it is used by Jīva, and I argue that mystery is a best translation because it addresses the ontological and epistemological senses of the word. I examine contemporary accounts of mystery as it is used by Aquinas, arguing that they reflect Jīva's use of the word acintya. This comparative study makes the case for similar approaches in Hindu and Christian scholasticism in regard to the use of reason to address the relational problem of simultaneous oneness and difference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of God in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas will be treated in three aspects: the question of the existence of God, the essence of God, and the topic of the relations between man and God. In this article, we would like to show the key issues of Thomas’s philosophy of God in order to show how they serve as a starting point for the theology of Aquinas. With regard to the first matter, it was claimed that the only argument of Thomas for the existence of God is the reasoning conducted in De ente et essential, where Aquinas points at the existence of God (the subsistent act of existence – ipsum esse subsistens) as the external efficient cause of the existence of beings composed of two elements, the act of existence and the essence as potentiality. In this perspective, the famous ways of St. Thomas were accepted in numerous philosophical systems (Aristotelianism, Neo-Platonism, and their compilations) to be an illustration of the possibilities of arriving at the stance that the first cause exists. When it comes to the latter issue, we present a concise approach to God’s attributes in Thomas’s Compendium theologiae and show a strictly existential approach to these attributes in the Thomism of Mieczysław Gogacz. Regarding the relation of man to God, we turned our attention —following St. Thomas — to two orders of these relations: natural, related to justice, and supernatural, which is love (friendship) between man and God. As an example of the application of philosophical solutions in theology, we point to a Thomistic interpretation of the development of the religious life of man. In sum, we observe that the philosophy of God, in its version developed by Aquinas, is characterized by strict intellectualism and a naturalistic starting point for philosophical analyses.

This article examines the doctrinal status of just war in the contemporary teaching of the Catholic magisterium. Some passages from Pope Francis's 2020 encyclical Fratelli tutti, On Fraternity and Social Friendship appear to exclude the just war idea from the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. To gauge whether this is so, the article establishes a baseline comparison to the seminal teaching of Thomas Aquinas on peace and just war. Both St. Thomas and Pope Francis proceed from the assumption that "war" designates a sinful violation of peace. They appear to differ, however, on the question whether a positive meaning should be ascribed to the Roman term bellum justum. To understand if this divergence is purely verbal or involves a substantive disagreement, I consider why Pope Francis's predecessors have (since the mid-twentieth century) abstained from employing the expression "just war" in their official documents. Finally, Pope Francis's emphatic statement that St. Augustine 'forged a concept of "just war" that we no longer uphold in our own day' is interpreted in light of the passage from his Epistle 229 to Darius that Francis references in Fratelli tutti. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I shall argue that the law of non-contradiction can be used to constructively reframe the univocalist debate. Duns Scotus argued famously that a term is univocal in two statements if its unity is sufficient for a contradiction. This logical definition was woven into his arguments against Henry of Ghent's (and indirectly Thomas Aquinas') view of analogy, arguing that all successful analogies must be built upon a univocal core. As early as the 1960s, this Scotist univocity had been singled out by French scholars and, by the turn of the century, had become the cherished whipping boy of Radical Orthodoxy, which claims that Scotus was the progenitor of modern onto-theology, nihilism, and secular immanence. While the genealogical critique in its fullness is beyond this paper's scope, it illustrates the gravity of the question. If the doctrine of analogy is coherent—i.e., if Scotus turned to univocity without cause—then perhaps his condemnation is justified. However—in line with the principle quod est necessarium est licitum (that which is necessary is permissible)—if univocity is necessary for successful theological reference, then perhaps the doctrine of univocity can be defended regardless of its historical usage. This paper will argue that univocity is latent in all successful analogies, commencing with a fairly standard analysis of Scotus' Ordinatio, then moving beyond Scotus to more constructively suggest that an expanded version of the argument from non-contradiction can help reframe the univocalist debate for today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transhumanism is an unsettling prospect for proponents of a natural law ethic. The goal of transhumanism is to fundamentally alter our human nature, while the natural law tradition relies on this nature for producing normative claims. The tension seems clear. But beyond the need to explore this underdeveloped relationship, it may be that natural law provides precisely the sort of ethical framework—a framework centered on human nature—for best evaluating transhumanism and bioenhancement technologies. Building on the work of Jason T. Eberl and Brian Patrick Green, I articulate how a Thomistic theory of natural law can guide us in a brave new world. Along the way, I note ways in which both Eberl and Green are too limiting in their interpretations of natural law, but in offering these critiques, I hope to bring out how natural law proves an invaluable guide for navigating life in creation—even a creation that has been tampered with. