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The author proves that rejecting the existence of permissive norms and limitation of norms to prohibitions and commands alone is possible only with reducing the idea of a function. The essence of the function is then the ability of the expression to generate independently the universal norm formation. Such manipulation is easy on the level of logical analysis, but proves risky from other points of view. If we want the deontic logic, which we construct, to consider the fact that permission is pragmatically necessary for the law-maker to convey his normative preferences, we must solve the consequences of the adopted structure of the function of norms, which originate on the socio-linguistic level. It appears, however, that due to a lack of a pragmatic theory useful for lawyers, there is no proof that the pragmatically strong permission can be expressed by means of a lot of prohibitions and commands (dos and don’ts). Besides, reducing permissions only to the language of legal rules is an obligation to accept the structure of an act of communication, which can find its full motivation in the Husserl’s structure of the direct cognition.

We develop an exact truthmaker semantics for permission and obligation. The idea is that with every singular act, we associate a sphere of permissions and a sphere of requirements: the acts that are rendered permissible and the acts that are rendered required by the act. We propose the following clauses for permissions and obligations: a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Pφ iff every exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of permissibility of the act, and a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Oφ iff some exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of requirements of the act. We show that this semantics is hyperintensional, and that it can deal with some of the so-called paradoxes of deontic logic in a natural way. Finally, we give a sound and complete axiomatization of the semantics.

We develop an exact truthmaker semantics for permission and obligation. The idea is that with every singular act, we associate a sphere of permissions and a sphere of requirements: the acts that are rendered permissible and the acts that are rendered required by the act. We propose the following clauses for permissions and obligations: a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Pφ iff every exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of permissibility of the act, and a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Oφ iff some exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of requirements of the act. We show that this semantics is hyperintensional, and that it can deal with some of the so-called paradoxes of deontic logic in a natural way. Finally, we give a sound and complete axiomatization of the semantics.

In this paper we propose an extension of Defeasible Logic to represent different concepts of defeasible permission. Special attention is paid in particular to permissive norms that work as exceptions to opposite obligations.

En este artículo, E. Bulygin aborda, una vez más, el problema del status lógico de los permisos y de las normas permisivas. Bulygin defiende la pertinencia de la triple clasificación de los permisos que ofreciera, junto con C. Alchourrón, en Normative Systems. De acuerdo con esta obra, debe distinguirse entre un concepto prescriptivo y dos conceptos descriptivos de permisión (fuerte y débil). La pertinencia y el alcance explicativo de estas distinciones han sido puestos en cuestión en algunos trabajos recientes, y estas «nuevas herejías» —dice E. Bulygin— «me obligan a empuñar nuevamente la pluma en defensa de la ortodoxia». Esta defensa desemboca en un conjunto de conclusiones, de las que parecen de especial importancia las siguientes: no existe la pretendida equivalencia pragmática sostenida por algunos críticos entre la no prohibición y la permisión; las normas permisivas son normativamente relevantes, pues cumplen múltiples funciones normativas; la concepción del Derecho que comprende reglas y principios subyacentes es irrelevante para el problema de la equivalencia entre regulación negativa (no prohibición) y permisión y para la caracterización de las lagunas normativas; las decisiones judiciales que hacen lugar a la demanda y las que la rechazan son simétricas. In this article, E. Bulygin once again approaches the problem of the logical status of permissions and permissive norms. Bulygin supports the appropriateness of the triple classification of permissions which he, together with C. Alchourrón, presented in Normative Systems. In accordance with this work, a distinction must be drawn between a prescriptive concept and two descriptive concepts of permission (strong and weak). The appropriateness and the explanatory reach of these distinctions have been questioned in some recent works and, in the words of E. Bulygin, these «new heresies have made me take up my pen again in defence of orthodoxy». This defence results in a number of conclusions of which the most important appear to be the following: the so called pragmatic equivalence believed by some critics to be found between nonprohibition and permission does not exist; permissive norms are normatively relevant, since they perform numerous normative functions; the conception of law which includes rules and underlying principles is irrelevant both with regard to the problem of equivalence between negative regulation (non-prohibition) and permission, and with regard to the characterization of normative gaps; judicial decisions which admit a claim and those which dismiss it are symmetrical.

En este artículo, E. Bulygin aborda, una vez más, el problema del status lógico de los permisos y de las normas permisivas. Bulygin defiende la pertinencia de la triple clasificación de los permisos que ofreciera, junto con C. Alchourrón, en Normative Systems. De acuerdo con esta obra, debe distinguirse entre un concepto prescriptivo y dos conceptos descriptivos de permisión (fuerte y débil). La pertinencia y el alcance explicativo de estas distinciones han sido puestos en cuestión en algunos trabajos recientes, y estas «nuevas herejías» —dice E. Bulygin— «me obligan a empuñar nuevamente la pluma en defensa de la ortodoxia». Esta defensa desemboca en un conjunto de conclusiones, de las que parecen de especial importancia las siguientes: no existe la pretendida equivalencia pragmática sostenida por algunos críticos entre la no prohibición y la permisión; las normas permisivas son normativamente relevantes, pues cumplen múltiples funciones normativas; la concepción del Derecho que comprende reglas y principios subyacentes es irrelevante para el problema de la equivalencia entre regulación negativa (no prohibición) y permisión y para la caracterización de las lagunas normativas; las decisiones judiciales que hacen lugar a la demanda y las que la rechazan son simétricas. In this article, E. Bulygin once again approaches the problem of the logical status of permissions and permissive norms. Bulygin supports the appropriateness of the triple classification of permissions which he, together with C. Alchourrón, presented in Normative Systems. In accordance with this work, a distinction must be drawn between a prescriptive concept and two descriptive concepts of permission (strong and weak). The appropriateness and the explanatory reach of these distinctions have been questioned in some recent works and, in the words of E. Bulygin, these «new heresies have made me take up my pen again in defence of orthodoxy». This defence results in a number of conclusions of which the most important appear to be the following: the so called pragmatic equivalence believed by some critics to be found between nonprohibition and permission does not exist; permissive norms are normatively relevant, since they perform numerous normative functions; the conception of law which includes rules and underlying principles is irrelevant both with regard to the problem of equivalence between negative regulation (non-prohibition) and permission, and with regard to the characterization of normative gaps; judicial decisions which admit a claim and those which dismiss it are symmetrical.