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The relationship between natural resource development and sustainable development has long been a focus in academia. In the context of a new global economic cooperation system, many scholars argue that such cooperation can lead to a "resource curse" effect in partner countries, hindering their sustainable development. This study analyzed panel data from 64 countries from 2008 to 2020, using the Belt and Road Initiative as a representative of multilateral economic cooperation (MEC) policies. The aim was to examine the actual impact of multilateral economic cooperation on the sustainable development levels of partner countries and to explore the underlying mechanisms influencing these outcomes. First, we measured and identified the sustainable development index (SDI) under natural resource development schemes and the "resource curse" effect in these countries. Then, we employed a double machine learning approach to evaluate the policy effects of MEC on sustainable resource development. We constructed an interactive double machine learning model to examine and validate the specific mechanisms of resource development effects. The results indicate that the level of sustainable resource development in MEC countries is relatively low, and a "resource curse" effect already exists. However, participating in MEC suppresses this "curse" effect. By promoting innovation cooperation, institutional improvement, structural optimization, trade openness, and pollution reduction, MEC effectively enhances the sustainable development levels of partner countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do natural resources have harmful economic consequences? This question is central to the interdisciplinary "resource curse" literature, but important questions remain unanswered. At the same time, the discovery of new resource deposits around the world and technological developments that enable greater resource extraction make understanding the dynamics of the resource curse even more pressing. This article addresses these issues by focusing on the relationship between resource abundance and fiscal outcomes, which we argue more accurately reflects the causal mechanisms emphasized in existing research than aggregate economic outcomes like increases in gross domestic product per capita. We describe a variety of hypotheses linking resource abundance to fiscal health, including how political and institutional factors can either mitigate or exacerbate the effect of resource wealth, and test these arguments using state‐level data from the United States encompassing the years 1992‐2014. This focus on subnational variation helps minimize some of the limitations of the cross‐country comparisons that have dominated the prior literature. Our regression results suggest that, contrary to the most pessimistic theories, resource wealth is often associated with stronger fiscal performance at the state level. However, a number of factors, including levels of political polarization, legislative term limits, and lower wage growth, negate these benefits. Related Articles: Khodr, Hiba. 2014. "A Preliminary Comparative Study of Policy Making in Two GCC Countries – Qatar and Kuwait: Processes, Politics, and Participants." Politics & Policy42 (2): 271‐310. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12068 Day, Jonathan, and KeithBoeckelman. 2012. "The Impact of Legislative Term Limits on State Debt: Increased Spending, Flat Revenue." Politics & Policy40 (2): 320‐338. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00347.x Prier, Eric, and KevinWagner. 2009. "Running Unopposed: Assessing the Impact of Term Limits on Competition in Florida and Maine." Politics & Policy37 (1): 101‐125. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00163.x [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of natural resource abundance on social spending in dictatorships. Natural resources, particularly oil, provide authoritarian leaders with economic rents without widescale labor force participation. I argue that dependence on natural resource production thus reduces dictators' incentive to invest in human capital, which is reflected in lower levels of social spending. Using a panel dataset of authoritarian regimes between 1972 and 2008, I find that oil abundance leads to significantly lower levels of social spending by authoritarian governments. The negative effects are especially prominent concerning expenditures for public education and health: when an authoritarian country earns ten more dollars per capita from oil production, per capita spending on education and health decreases by approximately 1%. Extended analysis shows that the negative impact of oil on social spending is peculiar to authoritarian regimes; no impact of oil wealth on social expenditures is found among democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars in philosophy, political science, and the policy community have recently advocated for a ‘sticks and carrots’, or conditional-coercion, approach to human rights violations. On this model, rights violators (usually states) are conceived of as rational agents who should be rewarded for good behavior and punished for bad behavior by other states seeking to improve human rights abroad. External states concerned about human rights abroad should impose punishments against foreign rights violators, and these punitive measures should not be lifted until rights violations in target countries cease. Against these scholars, I argue that the conditional-coercion model is mistaken. In this article, I explicate the ‘sticks and carrots’ approach to human rights, criticize it on both theoretical and empirical grounds, and suggest an alternative approach that I term rights diagnostics. The model I propose is sensitive to the internal political struggles in rights violating states and the incentive structures faced by rights violators. This model takes account of relevant empirical evidence on the role of external coercion and inducements in producing institutional change. I conclude by sketching an institutional design that would potentially implement ‘rights diagnostics’ policy.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The world expects that oil countries grow faster than non-endowment economies. Though, the observed is the opposite. It is the resource curse, which leads to economic volatility (Auty, 2009). Some scholars assert that efficient institutions curb the curse, and lead to stable economic growth (Robinson, Torvik & Verdier, 2006). Other authors refuse the role of institutions (Warner & Sachs, 1995). This paper provides the main findings of a research through comparative methods in order to ask to what extent does institutional efficiency help Colombia and Ecuador tofoster oil policies, which lead to stable economic growth in 1996-2013? It found evidence of the curse in the both economies during the oil boom. However, it made less impact in Colombia, because it experienced institutional transformation. In contrast, Ecuador diminished its institutional environment. Colombia described a more stable economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]