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Practical wisdom is the sine qua non of good conduct for Aristotelian virtue ethicists. Aristotelians conceive it as the virtue responsible for the intellectual side of good conduct, which involves having the right goal and deliberating well about what fulfils that goal, among other tasks. But is there any such trait as practical wisdom? Given the diversity of jobs practical wisdom is asked to do (seven goals are often enumerated), there may be a cluster of traits corresponding to what Aristotelians are talking about, so there really isn't one trait. In this paper, I defend a traditional Aristotelian position on practical wisdom, arguing that it is one thing despite having different functions. Following Thomas Aquinas, we can see practical wisdom as having parts. Those parts may be psychological components (integral parts) of the trait, or they may be derivative functions (virtual parts), things that someone with practical wisdom is also able to do because they have practical wisdom. Still, practical wisdom is one because it is a trait that functions to enable us to pursue the good as good; it possesses what I will call here 'practical unity' as the master virtue of praxis or acting well full stop. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, some of the approaches that have taken into consideration the doctrine of the Thomistic act of being (actus essendi) have reached sometimes drastic conclusions regarding the originality of what is the most important teaching of Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, his philosophy of being is based on the act-potency relation between form and being, as well as on the real distinction of essence and being, derived from it. In this study we would like to face a double challenge: that of justifying why an act of being is necessary in Thomistic metaphysics, and that of showing why this actuality (esse) is not identified with the existence or being of the thing, as the Thomistic school has pretended during its trajectory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article focuses on the questions on matter by the Franciscan Alexander of Alexandria (Lectura II, d. 12). The article is divided into two main sections. The first section provides a philosophical-historical overview of Alexander's questions on prime matter (qq. 1–2, 5). The second section provides insight into Alexander's questions on heavenly matter (qq. 3–4), expounding the author's solutions to the issues related to that subject. Appendix 1 contains a question list of Alexander's unedited Lectura II. An edition of Alexander's Lectura II, d. 12, qq. 1–5 is given in Appendix 2. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Scripta Mediaevalia is the property of Universidad Nacional de Cuyo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Scripta Mediaevalia is the property of Universidad Nacional de Cuyo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Scripta Mediaevalia is the property of Universidad Nacional de Cuyo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As is well known, for Thomas Aquinas the baptismal character is an instrumental power. This means that it belongs to a type of realities that he calls intentiones, immaterial entities with an esse intentionale. The article begins with an analysis of the properties and types of intentional realities. It then focuses on the baptismal character as the intentional presence of divine power in the baptised. Finally, it addresses the question of the permanence of the baptismal character as the constitution of the intellect of the baptised in the form of an instrument, and the inchoate presence of the divine virtue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we discuss with some contemporary Thomists the possibility of re-actualizing Thomas's fifth way to God in the science–theology dialogue. We start with a reference to Spinoza's critique of teleology in light of some recent Spinoza studies, and after summarizing several Thomistic defenses of Aquinas's teleological argument, we interpret that critique as targeting the fifth way as well. We then focus on Darwin's impact on biological design arguments. We argue that his naturalistic explanation of biological teleology also affects the fifth way. The distinction between internal-Aristotelian and external-Platonic conceptions of teleology does not seem to be able to protect the teleological argument from a Darwinian critique. We conclude by stressing the importance and fruitfulness of Thomas's thought for contemporary interdisciplinary dialogue, provided that Darwin's impact on the biological version of the fifth way is taken into due account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay presents a substantive Thomist response to neurophilosophy's main experimental challenge to free will: the Libet-style experiments on the neural antecedents of conscious voluntary actions. My response to this challenge will disclose that Thomists are rationally justified in rejecting both the conclusions of neurophilosophy skeptics of free will, and more fundamentally, the rival philosophical conceptions of voluntary action and free will that were chosen to be operationalized in these neuroscientific experiments. I show how the Thomists' alternative conception of human action justifies a significantly different interpretation of Libet-style experiments, one which reveals the psychological phenomenon targeted by these experiments is miscategorized as a voluntary action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been written of John Courtney Murray's reception of Thomas Aquinas. Although not totally misplaced, this near-exclusive attention to Aquinas's role in Murray's thought has obscured the contributions of an equally important figure—Augustine of Hippo—to Murray's political theology. This article thus offers a novel survey of Murray's seminal We Hold These Truths and reveals that Augustine's theory of Divine Providence, as articulated in