Search

The speed–accuracy tradeoff (SAT) often makes psychophysical data difficult to interpret. Accordingly, the SAT experimental procedure and model were proposed for an integrated account of the speed and accuracy of responses. However, the extensive data collection for a SAT experiment has blocked its popularity. For a quick estimation of SAT function (SATf), we previously developed a Bayesian adaptive SAT method, including an online stimulus selection strategy. By simulations, the method was proved efficient with high accuracy and precision with minimal trials, adequate for practically applying a single condition task. However, it calls for extensions to more general designs with multiple conditions and should be revised to achieve improved estimation performance. It also demands real experimental validation with human participants. In the current study, we suggested an improved method to measure SATfs for multiple task conditions concurrently and to enhance robustness in general designs. The performance was evaluated with simulation studies and a psychophysical experiment using a flanker task. Simulation results revealed that the proposed method with the adaptive stimulus selection strategy efficiently estimated multiple SATfs and improved performance even for cases with an extreme parameter value. In the psychophysical experiment, SATfs estimated by minimal adaptive trials (1/8 of conventional trials) showed high agreement with those by conventional trials required for reliably estimating multiple SATfs. These results indicate that the Bayesian adaptive SAT method is reliable and efficient in estimating SATfs in most experimental settings and may apply to SATf estimation in general behavioral research designs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a go/no-go task, lengthening the inter-trial interval (ITI) or decreasing the press percentage (PP) are known to have decelerating effects on both reaction time and on thought probe response time. The mental causes of these delays remain obscure. We performed an 18-minute online experiment with 60 participants who each performed 8 versions of an attention task (Test of Variables of Attention, ToVA) with different ITIs and PPs. After each block there were mind wandering (MW) thought probes and rating scales for subjective effort and awareness. A version of the ToVA with zero no-go-stimuli spontaneously and implicitly accelerated mean reaction time significantly. That version also quickened three subsequent response times for rating tasks by hundreds of milliseconds, which suggests that the basis of this effect is a lingering mental state. None of the subjective ratings measured were strongly related to the reaction time delay, although MW seems to delay the thought probe response. We conclude that there may be another lingering state besides MW. To perform different tasks participants make mental speed-accuracy trade-offs whereby the participant adopts a lingering mental strategy that speeds up thinking by reducing caution/uncertainty, quickening both reaction times and thought probe response times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neurocognitive profiles may be especially useful to identify factors that facilitate transitioning from contemplating suicide to attempting suicide. Generally, those who attempt suicide show greater disruptions in neurocognitive ability compared to those who think about suicide but do not proceed to attempt. The goal of this systematic review and meta-analysis is to test whether this pattern is observed with attentional control. We systematically searched PubMed, PsychINFO, CINAHL, and Google Scholar to find pertinent studies. All included studies compared attentional functioning using neutral stimuli. Each sample featured adults with a history of suicidal ideation (SI) and no history of suicide attempts (SA) compared to those with a history of SA. We identified 15 studies with 32 effect sizes (N = 931; n = 506 with SI only; n = 425 with SA). SA groups, compared to SI groups, exhibited worse accuracy yet similar reaction time, suggesting a comparatively blunted speed-accuracy tradeoff. Relative to SI, SA groups performed worse on Stroop-like and Go/NoGo tasks. SA performed better than SI on Trail Making Test B, but not A. There were few available studies. Most samples were small. We did not differentiate current vs. past SI or high vs. low lethality SA. Only English and Spanish language articles were included. Disrupted attentional control may convey risk for transitioning to SA from SI. More work is needed to determine which components of attention are most associated with suicide risk. • We evaluated 15 articles that assessed neurocognitive risk for suicide ideation vs. attempts. • All articles assessed attentional ability using neutral stimuli only. • Attempters performed worse but had similar response time, suggesting blunted cognitive control. • Stroop and Go/NoGo tasks showed greatest potential to distinguish the two groups. • Attempters performed better on Trals B, suggesting better cognitive flexibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to existing theories of simple decision-making, decisions are initiated by continuously sampling and accumulating perceptual evidence until a threshold value has been reached. Many models, such as the diffusion decision model, assume a noisy accumulation process, described mathematically as a stochastic Wiener process with Gaussian distributed noise. Recently, an alternative account of decision-making has been proposed in the Lévy Flights (LF) model, in which accumulation noise is characterized by a heavy-tailed power-law distribution, controlled by a parameter, α . The LF model produces sudden large "jumps" in evidence accumulation that are not produced by the standard Wiener diffusion model, which some have argued provide better fits to data. It remains unclear, however, whether jumps in evidence accumulation have any real psychological meaning. Here, we investigate the conjecture by Voss et al. (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,26(3), 813–832, 2019) that jumps might reflect sudden shifts in the source of evidence people rely on to make decisions. We reason that if jumps are psychologically real, we should observe systematic reductions in jumps as people become more practiced with a task (i.e., as people converge on a stable decision strategy with experience). We fitted five versions of the LF model to behavioral data from a study by Evans and Brown (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(2), 597–606, 2017), using a five-layer deep inference neural network for parameter estimation. The analysis revealed systematic reductions in jumps as a function of practice, such that the LF model more closely approximated the standard Wiener model over time. This trend could not be attributed to other sources of parameter variability, speaking against the possibility of trade-offs with other model parameters. Our analysis suggests that jumps in the LF model might be capturing strategy instability exhibited by relatively inexperienced observers early on in task performance. We conclude that further investigation of a potential psychological interpretation of jumps in evidence accumulation is warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The amount of information that can be concurrently maintained in the focus of attention is strongly restricted (Broadbent, 1958). The goal of this study was to test whether this restriction was functionally significant for language comprehension. We examined the time course dynamics of processing determiner-head agreement in English demonstrative phrases. We found evidence that agreement processing was slowed when determiner and head were no longer adjacent, but separated by modifiers. We argue that some information is shunted nearly immediately from the focus of attention, necessitating its later retrieval. Plural, the marked feature value for number, exhibits better preservation in the focus of attention, however, than the unmarked value, singular.

