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Theoretical theories underpin the governance effect of directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance include agency costs and stakeholder interests. Motivated by mixed evidence on the corporate governance effects of D&O, we ask whether and how the directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance affects corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance in China, one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world. We develop two contrasting hypotheses: (1) supervision and incentives versus (2) opportunism. To test these hypotheses, we rely on Chinese A‐share market data and fixed effect panel regressions, along with a battery of robustness checks, including Heckman sample selection bias, two‐stage least square instrumental variable (2SLS‐IV), difference‐in‐difference (DiD), propensity score matching (PSM) analyses. Consistent with supervision and incentives hypotheses and stakeholder theory, we find that D&O liability insurance significantly increases firm's CSR performance and firms renewing D&O liability insurance with the same insurers tend to have better CSR performance. Two possible mechanisms supporting this positive relation between D&O liability insurance and CSR performance are information transparency and accounting conservatism. Aside from theoretical contributions, our findings offer important practical contributions such as promoting D&O as external governance and ensuring the functions of D&O insurance comprehensively and correctly understood. Integrating D&O insurance with CSR can be viewed as an important business strategy by mitigating risks, enhancing reputation, ensuring legal compliance, and supporting responsible decision‐making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The real estate industry is characterized by a high degree of financial intensity and is more significant in certain areas. The relative enterprises require certain financial ability and large shareholders’ controlling power to support their survivals and competitiveness. However, due to the multiple adverse impacts of current state policies on banks and private capital, the problem of capital restraints of real estate has become increasingly serious. From a corporate governance perspective, this paper studies the interactions among financial constraints, ownership concentration and corporate performance under different shareholding states: by analyzing the quantitative characteristics of equity structure and searching for the appropriate range of the largest shareholder holding ratio, which has considered both the financial sustainability and characteristics. It is found that raising the ownership concentration could enhance supervision effect rather than encroachment, effectively ease the financial constraints and improve the performance of enterprises, both of which are significant under high ownership concentration. Financial constraints play a significant intermediary effect in absolute holdings and have obvious regulatory effects in decentralized equity. Also, the mechanisms of ownership concentration are reflected in the strengthening of corporate supervision, reduced agency costs, improved operating efficiency, and increased investment attractiveness. The adjusted behavior adds to the responsibility awareness rather than free-ride psychology, forming a dynamic game on financial decisions. Their financial sustainability in areas would provide a nationwide reference for governance reform and managerial behavior.

The real estate industry is characterized by a high degree of financial intensity and is more significant in certain areas. The relative enterprises require certain financial ability and large shareholders' controlling power to support their survivals and competitiveness. However, due to the multiple adverse impacts of current state policies on banks and private capital, the problem of capital restraints of real estate has become increasingly serious. From a corporate governance perspective, this paper studies the interactions among financial constraints, ownership concentration and corporate performance under different shareholding states: by analyzing the quantitative characteristics of equity structure and searching for the appropriate range of the largest shareholder holding ratio, which has considered both the financial sustainability and characteristics. It is found that raising the ownership concentration could enhance supervision effect rather than encroachment, effectively ease the financial constraints and improve the performance of enterprises, both of which are significant under high ownership concentration. Financial constraints play a significant intermediary effect in absolute holdings and have obvious regulatory effects in decentralized equity. Also, the mechanisms of ownership concentration are reflected in the strengthening of corporate supervision, reduced agency costs, improved operating efficiency, and increased investment attractiveness. The adjusted behavior adds to the responsibility awareness rather than free-ride psychology, forming a dynamic game on financial decisions. Their financial sustainability in areas would provide a nationwide reference for governance reform and managerial behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disclosing corporate innovation information plays a crucial role in investors' decision-making. It is important to regulate the consistency between a company's words and actions to ensure that their narrative innovation disclosures accurately reflect their innovation activities. This study utilizes data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2022 and explores the governance role of analyst coverage on corporate innovation inconsistency from a flexible governance perspective. The research finds that analyst tracking promotes a company's innovation inconsistency of "saying less and doing more" through the information effect and suppresses "saying more and doing less" through the monitoring effect. Further, analysts who work harder, have higher education levels, are more motivated, and demonstrate greater independence and objectivity significantly impact companies' innovation inconsistency. This study is of great theoretical and practical significance for understanding innovation inconsistency in companies, as well as the role of analysts in the capital market. [Display omitted] • This paper discusses the inconsistency of enterprise innovation from the perspective of "soft governance", supports the view that analysts can restrain the opportunistic behavior of management, and also puts forward a new perspective to solve the phenomenon of enterprise innovation inconsistency. • This paper delves into the underlying mechanisms by which analyst coverage affects innovation inconsistencies. It is explained that the information effect and monitoring effect of analysts are effective ways to restrain the inconsistency of enterprise innovation. • This paper enriches the existing research in the areas covered by the analyst through a heterogeneous analysis of factors such as effort, educational background, motivation, and independence/ objectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because women offenders often have limited social networks and unique needs, the actions of probation/parole officers providing community supervision may be particularly relevant to outcomes. The present study examined the effects of probation/parole officer relationship style, attention to criminogenic needs, and intensity of supervision on women offenders’ arrests and convictions within a 24-month period. Contrary to findings from other studies, the measured elements of officer actions had no direct effects on recidivism for a sample of 226 women. However, the analysis revealed an indirect effect in which a non-supportive, punitive relationship was related to reactance and anxiety, which in turn were related to high recidivism. The discussion focuses on theoretical and methodological explanations for the null findings regarding direct effects. Moreover, it draws on the literature in psychology and communication to suggest approaches to reducing the reactance that can promote recidivism and to suggest related future research directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]