The City of God , circumscribed Murray's Thomism. With the hope of reconciling differences between American Catholics and non-Catholics at mid-century, Murray relied upon two of the most influential theologians in western Christianity to assert that Divine Providence led the Founding Fathers to place the natural law and religious liberty at the foundation of the American republic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Teología y Vida is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Facultad de Teologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The following article examines the role of the sentidos and the entendimiento in Pedro Calderón de la Barca's auto sacramental, El cubo de la Almudena. While scholarship recognises the pervasiveness of the play on the senses in early modern Spain, scholars often either deny or overemphasise the reliability of the senses as a means of truth acquisition. Moreover, scholarship often attaches too much weight to hearing, thus neglecting the role of the eyes of the entendimiento. Based on a Thomistic framework, Calderón demonstrates that the literal element of allegory relies on the active vehicle of the senses to serve as guides for the entendimiento and an entrance into devotion. Although hearing plays a central role in the play, it serves as a herald for sight, by which the devotee exercises faith. Moreover, where the sentidos prove limited, the entendimiento is an auxiliary support that makes up for their lack, seeing beyond sensual perception through faith. In this way, the medium of the auto sacramental and the theology of the Eucharist train the audience to use the vision of faith through both the senses and the entendimiento to see the allegorical meaning of the play, the divine nature of the Eucharist provided by Mary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Manuel Piñon restores the Thomistic understanding of the concept of freedom, which was blurred by the interpretations of some of the Angelic Doctor's commentators--injecting into it ideas such as 'intrinsic active indifference' and 'capability for self-determination-by putting stress on the reflexive quality of the faculty of the will over its acts. Such is progressively developed in this article in three sections. In the first section, the clarification of the nature of the will as taught by Thomas Aquinas, which, according to the analysis of Piñon, acts self-reflexively, is discussed. In the second, the reasons offered by Piñon for expostulating that the will is a self-reflexive faculty, just like the intellect, are systematically presented. In the third, it is demonstrated how the self-reflexive modality of the volitive faculty over its specific acts. Finally, it is concluded with some personal observations and comments on the relevance of Piñon's elaboration on the Thomistic teaching of freedom to the practice of freedom by many today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his 1956 book Das Gemüt, Stephan Strasser presents an original phenomenological investigation into human happiness and pleasure. We will examine Strasser's theory of happiness in more detail and reveal how he incorporates important phenomenological insights from Thomas Aquinas' theory of the passions of the soul. Both Strasser and Aquinas view happiness as the fulfilment of intentional striving and differentiate between various feelings associated with the pursuit and attainment of a goal, such as joy and pleasure. However, while Aquinas believes that only an imperfect form of happiness can be attained in this life, Strasser aims to determine the essence of the highest form of happiness possible for human beings as the felt anticipation of perfect happiness in the future. Strasser, therefore, interprets Aquinas' theory through the lens of an existential-phenomenological approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The doctrine of Thomas Aquinas was formally adopted as the official teaching of the entire Dominican Order. Throughout the 13th and 14th centuries, general chapters placed significant emphasis on the importance of adhering to Aquinas’ views. They were deemed essential not only to maintain continuity within the orthodox tradition of the Church but also to foster unity within the entire order. Among the topics that sparked debate among medieval theologians was the conception of Mary. While Bernard of Clairvaux and the Dominicans rejected the idea of Mary’s immaculate conception, the Franciscans, led by figures like John Duns Scotus, advocated for it. This article highlights the stance taken by the Dominican general chapters in defence of Thomas’ views. Initially, in the 14th century, there were general indications supporting the maculistic understanding of Mary’s conception, but this stance shifted over time. By the 15th century, the Dominicans were compelled to embrace the immaculistic concept. The delayed promulgation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary in the mid-19th century underscores the complexity and unresolved nature of theological discussions throughout the medieval period.

It is commonly believed that in the debate on the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, representatives of the Order of St. Francis were supporters of the Marian privilege, while the Dominicans were against it. The aim of this article is to verify this opinion by analyzing selected Dominican homilies from the 13th –15th centuries, seeking answers to the questions: has the maculist position expressed by preachers been maintained over the centuries? What caused Dominicans to remain unchanged in their views, despite the gradual spread of the opinion about the Immaculate Conception of Mary, which was finally officially accepted by the Church? What role did Saint’s opinion play? Thomas Aquinas to the position of later Dominicans? The results of the analysis of medieval Dominican sermons allow us to consider the opinion that has so far been widespread as one-sided and superficial. The Dominican position is much more complex.