Performance on tasks involving speed and accuracy fluctuate throughout the 24-h day negatively affecting shift workers and organizations. Two simulated work shifts common in occupational settings were used to assess performance on a vigilance and math task. In study 1, 33 sleep-deprived participants completed a nightshift. In study 2, 32 partially sleep-deprived participants completed a dayshift. These studies found that performance differed between the type of task and the type of simulated shift where performance during the nightshift was worse than during the dayshift. In addition, collapsing speed and accuracy on the math task into inverse efficiency scores provided a unique measure that captured the impact of circadian rhythms during shiftwork. The current study also indicated that participants adopted cognitive strategies including speed-accuracy tradeoff and regulatory foci regarding work motivation (prevention focus and promotion focus) when completing the tasks depending on time-of-day, type of shift, circadian rhythms, and amount of sleep deprivation. This suggests that researchers and organizations should consider cognitive strategies in addition to the physiological components of sleep deprivation and circadian rhythms when investigating and documenting the impact of time-of-day due to different types of shiftwork conditions on performance and safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been considerable interest in what components of decision-making change when speed or accuracy is stressed. In many early studies, quite strict assumptions were made about parameter invariance across experimental conditions (sometimes called selective influence). Here we fit the standard diffusion model to the data from four large experiments with speed-accuracy instructions (with over a million total responses), allowing all model parameters to vary freely between the speed and accuracy conditions. Results show that most of the observed differences between speed and accuracy conditions appear in the boundary separation parameter, followed by nondecision time, with small effects on drift rates. However, changes in drift rates are accompanied by changes in across-trial variability in drift rate, which cancels out the effect of drift rate on accuracy and response time. Another analysis in which across-trial variance in drift rate was kept the same in fits to speed and accuracy conditions produced no difference in drift rates. Generally, if speed is stressed moderately, then both boundary separation and nondecision time are reduced and any changes in drift rate are compensated for by changes in the across-trial variance in drift rates. If speed is stressed to a high degree (Starns et al., 2012), boundary separation, nondecision time, and drift rates are reduced. This is because (we hypothesize) encoding is restricted leading to a lower degree of perceptual information or match with memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Noninvasive brain stimulation techniques, such as transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), show promise in treating a range of psychiatric and neurologic conditions. However, optimization of such applications requires a better understanding of how tDCS alters cognition and behavior. Existing evidence implicates dopamine in tDCS alterations of brain activity and plasticity; however, there is as yet no causal evidence for a role of dopamine in tDCS effects on cognition and behavior. Here, in a preregistered, double-blinded study, we examined how pharmacologically manipulating dopamine altered the effect of tDCS on the speed-accuracy trade-off, which taps ubiquitous strategic operations. Cathodal tDCS was delivered over the left prefrontal cortex and the superior medial frontal cortex before participants (N 5 62, 24 males, 38 females) completed a dot-motion task, making judgments on the direction of a field of moving dots under instructions to emphasize speed, accuracy, or both. We leveraged computational modeling to uncover how our interventions altered latent decisional processes driving the speed-accuracy trade-off. We show that dopamine in combination with tDCS (but not tDCS alone nor dopamine alone) not only impaired decision accuracy but also impaired discriminability, which suggests that these manipulations altered the encoding or representation of discriminative evidence. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first direct evidence implicating dopamine in the way tDCS affects cognition and behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now possible for real-life activities, unfolding over their natural range of temporal and spatial scales, to become the primary targets of cognitive studies. Movement toward this type of research will require an integrated methodological approach currently uncommon in the field. When executed hand in hand with thorough and ecologically valid empirical description, properly developed laboratory tasks can serve as model systems to capture the essentials of a targeted real-life activity. When integrated together, data from these two kinds of studies can facilitate causal analysis and modeling of the mental and neural processes that govern that activity, enabling a fuller account than either method can provide on its own. The resulting account, situated in the activity's natural environmental, social, and motivational context, can then enable effective and efficient development of interventions to support and improve the activity as it actually unfolds in real time. We believe that such an integrated multi-level research program should be common rather than rare and is necessary to achieve scientifically and societally important goals. The time is right to finally abandon the boundaries that separate the laboratory from the outside world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now possible for real-life activities, unfolding over their natural range of temporal and spatial scales, to become the primary targets of cognitive studies. Movement toward this type of research will require an integrated methodological approach currently uncommon in the field. When executed hand in hand with thorough and ecologically valid empirical description, properly developed laboratory tasks can serve as model systems to capture the essentials of a targeted real-life activity. When integrated together, data from these two kinds of studies can facilitate causal analysis and modeling of the mental and neural processes that govern that activity, enabling a fuller account than either method can provide on its own. The resulting account, situated in the activity’s natural environmental, social, and motivational context, can then enable effective and efficient development of interventions to support and improve the activity as it actually unfolds in real time. We believe that such an integrated multi-level research program should be common rather than rare and is necessary to achieve scientifically and societally important goals. The time is right to finally abandon the boundaries that separate the laboratory from the outside world.

