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This article shows how the principles of participatory deliberative democracy can serve as a guide for the institutional design of minipublics, while also discussing the obstacles such proposals are likely to face in becoming realised in practice. It does so by discussing the case of citizen-initiated citizens’ assemblies in Flanders, Belgium. This case represents an ambitious proposal that combined elements of petition, deliberation, public consultation and parliamentary deliberation to generate a robust deliberative system. Yet in the end it was soundly defeated in parliament. By studying the institutional specifics of this proposal as well as the macro-deliberative circumstances that led to its failure, this article presents a nuanced picture of the promises and pitfalls of institutionalising deliberative minipublics. It concludes with a call to ‘deliberative activism’.

Identity and democracy and, more particularly, national identity and deliberative democracy account for a controversial relationship. However, from a classical deliberative democratic point of view, the controversy over who is the 'we' that needs to stand together in contemporary complex societies settled with the constitution of modern states. In this sense, the main contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I rebut the analytical appropriateness and conceptual coherence of Habermas' discursive approach to democracy for the case of plurinational societies in contemporary constitutional democracies. A discussion of a test case – Catalonia – demonstrates that this inadequacy renders incoherent the deliberative model regarding one of its most fundamental premises: the equal weight of the principles of law and the principle of democracy. On the other hand, I sustain that the challenge is not about identity but democracy, and more particularly, about the role deliberative democracy is called to play when controversy challenges whether the people of a state do conform to a single people or not. More concretely, I explore the opportunities offered by the systemic turn to sustain a more realistic approach to deliberative democracy regarding its capacity to steer society towards integration in the context of the system of public deliberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The systemic turn in deliberative democracy theory seeks to connect specific deliberative exercises to the broader social and political context and processes of decision-making. However, it still lacks empirical foundations to capture the complexity of real-life deliberative processes. This is especially true in contexts where deliberation—at least in its pure idealized form—seems hardly possible, like in the case of deeply divided societies. Building on a systemic approach to deliberation, while addressing some of its critiques, this paper focuses on the preconditions that facilitate the emergence of more or less formal deliberative moments in deeply divided societies. We explore this question inductively through the study of a conflict over fisheries between settlers and Indigenous communities in Canada (Burnt Church/Esgenoopetitj). We argue that in order for a deliberative niche to emerge, shifts in the equilibrium between the actors involved have to happen, either because of external pressures or because, as the case studied here suggests, because of endogenous transformations to the ecology of the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Though commanding a prominent role in political theory, deliberative democracy has also become a mainstay of myriad other research traditions in recent years. This diffusion has been propelled along by the notion that deliberation, properly conceived and enacted, generates many beneficial outcomes. This article has three goals geared toward understanding whether these instrumental benefits provide us with good reasons – beyond intrinsic ones – to be deliberative democrats. First, the proclaimed instrumental benefits are systematized in terms of micro, meso, and macro outcomes. Second, relevant literatures are canvassed to critically assess what we know – and what we do not know – about deliberation’s effects. Finally, the instrumental benefits of deliberation are recast in light of the ongoing systemic turn in deliberative theory. This article adds to our theoretical understanding of deliberation’s promises and pitfalls, and helps practitioners identify gaps in our knowledge concerning how deliberation works and what its wider societal implications might be.

At the heart of the ideal of deliberative democracy lies an emphasis on the political autonomy of citizens participating in procedures of public justification aimed at the promotion of the common good. The recent systemic turn in deliberative democracy has moved so far away from this ideal that it relegates the deliberations of citizens to a secondary matter, legitimising forms of rule that may even undermine the normative impulses central to the project of deliberative democracy. We critically discuss this theoretical development and show how deliberative agency can effectively be exercised in complex political systems. We argue, in particular, that political parties play a central role in facilitating the exercise of deliberative agency, fostering deliberation among citizens and linking their deliberations to decisions. Instead of giving up on the possibility that citizens participate in procedures of public justification, deliberative democrats should look to parties' unique ability to enable deliberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a recent systemic turn in public participation in science studies. It reviews the main lines of criticism brought forward in science, technology and society towards public participation in science discourse and argues that much of it refers to the field’s preoccupation with isolated, stage-managed minipublics. It then discusses a series of efforts in science, technology and society, and other fields to study public participation in a more systemic or holistic perspective. The article advances the argument that there are different ways of conceptualizing such a perspective, not all of which are well equipped to account for contestation, conflict and power. We distinguish between an aggregative approach, deliberative systems theory, an eco-systemic and a decentred governance approach and argue that the latter allows us to study the complexities of public participation without relying on a normative concept of system and account for power relations that may structure the field of public participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We lack analyses of the judiciary from a systemic perspective. This article thus examines arguments offered by deliberativists who have reflected about this institution and argues that the current state of deliberative democracy requires us to rethink the ways they conceive of the judiciary within a deliberative framework. After an examination of these accounts, I define the deliberative system and describe the different phases deliberative democracy has gone through. I then single out elements common to all systemic approaches against which I test whether the regard that the authors show for the judiciary in deliberative terms can be maintained and argue in the negative. I conclude by pointing at the necessity to think about the definition of deliberative systems, and to the value of these discussions for debates on the legitimacy of judicial review when it is exercised under the form of judicial supremacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a novel analytical account of the relationship between deliberation and representation by reconstructing the specific institutional logics that guide deliberative action in parliaments. In contrast to the dominant generalised paradigm in empirical deliberation research it develops a contextualised-systemic approach. The article argues that the parliamentary context is characterised by a tension between two equally legitimate institutional logics: a discursive one, institutionalised through parliamentary procedures, and a positional one, constituted by relations of representation. The resulting theoretical model links the specific institutional and situational conditions to different forms and functions of deliberation. Depending on the specific balance between both logics deliberation fulfils functions of either integration or contestation. The model is applied to a comparative analysis of different cases of parliaments demonstrating how this account can advance both the comparative analysis of deliberation in representative institutions and the development of deliberative democracy after the systemic turn. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to Jonathan Kuyper, deliberative democratic theory, having taken a “systemic turn,” is now better able to deal with the complexity of the real world. Central to this development is the democratic “division of epistemic labor,” under which experts, public servants, and the politically engaged may compensate for the relative ignorance of democratic citizens at large. However, the systemic turn raises the question of whether deliberation has been reconstituted as a means to the end of citizens’ interests, or whether it remains an end in itself. To the extent that deliberation has been accepted as a means to the realization of common interests, the systemic turn begs the question of why we should expect the epistemic division of labor to be effective in identifying public policies that serve those interests. To the extent that deliberative democrats seek to avoid this problem by retaining an a priori commitment to deliberative inclusion, it is more than conceivable that the systemic turn will descend into a simplistic and unedifying form of functionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]