Introduction: Ethical living is a lifestyle in which all areas of human existence and work are formed and flow around ethics. That is, a person who wants to live morally, in all areas, tries to know the ethical considerations related to that area and follow them in practice and live according to them. The current article is research on the moral system of Thomas Aquinas with a focus on examining the nature of the moral goal of human life and the moral rationality of such a life. Material and Methods: The present review study examined bioethics from the perspective of Thomas Aquinas in a descriptive manner. In order to achieve this goal, articles related to research keywords from Thomson Information Institute, Science Direct and Pub Med were examined and books related to the views of Thomas Aquinas were studied. Conclusion: The results of this study show that according to Thomas Aquinas's view on man, becoming like God and realizing God's image in material life and seeing God in the hereafter is the moral goal and eternal happiness of man. Also, Thomas Aquinas believes in the moral rationality of such a life from both perspectives - having a reason to live morally and the usefulness of such a life.

This article discusses a form of Thomism that has emerged in the field of science and theology, which is termed "Science-Engaged Thomism" (SETh), following the recent and growing movement of Science-Engaged Theology (SET). After a brief introduction of SET, various definitions and essential features of SET and SETh are introduced and discussed, highlighting their similarities and differences. To showcase the latter, the article presents recent examples of SETh. The objective is to suggest that SETh is a form of Thomism, although not necessarily a new form of Thomism. As such, SETh might be considered a complementary approach to SET. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Dominican theologian Durand of Saint-Pourçain (ca. 1275–1334), breaking from the wide consensus, made a two-pronged attack on concurrentism (i.e., the theory according to which God does more than conserving creatures in existence and co-causes all their actions). On the one hand, he shows that the concurrentist position leads to the unacceptable consequence that God is the direct cause of man's evil actions. On the other hand, he attacks the metaphysical foundations of concurrentism, first in the version offered by Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, and then in a more general way. Against Thomas and Giles, he challenges Neoplatonic assumptions about causality and being. More generally, he establishes that God's action and a creature's action can be neither identical nor different, and thus cannot both be direct causes of the same effect. Without claiming that Durand's series of objections are definitely unanswerable, we may at least observe that they have generally been underestimated (which earned him the lowly role of the mere foil of the concurrentist view in the history of philosophy) and are able to do considerable damage to concurrentism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Opinião Jurídica is the property of Revista Opiniao Juridica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

There are strong reasons for assuming that Thomas Aquinas conceived of God's existence in terms of logical necessity in a broad sense. Yet this seems to stand in some tension with the fact that he excludes the possibility of a priori arguments for the existence of God. One apparently attractive way of handling this tension is to use a two-dimensional framework inspired by Saul Kripke. Against this, this article demonstrates that a Kripke-inspired framework is inapt in this context because it allows for the conceivability of God's non-existence, thereby rendering his non-existence possible in some important, and for Aquinas inacceptable, sense. Drawing on David Chalmers, the article submits that the existence of God can only be necessary if God's non-existence is ideally inconceivable. On the basis of Aquinas' own understanding of God, however, the article argues further that God's non-existence in fact is inconceivable. The alleged conceivability of God's non-existence is ultimately due to our (human) inability to grasp the nature of being, whereas creatures who grasp the nature of being are unable to conceive of God's non-existence. This removes God's non-existence from the realm of relevant conceivability and, therefore, from the range of possible worlds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within modern science, the rich explanatory power of causality has been relocated down to a simple, lacking notion of causality implicitly defined as ‘the material origin of a series.’ Through the course of this paper, I examine two prominent examples in modern science where this notion of causality is on full display. The first of these examples is the origin of the universe as espoused by the Big Bang theory. The second is the mind/body problem. In both cases, the modern notion of causality, as the origin of a material series, is utterly deficient in explanatory power. To rescue the notion of causality, I detail the classical view of causality as espoused by the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition and shown clearly in the Christian Faith. Most importantly, I show how reintroducing immaterial causality would absolve the explanatory gap in both cases. With this fuller notion of causality, I show how the origin of the universe and the mind/body problem are only problems considering the modern, deficient sense of causality. If the view of immaterial causality found in the Christian tradition is allowed, ample explanation is given as to the mechanics of both the origin of the universe and the mind/body problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how Thomas Aquinas and some Neo-Thomists scholars (Juan José Urráburu, Joseph Hontheim, Édouard