Recent years have seen a rapid increase in the number of studies using evidence-accumulation models (such as the drift diffusion model, DDM) in the fields of psychology and neuroscience. These models go beyond observed behavior to extract descriptions of latent cognitive processes that have been linked to different brain substrates. Accordingly, it is important for psychology and neuroscience researchers to be able to understand published findings based on these models. However, many articles using (and explaining) these models assume that the reader already has a fairly deep understanding of (and interest in) the computational and mathematical underpinnings, which may limit many readers' ability to understand the results and appreciate the implications. The goal of this article is therefore to provide a practical introduction to the DDM and its application to behavioral data - without requiring a deep background in mathematics or computational modeling. The article discusses the basic ideas underpinning the DDM, and explains the way that DDM results are normally presented and evaluated. It also provides a step-by-step example of how the DDM is implemented and used on an example dataset, and discusses methods for model validation and for presenting (and evaluating) model results. Supplementary material provides R code for all examples, along with the sample dataset described in the text, to allow interested readers to replicate the examples themselves. The article is primarily targeted at psychologists, neuroscientists, and health professionals with a background in experimental cognitive psychology and/or cognitive neuroscience, who are interested in understanding how DDMs are used in the literature, as well as some who may to go on to apply these approaches in their own work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The speed–accuracy tradeoff (SAT), where increased response speed often leads to decreased accuracy, is well established in experimental psychology. However, its implications for psychological assessments, especially in high-stakes settings, remain less understood. This study presents an experimental approach to investigate the SAT within a high-stakes spatial ability assessment. By manipulating instructions in a within-subjects design to induce speed variations in a large sample (N = 1,305) of applicants for an air traffic controller training program, we demonstrate the feasibility of manipulating working speed. Our findings confirm the presence of the SAT for most participants, suggesting that traditional ability scores may not fully reflect performance in high-stakes assessments. Importantly, we observed individual differences in the SAT, challenging the assumption of uniform SAT functions across test takers. These results highlight the complexity of interpreting high-stakes assessment outcomes and the influence of test conditions on performance dynamics. This study offers a valuable addition to the methodological toolkit for assessing the intraindividual relationship between speed and accuracy in psychological testing (including SAT research), providing a controlled approach while acknowledging the need to address potential confounders. Future research may apply this method across various cognitive domains, populations, and testing contexts to deepen our understanding of the SAT’s broader implications for psychological measurement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is growing evidence that a natural repellent, injury-released alarm cues, can be used to guide the movements of invasive fishes to achieve management goals. However, because this process involves perception, downstream cognitive processing of sensory information affects decisions regarding expression of antipredator behavior. Response habituation, wherein repeated or continuous exposure to a cue reduces behavioral response rates, is an oft-cited challenge for use of predation cues as conservation tools. Habituation may be delayed or prevented by altering the concentration and/or the temporal pattern of odor release (pulses of odor vs continuous application). We examined the effects of varying odor concentration and exposure regime (continuous vs pulsed) on behavioral response of adult sea lamprey (Petromyzon marinus) to conspecific alarm cue in a two-choice maze. We found that exposure to alarm cue induced more frequent and rapid upstream movement, regardless of exposure regime. There was also clear evidence of a speed-accuracy tradeoff, wherein sea lamprey that took longer to arrive at the bifurcation in the maze were more likely to avoid the arm activated with alarm cue. We could not ascertain the value of increasing concentration or pulsing the alarm cue on preventing habituation, as habituation did not occur. We hypothesize dishabituation to the alarm cue occurred immediately prior to testing due to handling that may have inadvertently simulated an unsuccessful predator attack. If true, incorporating dishabituating stimuli may prove a useful means to maintain the efficacy of alarm cue when applied as a repellent to manipulate the movements of sea lamprey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability to use past learned experiences to guide decisions is an important component of adaptive behavior, especially when decision-making is performed under time pressure or when perceptual information is unreliable. Previous studies using visual discrimination tasks have shown that this prior-informed decision-making ability is impaired in Parkinson's disease (PD), but the mechanisms underlying this deficit and the precise impact of dopaminergic denervation within cortico-basal circuits remain unclear. To shed light on this problem, we evaluated prior-informed decision-making under various conditions of perceptual uncertainty in a sample of 13 clinically established early PD patients, and compared behavioral performance with healthy control (HC) subjects matched in age, sex and education. PD patients and HC subjects performed a random dot motion task in which they had to decide the net direction (leftward vs. rightward) of a field of moving dots and communicate their choices through manual button presses. We manipulated prior knowledge by modulating the probability of occurrence of leftward vs. rightward motion stimuli between blocks of trials, and by explicitly giving these probabilities to subjects at the beginning of each block. We further manipulated stimulus discriminability by varying the proportion of dots moving coherently in the signal direction and speed-accuracy instructions. PD patients used choice probabilities to guide perceptual decisions in both speed and accuracy conditions, and their performance did not significantly differ from that of HC subjects. An additional analysis of the data with the diffusion decision model confirmed this conclusion. These results suggest that the impaired use of priors during visual discrimination observed at more advanced stages of PD is independent of dopaminergic denervation, though additional studies with larger sample sizes are needed to more firmly establish this conclusion. • Early stages of Parkinson's disease do not impair perceptual decision-making. • Patients optimally combined prior and current information to guide decisions. • Patients adjusted their decision threshold as a function of time constraints. • Modeling the data with the diffusion model strengthened these conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen a rapid increase in the number of studies using evidence-accumulation models (such as the drift diffusion model, DDM) in the fields of psychology and neuroscience. These models go beyond observed behavior to extract descriptions of latent cognitive processes that have been linked to different brain substrates. Accordingly, it is important for psychology and neuroscience researchers to be able to understand published findings based on these models. However, many articles using (and explaining) these models assume that the reader already has a fairly deep understanding of (and interest in) the computational and mathematical underpinnings, which may limit many readers’ ability to understand the results and appreciate the implications. The goal of this article is therefore to provide a practical introduction to the DDM and its application to behavioral data – without requiring a deep background in mathematics or computational modeling. The article discusses the basic ideas underpinning the DDM, and explains the way that DDM results are normally presented and evaluated. It also provides a step-by-step example of how the DDM is implemented and used on an example dataset, and discusses methods for model validation and for presenting (and evaluating) model results. Supplementary material provides R code for all examples, along with the sample dataset described in the text, to allow interested readers to replicate the examples themselves. The article is primarily targeted at psychologists, neuroscientists, and health professionals with a background in experimental cognitive psychology and/or cognitive neuroscience, who are interested in understanding how DDMs are used in the literature, as well as some who may to go on to apply these approaches in their own work.

In contrast to traditional professional sports, there are few standardized metrics in professional esports (competitive multiplayer video games) for assessing a player's skill and ability. We assessed the performance of professional-level players in Aim LabTM, a first-person shooter training and assessment game, with two target-shooting tasks. These tasks differed primarily in target size: the task with large targets provided an incentive to be fast but imprecise and the task with large targets provided an incentive to be precise but slow. Each player's motor acuity was measured by characterizing the speed-accuracy trade-off in shot behavior: shot time (elapsed time for a player to shoot at a target) and shot spatial error (distance from center of a target). We also characterized the fine-grained kinematics of players' mouse movements. Our findings demonstrate that: 1) movement kinematics depended on task demands; 2) individual differences in motor acuity were significantly correlated with kinematics; and 3) performance, combined across the two target sizes, was poorly characterized by Fitts Law. Our approach to measuring motor acuity has widespread applications not only in esports assessment and training, but also in basic (motor psychophysics) and clinical (gamified rehabilitation) research.

This study examined potential sources of grammatical gender variability in heritage speakers (HSs) of Italian with a focus on morphological markedness. Fifty-four adult Italian HSs living in Germany and 40 homeland Italian speakers completed an online Self-Paced Reading Task and an offline Grammaticality Judgment Task. Both tasks involved sentences with grammatical and ungrammatical noun-adjective agreement, manipulating markedness. In grammatical sentences, both groups showed a markedness effect: shorter reading times (RTs) and higher accuracy for sentences containing masculine nouns as compared to sentences with feminine nouns. In ungrammatical sentences, although both groups were sensitive to ungrammaticality, only HSs showed a markedness effect, that is, they had significantly longer RTs and higher accuracy when violations were realized on feminine adjectives. Proficiency in the HL was a significant predictor of accuracy and RTs at the individual level. Taken together, results indicate that HSs acquire and process gender in a qualitatively similar way to homeland native speakers. However, RT evidence seems to suggest that at least under particular experimental methods, markedness considerations are more prevalent for HSs resulting in a speed-accuracy tradeoff. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Antisaccade tasks can be used to index cognitive control processes, e.g. attention, behavioral inhibition, working memory, and goal maintenance in people with brain disorders. Though diagnoses of schizophrenia (SZ), schizoaffective (SAD), and bipolar I with psychosis (BDP) are typically considered to be distinct entities, previous work shows patterns of cognitive deficits differing in degree, rather than in kind, across these syndromes. Methods: Large samples of individuals with psychotic disorders were recruited through the Bipolar-Schizophrenia Network on Intermediate Phenotypes 2 (B-SNIP2) study. Anti- and pro-saccade task performances were evaluated in 189 people with SZ, 185 people with SAD, 96 people with BDP, and 279 healthy comparison participants. Logistic functions were fitted to each group's antisaccade speed-performance tradeoff patterns. Results: Psychosis groups had higher antisaccade error rates than the healthy group, with SZ and SAD participants committing 2 times as many errors, and BDP participants committing 1.5 times as many errors. Latencies on correctly performed antisaccade trials in SZ and SAD were longer than in healthy participants, although error trial latencies were preserved. Parameters of speed-performance tradeoff functions indicated that compared to the healthy group, SZ and SAD groups had optimal performance characterized by more errors, as well as less benefit from prolonged response latencies. Prosaccade metrics did not differ between groups. Conclusions: With basic prosaccade mechanisms intact, the higher speed-performance tradeoff cost for antisaccade performance in psychosis cases indicates a deficit that is specific to the higher-order cognitive aspects of saccade generation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined potential sources of grammatical gender variability in heritage speakers (HSs) of Italian with a focus on morphological markedness. Fifty-four adult Italian HSs living in Germany and 40 homeland Italian speakers completed an online Self-Paced Reading Task and an offline Grammaticality Judgment Task. Both tasks involved sentences with grammatical and ungrammatical noun-adjective agreement, manipulating markedness. In grammatical sentences, both groups showed a markedness effect: shorter reading times (RTs) and higher accuracy for sentences containing masculine nouns as compared to sentences with feminine nouns. In ungrammatical sentences, although both groups were sensitive to ungrammaticality, only HSs showed a markedness effect, that is, they had significantly longer RTs and higher accuracy when violations were realized on feminine adjectives. Proficiency in the HL was a significant predictor of accuracy and RTs at the individual level. Taken together, results indicate that HSs acquire and process gender in a qualitatively similar way to homeland native speakers. However, RT evidence seems to suggest that at least under particular experimental methods, markedness considerations are more prevalent for HSs resulting in a speed-accuracy tradeoff.

Errors and their consequences are typically studied by investigating changes in decision speed and accuracy in trials that follow an error, commonly referred to as "post-error adjustments". Many studies have reported that subjects slow down following an error, a phenomenon called "post-error slowing" (PES). However, the functional significance of PES is still a matter of debate as it is not always adaptive. That is, it is not always associated with a gain in performance and can even occur with a decline in accuracy. Here, we hypothesized that the nature of PES is influenced by one's speed-accuracy tradeoff policy, which determines the overall level of choice accuracy in the task at hand. To test this hypothesis, we had subjects performing a task in two distinct contexts (separate days), which either promoted speed (hasty context) or cautiousness (cautious context), allowing us to consider post-error adjustments according to whether subjects performed choices with a low or high accuracy level, respectively. Accordingly, our data indicate that post-error adjustments varied according to the context in which subjects performed the task, with PES being solely significant in the hasty context (low accuracy). In addition, we only observed a gain in performance after errors in a specific trial type, suggesting that post-error adjustments depend on a complex combination of processes that affect the speed of ensuing actions as well as the degree to which such PES comes with a gain in performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cognitive processes underlying the ability of human performers to trade speed for accuracy is often conceptualized within evidence accumulation models, but it is not yet clear whether and how these models can account for decision-making in the presence of various sources of conflicting information. In the present study, we provide evidence that speed-accuracy tradeoffs (SATs) can have opposing effects on performance across two different conflict tasks. Specifically, in a single preregistered experiment, the mean reaction time (RT) congruency effect in the Simon task increased, whereas the mean RT congruency effect in the Eriksen task decreased, when the focus was put on response speed versus accuracy. Critically, distributional RT analyses revealed distinct delta plot patterns across tasks, thus indicating that the unfolding of distractor-based response activation in time is sufficient to explain the opposing pattern of congruency effects. In addition, a recent evidence accumulation model with the notion of time-varying conflicting information was successfully fitted to the experimental data. These fits revealed task-specific time-courses of distractor-based activation and suggested that time pressure substantially decreases decision boundaries in addition to reducing the duration of non-decision processes and the rate of evidence accumulation. Overall, the present results suggest that time pressure can have multiple effects in decision-making under conflict, but that strategic adjustments of decision boundaries in conjunction with different time-courses of distractor-based activation can produce counteracting effects on task performance with different types of distracting sources of information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Optimal decision-making requires balancing fast but error-prone and more accurate but slower decisions through adjustments of decision thresholds. Here, we demonstrate two distinct correlates of such speed-accuracy adjustments by recording subthalamic nucleus (STN) activity and electroencephalography in 11 Parkinson's disease patients during a perceptual decision-making task; STN low-frequency oscillatory (LFO) activity (2-8 Hz), coupled to activity at prefrontal electrode Fz, and STN beta activity (13-30 Hz) coupled to electrodes C3/C4 close to motor cortex. These two correlates differed not only in their cortical topography and spectral characteristics but also in the relative timing of recruitment and in their precise relationship with decision thresholds. Increases of STN LFO power preceding the response predicted increased thresholds only after accuracy instructions, while cue-induced reductions of STN beta power decreased thresholds irrespective of instructions. These findings indicate that distinct neural mechanisms determine whether a decision will be made in haste or with caution.