Hugon, and Joseph Gredt) analysed the metaphysical possibility of miracles. My main goal is to unpack the metaphysical toolbox that Aquinas uses to solve the basic question about the possibility of miracles and to compare how his late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century followers solved the issue themselves. The key feature to differentiate the two approaches will reside in their use of different notions to account for the possibility of miracles, namely obediential potency for Aquinas and the laws of nature for the Neo-Thomists. To show why neo-Thomist scholars source to this notion, I also briefly discuss how the notion of the laws of nature emerged in the seventeenth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does God intervene in our lives? In this paper, I respond "yes" and work out a Thomistic account of special divine action in human life. I argue that God intensifies His action in moments that are particularly significant for our salvation. In such moments, God intervenes in a contingent mode and reorients our lives for the sake of our final good. First, I present Aquinas' terminological choice of specialis and intervenire and address concerns expressed in the contemporary divine action debate against the term "intervention". Second, I discuss the special divine action as a subtype of the special providence that rules over human beings. The special providence mirrors the special place of humans in the created order on account of their reason and freedom. Third, I show that divine interventions occur through irregular contingency. I refer to several interventions: test, habitual grace, God's moving of the will, God's enlightenment of the intellect, and punishment. Since it occurs contingently, the special divine action can be known through interpreting signs (a kind of conjectural knowledge). Fourth, I show that not all contingencies are divine interventions. To differentiate between them, I introduce an orientational criterion of interpretation: the transfiguration of a person's life toward her final good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Towards the end of The Horse and His Boy, as Shasta wanders blindly into Narnia, he unknowingly encounters Aslan, who explains to him the various ways that Aslan has watched over him dating back even to the boy's infancy. It is a beautiful account of Aslan's care for Shasta. If one were to focus exclusively on this passage, however, one might conclude that Narnian providence is merely a matter of external divine intervention and that creaturely agency plays little role in the way Aslan governs Narnia. An analysis of some of Lewis's non-fictional writings in conversation with Thomas Aquinas uncovers a more subtle understanding of providence. For Lewis, as for Aquinas, providence incorporates the acts of free agents without compromising their integrity. Virtuous, indifferent, and even vicious acts all contribute in some way to God's plan for the universe. The same can be said for Narnia, as one can see through representative examples from The Silver Chair, The Horse and His Boy, and The Magician's Nephew. In these stories Lewis illustrates, to paraphrase his own words about Oedipus Rex, 'how providence and free will can be combined, even how free will is the modus operandi of providence'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a slightly modified version of the keynote lecture given at the 2023 annual conference of the Catholic Theological Association of Great Britain. The theme of the conference was the role of law in the Christian life. The paper opened the conference by following the theological lead of the Common Doctor, St Thomas Aquinas, who treats theology as about God and all things, including law, in relation to God. In particular the paper looks at Aquinas's understanding in the Summa Theologiae of God as the eternal law. It examines how the eternal law meets Aquinas's criteria for what counts as a law, and links eternal law to other law, such as natural law, as well as to the doctrines of the Trinity, providence, the beatific vision, and Christology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces Phenomenological Thomism by accomplishing the three tasks Thomas Aquinas sets for every prooemium. First, to promote goodwill (beniuolus), it shows how fruitful Phenomenological Thomism promises to be by arguing that it unites the strengths of two complementary alternatives to the modern starting point. Second, to make teachable (docilis), it delineates the principal vectors of phenomenological engagement, including philosophy of nature, philosophical anthropology, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophical theology, and revealed theology. Third, to arouse attention (attentus), it focuses on the theme of manifestation to highlight the challenge of bringing the two traditions together. In this way, the prooemium encourages the further development of Phenomenological Thomism as a research program involving countless scholars and an infinity of tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My aim in this paper is to investigate what enables human flourishing from a Thomistic perspective by considering Aquinas' natural inclinations. I will argue that human beings flourish in different ways, depending on their practices. However, not every practice contributes to human flourishing, but only those that are consistent with human nature, which agents grasp through their natural inclinations. To support this argument, I will critically analyze MacIntyre's account, referring mainly to his latest work (2016). MacIntyre has the merit of highlighting the role of practices in human flourishing by considering the narrative dimension in the agents' lives, but he fails to recognize the properly metaphysical framework of human nature, that would be provided by the proper consideration of natural inclinations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]