Errors and their consequences are typically studied by investigating changes in decision speed and accuracy in trials that follow an error, commonly referred to as “post-error adjustments”. Many studies have reported that subjects slow down following an error, a phenomenon called “post-error slowing” (PES). However, the functional significance of PES is still a matter of debate as it is not always adaptive. That is, it is not always associated with a gain in performance and can even occur with a decline in accuracy. Here, we hypothesized that the nature of PES is influenced by one’s speed-accuracy tradeoff policy, which determines the overall level of choice accuracy in the task at hand. To test this hypothesis, we had subjects performing a task in two distinct contexts (separate days), which either promoted speed (hasty context) or cautiousness (cautious context), allowing us to consider post-error adjustments according to whether subjects performed choices with a low or high accuracy level, respectively. Accordingly, our data indicate that post-error adjustments varied according to the context in which subjects performed the task, with PES being solely significant in the hasty context (low accuracy). In addition, we only observed a gain in performance after errors in a specific trial type, suggesting that post-error adjustments depend on a complex combination of processes that affect the speed of ensuing actions as well as the degree to which such PES comes with a gain in performance.

Successful decision making often requires finding the right balance between the speed and accuracy of responding: Emphasising speed can lead to error-prone performance, yet emphasising accuracy leads to a slowing of performance. Such speed–accuracy tradeoffs (SATs) therefore require establishing appropriate response settings to optimise performance in response to changing environmental demands. Such strategic adaptation of response settings relies on the striatum component of the basal ganglia, an area implicated in depression. The current study explored the association between depression symptomatology and SAT performance. Two experiments presented participants with an SAT paradigm embedded within a simple decision-making task, together with measures of depression symptomatology. Experiment 1 (N = 349) was correlational, whereas Experiment 2 was a two-phase experiment where participants (N = 501) were first pre-screened on depression symptomatology and extreme-low and extreme-high responders (total N = 91) were invited to Phase 2. Behavioural data were modelled with a drift diffusion model. Behavioural data and associated diffusion modelling showed large and robust SAT effects. Emphasising accuracy led to an increase in boundary separation, an increase in drift rate, and an increase in non-decision time. However, the magnitude of the changes of these parameters with SAT instructions was not associated with measures of depression symptomatology. The results suggest that the strategic adaptation of response settings in response to environmental changes in speed–accuracy instructions does not appear to be associated with depression symptomatology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To explore the time course of space- and object-based attentional selection processes I analysed the shapes of the response time (RT) and accuracy distributions of left/right arrow identification responses in the two-rectangle paradigm. After cueing one of the four ends of two horizontally or vertically oriented rectangles the arrow typically appears at the cued location (valid), or sometimes at an uncued location in the same (invalid-same) or other rectangle (invalid-different). The data point to a multiple-route model in which (a) an informative cue generates response channel activation before arrow signals emerge, (b) the task-irrelevant arrow location is represented in multiple egocentric and allocentric reference frames around 150 ms after target onset, with the former including a reference frame centered on the currently attended location, (c) the task-irrelevant spatial codes activate premature response tendencies that are actively inhibited to allow gating of arrow direction signals, (d) after an invalid cue the onset of the arrow triggers an “attention shift” – acting between 150 and 240 ms after target onset – that strongly interferes with task performance in certain conditions (invalid-same cueing with horizontal rectangles, and invalid-different cueing with vertical rectangles), and (e) participants differ in which task-irrelevant codes they preferentially inhibit. These results pave the way for future confirmatory studies to temporally characterize and disentangle the contributions of different types of response channel activation processes, from those of reactive cognitive control processes including active and selective response suppression.

Cognitive variation is proposed to be the fundamental underlying factor that drives behavioral variation, yet it is still to be fully integrated with the observed variation at other phenotypic levels that has recently been unified under the common pace-of-life framework. This cognitive and the resulting behavioral diversity is especially significant in the context of a social group, the performance of which is a collective outcome of this diversity. In this review, we argue about the utility of classifying cognitive traits along a slow-fast continuum in the larger context of the pace-of-life framework. Using Tinbergen’s explanatory framework for different levels of analyses and drawing from the large body of knowledge about honeybee behavior, we discuss the observed interindividual variation in cognitive traits and slow-fast cognitive phenotypes from an adaptive, evolutionary, mechanistic and developmental perspective. We discuss the challenges in this endeavor and suggest possible next steps in terms of methodological, statistical and theoretical approaches to move the field forward for an integrative understanding of how slow-fast cognitive differences, by influencing collective behavior, impact social evolution.

Decision-making models in the behavioral, cognitive, and neural sciences typically consist of forced-choice paradigms with two alternatives. While theoretically it is feasible to translate any decision situation to a sequence of binary choices, real-life decision-making is typically more complex and nonlinear, involving choices among multiple items, graded judgments, and deferments of decision-making. Here, we discuss how the complexity of real-life decision-making can be addressed using conventional decision-making models by focusing on the interactive dynamics between criteria settings and the collection of evidence. Decision-makers can engage in multi-stage, parallel decision-making by exploiting the space for deliberation, with non-binary readings of evidence available at any point in time. The interactive dynamics principally adhere to the speed-accuracy tradeoff, such that increasing the space for deliberation enables extended data collection. The setting of space for deliberation reflects a form of meta-decision-making that can, and should be, studied empirically as a value-based exercise that weighs the prior propensities, the economics of information seeking, and the potential outcomes. Importantly, the control of the space for deliberation raises a question of agency. Decision-makers may actively and explicitly set their own decision parameters, but these parameters may also be set by environmental pressures. Thus, decision-makers may be influenced—or nudged in a particular direction—by how decision problems are framed, with a sense of urgency or a binary definition of choice options. We argue that a proper understanding of these mechanisms has important practical implications toward the optimal usage of space for deliberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans and other animals often need to balance the desire to gather sensory information (to make the best choice) with the urgency to act, facing a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). Given the ubiquity of SAT across species, extensive research has been devoted to understanding the computational mechanisms allowing its regulation at different timescales, including from one context to another, and from one decision to another. However, animals must frequently change their SAT on even shorter timescales--that is, over the course of an ongoing decision--and little is known about the mechanisms that allow such rapid adaptations. The present study aimed at addressing this issue. Human subjects performed a decision task with changing evidence. In this task, subjects received rewards for correct answers but incurred penalties for mistakes. An increase or a decrease in penalty occurring halfway through the trial promoted rapid SAT shifts, favoring speeded decisions either in the early or in the late stage of the trial. Importantly, these shifts were associated with stage-specific adjustments in the accuracy criterion exploited for committing to a choice. Those subjects who decreased the most their accuracy criterion at a given decision stage exhibited the highest gain in speed, but also the highest cost in terms of performance accuracy at that time. Altogether, the current findings offer a unique extension of previous work, by suggesting that dynamic cha*nges in accuracy criterion allow the regulation of the SAT within the timescale of a single decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motor control for forward step initiation begins with anticipatory postural adjustments (APAs). During APAs, the central nervous system controls the center of pressure (CoP) to generate an appropriate center of mass (CoM) position and velocity for various task requirements. In this study, we investigated the effect of required stepping accuracy on the CoM and CoP parameters during APA for a step initiation task. Sixteen healthy young participants stepped forward onto the targets on the ground as soon as and as fast as possible in response to visual stimuli. Two target sizes (small: 2 cm square and large: 10 cm square) and two target distances (short: 20% and long: 40% of the body height) were tested. CoP displacement during the APA and the CoM position, velocity, and extrapolated CoM at the timing of the takeoff of the lead leg were compared among the conditions. In the small condition, comparing with the large condition, the CoM position was set closer to the stance limb side during the APA, which was confirmed by the location of the extrapolated center of mass at the instance of the takeoff of the lead leg [small: 0.09 ± 0.01 m, large: 0.06 ± 0.01 m, mean and standard deviation, F(1, 15) = 96.46, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.87]. The variability in the mediolateral extrapolated center of mass location was smaller in the small target condition than large target condition when the target distance was long [small: 0.010 ± 0.002 m, large: 0.013 ± 0.004 m, t(15) = 3.8, p = 0.002, d = 0.96]. These findings showed that in the step initiation task, the CoM state and its variability were task-relevantly determined during the APA in accordance with the required stepping accuracy.

The neurophysiological characteristics of sustained attention states are unclear in discrete multi-finger force control tasks. In this article, we developed an immersive visuo-haptic task for conducting stimulus-response measurements. Visual cues were randomly provided to signify the required amplitude and tolerance of fingertip force. Participants were required to respond to the visual cues by pressing force transducers using their fingertips. Response time variation was taken as a behavioral measure of sustained attention states during the task. 50% low-variability trials were classified as the optimal state and the other high-variability trials were classified as the suboptimal state using z-scoring over time. A 64-channel electroencephalogram (EEG) acquisition system was used to collect brain activities during the tasks. The haptics-elicited potential amplitude at 20 ∼ 40 ms in latency and over the frontal-central region significantly decreased in the optimal state. Furthermore, the alpha-band power in the spectra of 8 ∼ 13 Hz was significantly suppressed in the frontal-central, right temporal, and parietal regions in the optimal state. Taken together, we have identified neuroelectrophysiological features that were associated with sustained attention during multi-finger force control tasks, which would be potentially used in the development of closed-loop attention detection and training systems exploiting haptic interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People with aphasia demonstrate language impairments evident in both performance accuracy and processing speed, but the direct relationship between accuracy and speed requires further consideration. This article describes two recent attempts to make quantitative progress in this domain using response time modeling: the diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) applied to two-choice tasks and a multinomial ex-Gaussian model applied to picture naming. The diffusion model may be used to characterize core linguistic processing efficiency and speed–accuracy tradeoffs independently, and research suggests that maladaptive speed–accuracy tradeoffs lead to performance impairments in at least some people with aphasia. The multinomial ex-Gaussian response time model of picture naming provides a simple and straightforward way to estimate the optimal response time cutoffs for individual people with aphasia (i.e., the cutoff where additional time is unlikely to lead to a correct response). While response time modeling applied to aphasia research is at an early stage of development, both the diffusion model and multinomial ex-Gaussian response time model of picture naming show promise and should be further developed in future work. This article also provides preliminary recommendations for clinicians regarding how to conceptualize, identify, and potentially address maladaptive speed–accuracy tradeoffs for people with aphasia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decision making often involves a tradeoff between speed and accuracy. Previous studies indicate that neural activity in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) represents the gradual accumulation of evidence toward a threshold level, or evidence bound, which terminates the decision process. The level of this bound is hypothesized to mediate the speed-accuracy tradeoff. To test this, we recorded from LIP while monkeys performed a motion discrimination task in two speed-accuracy regimes. Surprisingly, the terminating threshold levels of neural activity were similar in both regimes. However, neurons recorded in the faster regime exhibited stronger evidence-independent activation from the beginning of decision formation, effectively reducing the evidence-dependent neural modulation needed for choice commitment. Our results suggest that control of speed vs accuracy may be exerted through changes in decision-related neural activity itself rather than through changes in the threshold applied to such neural activity to terminate a decision.

Background: When environmental conditions require accurate foot placement during walking (e.g., on a rough path), we typically walk slower to avoid tripping, slipping or stumbling. Likewise, hurrying too much is a common situational circumstance of walking-related falls. This suggests a tradeoff between walking speed and stepping accuracy in situations that demand precise foot placement.Research Question: How can this expected tradeoff between walking speed and stepping accuracy best be parameterized?Methods: In Experiment 1, participants (n = 20) walked at five different speeds over an irregularly spaced sequence of projected stepping targets. Participants were instructed to place their feet accurately onto the targets, while following a constant-speed cue running alongside the walkway. Stepping accuracy was parameterized as overall (RMSE, root mean square error), variable (VE) and constant (CE) stepping errors, quantified over targets as well as per target. In Experiment 2, we determined preferred walking speed and stepping accuracy for regularly and irregularly spaced stepping targets.Results: Repeated-measures ANOVAs revealed that RMSE and VE grew linearly with increasing speeds, both over targets as well as per target. Per target CE varied in magnitude and sign with variations in inter-target spacing: for shorter inter-target spacing targets were overshot (CE > 0), while for longer inter-target spacing targets were undershot (CE < 0). This effect was stronger for faster speeds and for targets preceded by the shortest and longest inter-target spacing. Preferred walking speed and per-target VE did not differ between regularly and irregularly spaced targets.Significance: Participants stepped less precisely when walking faster. The linear increase in VE with faster speeds was consistent with Schmidt's law regarding the speed-accuracy tradeoff. The systematic comparison of stepping errors over regularly and irregularly spaced stepping-target conditions further provided important clues on how to best parameterize stepping accuracy: per stepping target using VE (i.e., stepping inconsistency), complemented with CE (i.e., stepping bias) in case of irregular inter-target spacing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Speed accuracy trade-off, the inverse relationship between movement speed and task accuracy, is a ubiquitous feature of skilled motor performance. Many previous studies have focused on the dominant arm, unimanual performance in both simple tasks, such as target reaching, and complex tasks, such as overarm throwing. However, while handedness is a prominent feature of human motor performance, the effect of limb dominance on speed-accuracy relationships is not well-understood. Based on previous research, we hypothesize that dominant arm skilled performance should depend on visual information and prior task experience, and that the non-dominant arm should show greater skill when no visual information nor prior task information is available. Forty right-handed young adults reached to 32 randomly presented targets across a virtual reality workspace with either the left or the right arm. Half of the participants received no visual feedback about hand position throughout each reach. Sensory information and task experience were lowest during the first cycle of exposure (32 reaches) in the no-vision condition, in which visual information about motion was not available. Under this condition, we found that the left arm group showed greater skill, measured in terms of position error normalized to speed, and by error variability. However, as task experience and sensory information increased, the right arm group showed substantial improvements in speed-accuracy relations, while the left arm group maintained, but did not improve, speed-accuracy relations throughout the task. These differences in performance between dominant and non-dominant arm groups during the separate stages of the task are consistent with complimentary models of lateralization, which propose different proficiencies of each hemisphere for different features of control. Our results are incompatible with global dominance models of handedness that propose dominant arm advantages under all performance conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term speed-accuracy tradeoff is used when an increase in response speed comes at the expense of response accuracy. Although originally a concept from experimental psychology, the speed-accuracy tradeoff has been a topic in psychological assessment, too. In the first part of the manuscript, we discuss motivational factors that may be responsible for a tradeoff between work pace and effective ability in psychological tests. We address possible modeling strategies and implications for psychological assessment. In the second part of the manuscript, we explore the tradeoff between work pace and effective ability in two empirical data sets. The findings suggest that the relation between work pace and effective ability is more complex than the standard conception of the speed-accuracy tradeoff implies. It seems possible to increase both work pace and effective ability. This might be due to the fact that motivated test takers allocate more mental resources, increase their speed of processing, or have a higher focus on the task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trajectories in human aimed movements are inherently variable. Using the concept of positional variance profiles, such trajectories are shown to be decomposable into two phases: In a first phase, the variance of the limb position over many trajectories increases rapidly; in a second phase, it then decreases steadily. A new theoretical model, where the aiming task is seen as a Shannon-like communication problem, is developed to describe the second phase: Information is transmitted from a "source" (determined by the position at the end of the first phase) to a "destination" (the movement's end-point) over a "channel" perturbed by Gaussian noise, with the presence of a noiseless feedback link. Information-theoretic considerations show that the positional variance decreases exponentially with a rate equal to the channel capacity C. Two existing datasets for simple pointing tasks are re-analyzed and observations on real data confirm our model. The first phase has constant duration, and C is found constant across instructions and task parameters, which thus characterizes the participant's performance. Our model provides a clear understanding of the speed-accuracy tradeoff in aimed movements: Since the participant's capacity is fixed, a higher prescribed accuracy necessarily requires a longer second phase resulting in an increased overall movement time. The well-known Fitts' law is also recovered using this approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The tradeoff between speed and accuracy of human movements has been exploited from many different perspectives, such as experimental psychology, workspace design, human–machine interface. This tradeoff is formalized by Fitts' law, which states a linear relationship between the duration and the difficulty of the movement. The bigger is the required accuracy in reaching a target or farther is the target, the slower has to be the movement. A variety of computational models of neuromusculoskeletal systems have been proposed to pinpoint the neurobiological mechanisms that are involved in human movement. We introduce a neurocomputational model of spinal cord to unveil how the tradeoff between speed and accuracy elicits from the interaction between neural and musculoskeletal systems. Model simulations showed that the speed–accuracy tradeoff is not an intrinsic property of the neuromuscular system, but it is a behavioral trait that emerges from the strategy adopted by the central nervous system for executing faster movements. In particular, results suggest that the velocity of a previous learned movement is regulated by the monosynaptic connection between cortical cells and alpha motoneurons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thanks to the work of Anne Treisman and many others, the visual search paradigm has become one of the most popular paradigms in the study of visual attention. However, statistics like mean correct response time (RT) and percent error do not usually suffice to decide between the different search models that have been developed. Recently, to move beyond mean performance measures in visual search, RT histograms have been plotted, theoretical waiting time distributions have been fitted, and whole RT and error distributions have been simulated. Here we promote and illustrate the general application of discrete-time hazard analysis to response times, and of micro-level speed–accuracy tradeoff analysis to timed response accuracies. An exploratory analysis of published benchmark search data from feature, conjunction, and spatial configuration search tasks reveals new features of visual search behavior, such as a relatively flat hazard function in the right tail of the RT distributions for all tasks, a clear effect of set size on the shape of the RT distribution for the feature search task, and individual differences in the presence of a systematic pattern of early errors. Our findings suggest that the temporal dynamics of visual search behavior results from a decision process that is temporally modulated by concurrently active recurrent object recognition, learning, and cognitive control processes, next to attentional selection processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present series of studies sought to examine how external factors influence behavioral decision making task performance. Utilizing the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to assess risky decision making, we examined the influence of a dual task paradigm (Study 1, Study 2), shifting task focus to decision making speed versus accuracy (Study 3), and varied intertrial intervals (Study 4). College student participants completed the IGT and decision making speed and the patterns of IGT selections by deck in the earlier (decision making under ambiguity) and later (decision making under risk) trials were examined. Participants completing the IGT while simultaneously completing a dual working memory task made slower decisions and failed to learn, compared to the single task participants, that Deck C was an advantageous deck. Participants told to focus on being as accurate as possible in their decisions selected more from Deck C, whereas participants told to focus on making the quickest possible decision selected more from Deck D. Manipulating the intertrial interval, giving participants more time to learn from feedback, did not affect decision making speed or accuracy. Implications for our understanding of how individuals decide on the IGT and how heuristics may develop are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Phasic alerting increases costs of response conflict in RT and ERR. • ERP and time-frequency results localized this effect at three stages of the S-R pathway. • Alerting affects both the emergence of conflict and conflict control. • Alerting-conflict interaction cannot be explained as speed-accuracy tradeoff. The present study investigated the locus of the effect of alerting on response conflict, and examined whether this effect may be interpreted as an alerting-triggered imbalance of speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). Participants performed the flanker task with an alerting tone in half of the trials and SAT manipulation. Behavioral results showed the usual increase of the conflict effect (incongruent-congruent flankers) in the alerting trials. This interaction was not affected by SAT manipulation in response times, although accuracy emphasis abolished alerting effects in error rates. Event-related potential (ERP) results showed that alerting increased the conflict by facilitating the selection and activation of stimulus-response links, reflected in modulations of the P3b component, and by enhancing the activation of incorrect response evoked by incongruent flankers, reflected in an increased initial incorrect activation in the lateralized readiness potential (LRP). Time-frequency analysis showed that the alerting-triggered increase of conflict entailed stronger response of executive mechanisms, reflected in a larger conflict-related midfrontal theta-band power. These EEG effects were not affected by SAT manipulation. In conclusion, alerting affects both the emergence of conflict and conflict control, and this alerting-conflict interaction could not be explained in terms of SAT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whenever we make a choice, we must also decide how much time to spend making it. Many theories of decision-making crucially assume that this deliberation perfectly balances the costs of time expenditure and the benefits of better decisions. However, might we "overthink" or "underthink" decisions? Here, I propose and implement a method to precisely determine whether people are optimally spending their time on deliberation, accounting for individual preferences. This test evaluates the consistency of underlying preferences for time when incentives change, which is a necessary condition for optimality. This enables a more comprehensive analysis of rationality in a variety of contexts. I demonstrate how the test can reveal departures from optimality using two motion discrimination experiments in which I vary task difficulty and monetary incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Recent research (Myszkowski, Çelik, & Storme, 2018) has suggested that the ability to form accurate visual aesthetic judgments – an ability referred to as aesthetic sensitivity (Child, 1964), or "good taste" (Eysenck, 1983) – could be explained by the extent to which one taps into extensive processing strategies when facing aesthetic objects. Because individual differences in processing extensiveness may lead to different processing speed, we hypothesize that individuals with high visual aesthetic sensitivity present slower responding to visual aesthetic sensitivity tasks – even without time constraints. 201 adults took the Visual Aesthetic Sensitivity Test-Revised (Myszkowski & Storme, 2017), and their responses and response times were analyzed through joint hierarchical item-response theory modeling (van der Linden & Fox, 2016). As hypothesized, latent speed was negatively correlated at −0.47 (95% HPD [−0.61, −0.32]) with latent accuracy. Similar findings were obtained, accounting for guessing or not, including aberrant response patterns or not. In addition, more difficult items were also more time intensive. These findings are discussed as a substantiation that an important explanation for individual differences in visual aesthetic sensitivity lies in how much individuals are disposed to extensively process aesthetic objects. Highlights • We hypothesize that speed impacts accuracy in aesthetic sensitivity tests. • 201 adults responded the VAST-R while the response times were recorded. • Joint hierarchical item-response theory modeling is used. • Latent speed correlated significantly negatively and strongly with ability. • This finding is obtained with or without accounting for guessing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stochastic accumulator models account for response times and errors in perceptual decision making by assuming a noisy accumulation of perceptual evidence to a threshold. Previously, we explained saccade visual search decision making by macaque monkeys with a stochastic multiaccumulator model in which accumulation was driven by a gated feed-forward integration to threshold of spike trains from visually responsive neurons in frontal eye field that signal stimulus salience. This neurally constrained model quantitatively accounted for response times and errors in visual search for a target among varying numbers of distractors and replicated the dynamics of presaccadic movement neurons hypothesized to instantiate evidence accumulation. This modeling framework suggested strategic control over gate or over threshold as two potential mechanisms to accomplish speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). Here, we show that our gated accumulator model framework can account for visual search performance under SAT instructions observed in a milestone neurophysiological study of frontal eye field. This framework captured key elements of saccade search performance, through observed modulations of neural input, as well as flexible combinations of gate and threshold parameters necessary to explain differences in SAT strategy across monkeys. However, the trajectories of the model accumulators deviated from the dynamics of most presaccadic movement neurons. These findings demonstrate that traditional theoretical accounts of SAT are incomplete descriptions of the underlying neural adjustments that accomplish SAT, offer a novel mechanistic account of decision-making mechanisms during speed-accuracy tradeoff, and highlight questions regarding the identity of model and neural accumulators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined adult age differences in day-to-day adjustments in speed-accuracy tradeoffs (SAT) on a figural comparison task. Data came from the COGITO study, with over 100 younger and 100 older adults, assessed for over 100 days. Participants were given explicit feedback about their completion time and accuracy each day after task completion. We applied a multivariate vector auto-regressive model of order 1 to the daily mean reaction time (RT) and daily accuracy scores together, within each age group. We expected that participants adjusted their SAT if the two cross-regressive parameters from RT (or accuracy) on day t-1 of accuracy (or RT) on day t were sizable and negative. We found that: (a) the temporal dependencies of both accuracy and RT were quite strong in both age groups; (b) younger adults showed an effect of their accuracy on day t-1 on their RT on day t, a pattern that was in accordance with adjustments of their SAT; (c) older adults did not appear to adjust their SAT; (d) these effects were partly associated with reliable individual differences within each age group. We discuss possible explanations for older adults' reluctance to recalibrate speed and accuracy on a day-to-day basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]